RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "Demokratie"

Frauen im Islam

Amira Burghul

Trotz großem Konsens unter einer großen Anzahl von Philosophen und Historiker, dass die

Prinzipien und Lehren des Islam verursachten in der Stellung der Frau einen grundlegenden Wandel

in Ländern, in Ost und West zum Zeitpunkt der vorherrschenden Situation im Vergleich, und trotz

die Vereinbarung einer großen Anzahl von Denkern und Gesetzgeber, dass Frauen während der Zeit der

Prophet (saw) wurden eingeräumten Rechte und rechtliche Privilegien nicht vom Menschen gemachten Gesetzen gewährt bis

vor kurzem, Propagandakampagnen von Westlern und Menschen mit einer verwestlichten Perspektive

konsequent beschuldigt Islam von den Frauen ungerecht, von über Beschränkungen für sie, und

marginalisiert ihre Rolle in der Gesellschaft.

Diese Situation wurde durch die Atmosphäre verschlimmert und Bedingungen vorherrschend über die

muslimische Welt, wo Unwissenheit und Armut haben ein begrenztes Verständnis von Religion produziert

und Familie und der menschlichen Beziehungen, die Gerechtigkeit und eine zivilisierte Art und Weise des Lebens okkludieren, insbesondere

zwischen Männern und Frauen. Die kleine Gruppe von Menschen, die Chancen eingeräumt wurden

eine Ausbildung erwerben und Fähigkeiten haben auch in die Falle der Annahme besteht, dass das Erreichen der Gerechtigkeit gefallen

für Frauen und auf ihre Fähigkeiten Kapital ist abhängig von Ablehnung der Religion und Frömmigkeit und

eine westliche Lebensweise Annahme, als Folge ihrer oberflächlichen Studien des Islam auf der einer Seite

und die Wirkung des Lebens ist Umleitungen auf der anderen.

Nur eine sehr kleine Anzahl von Menschen aus diesen beiden Gruppen hat zu fliehen und abgeworfen

ihre Mäntel aus Unwissenheit und Tradition. Diese Menschen haben ihr Erbe in großer Tiefe untersucht

und Detail, und haben bei den Ergebnissen der westlichen Erfahrungen mit einem offenen Geist sah. Sie haben

zwischen dem Weizen unterschieden und die Spreu sowohl in der Vergangenheit und der Gegenwart, und behandelt haben

wissenschaftlich und objektiv mit den Problemen, die entstanden sind,. Sie haben die falsche widerlegt

Gebühren, die gegen den Islam mit beredten Argumente, und haben verdeckte Mängel zugelassen.

Sie haben auch überprüften die Sprüche und Gebräuche der unfehlbare, um

unterscheiden zwischen dem, was hergestellt wird und heilig und was verändert wurde und verzerrt.

Das verantwortliche Verhalten dieser Gruppe hat neue Richtungen etabliert und neue Wege für den Umgang

mit der Frage der Frauen in islamischen Gesellschaften. Sie haben noch eindeutig nicht alle Probleme in Angriff genommen

und endgültige Lösungen für die vielen Gesetzeslücken und Mängel gefunden, aber sie haben fest die

für die Entstehung eines neuen Modells für muslimische Frauen gemahlen, die beide stark und

verpflichtet, die rechtlichen und wirksame Grundlagen ihrer Gesellschaft.

Mit dem Sieg der Islamischen Revolution im Iran und der Segen ihrer Führer, welches das

wichtigste religiöse Autorität für die Beteiligung von Frauen und deren wirksame politische und soziale

Beteiligung, der Spielraum für starke Debatte über Frauen im Islam wurde deutlich erweitert.

Das Modell der muslimischen Frauen in Iran hat Ausbreitung der islamischen Widerstandsbewegungen im Libanon,

Palästina andere arabische Länder und auch die westliche Welt, und als Ergebnis, Propaganda

Kampagnen gegen den Islam haben in gewissem Maße nachgelassen.

Die Entstehung von Salafi islamischen Bewegungen wie die Taliban in Afghanistan und ähnlichen

Salafi Bewegungen in Saudi-Arabien und Nordafrika, und ihre fanatische Art und Weise Frauen zur Behandlung von,

Nerven Zuschauer haben provozierte ein islamisches Wiederaufleben in der Einführung neue Propaganda aus Angst

Kampagnen Islam inspirierender Terrorismus beschuldigt und ist rückwärts und ungerecht gegen

Frauen.

Islam und die neue politische Landschaft

Die Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra und John Solomos

Im Zuge des Angriffs auf das World Trade Center auf 11 September 2001, und die Madrid und London Bombardierungen 2004 und 2005, eine Literatur, dass die Formen und Modalitäten des religiösen Ausdrucks Adressen - besonders islamischer religiöser Ausdruck - in den penumbral Regionen gediehen sind, dass Link Mainstream-Sozialwissenschaft Sozialpolitik Design, Think Tanks und Journalismus. Ein großer Teil der Arbeit hat versucht, Haltungen oder Prädispositionen einer muslimischen Bevölkerung in einer bestimmten Stelle der Spannung zu definieren, wie London oder Großbritannien (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Beratung, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), oder bestimmte Formen der Sozialpolitik Intervention critiqued (Hell, 2006ein; Mirza et al., 2007). Studien des Islamismus und Dschihadismus haben einen besonderen Fokus auf den synkretistischen und komplexen Verbindungen zwischen islamischem religiösem Glauben und Formen der sozialen Bewegung und politischer Mobilisierung geschaffen (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Konventionell, der analytische Schwerpunkt hat die Kultur des Islam ins Rampenlicht, die Glaubenssysteme der Gläubigen, und die historischen und geographische Bahnen der muslimischen Bevölkerung in der ganzen Welt im Allgemeinen und in ‚den Westen‘ insbesondere (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade und Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In diesem Artikel wird ein anderer Schwerpunkt. Wir argumentieren, dass Studien der islamischen Notwendigkeit politischer Partizipation sorgfältig zu großen Verallgemeinerungen über die Kultur und den Glauben ohne Rückgriff kontextualisiert werden. Dies liegt daran, sowohl Kultur und Glauben aufgebaut sind durch und wiederum Struktur, die kulturellen, institutionellen und deliberativen Landschaften, durch die sie artikuliert werden. Im Fall der britischen Erfahrung, die verborgenen Spuren des Christentums in der Bildung des Wohlfahrtsstaates im letzten Jahrhundert, die sich schnell ändernden Kartographie der Räume der politischen und der Rolle des "Glaubens Organisationen bei der Umstrukturierung von Sozialleistungen erzeugen, um das Material sozialen Kontext die Chancen und die Umrisse der neuen Formen der politischen Partizipation zu bestimmen.

Das Prinzip der Bewegung in der Struktur des Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

Als eine kulturelle Bewegung Islam lehnt die alte statische Sicht des Universums, und erreicht eine dynamische Sicht. Als ein emotionales System der Vereinigung erkennt er den Wert des Individuums als solchen, und lehnt bloodrelationship als Grundlage der menschlichen Einheit. Blut-Beziehung ist earthrootedness. Die Suche nach einer rein psychologischen Grundlage der menschlichen Einheit möglich wird, nur mit der Erkenntnis, dass alles menschliche Leben in seiner origin.1 Eine solche Wahrnehmung geistig ist kreativ von frischen Loyalitäten ohne Zeremoniell sie am Leben zu halten, und macht es möglich, sich der Mensch von der Erde zu emanzipieren. Christentum, das ursprünglich erschienen war, als ein Mönchsorden von Konstantin als ein System von unification.2 Sein Scheitern zu arbeiten als ein solches System versucht wurde, fuhr der Kaiser Julian3 zu den alten Göttern Roms zurückzukehren, an dem er versuchte, philosophische Interpretationen zu setzen. Ein moderner Historiker der Zivilisation hat somit den Zustand der zivilisierten Welt über die Zeit dargestellt, als der Islam auf der Bühne der Geschichte erschienen: Es schien dann, dass die große Zivilisation, dass es 4000 Jahre zu Konstrukt genommen hatte am Rande des Zerfalls war, und dass die Menschheit wahrscheinlich war zu diesem Zustand der Barbarei zurückzukehren, wo jeder Stamm und Sekt gegen die nächsten, und Recht und Ordnung waren unbekannt . . . Der
alte Stamm Sanktionen hatten ihre Macht verloren. Daraus ergibt sich die alte Kaiser Methoden nicht mehr funktionieren würde. Die neuen Sanktionen erstellt von
Christentum arbeitet Teilung und Zerstörung statt Einheit und Ordnung. Es war eine Zeit voller Tragik. Zivilisation, wie ein riesiger Baum, dessen Blätter hatte die Welt und deren Zweige hatte getragen, die goldenen Früchte der Kunst und der Wissenschaft und Literatur überwölbt, stand wankenden, ihr Stamm nicht mehr am Leben mit dem fließenden Saft der Hingabe und Verehrung, aber verrottet auf den Kern, von den Stürmen des Krieges zerrissen, und zusammen nur durch die Fesseln des alten Gewohnheiten gehalten und Gesetze, das könnte jederzeit schnappen. Gab es eine emotionale Kultur, die in gebracht werden konnte, Menschheit wieder in der Einheit zu sammeln und die Zivilisation zu retten? Diese Kultur muss etwas von einem neuen Typ sein, für die alten Sanktionen und Zeremoniells waren tot, und zu bauen andere von der gleichen Art nach oben wäre die Arbeit
centuries.'The des Schriftstellers geht dann um uns zu sagen, dass die Welt in der Notwendigkeit einer neuen Kultur stand der Ort der Kultur des Thrones zu nehmen, und die Systeme der Vereinigung, die auf bloodrelationship beruhten.
Es ist erstaunlich,, er addiert, dass eine solche Kultur aus Arabien entstanden sind, gerade zu der Zeit sollte, wenn es am meisten gebraucht wurde. Es gibt, jedoch, nichts Besonderes in der Erscheinung. Die Welt-Leben sieht intuitiv seine eigenen Bedürfnisse, und in kritischen Momenten legt seine eigene Richtung. Das ist was, in der Sprache der Religion, wir nennen prophetische Offenbarung. Es ist nur natürlich, dass der Islam sollte über das Bewußtsein eines einfachen Menschen durch eine der alten Kulturen unberührt geflasht haben, und besetzt eine geographische Position, wo drei Kontinente zusammentreffen. Die neue Kultur findet die Gründung der Welt-Einheit in dem Prinzip der Tauhâd.'5 Islam, als Gemeinwesen, ist nur ein praktisches Mittel, dieses Prinzip einen lebendigen Faktor in dem intellektuellen und emotionalen Leben der Menschheit zu machen. Er verlangt Treue zu Gott, nicht auf Thron. Und da Gott ist die ultimative spirituelle Grundlage allen Lebens, Treue zu Gott beträgt praktisch für die Menschen der Treue zu seiner eigenen idealen Natur. Die ultimative geistige Grundlage allen Lebens, wie durch den Islam konzipiert, ist ewig und zeigt sich in der Vielfalt und Wandel. Eine Gesellschaft, die auf eine solche Auffassung der Wirklichkeit muss versöhnen, in seinem Leben, die Kategorien der Dauerhaftigkeit und Wandel. Es muss ewige Prinzipien besitzt ihr kollektives Leben zu regulieren, für das ewige gibt uns einen Einstieg in die Welt der ewigen Veränderung.

Islamischen Reformation

Adnan Khan

Der italienische Premierminister, Silvio Berlusconi rühmte sich nach den Ereignissen von 9/11:
„... müssen wir uns bewusst von der Überlegenheit unserer Zivilisation, ein System, das garantiert hat

Wohlbefinden, Achtung der Menschenrechte und – im Gegensatz zu den islamischen Ländern – Respekt

für religiöse und politische Rechte, ein System, das sein Wert Verständnis von Vielfalt hat

und Toleranz ... Der Westen wird Völker erobern, wie es erobert Kommunismus, Selbst wenn es

bedeutet eine Konfrontation mit einer anderen Zivilisation, die islamische, stecken, wo es war

1,400 Jahren ...“1

Und in einem 2007 Bericht der RAND-Institut erklärt:
„Der Kampf im Gang in weiten Teilen der muslimischen Welt ist im Wesentlichen ein Krieg

Ideen. Sein Ergebnis wird die zukünftige Richtung der muslimischen Welt bestimmen.“

Der Aufbau moderater Muslim Networks, RAND-Institut

Der Begriff des ‚Islah‘ (Reform) ist ein Konzept, unbekannt zu Muslimen. Es gab nie im ganzen

Geschichte der islamischen Zivilisation; es wurde nie in Betracht gezogen diskutiert oder sogar. Ein flüchtiger Blick auf klassische

Islamische Literatur zeigt uns, dass, wenn die Altphilologen legte den Grundstein der usul, und kodifiziert

ihre islamische Urteile (Fiqh) sie waren auf der Suche nur auf das Verständnis der islamischen Regeln, um

gelten sie. Eine ähnliche Situation ereignete sich, als die Regeln wurden für den Hadithen festgelegt, Tafsir und die

arabische Sprache. Wissenschaftler, Denker und Intellektuelle im gesamten islamischen Geschichte viel Zeit damit verbracht

Allahs Offenbarung verstehen - der Koran und die Anwendung des Ayaat auf die Realitäten und geprägt

Prinzipien und Disziplinen, um das Verständnis zu erleichtern. Daher blieb der Koran die Basis

Studie und alle Disziplinen, die auf dem Koran basiert immer weiterentwickelt wurden. Diejenigen, die sich

von der griechischen Philosophie wie die muslimischen Philosophen und einige aus den Reihen der Mut'azilah geschlagen

die Falte des Islam verlassen zu haben, wurden als der Koran nicht mehr ihre Grundlage Studie sein. So für

jeder Muslim versuchen, Regeln abzuleiten oder zu verstehen, was Haltung auf einem bestimmten ergriffen werden sollten,

Ausgabe der Koran ist die Grundlage dieser Studie.

Der erste Versuch, den Islam reformieren fand an der Wende des 19. Jahrhunderts. Um die Wende des

Jahrhundert der Ummah hatte in einer langen Zeit des Verfalls, in denen das globale Machtgleichgewicht verschoben

vom Khilafah nach Großbritannien. Montageprobleme verschlungen die Khilafah während Westeuropa war in

inmitten der industriellen Revolution. Die Ummah kam ihr pristine Verständnis des Islam zu verlieren, und

in einem Versuch, den Rückgang engulfing die Uthmani der umkehren (Osmanen) einige Muslime wurden die geschickt

West, und als Ergebnis wurde geschlagen von dem, was sie sehen,. Rifa'a Rafi‘al-Tahtawi von Ägypten (1801-1873),

bei seiner Rückkehr aus Paris, ein biographisches Buch geschrieben namens Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis bariz (Der

Gewinnung von Gold, oder eine Übersicht über Paris, 1834), loben ihre Sauberkeit, Liebe zur Arbeit, und darüber

alle gesellschaftliche Moral. Er erklärte, dass müssen wir nachahmen, was in Paris getan wird,, befürworten Änderungen an

die islamische Gesellschaft von Frauen zu den Systemen der Liberalisierung der herrschenden. Dieser Gedanke, und andere wie es,

Der Beginn des neu zu erfinden Trend markiert im Islam.

Islam im Westen

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Außerdem, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nämlich, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US-, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US-Politik der Hamas Blöcke Frieden im Nahen Osten

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamische Politische Kultur, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte

Daniel E. Preis

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Folglich, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, jedoch, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; und (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, Glauben, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Aber, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Aber, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Demokratie, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
westliche Regierungen, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 Wahlen. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islam und Demokratie

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Hosen

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. Zum Beispiel, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Aber, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Ägypten am Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 zu 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.