Všetky záznamy označené ako: "demokracia"
Women in Islam
Amira Burghul
Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the
principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women
compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite
the agreement of a large number of thinkers and legislators that women during the time of the
Prophet (PBUH) were granted rights and legal privileges not granted by man-made laws until
recently, propaganda campaigns by Westerners and people with a Westernised perspective
consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, of imposing restrictions on them, a
marginalising their role in society.
This situation has been made worse by the atmosphere and conditions prevalent across the
Muslim world, where ignorance and poverty have produced a limited understanding of religion
a rodinné a medziľudské vzťahy, ktoré bránia spravodlivosti a civilizovanému spôsobu života, obzvlášť
medzi mužmi a ženami. Malá skupina ľudí, ktorí dostali príležitosť
získať vzdelanie a schopnosti sa tiež dostali do pasce presvedčenia, že dosiahnutie spravodlivosti
pre ženy a využitie ich schopností závisí od odmietnutia náboženstva a zbožnosti a
osvojiť si západný spôsob života, ako výsledok ich povrchného štúdia islamu na jednej strane
a vplyv odklonov života na toho druhého.
Len veľmi malému počtu ľudí z týchto dvoch skupín sa podarilo utiecť a odvrhnúť sa
ich plášte nevedomosti a tradície. Títo ľudia študovali svoje dedičstvo do veľkej hĺbky
a detail, and have looked at the results of Western experiences with an open mind. They have
distinguished between the wheat and the chaff in both the past and the present, and have dealt
scientifically and objectively with the problems which have arisen. They have refuted the false
charges made against Islam with eloquent arguments, and have admitted to concealed flaws.
They have also re-examined the sayings and customs of the Infallible Ones in order to
distinguish between what is established and holy and what has been altered and distorted.
The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing
with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems
and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the
ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and
committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.
With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the
main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social
participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.
The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,
Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda
campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.
The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar
Salafi hnutia v Saudskej Arábii a severnej Afrike, a ich fanatický spôsob zaobchádzania so ženami,
vyprovokovali nervóznych divákov, ktorí sa obávajú oživenia islamu, aby spustili novú propagandu
kampane obviňujúce islam z inšpirácie k terorizmu a z toho, že je voči nemu zaostalý a nespravodlivý
ženy.
| Sep 17, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islam and the New Political Landscape
Les Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 septembra 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 a 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
| Sep 08, 2010 | Komentáre 0
The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam
Dr. Muhammad Iqbal
As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, však, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. Konečný duchovný základ všetkého života, ako je chápaný islamom, je večné a odhaľuje sa v rozmanitosti a zmene. Spoločnosť založená na takejto koncepcii Reality sa musí zmieriť, vo svojom živote, kategórie trvalosti a zmeny. Musí mať večné princípy, aby mohol riadiť svoj kolektívny život, lebo večné nám dáva oporu vo svete ustavičných zmien.
| Sep 08, 2010 | Komentáre 0
islamská reformácia
Adnan Khan
Taliansky premiér, Silvio Berlusconi sa po udalostiach o 9/11:
„...musíme si byť vedomí nadradenosti našej civilizácie, systém, ktorý zaručuje
blahobyt, rešpektovanie ľudských práv a – na rozdiel od islamských krajín – rešpekt
za náboženské a politické práva, systém, ktorý má svoje hodnoty a chápe rozmanitosť
a tolerancia...Západ si podmaní národy, like it conquered communism, even if it
means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was
1,400 years ago…”1
And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of
ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”
Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute
The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the
history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical
Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified
their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to
apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Tí, ktorí sa stali
ovplyvnený gréckou filozofiou, ako sú moslimskí filozofi a niektorí z Mut'azilah
sa považovali za ľudí, ktorí opustili záhyb islamu, keďže Korán prestal byť základom ich štúdia. Teda pre
každý moslim, ktorý sa pokúša odvodiť pravidlá alebo pochopiť, aký postoj by mal zaujať ku konkrétnemu
vydanie Koránu je základom tejto štúdie.
Prvý pokus o reformu islamu sa uskutočnil na prelome 19. storočia. Na prelome
storočia bola Ummah v dlhom období úpadku, keď sa globálna rovnováha síl posunula
z Khilafahu do Británie. Narastajúce problémy zachvátili Khilafah, kým bola západná Európa
uprostred priemyselnej revolúcie. Ummah stratila svoje pôvodné chápanie islamu, a
v snahe zvrátiť úpadok, ktorý pohltil Uthmáncov (Osmani) niektorí moslimovia boli poslaní do
West, a v dôsledku toho boli ohromení tým, čo videli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi z Egypta (1801-1873),
pri návrate z Paríža, napísal životopisnú knihu s názvom Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Ťažba zlata, alebo Prehľad Paríža, 1834), chvália ich čistotu, láska k práci, a nad
všetku spoločenskú morálku. Vyhlásil, že musíme napodobňovať to, čo sa robí v Paríži, obhajovanie zmien
islamskej spoločnosti od liberalizácie žien k systémom vládnutia. Táto myšlienka, a ostatným sa to páči,
znamenal začiatok nového trendu v islame.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islam na Západe
Jocelyne Cesari
Imigrácia moslimov do Európy, Severná Amerika, Austrália a zložitá sociálno-náboženská dynamika, ktorá sa následne vyvinula, urobili z islamu na Západe presvedčivú novú oblasť výskumu. Aféra Salmana Rushdieho, hidžábové kontroverzie, útoky na Svetové obchodné centrum, a rozruch nad dánskymi karikatúrami sú príkladmi medzinárodných kríz, ktoré odhalili spojenie medzi moslimami na Západe a globálnym moslimským svetom.. Tieto nové situácie prinášajú teoretické a metodologické výzvy pre štúdium súčasného islamu, a stalo sa kľúčovým, aby sme sa vyhli esencializácii či už islamu alebo moslimov a odolali rétorickým štruktúram diskurzov, ktoré sú zaujaté bezpečnosťou a terorizmom..
V tomto článku, Tvrdím, že islam ako náboženská tradícia je terra incognita. Predbežným dôvodom tejto situácie je, že neexistuje konsenzus o náboženstve ako predmete výskumu. Náboženstvo, ako akademická disciplína, sa rozpoltená medzi historickými, sociologický, a hermeneutických metodológií. S islamom, situácia je ešte zamotanejšia. Na západe, štúdium islamu začalo ako odvetvie orientalistických štúdií, a preto nasledovalo samostatnú a osobitnú cestu od štúdia náboženstiev. Aj keď kritika orientalizmu bola ústredným prvkom objavenia sa islamu v oblasti spoločenských vied, napätie medzi islamistami a antropológmi a sociológmi zostáva silné. Téma islamu a moslimov na Západe je zakomponovaná do tohto boja. Jedným z dôsledkov tohto metodologického napätia je, že študenti islamu, ktorí začali svoju akademickú kariéru štúdiom islamu vo Francúzsku, Nemecko, alebo pre Ameriku je náročné vybudovať si dôveryhodnosť ako učenci islamu, najmä v akademickej oblasti Severnej Ameriky
kontext.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & SPOJENÉ ŠTÁTY AMERICKÉ:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Bohužiaľ, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islamic Political Culture, demokracia, and Human Rights
Daniele. cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, však, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Komentáre 0
PRESNOSŤ V GLOBÁLNEJ VOJNE PROTI TERORU:
Sherifa zuhur
Sedem rokov po septembri 11, 2001 (9/11) útokov, Mnohí experti sa domnievajú, že al-Káida opäť nabrala na sile a že jej napodobňovatelia alebo pridružení členovia sú smrteľnejší ako predtým. Národný spravodajský odhad z 2007 tvrdil, že al-Káida je teraz nebezpečnejšia ako predtým 9/11.1 Emulátori al-Káidy naďalej ohrozujú Západ, Stredný východ, a európske národy, ako na pozemku zmarenej v septembri 2007 v Nemecku. uvádza Bruce Riedel: Predovšetkým vďaka horlivosti Washingtonu ísť do Iraku a nie loviť vodcov al-Kájdy, organizácia má teraz pevnú základňu operácií v Badlands v Pakistane a efektívnu franšízu v západnom Iraku. Jeho dosah sa rozšíril po celom moslimskom svete a v Európe . . . Usáma bin Ládin spustil úspešnú propagandistickú kampaň. . . . Jeho nápady teraz priťahujú viac nasledovníkov ako kedykoľvek predtým.
Je pravda, že v celom islamskom svete stále vznikajú rôzne salafi-džihádistické organizácie. Prečo sa reakcie na islamistický terorizmus, ktoré nazývame globálnym džihádom, neukázali mimoriadne efektívne?
Prechod k nástrojom „mäkkej sily,“A čo účinnosť úsilia Západu posilniť moslimov v globálnej vojne proti terorizmu? (GWOT)? Prečo si Spojené štáty získali tak málo „sŕdc a myslí“ v širšom islamskom svete? Prečo americké strategické posolstvá o tejto otázke hrajú v regióne tak zle? Prečo?, napriek širokému moslimskému nesúhlasu s extrémizmom, ako ukazujú prieskumy a oficiálne vyjadrenia kľúčových moslimských vodcov, V Jordánsku a Pakistane sa podpora pre bin Ládina skutočne zvýšila?
Táto monografia sa nebude zaoberať pôvodom islamistického násilia. Namiesto toho sa zaoberá typom koncepčného zlyhania, ktoré nesprávne vytvára GWOT a ktoré odrádza moslimov od jeho podpory.. Nie sú schopní stotožniť sa s navrhovanými transformačnými protiopatreniami, pretože vnímajú niektoré zo svojich základných presvedčení a inštitúcií ako ciele v
toto úsilie.
Niekoľko hlboko problematických trendov mätie americké konceptualizácie GWOT a strategické posolstvá vytvorené na boj proti tejto vojne.. Tieto sa vyvíjajú z (1) postkoloniálne politické prístupy k moslimom a moslimským väčšinovým národom, ktoré sa veľmi líšia, a preto vytvárajú protichodné a mätúce dojmy a účinky; a (2) zvyšková všeobecná nevedomosť a predsudky voči islamu a subregionálnym kultúram. Pridajte k tomu americký hnev, strach, a úzkosť zo smrteľných udalostí 9/11, a určité prvky, ktoré, napriek naliehaniu chladnejších hláv, brať moslimov a ich náboženstvo na zodpovednosť za zločiny ich koreligistov, alebo ktorí to považujú za užitočné z politických dôvodov.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Komentáre 0
DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, viera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. However, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. However, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
demokracia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
západné vlády, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
EGYPTskí MUSLIMNÍ BRATIA: KONFRONTÁCIA ALEBO INTEGRÁCIA?
Výskum
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, režim by mal podniknúť predbežné kroky na normalizáciu účasti moslimských bratov na politickom živote. Moslimskí bratia, ktorých spoločenské aktivity boli dlho tolerované, ale ktorých úloha vo formálnej politike je prísne obmedzená, vyhral nevídaný 20 percent parlamentných kresiel v 2005 voľby. Urobili tak napriek tomu, že súťažili len o tretinu voľných miest a napriek značným prekážkam, vrátane policajných represií a volebných podvodov. Tento úspech potvrdil ich pozíciu mimoriadne dobre organizovanej a hlboko zakorenenej politickej sily. Zároveň, podčiarkol slabé stránky právnej opozície aj vládnucej strany. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islam a demokracia
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| Sep 04, 2010 | Komentáre 0
In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism
Nadirsyah Hosen
While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. However, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
najprv, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts
| Sep 03, 2010 | Komentáre 0
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY
Haldun Gulalp
Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.
| Sep 03, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Egypt at the Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Husní Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 do 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
| Sep 02, 2010 | Komentáre 0
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