Wszystkie wpisy oznaczone tagiem: "Turkey’s AKP"
MUZUŁMAŃSCY BRACIA EGIPTU: KONFRONTACJA CZY INTEGRACJA?
Research
GLOBALIZACJA I ISLAM POLITYCZNY: PODSTAWY SPOŁECZNE TURCJI OPIEKI SPOŁECZNEJ
Haldun Gulalp
Islamskie partie opozycyjne i potencjał zaangażowania UE
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Islam polityczny na Bliskim Wschodzie
Czy Knudsen
STRATEGIE ANGAŻOWANIA ISLAMÓW POLITYCZNYCH
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
Partie Islamskie : uczestnictwo bez władzy
Malika Zeghal
RADYKALIZACJA ISLAMISTÓW
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Przeciwdziałać przemianom w centrum i na peryferiach społeczeństwa tureckiego oraz powstaniu Partii Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju
Ramin Ahmadov
Turcja i UE: Ankieta na temat wizji UE tureckich parlamentarzystów
Kudret Bulbul
Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.
gorliwi demokraci : ISLAMIZM I DEMOKRACJA W EGIPCIE, INDONEZJA I TURCJA
The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.
They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. W tym samym czasie, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Rzeczywiście, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.
Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.
Sukces tureckiej partii AK nie może osłabiać obaw o arabskich islamistów
Mona Eltahawy
It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “islamista” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Faktycznie, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, ten “Zachód”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.
CZY TAYYIP ERDO (NOWY NASSER)
Last Thursday night, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan suddenly became the focus of all the news channels in the country. The reason was that he had stormed the diplomatic scene at a World Economic Forum panel in Davos by accusing Israeli President Shimon Peres for “killing people,” and reminding the biblical commandment, “Thou shall not kill.”
This was not just breaking news to the media, but also music to the ears of millions of Turks who were deeply touched by the recent bloodshed that Israel caused in the Gaza Strip. Some of them even hit the streets in order to welcome Erdoğan, who had decided to come to Istanbul right away after the tense debate. Thousands of cars headed toward the Atatürk airport in the middle of the night in order to welcome “the conqueror of Davos.
” ’Turkey is proud of you’
I personally had a more mundane problem at that very moment. In order to catch my 5 a.m. flight, I had left home at a quite reasonable time, 2.30 a.m. But the traffic to the airport was completely locked because of the amazing number of cars destined toward it. So, after leaving the taxi at the start of the long river of vehicles, I had to walk on the highway for about two kilometers, my hands on my luggage and my eyes on the crowd. When Erdoğan finally stepped out of the terminal, while I just walking into it, thousands applauded him and started to chant, “Turkey is proud of you!”
POWSTANIE „DEMOKRACJI MUZUŁMAŃSKIEJ””
Vali Nasr
A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonezja, Malezja, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (prawo islamskie) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.
Rozstanie zasłony
shadi hamid
America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Dziś,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egipt, Jordania, Tunezja, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Liban, Irak, i terytoria palestyńskie,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, NAS. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.
Ruch islamski: Wolność polityczna & Demokracja
dr Yusuf al-Karadawi
To jest obowiązek (islamski) Ruch w nadchodzącej fazie, aby stanowczo przeciwstawić się totalitarnym i dyktatorskim rządom, despotyzm polityczny i uzurpacja praw człowieka. Ruch powinien zawsze stać na straży wolności politycznej, reprezentowane przez true,nie fałszywe, demokracja. Powinna stanowczo ogłosić odmowę tyranów i omijać wszystkich dyktatorów, nawet jeśli jakiś tyran wydaje się mieć wobec niego dobre intencje dla jakiegoś zysku i przez zwykle krótki czas, jak pokazało doświadczenie. Prorok (PIŁY) powiedział, „Kiedy widzisz, że mój naród pada ofiarą strachu i nie mówi złemu – sprawcy, "Mylisz się", wtedy możesz stracić w nich nadzieję”. A co z reżimem, który zmusza ludzi do mówienia zarozumiałemu złoczyńcy?, „Jak po prostu, jaki jesteś wspaniały. O nasz bohater, nasz zbawiciel i nasz wyzwoliciel!„Koran potępia tyranów takich jak Numrudh, faraon, Haman i inni, ale też znieważa tych, którzy podążają za tyranami i wypełniają ich rozkazy”.. Oto dlaczego Allah znieważa lud Noego mówiąc:, „Ale oni podążają (m in) których majątek i dzieci nie dają im wzrostu, a jedynie stratę”. [List Noego; 21]Allah mówi również o Adi, ludzie z Hudu, „I postępował zgodnie z poleceniem wszystkich potężnych, uparty przestępca”. [List Huda:59]Zobacz także, co Koran mówi o ludu faraona, „Ale postępowali zgodnie z poleceniem faraona, a rozkaz faraona nie był właściwie prowadzony.[List Huda: 97] „W ten sposób uczynił głupców ze swojego ludu”, i byli mu posłuszni: naprawdę byli ludem zbuntowanym (przeciwko Allahowi).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Bliższe spojrzenie na historię Narodu Muzułmańskiego i Ruchu Islamskiego we współczesnych czasach powinno jasno pokazać, że idea Islamu, Ruch Islamski i Islamskie Przebudzenie nigdy nie rozkwitły ani nie przyniosły owoców, chyba że w atmosferze demokracji i wolności, i zwiędły i stały się bezpłodne tylko w czasach ucisku i tyranii, które deptały wolę narodów, które przylgnęły do islamu. Takie opresyjne reżimy narzucały ich sekularyzm, socjalizm lub komunizm na swoich narodach siłą i przymusem, stosując tajne tortury i publiczne egzekucje, i posługując się tymi diabelskimi narzędziami, które rozdzierają ciało,przelać krew, zmiażdżył kości i zniszczył duszę. Widzieliśmy te praktyki w wielu krajach muzułmańskich, w tym Turcja, Egipt, Syria, Irak, (były) Jemen Południowy, Somalia i północne kraje Afryki przez różne okresy, w zależności od wieku lub panowania dyktatora w każdym kraju. Z drugiej strony, widzieliśmy, jak Ruch Islamski i Islamskie Przebudzenie przynosiły owoce i rozkwitały w czasach wolności i demokracji, oraz w następstwie upadku imperialnych reżimów, które rządziły narodami ze strachem i uciskiem, Nie wyobrażam sobie, żeby Ruch Islamski mógł wspierać cokolwiek innego niż wolność polityczną i demokrację. Tyrani pozwolili na podniesienie każdego głosu, z wyjątkiem głosu islamu, i niech każdy trend wyraża się w formie partii politycznej lub jakiegoś organu, z wyjątkiem nurtu islamskiego, który jest jedynym trendem, który faktycznie przemawia w imieniu tego Narodu i wyraża go jasną powagą, wartości, istota i samo istnienie.
Polityczne odrodzenie islamu: Przypadek Egiptu
Nazih N. M. Ajubi
he Middle East was the cradle of the world’s three great monotheistic religions,and to this day they continue to play a very important role it its affairs.The recent events in Iran, Arabia Saudyjska, and Afghanistan, and in Libya andPakistan, as well as the less widely publicized events in Turkey, Syria, Egyptand the Gulf, have stimulated and renewed people’s interest in understandingboth the role of religion and the religious revival in the Middle East.It should be observed here that I speak of religious revival, not only of Islamicrevival, for in addition to Islamic movements we have the Likud bloc(with its important religious component) in power in Israel for the first time inthat state’s three decades of existence, while in Lebanon and in Egypt we canobserve Christian revivalist movements that cannot be regarded entirely ascounterreactions.However, it is the so-called Islamic revival that has drawn people’s attentionmost in the West, owing in part to political and international considerations.