RSSSvi unosi označeni: "izbori"

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. Odgovarajući na, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) odbijanje popuštanja stiska riskira pogoršanje napetosti u vrijeme političke neizvjesnosti oko nasljeđivanja predsjednika i ozbiljnih socioekonomskih nemira. Iako će to vjerojatno biti produljeno, postupan proces, režim bi trebao poduzeti preliminarne korake za normalizaciju sudjelovanja Muslimanske braće u političkom životu. Muslimanska braća, čije su se društvene aktivnosti dugo tolerirale, ali čija je uloga u formalnoj politici strogo ograničena, osvojio neviđenu 20 posto zastupničkih mjesta u 2005 izbori. Učinili su to unatoč tome što su se natjecali za samo trećinu raspoloživih mjesta i unatoč značajnim preprekama, uključujući policijsku represiju i izbornu prijevaru. Ovim uspjehom potvrdili su svoju poziciju izuzetno dobro organizirane i duboko ukorijenjene političke snage. U isto vrijeme, ona je naglasila slabosti i legalne oporbe i vladajuće stranke. Režim se mogao kladiti da bi se skromno povećanje zastupljenosti Muslimanske braće u parlamentu moglo iskoristiti za raspirivanje straha od islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti i time poslužiti kao razlog za odugovlačenje reforme. Ako je tako, strategija je pod velikim rizikom od povratnog učinka.

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi

vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode

u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, i vlada

dužnosnici često ističu "islamski fundamentalizam" kao sljedeći

ideološka prijetnja liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno

o analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije

pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. To je moja tvrdnja

da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija,

može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Zemlja

specifične i deskriptivne studije ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi pomogli

objašnjavamo različite odnose između islama i politike diljem svijeta

zemalja muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju

traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama,

demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, to previše

naglasak se stavlja na moć islama kao političke snage. ja prvi

koristiti komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru

između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi,

i društveni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

STRATEGIJE ZA ANGAŽIRANJE POLITIČKOG ISLAMA

ŠADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politički islam je danas najaktivnija politička snaga na Bliskom istoku. Njegova je budućnost usko povezana s budućnošću regije. Ako su Sjedinjene Države i Europska unija predani podršci političkih reformi u regiji, trebat će osmisliti beton, koherentne strategije za angažiranje islamističkih skupina. Još, sad. općenito nije bio voljan otvoriti dijalog s tim pokretima. Na sličan način, Angažman EU-a s islamistima bio je izuzetak, nije pravilo. Gdje postoje kontakti niske razine, oni uglavnom služe u svrhe prikupljanja informacija, ne strateški ciljevi. Sad. i EU imaju niz programa koji se bave gospodarskim i političkim razvojem u regiji – među njima i Bliskoistočna partnerska inicijativa (MEPI), korporacija Millennium Challenge (MCC), uniji za Mediteran, i Europska politika susjedstva (ENP) – ali imaju malo toga za reći o tome kako se izazov islamističke političke opozicije uklapa u šire regionalne ciljeve. NAS. a pomoć i programiranje demokracije EU-a gotovo su u potpunosti usmjereni ili na same autoritarne vlade ili na sekularne skupine civilnog društva s minimalnom podrškom u vlastitim društvima.
Sazrelo je vrijeme za preispitivanje trenutne politike. Od terorističkih napada u rujnu 11, 2001, podupiranje demokracije na Bliskom istoku postalo je važnije za zapadne kreatore politike, koji vide vezu između nedostatka demokracije i političkog nasilja. Veća pažnja posvećena je razumijevanju varijacija unutar političkog islama. Nova američka administracija otvorenija je za širenje komunikacije s muslimanskim svijetom. U međuvremenu, velika većina glavnih islamističkih organizacija – uključujući Muslimansko bratstvo u Egiptu, Jordanski front islamske akcije (IAF), Marokanska stranka pravde i razvoja (PJD), Islamski ustavni pokret Kuvajta, i Jemenska stranka Islah – potporu političkim reformama i demokraciji sve više čine središnjom komponentom svojih političkih platformi. U Dodatku, mnogi su signalizirali snažan interes za otvaranje dijaloga sa SAD-om. i vlade EU.
Budućnost odnosa između zapadnih nacija i Bliskog istoka može biti uvelike određena stupnjem do kojeg prve angažiraju nenasilne islamističke stranke u širokom dijalogu o zajedničkim interesima i ciljevima. Nedavno je došlo do proliferacije studija o angažmanu s islamistima, ali malo ih se jasno bavi što bi to moglo značiti u praksi. As Zoé Nautré, gostujući suradnik u Njemačkom vijeću za vanjske odnose, stavlja ga, “EU razmišlja o angažmanu, ali zapravo ne zna kako.”1 U nadi da će razjasniti raspravu, razlikujemo tri razine „angažmana,” svaki s različitim sredstvima i ciljevima: kontakti niske razine, strateški dijalog, i partnerstvo.

Islamističke stranke : sudjelovanje bez moći

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. U Egiptu, muslimanskog bratstva (MB) nikada nije bio ovlašten osnivati ​​političku stranku, ali usprkos državnoj represiji uspješno je kandidirao kandidate kao nominalne neovisne kandidate i na državnim i na lokalnim izborima.
Od ranih 1990-ih, ovaj je trend išao ruku pod ruku sa službenom politikom ograničene političke liberalizacije. Zajedno, dva su trenda potaknula raspravu o tome jesu li ti pokreti predani "demokraciji". Pojavila se ogromna literatura koja naglašava paradokse kao i moguće rizike i dobrobiti uključivanja islamističkih stranaka u izborni proces. Glavna paradigma koja se nalazi u ovom tekstu usredotočuje se na posljedice koje bi mogle nastupiti kada islamisti koriste demokratske instrumente, i nastoji naslutiti "prave" namjere koje će islamisti manifestirati ako dođu na vlast.

Demokracija, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Therefore, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; i 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Hamas can set an example

Khader Khader

Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamasoverwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
Ovaj, međutim, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria’s Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the “demokratski” West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.
Thus Hamaselectoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. Hamas, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.
But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.
But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.
Thus, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, Dr. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.
By the same token, međutim, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimesmoderate and realistic”, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.
Sada, međutim, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.
Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere.

2005 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ASSESSMENT IN EGYPT

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

With President Hosni Mubarak’s surprise announcement to amend the constitution and to hold the first direct, multi-candidate presidential elections in September of this year, it appeared that the Egyptian government had made political reform a priority
and was committed to opening the door to greater political competition. The presidential election initially held symbolic significance and the promise of setting the stage for further reform and greater citizen participation. Međutim, whether this symbolic step toward expanded democratic participation can be characterized as the start of a genuine democratic transition leading to a sustained system of democracy
remains in doubt. The 2005 parliamentary election process suggests otherwise.
The three rounds of parliamentary elections in November and December 2005 appear to have been deeply flawed and will be most remembered for escalating tension over each successive round and outright violence resulting in 12 deaths. Overt intimidation cast a menacing shadow over the second and third phases of elections in particular, and low voter turnout—as with the presidential election—was a notable feature that underscored continued citizen apathy in the political process. Vote buying
was also rampant. Yet despite this, it must be noted that open campaigning for opposition candidates was permitted and that some important procedural changes were made as a result of complaints emerging from the presidential election. Overall, the parliamentary elections seem to indicate that government policies have left the secular opposition extremely weak. Although Egypt does provide for political party engagement—a positive attribute in a region where political parties are not always allowed—the lack of genuine political competition is a pervasive problem that constitutes a major impediment to sustained democratic change.
The most notable features that shaped the electoral environment for parliamentary elections were the fracture and competition between official National Democratic Party-endorsed candidates and those not selected who ran as independents; the inevitable weakness of the secular opposition parties as a result of emergency laws that limited development; and the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to campaign
freely and demonstrate its strength on the ground despite its status as an illegal
organization.
The new parliament, comprised of a majority of NDP members, the near absence of opposition party members, and a solid minority bloc of independents affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood will present a new challenge for the regime and leave democratic reformers uncertain as to their future.

The Hamas Victory in the Palestinian Elections

Riaz Hassan

The parliamentary election triumph of Hamas surprised almost everybody, including the Hamas leadership, if the press reported correctly. The Bush Administration is blaming its intelligence services for failing to predict Hamas’ victory. Most observers forecast that Fatah would win theelections because of its political dominance in Palestinian affairs. Zašto, zatim, did most politicalobservers in the West get it so wrong? This political miscalculation will be the subject of much analysis and commentary in the coming months.A number of specific local issues delivered Hamas its historic electoral victory. Credit must goto the Palestinian people, who turned out to be astute voters. A significant number of Palestinians were simply unable to accept the corruption and cronyism that allegedly flourished under the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. While most Palestinians remember well and admire the sacrifices made by Fatah leaders in the past, they were simply deterred by their in ability to institute political and economic reforms to better the lives of ordinary people. Hamashad a much better reading of the Palestinian political pulse. It was not difficult for Hamas to doso: Hamas delivers health, educational and social services to large numbers of Palestinians,making daily life bearable.Unlike Fatah, which had several candidates contesting the same constituency, resulting in asplitting of Fatah’s votes, Hamas ran an extremely disciplined political campaign. Hamas alsomade use of its female supporters, sending them door-to-door to canvass voters and to pollingstations to campaign for Hamas’ candidates. These election strategies obviously worked in Hamas’ favor. Hamas has also amassed political capital through its resistance and military campaigns against the Israeli occupation. It was these actions which led to Hamas’ being labelled and treated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union andseveral other western countries. In a political environment in which ordinary Palestinians feelcompletely powerless, Hamas’ acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave Palestinians a senseof empowerment that may well be the reason for its electoral victory over its opponents.

Egypt’s Local Elections Farce Causes and Consequences

Mohammed Herzallah

Amr Hamzawy

Egypt’s local elections of April 8, 2008 were a confirmation of a backwardslide in Egyptian politics. They were plagued by social unrest and politicaldiscord. In the weeks prior to the elections, labor protests escalated,precipitating a harsh crackdown that resulted in at least two fatalities and many injuries.The country’s largest opposition force, muslimanskog bratstva, decided at the last minute to boycott the elections. Voter turn out did not exceed 5 percent and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP),facing virtually no competition, landed a sweeping victory—winning roughly95 percent of the seats at stake.These developments bring to light a broader deterioration in Egyptian politics.Three elements of this process stand out and deserve careful attention:

Prvi, the burgeoning social crisis caused by out of control inflation, acrippled welfare system, and persistent unemployment;

• Second, a return to the old authoritarian practices of the rulingestablishment; i

• Third, worrying signs that call into question the very existence of aviable opposition capable of advancing reform through the political process.

Egypt in Prophecy

Brad Macdonald

The Muslim Brotherhood, though officially banned, is now Egypt’s largest and most influential opposition party. This signals a stunning shift within one of America’s few remaining Middle Eastern allies.December 2005 was a water shedmonth in the history of Egyptian politics. Thanks to elections thatwere closer to being democratic than any in Egypt’s history, the Islamic party of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb)won 88 parliamentary seats (the organization is officially out lawed, but it ran its candidates as independents)—a more than six-fold increase over its previous representation.Considering that Egypt’s parliament is comprised of 454seats, the mb’s capture of 88 seats—fewer than a quarter of the total—may not seem like much to write home about.Despite the gains,the Islamic partywill remain out numbered by the majority rule of autocratic leader Hosni Mubarak’sN a t i o n a lDemocratic Party.Some argue that as long as Mubarak controls parliament—as he hasfor the past 24years—the mb can never play a more significant role in Egyptian politics.But politics can be messy business—especially in the Middle East.Death, incitement, revolution—all can turn a governmenT on its head in a matter of days. The rise of an openly Islamist party in Egypt is no small matter. The political success Of this long-established Islamic group represents a major step toward a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics, made possible by an electorate with a growing affinity for Islamic leadership and law, and mounting disdain for the Mubarak government.Political Shift Banned from government in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization of staunch Islamic conservatives with a strong desire to install Islamic law as the foundation of Egyptian government.In the run up to the elections,the Brotherhood’s ominously vague campaign motto was “Islam is the solution.”Thu s , the Brotherhood ’s rising popularity unmistakably signalsthe growingdesire of many foran Islamic governmentin Egypt—which makes itssuccess nothingshort of profound.“Considering thatthe mb won almosthalf of the seatsit is contesting,despite reportedly wide spread

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Success in the Legislative Elections in Egypt 2005

Noha Antar


In the context of an unprecedented opening of the political system in Egypt in 2004/2005, muslimanskog bratstva (MB) scored an impressive success in the 2005 legislative elections that showed that the mainstream non-violent Islamist movement, despite the legal ban of the movement itself and of its political activities, is the only influential and organised political opposition in the face of the veteran National Democratic Party (NDP).Reasons for the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success in 2005The first set of reasons for the MB’s success is related to the changes that occurred in the political context. Above all, the first presidential elections that took place in September 2005 had a direct impact on the legislative elections in November the same year: By opening up competition for the post of the president, the election signalled the unprecedented impasse of the regime seeking to patch up its legitimacy. U Dodatku, civic protest movements had emerged that rejected the political system much more fundamentally and called for comprehensive reform. The most important of these has been the dynamic protest movement called the Egyptian Movement for Change, Kifaja. Međutim, as a second set of factors, the regime itself can also be considered a factor in the MB’s rising influence: The NDP and government officials have relied heavily on religious arguments; they have oppressed secular or liberal opponents; they have nourished obscurantist religious trends in Al-Azhar and among religious groups; and they have let the MB take charge of welfare services in order to save on the state budget. Također, the regime has allowed Islamist activists to enter trade unions, while reserving the leadership positions for the NDP. There is a third set of reasons for the MB’s success which is related to the movement’s long term strategy to build a societal base: The MB’s strategic approach has been to invest in welfare services so as to build a large power base among the population that they are able to mobilize politically. And indeed, not only have many MB candidates gained credibility and respect through their daily contacts with the people, the movement has been investing in the social sphere for more than 30 godine. In a society in which 40 percent of the population lives under the poverty line and the political participation rate is only 25 percent, providing services in all vital sectors – education, health, and employment – has proved to be the fastest and most successful way to gain supporters. Fourth, using the religious sphere as a place for political mobilisation has been a successful strategy of the MB. Those affiliated with the MB, members and sympathizers, often saw it as a religious duty to vote for a candidate of the movement. Despite the doubts the slogan “Islam is the solution” raised among many, the MB continued to use it because it wanted to focus on religion as the determining factor for the vote, and because it had gained the trust of the people as being the movement representing Islamic identity. On top of this, the movement was able to make use of the unprecedented coincidence of growing internal and external pressures on the regime, by starting open and direct political activity in the name of the movement. The MB has also understood the importance of rallying with other opposition forces, and it has sought coordination with these forces for creating more pressure on the regime. Related to this is another important factor for the MB’s success: its organisational capacity.Has the MB changed its agenda and priorities?While the MB has opted to participate peacefully in the political process in Egypt, it remains unclear as to whether it represents a genuine democratic force or if it will use the democratic opening to pursue an authoritarian agenda. Still, participation in the political system has already transformed the movement. During the 2005 election campaign the concepts of “democracy” and “political participation” found their way into the MB’s rhetoric and, most importantly, into its political strategies of creating grassroot networks for popular support. The experience of elaborating a political programme for the legislative elections pushed the movement to publicly clarify its positions on concepts such as party pluralism – something that had previously been refused in some trends of Islamic thought as “al-tahazzub” (partisanship) with the argument that Islam calls for unity of the nation rather than its fragmentation. The MB can be considered to be part of Egypt’s reform forces, but that is primarily so because it agrees with other political reformers on the tools for bringing about reforms: rule of law, good governance and free elections. The MB’s activities in Parliament have so far demonstrated their devotion to serving their voters and retaining credibility. They have been more efficient in dealing with public needs, in revealing corruption cases and in rapidly interacting with victims of injustice than other deputies. As has been discussed above, political change in Egypt until now has not meant a significant move toward democracy. Prvi, this has reflected on the MB’s organisation, strategy and agenda. The “mutual fear reflex” as an outcome of the relationship between the illegal MB and the regime has required the movement to adopt a strategy of secrecy which prevents them from being transparent for security reasons. Također, maintaining ambiguous positions is a defence mechanism used by both Islamist and non-Islamist opposition forces in Egypt.