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MESIR'S MUSLIM BROTHERS: KONFRONTASI ATAU INTEGRASI?

Riset

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. menanggapi, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, rezim harus mengambil langkah awal untuk menormalkan partisipasi Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam kehidupan politik. Saudara Muslim, yang aktivitas sosialnya telah lama ditoleransi tetapi perannya dalam politik formal sangat terbatas, memenangkan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya 20 persen kursi parlemen di 2005 pemilihan. Mereka melakukannya meskipun bersaing hanya untuk sepertiga dari kursi yang tersedia dan meskipun ada banyak rintangan, termasuk represi polisi dan kecurangan pemilu. Keberhasilan ini menegaskan posisi mereka sebagai kekuatan politik yang sangat terorganisir dengan baik dan mengakar. Pada waktu bersamaan, itu menggarisbawahi kelemahan oposisi hukum dan partai yang berkuasa. Rezim mungkin telah bertaruh bahwa sedikit peningkatan dalam perwakilan parlemen Ikhwanul Muslimin dapat digunakan untuk memicu ketakutan akan pengambilalihan oleh kelompok Islam dan dengan demikian menjadi alasan untuk menghentikan reformasi.. Jika begitu, strateginya berisiko besar menjadi bumerang.

GLOBALISASI DAN POLITIK ISLAM: DASAR SOSIAL PIHAK KESEJAHTERAAN TURKI

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. Makalah ini akan, karena itu, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, dengan 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Namun, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Pihak Oposisi Islam dan Potensi Engagement Uni Eropa

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, dia

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

hak asasi manusia, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamis

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, dan

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Politik Islam di Timur Tengah

Apakah Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. Laporan ini memberikan penekanan khusus untuk Timur Tengah, di

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Namun, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

STRATEGI UNTUK MELAKUKAN POLITIK ISLAM

Shadi HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politik Islam adalah kekuatan politik yang paling aktif di Timur Tengah hari ini. masa depan adalah terkait erat dengan daerah. Jika Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa berkomitmen untuk mendukung reformasi politik di daerah, mereka akan perlu untuk merancang beton, koheren strategi untuk melibatkan kelompok-kelompok Islam. Belum, Amerika Serikat. secara umum telah bersedia untuk membuka dialog dengan gerakan-gerakan ini. Demikian pula, keterlibatan Uni Eropa dengan Islam telah pengecualian, tidak aturan. Dimana tingkat rendah ada kontak, mereka terutama melayani tujuan pengumpulan-informasi, tidak strategis tujuan. Amerika Serikat. dan Uni Eropa memiliki sejumlah program yang menangani pembangunan ekonomi dan politik di wilayah ini - di antara mereka di Timur Tengah Inisiatif Kemitraan (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (PKS), Uni untuk Mediterania, dan Kebijakan Lingkungan Eropa (EPP) - Namun mereka memiliki sedikit untuk mengatakan tentang bagaimana tantangan oposisi Islam politik pas dengan tujuan regional yang lebih luas. AS. dan Uni Eropa demokrasi bantuan dan program diarahkan hampir seluruhnya baik pemerintah otoriter sendiri atau kelompok-kelompok masyarakat sipil sekuler dengan dukungan minimal dalam masyarakat mereka sendiri.
Waktu yang matang untuk penilaian ulang kebijakan saat ini. Sejak serangan teroris September 11, 2001, mendukung demokrasi di Timur Tengah telah mengambil kepentingan yang lebih besar bagi para pembuat kebijakan Barat, yang melihat hubungan antara kurangnya demokrasi dan kekerasan politik. Perhatian yang lebih besar telah dikhususkan untuk memahami variasi dalam Islam politik. Pemerintah Amerika baru yang lebih terbuka untuk memperluas komunikasi dengan dunia Muslim. Sementara itu, sebagian besar organisasi Islam mainstream - termasuk Ikhwanul Muslimin di Mesir, Yordania Front Aksi Islam (IAF), Maroko Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan (PJD), Gerakan Konstitusi Islam Kuwait, dan Yaman Islah Partai - telah semakin membuat dukungan bagi reformasi politik dan demokrasi komponen utama dalam platform politik mereka. Selain, banyak telah mengisyaratkan minat yang kuat dalam membuka dialog dengan AS. dan pemerintah Uni Eropa.
Masa depan hubungan antara negara-negara Barat dan Timur Tengah mungkin sebagian besar ditentukan oleh sejauh mana yang pertama melibatkan partai-partai Islam anti kekerasan dalam dialog yang luas tentang kepentingan bersama dan tujuan. Telah ada proliferasi baru-baru ini studi tentang keterlibatan dengan Islamis, tetapi sedikit alamat jelas apa yang mungkin memerlukan dalam praktek. Sebagai Nautré Zoe, mengunjungi rekan-rekan di Dewan Hubungan Luar Negeri Jerman, dikatakan, "Uni Eropa berpikir tentang keterlibatan tetapi tidak benar-benar tahu bagaimana." 1 Dalam harapan mengklarifikasi diskusi, kita membedakan antara tiga tingkat "keterlibatan,"Masing-masing dengan cara yang bervariasi dan berakhir: tingkat rendah kontak, dialog strategis, dan kemitraan.

Pihak Islam : partisipasi tanpa kekuasaan

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. Di Mesir, Ikhwanul Muslimin (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Sejak awal 1990-an, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Radikalisasi Islam

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Counter Transformasi di Pusat dan pinggiran Masyarakat Turki dan Kebangkitan Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Setelah itu, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Menariknya, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (dari 8.35 % di 2002). Akhirnya, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

Turki dan Uni Eropa: Sebuah Survei Visi anggota parlemen Uni Eropa Turki '

Power Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (SAYA) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

bersemangat demokrat : Islamisme DAN DEMOKRASI DI MESIR, INDONESIA DAN TURKI

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Pada waktu bersamaan, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Memang, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Keberhasilan Partai AK Turki tidak boleh encer kekhawatiran atas Islamis Arab

Mona Eltahawy

Tidak mengherankan bahwa sejak Abdullah Gul menjadi presiden Turki 27 Agustus banyak analisis yang salah arah telah disia-siakan tentang bagaimana “Islamis” bisa lulus ujian demokrasi. Kemenangannya pasti akan digambarkan sebagai “Islamis” perutean politik Turki. Dan Islamis Arab – dalam bentuk Ikhwanul Muslimin, pendukung dan pembela mereka – selalu menunjuk ke Turki dan memberi tahu kami bahwa selama ini kami salah untuk mengkhawatirkan Islamis Arab itu’ dugaan godaan dengan demokrasi. “Ini berhasil di Turki, itu bisa berhasil di dunia Arab,” mereka akan mencoba meyakinkan kita. Salah. Dan salah. Pertama, Gul bukanlah seorang Islamis. Jilbab istrinya mungkin menjadi kain merah bagi banteng nasionalis sekuler di Turki, tetapi baik Gul maupun Partai AK yang menyapu pemilihan parlemen di Turki pada bulan Juni, bisa disebut Islamis. Sebenarnya, begitu sedikit yang dimiliki Partai AK dengan Ikhwanul Muslimin – selain dari keyakinan umum para anggotanya – bahwa tidak masuk akal menggunakan keberhasilannya dalam politik Turki sebagai alasan untuk mengurangi ketakutan atas peran Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam politik Arab. Tiga tes lakmus Islamisme akan membuktikan pendapat saya: wanita dan seks, yang “Barat”, dan Israel. Sebagai seorang Muslim sekuler yang telah bersumpah untuk tidak pernah tinggal di Mesir jika para Islamis pernah mengambil alih kekuasaan, Saya tidak pernah menganggap enteng upaya mencampurkan agama dengan politik. Jadi dengan pandangan skeptis saya telah mengikuti politik Turki selama beberapa tahun terakhir.

ADALAH TAYYIP ERDOĞAN THE NEW NASSER

Hurriyet DailyNews
Mustafa Akyol

Kamis malam kemarin, Perdana Menteri Turki Tayyip Erdoğan tiba-tiba menjadi fokus dari semua saluran berita di negara itu. Alasannya adalah dia telah menyerbu panggung diplomatik di panel Forum Ekonomi Dunia di Davos dengan menuduh Presiden Israel Shimon Peres karena “membunuh orang,” dan mengingatkan perintah alkitabiah, “Jangan membunuh.”

Ini bukan sekedar berita hangat ke media, tetapi juga musik di telinga jutaan orang Turki yang sangat tersentuh oleh pertumpahan darah baru-baru ini yang disebabkan Israel di Jalur Gaza. Beberapa dari mereka bahkan turun ke jalan untuk menyambut Erdogan, yang telah memutuskan untuk datang ke Istanbul segera setelah debat yang menegangkan. Ribuan mobil menuju ke bandara Atatürk di tengah malam untuk menyambut “penakluk Davos.

” 'Turki bangga padamu'

Saya pribadi memiliki masalah yang lebih biasa pada saat itu. Untuk menangkap saya 5 saya. penerbangan, Saya telah meninggalkan rumah pada waktu yang cukup masuk akal, 2.30 saya. Tapi lalu lintas ke bandara benar-benar terkunci karena banyaknya mobil yang menuju ke sana. Begitu, setelah meninggalkan taksi di awal sungai panjang kendaraan, Saya harus berjalan di jalan raya sekitar dua kilometer, tangan saya di atas barang bawaan saya dan mata saya tertuju pada kerumunan. Saat Erdogan akhirnya keluar dari terminal, sementara saya hanya berjalan ke dalamnya, ribuan orang bertepuk tangan dan mulai bernyanyi, “Turki bangga padamu!”

KEBANGKITAN DARI "MUSLIM DEMOKRASI”

Gubernur Nasr

momok adalah menghantui dunia Muslim. Ini momok tertentu memfitnah notthe dan banyak dibahas semangat fundamentalis ekstremisme, bukan juga harapan hantu yang dikenal sebagai Islam liberal. Sebagai gantinya, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Hukum Islam) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Perpisahan cadarnya itu

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Hari ini,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Mesir, Jordan, Tunisia, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Tiga dari pemerintahan paling demokratis di kawasan ini, Libanon, Irak, dan wilayah Palestina,sedang dicabik-cabik oleh kekerasan dan konflik sektarian. Belum lama ini, sepertinya hasil yang sama sekali berbeda akan segera terjadi. Baru-baru ini terlambat 2005, pengamat memuji "musim semi Arab",” sebuah “musim gugur untuk otokrat,” dan formulasi musiman lainnya. Mereka memiliki alasan untuk optimisme seperti itu. Pada bulan Januari 31, 2005, dunia berdiri dalam kekaguman kolektif ketika orang Irak menerjang ancaman teroris untuk memberikan suara mereka untuk pertama kalinya. Februari itu, Presiden Mesir Hosni Mubarak mengumumkan pemilihan presiden multi-kandidat, yang lain dulu. Dan di bulan yang sama, setelah mantan Perdana Menteri Lebanon Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid adalah direktur penelitian di Proyek Demokrasi Timur Tengah dan rekanan Proyek Keamanan Nasional Truman. Memisahkan Kerudung Sekarang bukan waktunya untuk menyerah mendukung demokrasi di dunia Muslim. Tetapi untuk melakukannya, Amerika Serikat harus merangkul kaum moderat Islam.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon meletus dalam kesedihan dan kemudian kemarahan ketika hampir satu juta orang Lebanon turun ke jalan-jalan di ibu kota mereka yang dilanda perang, menuntut penentuan nasib sendiri. Tidak lama kemudian, 50,000 Bahrain—seperdelapan dari populasi negara itu—berdemo untuk reformasi konstitusi. Oposisi akhirnya menjadi hidup. Tapi ketika musim semi Arab benar-benar datang, tanggapan Amerika memberikan sedikit bukti bahwa sementara orang Arab siap untuk demokrasi, Amerika Serikat pasti tidak. Melihat kembali, kegagalan upaya Pemerintahan Bush seharusnya tidak begitu mengejutkan. Sejak awal 1990-an, AS. pembuat kebijakan memiliki dua duel dan tujuan yang akhirnya tidak sesuai di Timur Tengah: mempromosikan demokrasi Arab di satu sisi, dan mengekang kekuatan dan daya tarik kelompok-kelompok Islamis di sisi lain. Dalam pidato pelantikannya yang kedua, Presiden George W. Bush menyatakan bahwa dalam mendukung demokrasi Arab, “kepentingan vital dan keyakinan terdalam kita” sekarang menjadi satu. Kenyataannya lebih rumit. Ketika kelompok-kelompok Islamis di seluruh wilayah mulai membuat keuntungan yang mengesankan di kotak suara, khususnya di Mesir dan di wilayah Palestina, pemerintahan Bush tersandung. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Gerakan Islam: Kebebasan Politik & Demokrasi

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Ini adalah tugas (Islam) Gerakan dalam fase mendatang tostand tegas terhadap pemerintahan totaliter dan diktator, politik despotisme dan perampasan hak-hak rakyat. Gerakan harus selalu stand by kebebasan politik, seperti yang diwakili oleh benar,tidak palsu, demokrasi. Ini harus tegas menyatakan itu penolakan tyrantsand menghindari semua diktator, bahkan jika tiran beberapa tampaknya havegood niat ke arah itu untuk mendapatkan beberapa dan untuk waktu yang biasanya pendek, seperti yang telah ditunjukkan oleh Nabi experience.The (Gergaji) mengatakan, "Bila Anda melihat korban jatuh Bangsa saya untuk takut dan tidak mengatakan kepada pelaku-yang salah, "Anda salah", thenyou mungkin kehilangan harapan di dalamnya "Jadi. bagaimana tentang rezim yang memaksa orang untuk berkata kepada seorang pelaku kesalahan sombong, "Bagaimana saja, betapa hebatnya Anda. O pahlawan kita, kami penyelamat dan pembebas kita!"Al-Qur'an mencela tiran seperti Numrudh, Firaun, Haman dan lain-lain, tetapi juga dispraises mereka yang mengikuti perintah mereka tiran andobey. Inilah sebabnya mengapa Allah dispraises rakyat Noahby mengatakan, "Tapi mereka mengikuti (m) yang harta dan childrengive mereka tidak naik tapi rugi saja. " [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah juga mengatakan Ad, orang Hud, "Dan diikuti thecommand setiap kuat, keras kepala pelanggar ". [Surat Hud:59]Lihat juga apa Quran mengatakan tentang orang-orang Firaun, "Butthey mengikuti perintah Firaun, ofPharaoh perintah dan tidak mendapat petunjuk.[Surat Hud: 97] "Jadi dia membuat bodoh umat-Nya, dan mereka patuh kepadanya: benar-benar mereka adalah orang-orang memberontak (terhadap Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Sebuah melihat lebih dekat pada sejarah Bangsa Muslim dan IslamicMovement di zaman modern harus menunjukkan dengan jelas bahwa Islamicidea, Gerakan Islam dan Kebangkitan Islam tidak pernah berkembang atau ditanggung buah kecuali dalam ofdemocracy suasana dan kebebasan, dan sudah layu dan menjadi tandus hanya pada waktu penindasan dan tirani yang menginjak di atas willof dari bangsa-bangsa yang menempel ke Islam. menindas tersebut regimesimposed sekularisme mereka, sosialisme atau komunisme pada masyarakat mereka dengan kekerasan dan pemaksaan, menggunakan rahasia penyiksaan dan publicexecutions, dan mempekerjakan orang-alat iblis yang merobek daging,menumpahkan darah, hancur tulang dan menghancurkan soul.We melihat praktik di negara-negara Muslim, termasuk Turki, Mesir, Suriah, Irak, (mantan) Yaman Selatan, Somaliaand Afrika utara Amerika untuk berbagai periode waktu, tergantung pada usia atau pemerintahan diktator di setiap country.On sisi lain, kita melihat Gerakan Islam dan berbuah Kebangkitan Islam dan berkembang pada saat-saat kebebasan dan demokrasi, dan di belakang runtuhnya rezim kekaisaran yang memerintah rakyat dengan rasa takut dan oppression.Therefore, Aku tidak membayangkan bahwa Gerakan Islam dapat mendukung apa-apa selain kebebasan politik dan tiran democracy.The memungkinkan setiap suara untuk dibesarkan, kecuali ofIslam suara, dan biarkan setiap tren mengekspresikan dirinya dalam bentuk politicalparty atau badan dari beberapa macam, kecuali arus Islam yang theonly tren yang benar-benar berbicara untuk Bangsa ini dan menyatakan itu yg panjang lebar, nilai, esensi dan eksistensinya.

Kebangkitan Politik Islam: Kasus Mesir

Nazih N. M. Ayubi

ia Timur Tengah adalah tempat lahirnya tiga agama monoteistik dunia besar,dan sampai hari ini mereka terus memainkan peran yang sangat penting itu peristiwa affairs.The yang baru-baru ini di Iran, Arab Saudi, dan Afghanistan, dan dalam andPakistan Libya, serta peristiwa kurang dipublikasikan secara luas di Turki, Suriah, Egyptand Teluk yang, telah merangsang dan diperbaharui minat masyarakat di understandingboth peran agama dan kebangkitan agama di East.It Tengah harus diamati di sini bahwa saya berbicara tentang kebangkitan agama, tidak hanya Islamicrevival, untuk di samping gerakan-gerakan Islam kita memiliki blok Likud(dengan komponen penting keagamaannya) berkuasa di Israel untuk tiga negara inthat kali pertama dekade keberadaan, sementara di Libanon dan di Mesir kita canobserve gerakan revivalis Kristen yang tidak dapat dianggap sepenuhnya ascounterreactions.However, itu adalah kebangkitan Islam yang disebut yang telah menarik attentionmost masyarakat di Barat, karena sebagian untuk pertimbangan politik dan internasional.