RSSسب کے ساتھ ٹیگ کردہ تحاریر درآمد کریں: "جمہوریت"

اسلام میں خواتین

Amira Burghul

Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the

principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women

compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite

the agreement of a large number of thinkers and legislators that women during the time of the

Prophet (PBUH) were granted rights and legal privileges not granted by man-made laws until

recently, propaganda campaigns by Westerners and people with a Westernised perspective

consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, of imposing restrictions on them, اور

marginalising their role in society.

This situation has been made worse by the atmosphere and conditions prevalent across the

Muslim world, where ignorance and poverty have produced a limited understanding of religion

and family and human relations which occlude justice and a civilised way of life, خاص طور پر

between men and women. The small group of people who have been granted opportunities to

acquire an education and abilities have also fallen into the trap of believing that achieving justice

for women and capitalising on their abilities is dependent upon rejecting religion and piety and

adopting a Western way of life, as a result of their superficial studies of Islam on the one hand

and the effect of life’s diversions on the other.

Only a very small number of people from these two groups have managed to escape and cast off

their cloaks of ignorance and tradition. These people have studied their heritage in great depth

and detail, and have looked at the results of Western experiences with an open mind. They have

distinguished between the wheat and the chaff in both the past and the present, and have dealt

scientifically and objectively with the problems which have arisen. They have refuted the false

charges made against Islam with eloquent arguments, and have admitted to concealed flaws.

They have also re-examined the sayings and customs of the Infallible Ones in order to

distinguish between what is established and holy and what has been altered and distorted.

The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing

with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems

and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the

ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and

committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.

With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the

main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social

participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.

The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,

Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda

campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.

The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar

Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,

have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda

campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards


اسلام اور نئے سیاسی منظر نامے

لیس کا پچھلا, مائیکل کیتھ, عذرا خان,
Kalbir Shukra کی اور جان Solomos

ورلڈ ٹریڈ سینٹر پر حملے پر کے تناظر میں 11 ستمبر 2001, اور میڈرڈ اور لندن بم دھماکوں 2004 اور 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (بارنس, 2006; Ethnos کی کنسلٹنسی, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; لوگ, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (روشن, 2006ایک; مرزا ET رحمہ اللہ تعالی., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (حسین, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; mcroy, 2006; نےولی جونز ET رحمہ اللہ تعالی., 2006, 2007; فلپس, 2006; رائے, 2004, 2006). روایتی, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, وفادار کے عقیدہ کے نظام, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (عباس, 2005; انصاری, 2002; Eade اور Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; رمضان المبارک, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

اسلام کے ڈھانچے میں تحریک کے اصول

ڈاکٹر. محمد اقبال

ایک ثقافتی تحریک کے طور پر اسلام کائنات کی پرانی مستحکم نقطہ نظر کو مسترد کر دیا, اور ایک متحرک مآخذ تک پہنچ جاتا ہے. اتحاد کے ایک جذباتی نظام کے طور پر یہ اس طرح کے طور پر فرد کی قدروقیمت کو تسلیم, اور انسانی اتحاد کی بنیاد کے طور پر bloodrelationship مسترد کر دی. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, تاہم, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

اسلامی اصلاح

عدنان خان

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, اور

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

مغربی, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

مغرب میں اسلام

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic

اسلام, جمہوریت & ریاستہائے متحدہ امریکہ:

قرطبہ فاؤنڈیشن

عبداللہ Faliq

انٹرو ,

اس کے باوجود ایک بارہماسی اور ایک پیچیدہ بحث دونوں ہونے کے ناطے, محرابات سہ ماہی کی نظریاتی اور عملی بنیادوں سے دوبارہ جائزہ لیتے ہیں, اسلام اور جمہوریت کے مابین تعلقات اور مطابقت کے بارے میں اہم بحث, جیسا کہ براک اوباما کے امید اور تبدیلی کے ایجنڈے میں گونج اٹھا ہے. جب کہ اوول کے دفتر میں بہت سارے امریکی صدر کے طور پر اوبامہ کے چڑھ جانے کو مناتے ہیں, دوسرے بین الاقوامی میدان میں نظریہ اور نقطہ نظر میں تبدیلی کے بارے میں کم پر امید ہیں. جبکہ مسلم دنیا اور امریکہ کے مابین کشیدگی اور عدم اعتماد کو جمہوریت کے فروغ کے نقطہ نظر کی وجہ قرار دیا جاسکتا ہے, عام طور پر آمریت اور کٹھ پتلی حکومتوں کے حامی ہیں جو جمہوری اقدار اور انسانی حقوق کو لب و پیش کی ادائیگی کرتے ہیں, آفٹر شاک 9/11 سیاسی اسلام سے متعلق امریکہ کی پوزیشن کے ذریعے بدگمانیوں کو واقعتا. مزید مستحکم کردیا ہے. اس نے منفی کی ایک ایسی دیوار تشکیل دی ہے جیسا کہ ورلڈ پبلکپلوپیئنئن آرگنائزیشن نے حاصل کیا ہے, جس کے مطابق 67% مصریوں کا خیال ہے کہ عالمی سطح پر امریکہ ایک "بنیادی طور پر منفی" کردار ادا کر رہا ہے.
اس طرح امریکہ کا جواب مناسب تھا. اوباما کو منتخب کرکے, دنیا بھر میں بہت سارے کم باہمی ترقی کرنے کی امیدوں میں مصروف ہیں, لیکن مسلم دنیا کے لئے بہتر خارجہ پالیسی. اوبامہ کے لئے ٹیسٹ, جیسا کہ ہم بحث کرتے ہیں, اس طرح امریکہ اور اس کے اتحادی جمہوریت کو فروغ دیتے ہیں. کیا اس میں سہولت ہوگی یا مسلط کیا جائے گا؟?
اس کے علاوہ, کیا یہ اہم بات یہ ہے کہ کونفل آئیکٹس کے طویل علاقوں میں ایک ایماندار دلال ہوسکتا ہے؟? پرولیفی کی مہارت اور بصیرت کا نام شامل کرنا
c اسکالرز, ماہرین تعلیم, تجربہ کار صحافی اور سیاستدان, آرچس سہ ماہی سے اسلام اور جمہوریت کے درمیان تعلقات اور امریکہ کے کردار کے بارے میں روشنی ڈالتی ہے۔ ساتھ ہی اوباما کے ذریعہ کی جانے والی تبدیلیاں, مشترکہ زمین کی تلاش میں. انس الٹکارتی, تھ ای قرطبہ فاؤنڈیشن کے سی ای او اس مباحثے کا افتتاحی سامان فراہم کرتے ہیں, جہاں وہ اوباما کی راہ پر منحصر امیدوں اور چیلنجوں کا مقابلہ کرتے ہیں. فالو کریں, صدر نیکسن کے سابق مشیر, ڈاکٹر رابرٹ کرین نے آزادی کے حق کے اسلامی اصول کا مکمل تجزیہ کیا. انور ابراہیم, ملائیشیا کے سابق نائب وزیر اعظم, مسلم غالب معاشروں میں جمہوریت کے نفاذ کی عملی حقائق کے ساتھ گفتگو کو تقویت بخشتا ہے, یعنی, انڈونیشیا اور ملائشیا میں.
ہمارے پاس ڈاکٹر شیریں ہنٹر بھی ہے, جارج ٹاؤن یونیورسٹی, ریاستہائے متحدہ امریکہ, جو جمہوریت اور جدید کاری میں پسماندہ مسلم ممالک کی تلاش کرتا ہے. یہ دہشت گردی کے مصنف کی تکمیل ہے, ڈاکٹر نفیس احمد کی جدیدیت اور اس کے بعد کے بحران کی وضاحت
جمہوریت کا خاتمہ. ڈاکٹر (مڈل ایسٹ میڈیا مانیٹر کے ڈائریکٹر), ایلن ہارٹ (سابق آئی ٹی این اور بی بی سی پینورما نمائندے; صیہونیت کے مصنف: یہودیوں کا اصل دشمن) اور عاصم سنڈوس (ایڈیٹر مصر کا ساوت الا اوما ہفتہ وار) مسلم دنیا میں جمہوری فروغ کے لئے اوباما اور ان کے کردار پر توجہ دیں, نیز اسرائیل اور اخوان المسلمون کے ساتھ امریکی تعلقات.
وزیر خارجہ افسران کا تبادلہ, مالدیپ, احمد شہید نے اسلام اور جمہوریت کے مستقبل پر قیاس آرائیاں کیں; Cllr. گیری میکلوچلن
– سن فین ممبر جو آئرش ریپبلکن سرگرمیوں کے الزام میں چار سال قید اور گلڈ فورڈ کے انتخابی مہم چلانے والا تھا 4 اور برمنگھم 6, غزہ کے اپنے حالیہ دورے پر ریفل ایکٹس جہاں انہوں نے فلسطینیوں کے ساتھ بربریت اور ناانصافی کا اثر دیکھا۔; ڈاکٹر میری برین سمتھ, مرکز برائے مطالعاتی بنیاد پرستی اور معاصر سیاسی تشدد کے ڈائریکٹر نے سیاسی دہشت گردی پر تنقیدی طور پر تحقیق کرنے کے چیلنجوں پر تبادلہ خیال کیا۔; ڈاکٹر خالد المبارک, مصنف اور ڈرامہ نگار, دارفور میں امن کے امکانات پر تبادلہ خیال; اور ایف آئی ایل نامی صحافی اور انسانی حقوق کے کارکن عاشور شمیس آج مسلمانوں کے جمہوری اور سیاسیકરણ پر تنقیدی نظر ڈالتے ہیں.
ہم امید کرتے ہیں کہ یہ سب ایک جامع مطالعہ اور ان امور پر ردl عمل کا ذریعہ بناتا ہے جو امید کے ایک نئے صبح میں ہم سب کو متاثر کرتے ہیں۔.

امریکہ حماس کو پالیسی بلاک مشرق وسطی میں امن

ہینری Siegman

ماضی کے ان پر ناکام باہمی مذاکرات 16 سال ظاہر کیا ہے کہ مشرق وسطی میں امن معاہدے کے فریقین خود سے کبھی نہیں کیا جا سکتا ہے تک پہنچ گئے ہیں. اسرائیلی حکومتوں کو یقین ہے کہ وہ ان کے مغربی کنارے میں غیر قانونی طور پر جاپان کا منصوبہ بین الاقوامی مذمت انحراف کی وجہ سے وہ امریکہ پر شمار بین الاقوامی پابندیوں کی مخالفت کر سکتے ہیں. دو طرفہ مذاکرات کے ذریعے بنائے گئے نہیں ہیں اور امریکہ کے دائرہ کار تیار (سلامتی کونسل کی قراردادوں کی بنیاد پر, the Oslo accords, عرب امن سرگرمی, "روڈ میپ" اور دیگر گزشتہ اسرائیل فلسطین معاہدے) کامیاب ہونے نہیں کر سکتے. اسرائیلی حکومت کا خیال ہے کہ امریکی کانگریس کے ایک امریکی صدر کی اجازت نہیں ایسے اجزاء کو جاری کرنے اور مطالبہ ان کی منظوری گے. کیا امید ہے کہ ستمبر کو واشنگٹن ڈی سی میں دو طرفہ مذاکرات جو شروع کے لئے ہے 2 صدر اوباما نے جو ایمان ثابت کر ظالموں میں سے ہو کے مکمل طور پر انحصار کرتا ہے, اور کیا "کو کم کرنے کی تجویز" انہوں نے وعدہ کیا ہے ، پر, مذاکرات ایک تعطل حاصل کرنی چاہیے, امریکی معیار کے حضور عاجزی و فرمانبرداری کے لئے ایک euphemism ہیں. اس طرح ایک امریکی پہل اس سے قبل 1967 ء کی مشترکہ سرحد کے اندر اندر اپنی سلامتی کے لیے اسرائیل لوہا پہنے ضمانت چڑھانا, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: ایک مؤثر فلسطینی مذاکرات کی غیر موجودگی. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, امید ہے اور امریکہ کی پیروی کرے گا. بدقسمتی سے, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

اسلامی سیاسی ثقافت, جمہوریت, اور انسانی حقوق

ڈینیل ای. قیمت

یہ دلیل دی گئی کہ اسلام authoritarianism سہولت, مغربی معاشروں کی اقدار کے مخالف, اور کافی حد تک مسلم ممالک میں اہم سیاسی نتائج پر اثر انداز. اس کے نتیجے میں, علماء کرام, تفسیر, اور سرکاری اہلکاروں نے بار بار ''اسلامی سخت گیروں کے لئے'' کے طور پر لبرل جمہوریتوں کی اگلی نظریاتی خطرہ پوائنٹ. یہ نظریہ, تاہم, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, اسلامی سیاسی نظریہ, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, جو دوسرے عوامل پر غور نہیں کرتے ہیں. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, دوسرے مذاہب کے مانند, متعدد سیاسی نظاموں اور پالیسیوں کی حمایت کے لئے استعمال کیا جاسکتا ہے. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. لہذا, کے مطالعہ کے لئے ایک نیا نقطہ نظر
اسلام اور سیاست کے مابین رابطے کی ضرورت ہے.
میرا مشورہ, اسلام کے مابین تعلقات کی کڑی تشخیص کے ذریعے, جمہوریت, اور بین الاقوامی سطح پر انسانی حقوق, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, معاشی اثرات, نسلی درار, اور معاشرتی ترقی, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, اداروں, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

وزن کے دہشت گردی کے خلاف عالمی جنگ میں:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? کیوں, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; اور (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

عرب دنیا میں جمہوریت پر بحث

Ibtisam ابراہیم (علیہ السلام

What is Democracy?
مغربی علماء افراد کے شہری اور سیاسی حقوق کی حفاظت کے لئے جمہوریت ایک طریقہ کار کی وضاحت. یہ تقریر کی ازادی کے لئے فراہم کرتا ہے, پریس, ایمان, رائے, ملکیت, اور اسمبلی, کے طور پر اچھی طرح سے ووٹ دینے کا حق کے طور پر, نامزد اور سرکاری دفتر طلب. ہنٹنگٹن (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. سعد Eddin ابراہیم (علیہ السلام (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. تاہم, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. تاہم, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

جمہوریت, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (ایم بی), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

مصر کے مسلمان بھائيوں: محاذ آرائی یا یکتا?


نومبر دسمبر میں مسلمان بھائی کی کامیابی کا سوسائٹی 2005 پیپلز اسمبلی کے لئے انتخابات میں مصر کی سیاسی نظام کے ذریعے shockwaves بھیجا. اس کے جواب میں, اس تحریک پر نیچے ٹوٹ حکومت, دیگر ممکنہ حریف ہراساں کیا اور اس کے fledging اصلاحات کا عمل الٹا. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. لیکن حکمران نیشنل ڈیموکریٹک
پارٹی (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, بتدریج عمل, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, ایک ریکارڈ جیت 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 انتخابات. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. عین اسی وقت پر, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. اگر ایسا ہے تو, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

اسلام اور جمہوریت


اگر ایک پریس پڑھتا ہے یا بین الاقوامی معاملات پر تبصرہ نگاروں کو سنتا ہے, اکثر یہ کہا جاتا ہے -- اور بھی زیادہ کثرت سے شامل نہیں کہا -- کہ اسلام جمہوریت کے ساتھ ہم آہنگ نہیں ہے. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Hosen

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. جیسا کہ
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. تاہم, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
پہلا, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

ویشویکرن اور سیاسی اسلام: ترکی کی بہبود پارٹی کی سماجی بنیاد

کا انعقاد Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, تو, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. یہ کاغذ کرے گا, لہذا, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, کے ساتھ 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. بہر حال, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

ڈیوڈ بی. Ottaway
1980 کی دہائی کے اوائل میں, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, حسنی مبارک, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 کرنے کے لئے 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.