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Egyptische Moslimbroeders: CONFRONTATIE of integratie?

Onderzoek

De Vereniging van het succes Moslimbroeders in het november-december 2005 verkiezingen voor de Volksvergadering zond schokgolven door middel van politieke systeem van Egypte. In antwoord, het regime met harde hand op de beweging, lastiggevallen andere potentiële rivalen en zijn vliegvlug hervormingsproces omgekeerd. Dit is gevaarlijk kortzichtig. Er is reden om bezorgd te zijn over het politieke programma van de Moslimbroeders, en ze te danken aan de mensen echte opheldering over een aantal van zijn aspecten. Maar de regerende Nationale Democratische
Party's (NDP) weigering om zijn greep los te maken risico's verergeren spanningen in een tijd van zowel de politieke onzekerheid rond de presidentiële successie en ernstige sociaal-economische onrust. Hoewel dit zal waarschijnlijk een langdurige, geleidelijk proces, de regeling moet voorbereidende stappen te nemen om de deelname van de Moslimbroeders in het politieke leven te normaliseren. De Moslimbroeders, wier sociale activiteiten zijn reeds lang getolereerd, maar waarvan de rol in de formele politiek strikt beperkt, won een ongekende 20 procent van de parlementszetels in de 2005 verkiezingen. Zij deden dat ondanks concurreren voor slechts een derde van de beschikbare zitplaatsen en ondanks aanzienlijke hindernissen, inbegrip van de politie repressie en verkiezingsfraude. Dit succes bevestigt hun positie als een uiterst, overzichtelijk en diepgewortelde politieke kracht. Tegelijkertijd, Hij benadrukte dat er zwakke punten van zowel de legale oppositie en de regerende partij. Het regime zou goed hebben ingezet, dat een bescheiden toename van de parlementaire vertegenwoordiging van de Moslimbroeders kunnen worden gebruikt om stoke vrees voor een islamistische overname en daarbij dienen als een reden om kraam hervorming. Als, de strategie is op zware risico van terugslag.

Islamitische politieke cultuur, Democratie, en mensenrechten

Daniel E. Prijs

Er is beweerd dat de islam autoritarisme faciliteert, is in tegenspraak met de

waarden van westerse samenlevingen, en heeft een aanzienlijke invloed op belangrijke politieke resultaten

in moslimlanden. Vervolgens, geleerden, commentatoren, en overheid

ambtenaren wijzen vaak op ‘islamitisch fundamentalisme’ als het volgende

ideologische bedreiging voor liberale democratieën. Dit beeld, echter, is voornamelijk gebaseerd

over de analyse van teksten, Islamitische politieke theorie, en ad-hocstudies

van individuele landen, die geen rekening houden met andere factoren. Het is mijn bewering

dat de teksten en tradities van de islam, zoals die van andere religies,

kan worden gebruikt ter ondersteuning van een verscheidenheid aan politieke systemen en beleid. Land

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Vandaar, een nieuwe benadering van de studie van de

verbinding tussen islam en politiek nodig is.
ik stel voor, door een grondige evaluatie van de relatie tussen de islam,

democratie, en mensenrechten op grensoverschrijdend niveau, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economische invloeden, etnische breuklijnen,

en maatschappelijke ontwikkeling, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Voor het contact POLITIEKE ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

De politieke islam is tegenwoordig de meest actieve politieke kracht in het Midden-Oosten. De toekomst is nauw verbonden met die van de regio. Als de Verenigde Staten en de Europese Unie zich inzetten voor de ondersteuning van politieke hervormingen in de regio, ze zullen beton moeten bedenken, coherente strategieën om islamitische groeperingen te betrekken. Nog, de VS. was over het algemeen niet bereid een dialoog met deze bewegingen aan te gaan. evenzo, EU-betrokkenheid bij islamisten was de uitzondering, niet de regel. Waar contacten op laag niveau bestaan, ze dienen voornamelijk voor het verzamelen van informatie, geen strategische doelstellingen. de VS. en de EU hebben een aantal programma's die zich richten op de economische en politieke ontwikkeling in de regio, waaronder het Midden-Oostenpartnerschapsinitiatief (MEPI), de Millennium Challenge Corporation (Mijn Klantencentrum), de Unie voor de Middellandse Zee, en het Europees nabuurschapsbeleid (ENP) – toch hebben ze weinig te zeggen over hoe de uitdaging van de islamistische politieke oppositie past binnen bredere regionale doelstellingen. VS. en de EU-ondersteuning en programmering voor democratie zijn bijna volledig gericht op autoritaire regeringen zelf of seculiere maatschappelijke groeperingen met minimale steun in hun eigen samenlevingen.
De tijd is rijp voor een herijking van het huidige beleid. Sinds de terroristische aanslagen van september 11, 2001, het ondersteunen van democratie in het Midden-Oosten is belangrijker geworden voor westerse beleidsmakers, die een verband zien tussen gebrek aan democratie en politiek geweld. Er is meer aandacht besteed aan het begrijpen van de variaties binnen de politieke islam. De nieuwe Amerikaanse regering staat meer open voor verbreding van de communicatie met de moslimwereld. In de tussentijd, de overgrote meerderheid van de reguliere islamitische organisaties – waaronder de Moslimbroederschap in Egypte, Jordan's Islamitisch Actiefront (IAF), Marokko's Partij voor Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling (PJD), de islamitische constitutionele beweging van Koeweit, en de Jemenitische Islah-partij – hebben in toenemende mate steun voor politieke hervormingen en democratie tot een centraal onderdeel van hun politieke platforms gemaakt. In aanvulling, velen hebben sterke interesse getoond in het openen van een dialoog met de VS. en EU-regeringen.
De toekomst van de betrekkingen tussen westerse landen en het Midden-Oosten kan grotendeels worden bepaald door de mate waarin eerstgenoemde geweldloze islamitische partijen betrekken bij een brede dialoog over gedeelde belangen en doelstellingen. Er is recentelijk een wildgroei aan onderzoeken geweest over betrokkenheid bij islamisten, maar weinigen gaan duidelijk in op wat het in de praktijk kan inhouden. Als Zoë Nautre, visiting fellow bij de Duitse Raad voor Buitenlandse Betrekkingen, plaatst het, “de EU denkt aan engagement, maar weet niet goed hoe.”1 In de hoop de discussie te verhelderen, we onderscheiden drie niveaus van “betrokkenheid”,” elk met verschillende middelen en doelen: contacten op laag niveau, strategische dialoog, en partnerschap.

islamitische partijen : deelname zonder macht

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypte, de Moslim Broederschap (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Democratie, Terrorisme en Amerikaans beleid in de Arabische wereld

F. Gregory Gause

De Verenigde Staten zijn begonnen aan wat president Bush en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Rice een "generatie-uitdaging" hebben genoemd om politieke hervormingen en democratie in de Arabische wereld aan te moedigen.. De regering-Bush en andere verdedigers van de democratiecampagne beweren dat het streven naar Arabische democratie niet alleen gaat over het verspreiden van Amerikaanse waarden, maar ook over het verzekeren van Amerikaanse veiligheid. Ze veronderstellen dat naarmate de democratie groeit in de Arabische wereld, anti-Amerikaans terrorisme vanuit de Arabische wereld zal afnemen. daarom, de bevordering van democratie in de Arabische wereld strookt niet alleen met de Amerikaanse veiligheidsdoelen in het gebied, maar noodzakelijk om die doelen te bereiken.
Twee vragen doen zich voor bij het beschouwen van dit element van de "Bush-doctrine" in de Arabische wereld: 1) Is er een zodanig verband tussen terrorisme en democratie dat hoe democratischer een land wordt?, hoe minder waarschijnlijk het is dat het terroristen en terroristische groeperingen voortbrengt? Met andere woorden, is de veiligheidsreden voor de bevordering van democratie in de Arabische wereld, gebaseerd op een deugdelijk uitgangspunt?; en 2) Wat voor soort regeringen zouden waarschijnlijk worden gegenereerd door democratische verkiezingen in Arabische landen? Zouden ze bereid zijn samen te werken met de Verenigde Staten aan belangrijke beleidsdoelstellingen in het Midden-Oosten?, niet alleen in het handhaven van de democratie, maar ook op
Arabisch-Israëlisch, Golfveiligheid en oliekwesties?
Deze paper behandelt deze twee vragen. Het stelt vast dat er weinig empirisch bewijs is dat democratie in verband brengt met de afwezigheid of vermindering van terrorisme. Het vraagt ​​zich af of democratie de motieven en kansen van groepen als al-Qa'ida zou verminderen, die zich zowel op religieuze als praktische gronden verzetten tegen democratie. Het onderzoekt recente trends in de Arabische publieke opinie en verkiezingen, concluderen dat hoewel het Arabische publiek de democratie zeer steunt, democratische verkiezingen in Arabische staten zullen waarschijnlijk islamitische regeringen voortbrengen die veel minder snel zullen samenwerken met de Verenigde Staten dan hun autoritaire voorgangers.

Hamas kan een voorbeeld stellen

Khader Khader

Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamasoverwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
This, echter, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria’s Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the “democratisch” West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.
Thus Hamaselectoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. Hamas, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.
But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.
But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.
Zo, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, Dr. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.
By the same token, echter, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimesmoderate and realistic”, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.
Now, echter, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.
Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere.

2005 BEOORDELING VAN DE PARLEMENTAIRE VERKIEZING IN EGYPTE

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

With President Hosni Mubarak’s surprise announcement to amend the constitution and to hold the first direct, multi-candidate presidential elections in September of this year, it appeared that the Egyptian government had made political reform a priority
and was committed to opening the door to greater political competition. The presidential election initially held symbolic significance and the promise of setting the stage for further reform and greater citizen participation. Evenwel, whether this symbolic step toward expanded democratic participation can be characterized as the start of a genuine democratic transition leading to a sustained system of democracy
remains in doubt. De 2005 parliamentary election process suggests otherwise.
The three rounds of parliamentary elections in November and December 2005 appear to have been deeply flawed and will be most remembered for escalating tension over each successive round and outright violence resulting in 12 deaths. Overt intimidation cast a menacing shadow over the second and third phases of elections in particular, and low voter turnout—as with the presidential election—was a notable feature that underscored continued citizen apathy in the political process. Vote buying
was also rampant. Yet despite this, it must be noted that open campaigning for opposition candidates was permitted and that some important procedural changes were made as a result of complaints emerging from the presidential election. globaal, the parliamentary elections seem to indicate that government policies have left the secular opposition extremely weak. Although Egypt does provide for political party engagement—a positive attribute in a region where political parties are not always allowed—the lack of genuine political competition is a pervasive problem that constitutes a major impediment to sustained democratic change.
The most notable features that shaped the electoral environment for parliamentary elections were the fracture and competition between official National Democratic Party-endorsed candidates and those not selected who ran as independents; the inevitable weakness of the secular opposition parties as a result of emergency laws that limited development; and the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to campaign
freely and demonstrate its strength on the ground despite its status as an illegal
organization.
The new parliament, comprised of a majority of NDP members, the near absence of opposition party members, and a solid minority bloc of independents affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood will present a new challenge for the regime and leave democratic reformers uncertain as to their future.

De overwinning van Hamas bij de Palestijnse verkiezingen

Riaz Hassan

The parliamentary election triumph of Hamas surprised almost everybody, including the Hamas leadership, if the press reported correctly. The Bush Administration is blaming its intelligence services for failing to predict Hamas’ victory. Most observers forecast that Fatah would win theelections because of its political dominance in Palestinian affairs. Waarom, then, did most politicalobservers in the West get it so wrong? This political miscalculation will be the subject of much analysis and commentary in the coming months.A number of specific local issues delivered Hamas its historic electoral victory. Credit must goto the Palestinian people, who turned out to be astute voters. A significant number of Palestinians were simply unable to accept the corruption and cronyism that allegedly flourished under the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. While most Palestinians remember well and admire the sacrifices made by Fatah leaders in the past, they were simply deterred by their in ability to institute political and economic reforms to better the lives of ordinary people. Hamashad a much better reading of the Palestinian political pulse. It was not difficult for Hamas to doso: Hamas delivers health, educational and social services to large numbers of Palestinians,making daily life bearable.Unlike Fatah, which had several candidates contesting the same constituency, resulting in asplitting of Fatah’s votes, Hamas ran an extremely disciplined political campaign. Hamas alsomade use of its female supporters, sending them door-to-door to canvass voters and to pollingstations to campaign for Hamas’ candidates. These election strategies obviously worked in Hamas’ favor. Hamas has also amassed political capital through its resistance and military campaigns against the Israeli occupation. It was these actions which led to Hamas’ being labelled and treated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union andseveral other western countries. In a political environment in which ordinary Palestinians feelcompletely powerless, Hamas’ acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave Palestinians a senseof empowerment that may well be the reason for its electoral victory over its opponents.

Egyptische lokale verkiezingen Farce Oorzaken en gevolgen

Mohammed Herzallah

Amr Hamzawy

Egypt’s local elections of April 8, 2008 were a confirmation of a backwardslide in Egyptian politics. They were plagued by social unrest and politicaldiscord. In the weeks prior to the elections, labor protests escalated,precipitating a harsh crackdown that resulted in at least two fatalities and many injuries.The country’s largest opposition force, de Moslim Broederschap, decided at the last minute to boycott the elections. Voter turn out did not exceed 5 percent and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP),facing virtually no competition, landed a sweeping victory—winning roughly95 percent of the seats at stake.These developments bring to light a broader deterioration in Egyptian politics.Three elements of this process stand out and deserve careful attention:

Eerst, the burgeoning social crisis caused by out of control inflation, acrippled welfare system, and persistent unemployment;

• Second, a return to the old authoritarian practices of the rulingestablishment; en

• Third, worrying signs that call into question the very existence of aviable opposition capable of advancing reform through the political process.

Egypte in Profetie

Brad Macdonald

De Moslim Broederschap, though officially banned, is now Egypt’s largest and most influential opposition party. This signals a stunning shift within one of America’s few remaining Middle Eastern allies.December 2005 was a water shedmonth in the history of Egyptian politics. Thanks to elections thatwere closer to being democratic than any in Egypt’s history, the Islamic party of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb)won 88 parliamentary seats (the organization is officially out lawed, but it ran its candidates as independents)—a more than six-fold increase over its previous representation.Considering that Egypt’s parliament is comprised of 454seats, the mb’s capture of 88 seats—fewer than a quarter of the total—may not seem like much to write home about.Despite the gains,the Islamic partywill remain out numbered by the majority rule of autocratic leader Hosni Mubarak’sN a t i o n a lDemocratic Party.Some argue that as long as Mubarak controls parliament—as he hasfor the past 24years—the mb can never play a more significant role in Egyptian politics.But politics can be messy business—especially in the Middle East.Death, incitement, revolution—all can turn a governmenT on its head in a matter of days. The rise of an openly Islamist party in Egypt is no small matter. The political success Of this long-established Islamic group represents a major step toward a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics, made possible by an electorate with a growing affinity for Islamic leadership and law, and mounting disdain for the Mubarak government.Political Shift Banned from government in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization of staunch Islamic conservatives with a strong desire to install Islamic law as the foundation of Egyptian government.In the run up to the elections,the Brotherhood’s ominously vague campaign motto was “Islam is the solution.”Thu s , the Brotherhood ’s rising popularity unmistakably signalsthe growingdesire of many foran Islamic governmentin Egypt—which makes itssuccess nothingshort of profound.“Considering thatthe mb won almosthalf of the seatsit is contesting,despite reportedly wide spread

Het succes van de Moslimbroederschap bij de wetgevende verkiezingen in Egypte 2005

Hoewel Antar


In the context of an unprecedented opening of the political system in Egypt in 2004/2005, de Moslim Broederschap (MB) scored an impressive success in the 2005 legislative elections that showed that the mainstream non-violent Islamist movement, despite the legal ban of the movement itself and of its political activities, is the only influential and organised political opposition in the face of the veteran National Democratic Party (NDP).Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success in 2005The first set of reasons for the MB’s success is related to the changes that occurred in the political context. Above all, the first presidential elections that took place in September 2005 had a direct impact on the legislative elections in November the same year: By opening up competition for the post of the president, the election signalled the unprecedented impasse of the regime seeking to patch up its legitimacy. In aanvulling, civic protest movements had emerged that rejected the political system much more fundamentally and called for comprehensive reform. The most important of these has been the dynamic protest movement called the Egyptian Movement for Change, Kifaya. Evenwel, as a second set of factors, the regime itself can also be considered a factor in the MB’s rising influence: The NDP and government officials have relied heavily on religious arguments; they have oppressed secular or liberal opponents; they have nourished obscurantist religious trends in Al-Azhar and among religious groups; and they have let the MB take charge of welfare services in order to save on the state budget. Ook, the regime has allowed Islamist activists to enter trade unions, while reserving the leadership positions for the NDP. There is a third set of reasons for the MB’s success which is related to the movement’s long term strategy to build a societal base: The MB’s strategic approach has been to invest in welfare services so as to build a large power base among the population that they are able to mobilize politically. And indeed, not only have many MB candidates gained credibility and respect through their daily contacts with the people, the movement has been investing in the social sphere for more than 30 jaar. In a society in which 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and the political participation rate is only 25 procent, providing services in all vital sectors – education, health, and employment – has proved to be the fastest and most successful way to gain supporters. Fourth, using the religious sphere as a place for political mobilisation has been a successful strategy of the MB. Those affiliated with the MB, members and sympathizers, often saw it as a religious duty to vote for a candidate of the movement. Despite the doubts the slogan “Islam is the solution” raised among many, the MB continued to use it because it wanted to focus on religion as the determining factor for the vote, and because it had gained the trust of the people as being the movement representing Islamic identity. On top of this, the movement was able to make use of the unprecedented coincidence of growing internal and external pressures on the regime, by starting open and direct political activity in the name of the movement. The MB has also understood the importance of rallying with other opposition forces, and it has sought coordination with these forces for creating more pressure on the regime. Related to this is another important factor for the MB’s success: its organisational capacity.Has the MB changed its agenda and priorities?While the MB has opted to participate peacefully in the political process in Egypt, it remains unclear as to whether it represents a genuine democratic force or if it will use the democratic opening to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Nog steeds, participation in the political system has already transformed the movement. During the 2005 election campaign the concepts of “democracy” and “political participation” found their way into the MB’s rhetoric and, most importantly, into its political strategies of creating grassroot networks for popular support. The experience of elaborating a political programme for the legislative elections pushed the movement to publicly clarify its positions on concepts such as party pluralism – something that had previously been refused in some trends of Islamic thought as “al-tahazzub” (partisanship) with the argument that Islam calls for unity of the nation rather than its fragmentation. The MB can be considered to be part of Egypt’s reform forces, but that is primarily so because it agrees with other political reformers on the tools for bringing about reforms: rule of law, good governance and free elections. The MB’s activities in Parliament have so far demonstrated their devotion to serving their voters and retaining credibility. They have been more efficient in dealing with public needs, in revealing corruption cases and in rapidly interacting with victims of injustice than other deputies. As has been discussed above, political change in Egypt until now has not meant a significant move toward democracy. Eerst, this has reflected on the MB’s organisation, strategy and agenda. The “mutual fear reflex” as an outcome of the relationship between the illegal MB and the regime has required the movement to adopt a strategy of secrecy which prevents them from being transparent for security reasons. Ook, maintaining ambiguous positions is a defence mechanism used by both Islamist and non-Islamist opposition forces in Egypt.