RSSAlle Entries Tagged Met: "Egipte"

Irak en die toekoms van politieke Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam en Demokrasie

ITAC

As 'n mens die pers lees of luister na kommentators oor internasionale aangeleenthede, Daar word dikwels gesê - en nog meer dikwels geïmpliseer, maar nie gesê nie - dat Islam nie verenigbaar is met demokrasie nie. In die negentigerjare, Samuel Huntington het 'n intellektuele vuurstorm veroorsaak toe hy The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order gepubliseer het, waarin hy sy voorspellings vir die wêreld voorstel - grootliks. Op die politieke terrein, hy merk op dat hoewel Turkye en Pakistan 'n klein aanspraak op 'demokratiese legitimiteit' het, alle ander '... Moslemlande was oorwegend nie-demokraties: monargieë, eenpartystelsels, militêre regimes, persoonlike diktature of 'n kombinasie hiervan, rus gewoonlik op 'n beperkte gesin, stam, of stambasis ”. Die uitgangspunt waarop sy argument gegrond is, is dat hulle nie net 'nie soos ons' is nie, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in die konteks) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Op soek na Islamitiese konstitusionalisme

Nadirsyah Pants

Terwyl konstitusionalisme in die Weste meestal met sekulêre denke geïdentifiseer word, Islamitiese konstitusionalisme, wat enkele godsdienstige elemente bevat, het die afgelope jaar toenemende belangstelling gelok. Byvoorbeeld, die reaksie van die Bush-administrasie op die gebeure van 9/11 die situasie in Irak en Afghanistan radikaal verander, en albei lande herskryf nou hul grondwette. soos
Ann Elizabeth Mayer wys daarop, Islamitiese konstitusionalisme is konstitusionalisme, in een of ander vorm, gebaseer op Islamitiese beginsels, in teenstelling met die konstitusionalisme wat ontwikkel is in lande wat toevallig Moslem is, maar wat nie deur kenmerkende Islamitiese beginsels ingelig is nie. Verskeie Moslemgeleerdes, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Egter, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
Eerstens, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, met die veronderstelling dat die 'regverdige' eienskappe van 'Umar die ingewikkelde en geartikuleerde voorskrifte van grondwetlike balans insluit wat in moderne tekste gevind word

Islam en Islamisme in Afghanistan

Christine Mendoza

The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as

ideologie, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the

establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became

the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Egter, the earlier appearance of an

Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an

instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.

This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three

parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,

indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing

its own vision. Toe, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is

discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in

the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will

show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these

countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned

theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the

implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a

discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. Dit is

necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, and the

role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist

experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist

experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and

legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will

underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of

understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current

demands.


Globalisering en politieke Islam: DIE SOSIALE BASES van Turkye se welsyn PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Politieke Islam opgedoen het verhoogde sigbaarheid in die afgelope dekades in Turkye. Groot getalle vroulike studente het hul toewyding begin demonstreer deur die verbode Islamitiese hooftooisel op universiteitskampusse te dra, en invloedryke pro-Islamitiese TV
kanale het haarden. Hierdie artikel fokus op die Welsyn (Welsyn) Party as die voorste institusionele verteenwoordiger van politieke Islam in Turkye.
Die Welsynsparty se kort ampstermyn aan bewind as die voorste koalisievennoot vanaf middel 1996 tot middel 1997 was die hoogtepunt van 'n dekade van bestendige groei wat deur ander Islamitiese organisasies en instellings bygestaan ​​is.. Hierdie organisasies en instansies
ingesluit koerante en uitgewers wat aangetrokke Islamitiese skrywers, talle Islamitiese fondamente, 'n Islamitiese arbeid Union Confederation, en 'n Islamitiese sakemannevereniging. Hierdie instellings het in tandem met, en ter ondersteuning van, Welsyn as die leier en verteenwoordiger van politieke Islam in Turkye, al het hulle hul eie partikularistiese doelwitte en ideale gehad, wat dikwels van Welsyn se politieke projekte afgewyk het. Fokus op die Welsyn Party, dan, maak voorsiening vir 'n ontleding van die breër sosiale basis waarop die Islamitiese politieke beweging in Turkye opgestaan ​​het. Sedert Welsyn se verdrijving van krag en sy uiteindelike sluiting, die Islamitiese beweging was in wanorde. Hierdie vraestel sal, dus, tot die Welsynsparty-tydperk beperk word.
Welsyn se voorganger, die Nasionale Salvation Party, was aktief in die 1970's, maar is deur die militêre regime in 1980. Welsyn is gestig in 1983 en het in die 1990's groot gewildheid verwerf. Begin met 'n 4.4 persent stem in die munisipale verkiesings van 1984, die Welsynsparty het sy vertoning geleidelik verhoog en sy stem byna vyf keer in twaalf jaar vermenigvuldig. Dit het Turkye se sekulêre establishment eers in die munisipale verkiesings van 1994, met 19 persent van alle stemme landwyd en die burgemeester se setels in beide Istanbul en Ankara, dan in die algemene verkiesing van 1995 toe dit 'n pluraliteit gewen het met 21.4 persent van die nasionale stemme. Nogtans, die Welsynsparty kon slegs kortstondig 'n koalisieregering lei in vennootskap met die regse True Path Party van Tansu C¸ iller.

Egipte by die Kantelpunt ?

David B. Ottaway
In die vroeë 1980's, Ek het in Kaïro gewoon as burohoof van The Washington Post wat sulke geskiedkundige gebeure dek soos die onttrekking van die laaste
Israeliese magte van Egiptiese grondgebied beset tydens die 1973 Arabies-Israeliese oorlog en die sluipmoord op president
Anwar Sadat deur Islamitiese fanatici in Oktober 1981.
Laasgenoemde nasionale drama, wat ek persoonlik aanskou het, het bewys dat dit 'n verskriklike mylpaal was. Dit het Sadat se opvolger gedwing, Hosni Mubarak, om na binne te draai om 'n Islamitiese uitdaging van onbekende afmetings te hanteer en effektief Egipte se leiersrol in die Arabiese wêreld te beëindig.
Mubarak het dadelik gewys dat hy 'n uiters versigtige is, verbeeldinglose leier, angswekkend reaktief eerder as pro-aktief in die hantering van die sosiale en ekonomiese probleme wat sy nasie oorweldig soos sy plofbare bevolkingsgroei (1.2 miljoen meer Egiptenare per jaar) en ekonomiese agteruitgang.
In 'n vierdelige Washington Post-reeks geskryf terwyl ek vroeg vertrek het 1985, Ek het opgemerk dat die nuwe Egiptiese leier nog redelik baie was
'n totale raaisel vir sy eie mense, wat geen visie bied nie en beveel het wat na 'n stuurlose staatskip gelyk het. Die sosialistiese ekonomie
geërf uit die era van president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 te 1970) was 'n gemors. Die land se geldeenheid, die pond, bedryf was
op agt verskillende wisselkoerse; sy staatsbeheerde fabrieke was onproduktief, onmededingend en diep in die skuld; en die regering was op bankrotskap afstuur, deels as gevolg van subsidies vir voedsel, elektrisiteit en petrol het een derde verbruik ($7 miljard) van sy begroting. Kaïro het gesink in 'n hopelose moeras van geslote verkeer en wemelende mensdom—12 miljoen mense het in 'n smal stuk grond ingedruk wat aan die Nylrivier grens, mees lewende wang vir kak in vervalle woonhuise in die stad se steeds groeiende krotbuurte.

Organisatoriese Kontinuïteit in Egipte se Moslem-broederskap

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Sedert sy stigting in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, egter, die Broederskap het
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. In plaas daarvan, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Toespraak van Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; dus, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

Tussen gister en vandag

HASAN AL-BANNA

Die Eerste Islamitiese Staat
Op die grondslag van hierdie deugsame Koraniese sosiale orde het die eerste Islamitiese staat ontstaan, onwrikbare geloof in Dit, dit noukeurig toe te pas, en versprei dit oor die hele wêreld, so het die eerste Khilafah altyd gesê: 'As ek moet 'n kameel se voorsprong verloor, Ek sou dit in Allah se Boek vind.'. Hy het teen diegene geveg wat geweier het om zakah te betaal, aangaande hulle as afvalliges omdat hulle een van die pilare van hierdie orde omvergewerp het, sê: 'Deur Allah, as hulle geweier het my 'n leidraad wat hulle aan die Apostel van Allah sou oorhandig (PBUH), Ek sal teen hulle veg sodra ek 'n swaard in my hand!’ Vir eenheid, in al sy betekenisse en manifestasies, hierdie nuwe komende nasie deurdring.
Volledige sosiale eenheid het ontstaan ​​uit die maak van die Koran-orde en sy taal universeel, terwyl dit heeltemal polities is eenheid was onder die skadu van die Amir Al-Mumineen en onder die standaard van die Khilafah in die hoofstad.
Die feit dat die Islamitiese ideologie een van desentralisasie van die gewapende magte was, die staatskas, en provinsiale goewerneurs was geen struikelblok hiervoor nie, aangesien almal opgetree het volgens 'n enkele geloofsbelydenis en 'n verenigde en omvattende beheer. Die Koran-beginsels het die bygelowige afgodery wat algemeen voorkom, verdryf en ter ruste gelê in die Arabiese Skiereiland en Persië. Hulle het die skuldige Judaïsme verban en dit tot 'n nou provinsie beperk, om 'n einde te maak aan sy godsdienstige en politieke gesag. Hulle het so met die Christendom gesukkel dat die invloed daarvan was aansienlik verminder in die Asiatiese en Afrika-kontinente, slegs tot Europa beperk onder die bewaking van die Bisantyne Ryk in Konstantinopel. So het die Islamitiese staat die middelpunt geword van geestelike en politieke oorheersing binne die twee grootste kontinente. Hierdie staat het volgehou in sy aanvalle teen die derde kontinent, aanranding Konstantinopel uit die ooste en beleër dit totdat die beleg vermoeiend geword het. Toe kom dit uit die weste,
in Spanje duik, met sy seëvierende soldate wat die hart van Frankryk bereik en so ver as noord deurdring en Suid-Italië. Dit het 'n imposante staat in Wes-Europa gestig, stralend van wetenskap en kennis.
Daarna, dit het die verowering van Konstantinopel self en die beperkte Christendom binne die beperkte gebied beëindig van Sentraal-Europa. Islamitiese vlote het die dieptes van die Middellandse See en Rooi See ingevaar, albei het geword Islamitiese mere. En so het die gewapende magte van die Islamitiese staat die oppergesag van die see in beide die Ooste aanvaar en Wes, geniet absolute meesterskap oor land en see. Hierdie Islamitiese nasies het reeds gekombineer en het baie dinge van ander beskawings opgeneem, maar hulle het geseëvier deur die krag van hulle geloof en die soliditeit van hul stelsel bo ander. Hulle het hulle arabiseer, of in 'n mate daarin geslaag het, en was in staat om hulle te swaai en hulle tot die prag te bekeer, skoonheid en lewenskragtigheid van hul taal en godsdiens. Die Moslems was vry om enigiets voordelig van ander beskawings aan te neem, in soverre dit nie nadelige gevolge gehad het nie oor hul sosiale en politieke eenheid.

'N Moslem Archipelago

Max L. Bruto

Hierdie boek is al baie jare in wording, soos die skrywer in sy voorwoord verduidelik, hoewel hy die meeste van die werklike teks geskryf het gedurende sy jaar as senior Navorsingsgenoot by die Sentrum vir Strategiese Intelligensie Navorsing. Die skrywer was vir baie jare dekaan van die Skool vir Intelligensiestudies by die Joint Military Intelligence College. Al mag dit voorkom asof die boek deur enige goeie historikus of streekspesialis in Suidoos-Asië geskryf kon gewees het, hierdie werk word belig deur die skrywer se meer as drie dekades van diens binne die nasionale intelligensiegemeenskap. Sy streekskundigheid is dikwels toegepas op spesiale assesserings vir die Gemeenskap. Met 'n kennis van Islam wat ongeëwenaard is onder sy eweknieë en 'n onblusbare dors om te bepaal hoe die doelwitte van hierdie godsdiens kan uitspeel op gebiede ver van die fokus van die huidige aandag van die meeste beleidmakers, die skrywer het hierdie geleentheid ten volle benut om die intelligensiegemeenskap en 'n breër leserspubliek bekend te maak met 'n strategiese waardering van 'n streek in die versoening van sekulêre en godsdienstige magte.
Hierdie publikasie is goedgekeur vir onbeperkte verspreiding deur die Office of Security Review, Departement van Verdediging.

Demokrasie in Islamitiese Politieke Denke

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, in 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, in 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte

Daniel E. Prys

Dit is aangevoer dat die Islam fasiliteer outoritarisme, weerspreek die

waardes van Westerse samelewings, en dit het belangrike politieke uitkomste beduidend beïnvloed

in Moslemlande. Gevolglik, geleerdes, kommentators, en die regering

amptenare wys gereeld op '' Islamitiese fundamentalisme '' as die volgende

ideologiese bedreiging vir liberale demokrasieë. hierdie siening, egter, is hoofsaaklik gebaseer

oor die ontleding van tekste, Islamitiese politieke teorie, en ad hoc-studies

van individuele lande, wat nie oorweeg ander faktore. Dit is my stelling

dat die tekste en tradisies van Islam, soos dié van ander godsdienste,

gebruik kan word om 'n verskeidenheid van politieke stelsels en beleid te ondersteun. land

spesifieke en beskrywende studies help ons nie om patrone te vind wat sal help nie

ons verduidelik die verskillende verhoudings tussen Islam en politiek regoor die land

lande van die Moslem-wêreld. vandaar, 'n nuwe benadering tot die studie van die

verband tussen Islam en die politiek is 'n beroep vir.
Ek stel voor, deur middel van streng evaluering van die verhouding tussen Islam,

demokrasie, en menseregte by die kruis-nasionale vlak, dit te veel

klem word gelê op die mag van Islam as 'n politieke mag. Ek eerste

gebruik vergelykende gevallestudies, wat fokus op faktore wat verband hou met die wisselwerking

tussen Islamitiese groepe en regimes, ekonomiese invloede, etniese gleufies,

en maatskaplike ontwikkeling, om die variansie in die invloed van

Islam oor politiek in agt nasies.

Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte

Daniel E. Prys

Dit is aangevoer dat die Islam fasiliteer outoritarisme, weerspreek die

waardes van Westerse samelewings, en dit het belangrike politieke uitkomste beduidend beïnvloed
in Moslemlande. Gevolglik, geleerdes, kommentators, en die regering
amptenare wys gereeld op '' Islamitiese fundamentalisme '' as die volgende
ideologiese bedreiging vir liberale demokrasieë. hierdie siening, egter, is hoofsaaklik gebaseer
oor die ontleding van tekste, Islamitiese politieke teorie, en ad hoc-studies
van individuele lande, wat nie oorweeg ander faktore. Dit is my stelling
dat die tekste en tradisies van Islam, soos dié van ander godsdienste,
gebruik kan word om 'n verskeidenheid van politieke stelsels en beleid te ondersteun. land
spesifieke en beskrywende studies help ons nie om patrone te vind wat sal help nie
ons verduidelik die verskillende verhoudings tussen Islam en politiek regoor die land
lande van die Moslem-wêreld. vandaar, 'n nuwe benadering tot die studie van die
verband tussen Islam en die politiek is 'n beroep vir.
Ek stel voor, deur middel van streng evaluering van die verhouding tussen Islam,
demokrasie, en menseregte by die kruis-nasionale vlak, dit te veel
klem word gelê op die mag van Islam as 'n politieke mag. Ek eerste
gebruik vergelykende gevallestudies, wat fokus op faktore wat verband hou met die wisselwerking
tussen Islamitiese groepe en regimes, ekonomiese invloede, etniese gleufies,

en maatskaplike ontwikkeling, om die variansie in die invloed van

Islam oor politiek in agt nasies.

Islamistiese opposisiepartye en die potensiaal vir EU -betrokkenheid

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In die lig van die toenemende belangrikheid van Islamistiese bewegings in die Moslemwêreld en

die manier waarop radikalisering wêreldwye gebeure sedert die eeuwisseling beïnvloed het, Dit

is dit belangrik dat die EU sy beleid ten opsigte van akteurs evalueer binne wat losweg kan wees

die 'Islamitiese wêreld' genoem. Dit is veral belangrik om te vra of en hoe om betrokke te raak

met die verskillende Islamistiese groepe.

Dit bly omstrede, selfs binne die EU. Sommige voel dat die Islamitiese waardes dat

agter Islamistiese partye lê, is eenvoudig nie verenigbaar met westerse ideale van demokrasie en

menseregte, terwyl ander betrokkenheid as 'n realistiese noodsaaklikheid beskou as gevolg van die groeiende

huislike belangrikheid van Islamistiese partye en hul toenemende betrokkenheid by die internasionale

sake. 'N Ander perspektief is dat demokratisering in die Moslemwêreld toeneem

Europese veiligheid. Die geldigheid van hierdie en ander argumente oor of en hoe die

EU moet betrokke kan slegs getoets word deur die bestudering van die verskillende Islamistiese bewegings en

hul politieke omstandighede, land vir land.

Demokratisering is 'n sentrale tema van die EU se algemene optrede in die buiteland, soos gelê

uiteengesit in artikel 11 van die Verdrag oor die Europese Unie. Baie van die state het hierin besin

verslag is nie demokraties nie, of nie heeltemal demokraties nie. In die meeste van hierdie lande, Islamiste

partye en bewegings vorm 'n beduidende opposisie teen die heersende regimes, en

in sommige vorm hulle die grootste opposisieblok. Europese demokrasieë moes lankal

hanteer regerende regimes wat outoritêr is, maar dit is 'n nuwe verskynsel om te druk

vir demokratiese hervorming in state waar die mees waarskynlike begunstigdes kan hê, van die

EU se standpunt, verskillende en soms problematiese benaderings tot demokrasie en sy

verwante waardes, soos minderheids- en vroueregte en die oppergesag van die reg. Hierdie aanklagte is

dikwels teen Islamitiese bewegings gelê, daarom is dit belangrik vir Europese beleidmakers om

'n akkurate beeld te hê van die beleide en filosofieë van potensiële vennote.

Ervarings van verskillende lande is geneig om te suggereer dat hoe meer vryheid Islamitiese

partytjies word toegelaat, hoe meer gematig is hulle in hul optrede en idees. In baie

gevalle islamistiese partye en groepe het lankal weggedraai van hul oorspronklike doel

van die stigting van 'n Islamitiese staat onder die Islamitiese wet, en het basiese beginsels aanvaar

demokratiese beginsels van verkiesingskompetisie om mag, die bestaan ​​van ander politieke

mededingers, en politieke pluralisme.

Demokratisering en die Islamitiese politiek: 'N Studie oor die Wasat Party in Egipte

Yokota Takayuki

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratization and Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ).
Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic political organizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Aan die ander kant, this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continue to act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, egter, Islamic political parties are often suspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as a justification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is a mainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,
successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Some of the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order to break this stalemate.
There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platform of the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principles of the Wasat Party as follows: demokrasie, sharī‘a (Islamitiese wet), rights of women, and Muslim- Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups that have appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004] discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the Wasat Party from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As these earlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s, I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratization movement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, such
as the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews with its members.

Die lewens van Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Die Moslem Broederskap (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) is gestig deur Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in die Egiptiese dorp van al- Isma'iliyyah in 1928. Die seun van 'n Azharite geleerde, wat sy lewensonderhoud verdien deur die herstel van horlosies, Hasan al-Banna het uit sy vroeë
skool-dae 'n neiging en 'n groot ywer het vir mense roep om Islamitiese waardes en tradisies. Sy sterk gevoel van godsdienstigheid en geestelike bewustheid het hom na die Hasafiyyah tariqah aansluit, een van die vele Sufi tariqahs wat in Egipte op daardie tydstip wydverspreide was. Selfs al is hy nie formeel wat verband hou met hierdie tariqah nadat hy die stigter van die Ikhwan, hy, nogtans, gehandhaaf 'n goeie verhouding met dit, as wel met ander Islamitiese organisasies en godsdienstige persoonlikhede, en volhard in die voordrag van die litanies (awrad, pl. van sal) van hierdie tariqah totdat sy laaste dae. Hoewel Hasan al-Banna by 'n moderne-tipe skool van onderwys, Hy het belowe sy pa dat hy sal voortgaan om die Koran te memoriseer, wat hy gedoen het, Om die waarheid te later, op die ouderdom van twaalf. Terwyl by die skool, het hy deelgeneem aan die aktiwiteite van 'n paar godsdienstige verenigings en klubs wat dit is te bevorder en te vra vir die nakoming van die Islamitiese leer .