RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "Al-Qaida"

Von Rebellenbewegung zu Politische Partei

Alastair Crooke

Die Ansicht von vielen im Westen gehalten, dass Transformation von einer bewaffneten Widerstandsbewegung politische Partei sollte linear, sollte durch einen Verzicht auf Gewalt vorangestellt werden, der Zivilgesellschaft und vermittelt durch moderate Politiker sollten hat für den Fall der Islamischen Widerstandsbewegung wenig Realität erleichtert werden (Hamas). Dies ist nicht zu vermuten, dass die Hamas Gegenstand eine politische Transformation nicht gewesen: es hat. Aber diese Transformation wurde trotz der westlichen Bemühungen erreicht und nicht durch diese Bemühungen erleichtert. Während verbleibenden einen Bewegungswiderstand, Hamas hat die Regierung der Palästinensischen Behörde worden und hat seine militärische Haltung geändert. Aber diese Transformation hat einen anderen Verlauf der in der traditionellen Konfliktlösungsmodelle skizziert ein genommen. Hamas und andere islamistische Gruppen sich weiterhin als Widerstandsbewegungen sehen, aber immer sehen sie die Aussicht, dass ihre Organisationen in politische Strömungen entwickeln können, die auf gewalt resistance.Standard Konfliktlösungsmodelle stützen sich stark auf die westliche Erfahrung in der Konfliktlösung fokussiert sind und oft die unterschiedlichen Ansätze in der islamischen Geschichte der Friedensschaffung ignorieren. Nicht überraschend, die Hamas Ansatz zu politischen Verhandlungen unterscheidet sich in der Art, dass der Westen. Ebenfalls, als islamistische Bewegung, dass die breitere Optik der Auswirkungen des Westens auf ihren Gesellschaften Aktien, Hamas hat Anforderungen an Authentizität und Legitimität in seinem eigenen Wahlkreis, der auf der Bedeutung tragen an der Aufrechterhaltung eine bewaffnete Fähigkeit. Diese Faktoren, gemeinsam mit der überwältigenden Wirkung des langfristigen Konflikts auf einer Psychologie-Community (ein Aspekt, der wenig Aufmerksamkeit in der westlichen Modellen erhält, die auf politische Analyse überwiegendes Gewicht zugelegt), schlägt vor, dass der Transformationsprozess für die Hamas aus der Umwandlung von Waffen Bewegungen sehr unterschiedlich in der traditionellen Analyse wurde. Außerdem, die rauen Landschaft des israelisch - palästinensischen Konflikt gibt die Hamas ihre besondere characteristics.Hamas erleben, ist in der Mitte einer wichtigen Transformation, aber die politischen Strömungen innerhalb Israel, und innerhalb der Region, macht das Ergebnis dieser Transformation unberechenbar. Viel wird über den Verlauf der westlichen Politik abhängen (seine „Global War on Terror“) und wie, dass die politischen Auswirkungen Erweckungsislamistische Gruppen wie die Hamas, Gruppen, die an Wahlen begangen werden, Reform und gute Regierungsführung.

Terroristischen und extremistischen Bewegungen im Nahen Osten

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorismus und asymmetrische Kriegsführung sind kaum neue Features des Nahen Ostens militärischen Gleichgewichts, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, jedoch, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
PLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Marokko, Libya, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Katar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorismus und asymmetrische Kriegsführung sind kaum neue Features des Nahen Ostens militärischen Gleichgewichts, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, jedoch, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Marokko, Libya, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Katar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

TERORRIST Diaspora in THE MIDDLE EAST und Südasien

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze


Seit der Erklärung eines globalen Krieg gegen den Terror der Bush-Regierung nach 11.09, Wissenschaftler und Politiker suchten Wege haben die globale terroristische Bedrohung zu begegnen. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Außerdem, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Folglich, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Aber, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.