所有帶有標籤的條目: "Turkey’s AKP"

埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 對抗或整合?

Research

全球化與政治伊斯蘭: 土耳其福利黨的社會基礎

Haldun Gulalp

伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力

托比·阿徹

海蒂Huuhtanen

中東的政治伊斯蘭教

是克努森

參與政治伊斯蘭的策略

沙迪哈米德

AMANDA卡德萊茨

伊斯蘭政黨 : 無權參與

Malika Zeghal

伊斯蘭激進化

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

反對土耳其社會中心和邊緣的變革以及正義與發展黨的崛起

拉敏Ahmadov

土耳其和歐盟: 土耳其國會議員歐盟願景調查

庫德雷特鵯

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (歐盟) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

熱心的民主人士 : 埃及的伊斯蘭主義和民主, 印度尼西亞和土耳其

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. 同時, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. 確實, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

土耳其正義與發展黨的成功絕不能淡化對阿拉伯伊斯蘭主義者的擔憂

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “伊斯蘭主義者” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. 事實上, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, 該 “西方”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

TAYYIP ERDOĞAN 是新的納塞爾嗎

Last Thursday night, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan suddenly became the focus of all the news channels in the country. The reason was that he had stormed the diplomatic scene at a World Economic Forum panel in Davos by accusing Israeli President Shimon Peres for “killing people,” and reminding the biblical commandment, “Thou shall not kill.”

This was not just breaking news to the media, but also music to the ears of millions of Turks who were deeply touched by the recent bloodshed that Israel caused in the Gaza Strip. Some of them even hit the streets in order to welcome Erdoğan, who had decided to come to Istanbul right away after the tense debate. Thousands of cars headed toward the Atatürk airport in the middle of the night in order to welcome “the conqueror of Davos.

” ’Turkey is proud of you’

I personally had a more mundane problem at that very moment. In order to catch my 5 a.m. flight, I had left home at a quite reasonable time, 2.30 a.m. But the traffic to the airport was completely locked because of the amazing number of cars destined toward it. So, after leaving the taxi at the start of the long river of vehicles, I had to walk on the highway for about two kilometers, my hands on my luggage and my eyes on the crowd. When Erdoğan finally stepped out of the terminal, while I just walking into it, thousands applauded him and started to chant, “Turkey is proud of you!”

“穆斯林民主”的興起”

瓦利納斯爾

一個幽靈困擾著穆斯林世界. 這個特殊的幽靈不是原教旨主義極端主義的惡毒和備受爭議的精神, 也沒有被稱為自由伊斯蘭教的幻影希望. 反而, 我心目中的幽靈是第三種力量, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) 政黨在孟加拉國成功爭奪選票, 印度尼西亞, 馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦 (之前 1999 軍事政變), 和土耳其。不像伊斯蘭主義者, 他們對伊斯蘭教法統治的願景 (伊斯蘭法) 甚至恢復哈里發, 穆斯林民主黨人以務實的眼光看待政治生活. 他們拒絕或至少貶低伊斯蘭主義者的經典主張，即伊斯蘭教命令追求伊斯蘭教法國家, 他們的主要目標是在他們尊重的民主領域內製定可行的選舉平台和穩定的執政聯盟，以服務於個人和集體利益——伊斯蘭和世俗的利益——更加平凡, 贏或輸. 伊斯蘭主義者認為民主不是非常合法的東西, 但充其量是一種工具或策略，可能有助於獲得建立伊斯蘭國家的權力.

揭開面紗

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. 今天,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. 埃及, 約旦, 突尼斯, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, 黎巴嫩, 伊拉克, 和巴勒斯坦領土,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, 我們. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

伊斯蘭運動: 政治自由 & 民主

優素福·卡拉達維博士

這是人的職責 (清真) 下一階段的運動堅決反對極權獨裁統治, 政治專制和篡奪民權. 運動應始終支持政治自由, 如真,不假, 民主. 它應該斷然宣布它拒絕暴君並避開所有獨裁者, 即使某些暴君似乎對它有良好的意圖，以獲取一些利益，而且時間通常很短, 正如經驗所表明的那樣。先知 (鋸) 說, “當你看到我的國家成為恐懼的犧牲品，而不是對做錯事的人說, “你錯了”, 那麼你可能會對他們失去希望。”那麼，一個強迫人們對自負的不法者說話的政權怎麼樣？, “怎麼剛剛, 你有多棒. 哦，我們的英雄, 我們的救世主和我們的解放者!”《古蘭經》譴責像努姆魯德這樣的暴君, 法老, 哈曼等, 但它也鄙視那些追隨暴君並服從他們命令的人. 這就是為什麼安拉蔑視諾亞比的人說, “但他們跟隨 (米) 他們的財富和孩子不會給他們增加，只會給他們帶來損失。” [諾亞的信; 21]安拉也提到了廣告, 胡德人, “並且聽從了每一個強者的命令, 頑固的違法者”. [胡德的信:59]也看看古蘭經是怎麼說法老的人民的, “但他們聽從了法老的命令, 法老的命令沒有得到正確的引導。[胡德的信: 97] “因此他愚弄了他的人民, 他們服從了他: 他們確實是一個叛逆的民族 (反對真主).” [蘇拉特·祖赫魯夫: 54]仔細研究穆斯林民族的歷史和現代伊斯蘭運動應該清楚地表明，伊斯蘭思想, 除非在民主和自由的氣氛中，否則伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒從未繁榮或結出果實, 只有在壓迫和暴政踐踏了堅持伊斯蘭教的人民的意誌時，它們才會枯萎和貧瘠. 這種壓迫政權強加了他們的世俗主義, 通過武力和脅迫對其人民實行社會主義或共產主義, 使用秘密酷刑和公開處決, 並使用那些撕裂肉體的惡魔工具,流血, 粉碎骨頭並摧毀靈魂。我們在許多穆斯林國家看到了這些做法, 包括土耳其, 埃及, 敘利亞, 伊拉克, (前者) 南也門, 不同時期的索馬里和北非國家, 取決於每個國家獨裁者的年齡或統治時期。另一方面, 我們看到伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒在自由和民主時代結出碩果並蓬勃發展, 在以恐懼和壓迫統治人民的帝國政權崩潰之後。因此, 我無法想像伊斯蘭運動會支持政治自由和民主以外的任何東西。暴君允許每個人發出聲音, 除了伊斯蘭教的聲音, 讓每一種趨勢都以政黨或某種團體的形式表現出來, 除了伊斯蘭潮流，它是唯一真正代表這個國家並表達它的趨勢, 價值觀, 本質和存在.

伊斯蘭教的政治復興: 埃及案例

Nazihñ. 中號. Ayubi

he Middle East was the cradle of the world’s three great monotheistic religions,and to this day they continue to play a very important role it its affairs.The recent events in Iran, 沙特阿拉伯, and Afghanistan, and in Libya andPakistan, as well as the less widely publicized events in Turkey, 敘利亞, Egyptand the Gulf, have stimulated and renewed people’s interest in understandingboth the role of religion and the religious revival in the Middle East.It should be observed here that I speak of religious revival, not only of Islamicrevival, for in addition to Islamic movements we have the Likud bloc(with its important religious component) in power in Israel for the first time inthat state’s three decades of existence, while in Lebanon and in Egypt we canobserve Christian revivalist movements that cannot be regarded entirely ascounterreactions.However, it is the so-called Islamic revival that has drawn people’s attentionmost in the West, owing in part to political and international considerations.