RSSSvi unosi označeni: "Alžir"

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

listopad 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Liberalna demokracija i politički islam: Potraga za zajedničkim jezikom.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: na primjer, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
režim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Na primjer, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Na primjer, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Doista, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, a vladini dužnosnici često ističu ‘’islamski fundamentalizam’’ kao sljedeću ideološku prijetnju liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno na analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. Moja je tvrdnja da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija, može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Deskriptivne studije specifične za zemlju ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi nam pomogli objasniti različite odnose između islama i politike u zemljama muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju
traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama, demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, da se previše naglašava moć islama kao političke snage. Prvo koristim komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi, i društveni razvoj, objasniti razlike u utjecaju islama na politiku u osam nacija. Tvrdim da velik dio moći
pripisuje islamu kao pokretačkoj snazi ​​iza politika i političkih sustava u muslimanskim nacijama može se bolje objasniti prethodno spomenutim čimbenicima. Također nalazim, suprotno uvriježenom mišljenju, da je sve veća snaga islamskih političkih skupina često bila povezana sa skromnom pluralizacijom političkih sustava.
Konstruirao sam indeks islamske političke kulture, na temelju toga u kojoj se mjeri islamsko pravo koristi i je li i, ako je tako, kako,zapadne ideje, institucija, i tehnologije se implementiraju, ispitati prirodu odnosa između islama i demokracije i islama i ljudskih prava. Ovaj se pokazatelj koristi u statističkoj analizi, koji uključuje uzorak od dvadeset i tri pretežno muslimanske zemlje i kontrolnu skupinu od dvadeset i tri nemuslimanske zemlje u razvoju. Osim uspoređivanja
Islamske nacije neislamskim nacijama u razvoju, statistička analiza omogućuje mi kontrolu utjecaja drugih varijabli za koje je utvrđeno da utječu na razine demokracije i zaštitu prava pojedinca. Rezultat bi trebao biti realnija i točnija slika utjecaja islama na politiku i politiku.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim |

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, vjera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Međutim, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Međutim, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi

vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode
u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, i vlada
dužnosnici često ističu "islamski fundamentalizam" kao sljedeći
ideološka prijetnja liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno
o analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije
pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. To je moja tvrdnja
da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija,
može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Zemlja
specifične i deskriptivne studije ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi pomogli
objašnjavamo različite odnose između islama i politike diljem svijeta
zemalja muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju
traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama,
demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, to previše
naglasak se stavlja na moć islama kao političke snage. ja prvi
koristiti komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru
između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi,

i društveni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamističke oporbene stranke i potencijal za angažman u EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

U svjetlu sve veće važnosti islamističkih pokreta u muslimanskom svijetu i

način na koji je radikalizacija utjecala na globalna događanja od prijelaza stoljeća, to

važno je da EU ocijeni svoje politike prema akterima unutar onoga što može biti labavo

nazvan "islamski svijet". Osobito je važno postaviti pitanje treba li i kako se uključiti

s raznim islamističkim skupinama.

To ostaje kontroverzno čak i unutar EU. Neki smatraju da islam to cijeni

laži iza islamističkih stranaka jednostavno su nekompatibilne sa zapadnim idealima demokracije i

ljudska prava, dok drugi angažman vide kao realnu nužnost zbog rastućeg

domaća važnost islamističkih stranaka i njihova sve veća uključenost u međunarodne

poslova. Druga perspektiva je da bi se demokratizacija u muslimanskom svijetu povećala

europska sigurnost. Valjanost ovih i drugih argumenata o tome hoće li i kako

EU bi se trebao angažirati može se testirati samo proučavanjem različitih islamističkih pokreta i

njihove političke prilike, zemlja po zemlja.

Demokratizacija je središnja tema zajedničkog vanjskopolitičkog djelovanja EU-a, kako je položeno

u članku 11 Ugovora o Europskoj uniji. Mnoge države koje se u ovome razmatraju

izvješća nisu demokratska, ili ne potpuno demokratski. U većini ovih zemalja, islamistički

stranke i pokreti čine značajnu opoziciju vladajućim režimima, i

u nekima čine najveći oporbeni blok. Europske demokracije odavno su morale

nositi se s vladajućim režimima koji su autoritarni, ali to je nova pojava za tisak

za demokratsku reformu u državama u kojima bi najvjerojatnije mogli imati koristi, od

Gledište EU, različiti i ponekad problematični pristupi demokraciji i njezinim

povezane vrijednosti, kao što su prava manjina i žena te vladavina prava. Ove optužbe su

često protiv islamističkih pokreta, pa je za kreatore europske politike važno da

imati točnu sliku politika i filozofija potencijalnih partnera.

Iskustva iz različitih zemalja sugeriraju da je više slobode islamista

zabave su dopuštene, što su umjereniji u svojim postupcima i idejama. U mnogim

slučajevima islamističke stranke i skupine odavno su se udaljile od svog izvornog cilja

uspostavljanja islamske države kojom upravlja islamski zakon, i prihvatili su osnovne

demokratska načela izbornog nadmetanja za vlast, postojanje drugih političkih

natjecatelji, i politički pluralizam.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Jesu li Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, u

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

da postoji tendencija zanemarivanja činjenice da su mnoge zemlje Bliskog istoka bile

sudjelovao u brutalnom gušenju islamističkih pokreta, uzrokujući ih, neki tvrde, uzeti

oružjem protiv države, a rjeđe, strane zemlje. Korištenje političkog nasilja je

raširena na Bliskom istoku, ali nije ni nelogičan ni iracionalan. U mnogim slučajevima čak

Islamističke skupine poznate po korištenju nasilja pretvorene su u miroljubive političke

stranaka koje su se uspješno natjecale na općinskim i nacionalnim izborima. Usprkos tome, islamista

oživljavanje na Bliskom istoku ostaje djelomično neobjašnjeno unatoč brojnim teorijama koje nastoje

objasniti njegov rast i popularnost. Općenito, većina teorija drži da je islamizam a

reakcija na relativnu deprivaciju, osobito društvene nejednakosti i političkog ugnjetavanja. Alternativa

teorije traže odgovor na islamistički preporod unutar granica same religije i

snažan, evokativni potencijal religijskog simbolizma.

Zaključak govori u prilog nadilaženja pristupa "mraka i propasti" koji

prikazuje islamizam kao nelegitiman politički izraz i potencijalnu prijetnju Zapadu ("Star

islamizam”), i nijansiranijeg razumijevanja trenutne demokratizacije islamističkog

pokreta koji se sada odvija diljem Bliskog istoka (“Novi islamizam”). Ovaj

u prvi plan se stavlja važnost razumijevanja ideoloških korijena “novog islamizma”.

zajedno s potrebom za temeljitim poznavanjem islamističkih pokreta i njihovih iz prve ruke

pristaše. Kao društveni pokreti, Tvrdi se da treba staviti veći naglasak na

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGIJE ZA ANGAŽIRANJE POLITIČKOG ISLAMA

ŠADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politički islam je danas najaktivnija politička snaga na Bliskom istoku. Njegova je budućnost usko povezana s budućnošću regije. Ako su Sjedinjene Države i Europska unija predani podršci političkih reformi u regiji, trebat će osmisliti beton, koherentne strategije za angažiranje islamističkih skupina. Još, sad. općenito nije bio voljan otvoriti dijalog s tim pokretima. Na sličan način, Angažman EU-a s islamistima bio je izuzetak, nije pravilo. Gdje postoje kontakti niske razine, oni uglavnom služe u svrhe prikupljanja informacija, ne strateški ciljevi. Sad. i EU imaju niz programa koji se bave gospodarskim i političkim razvojem u regiji – među njima i Bliskoistočna partnerska inicijativa (MEPI), korporacija Millennium Challenge (MCC), uniji za Mediteran, i Europska politika susjedstva (ENP) – ali imaju malo toga za reći o tome kako se izazov islamističke političke opozicije uklapa u šire regionalne ciljeve. NAS. a pomoć i programiranje demokracije EU-a gotovo su u potpunosti usmjereni ili na same autoritarne vlade ili na sekularne skupine civilnog društva s minimalnom podrškom u vlastitim društvima.
Sazrelo je vrijeme za preispitivanje trenutne politike. Od terorističkih napada u rujnu 11, 2001, podupiranje demokracije na Bliskom istoku postalo je važnije za zapadne kreatore politike, koji vide vezu između nedostatka demokracije i političkog nasilja. Veća pažnja posvećena je razumijevanju varijacija unutar političkog islama. Nova američka administracija otvorenija je za širenje komunikacije s muslimanskim svijetom. U međuvremenu, velika većina glavnih islamističkih organizacija – uključujući Muslimansko bratstvo u Egiptu, Jordanski front islamske akcije (IAF), Marokanska stranka pravde i razvoja (PJD), Islamski ustavni pokret Kuvajta, i Jemenska stranka Islah – potporu političkim reformama i demokraciji sve više čine središnjom komponentom svojih političkih platformi. U Dodatku, mnogi su signalizirali snažan interes za otvaranje dijaloga sa SAD-om. i vlade EU.
Budućnost odnosa između zapadnih nacija i Bliskog istoka može biti uvelike određena stupnjem do kojeg prve angažiraju nenasilne islamističke stranke u širokom dijalogu o zajedničkim interesima i ciljevima. Nedavno je došlo do proliferacije studija o angažmanu s islamistima, ali malo ih se jasno bavi što bi to moglo značiti u praksi. As Zoé Nautré, gostujući suradnik u Njemačkom vijeću za vanjske odnose, stavlja ga, “EU razmišlja o angažmanu, ali zapravo ne zna kako.”1 U nadi da će razjasniti raspravu, razlikujemo tri razine „angažmana,” svaki s različitim sredstvima i ciljevima: kontakti niske razine, strateški dijalog, i partnerstvo.

Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements

Tamara Cofman

Between 1991 i 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Danas, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Usprkos tome, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderates” ili “reformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Politički islam i europska vanjska politika

POLITIČKI ISLAM I EUROPSKA POLITIKA SUSJEDSTVA

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Od 2001 a međunarodni događaji koji su uslijedili zbog prirode odnosa Zapada i političkog islama postali su odlučujuće pitanje za vanjsku politiku. Posljednjih godina poduzeta je značajna količina istraživanja i analiza po pitanju političkog islama. To je pomoglo ispraviti neke pojednostavljene i alarmantne pretpostavke koje su se prije držale na Zapadu o prirodi islamističkih vrijednosti i namjera. Paralelno s ovim, Europska Unija (MI) razvio je niz političkih inicijativa prvenstveno Europsku politiku susjedstva(ENP) koji se u principu obvežu na dijalog i dublje angažman(nenasilno) politički akteri i organizacije civilnog društva u arapskim zemljama. Ipak, mnogi analitičari i kreatori politike sada se žale na određeni trofej i u konceptualnoj raspravi i u razvoju politike. Utvrđeno je da je politički islam krajolik koji se mijenja, duboko pogođen nizom okolnosti, no čini se da je rasprava često zapela o pojednostavljenom pitanju "jesu li islamisti demokratski?'Mnogi su neovisni analitičari unatoč tome zagovarali angažman s islamistima, ali stvarno zbližavanje zapadnih vlada i islamističkih organizacija i dalje je ograničeno .

THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Umjesto toga, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonezija, Malezija, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (islamsko pravo) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. U 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,vojnici, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. U rujnu 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.