Kõik Entries Tagged With: "Turkey’s AKP"
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
ÜLEMAAILMASTUMISE JA poliitilise islami: SOTSIAALKOMITEELE ALUSED Türgi HEAOLU PARTY
Haldun Gulalp
Islamistlikud opositsiooniparteid ja ELi kaasamise potentsiaal
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Political Islam in the Middle East
Kas Knudsen
STRATEEGIATE tegelemise poliitilise islami
SHADI HAMID
Amanda Kadlec
islami Pooled : participation without power
Malika Zeghal
islami RADIKALISEERUMINE
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Counter transformatsioonid Center ja perifeeria Türgi ühiskonna ja Rise of Õigluse ja Arengu Partei
Ramin Ahmadov
Türgi ja EL: Survey Türgi parlamendiliikmed "ELi nägemus
Power ööbik
Kuigi Türgi unistus on Euroopa Liidu liikmeks (USA) ulatub tagasi 1950ndate lõpus, võib öelda, et see protsess on saavutanud oma hoogu, kuna reguleerivad aja Õigluse ja Arengu Partei, mis varsti nimetatakse AK partei või AKP Türgi. Võrreldes varasemate perioodidega, tohutu saavutusi ajal AK partei reegel on tunnustatud siseriiklike ja Euroopa asutuste samasugused. Paralleelse hiiglasliku sammu towardsthe Euroopa liikmeks, mis on nüüd reaalne võimalus Türgile, on olnud increasingdebates umbes selles protsessis. Kuigi mõned Euroopa asutused loovad poliitika üle Küprose issueagainst Türgi liikmelisuse, mõned teised peamiselt pliid Saksa kristlike demokraatide proposea privilegeeritud staatuse asemel täisliikmeks. Türgi ametiasutused ei vaikida üle thesearguments, ja ilmselt esimest korda Türgi välisminister saab väljendada, et "kui nad peaksid(USA) ettepaneku midagi puudu täisliikmeks, või uusi tingimusi, me kõnnime away.And seekord on see hea " (The Economist 2005 30-31) Pärast oktoobrit kolmas, Isegi hr. Abdullah Gul, kes on välisminister AK partei govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes et ei ole olemas sellist mõistet nn privilegeeritud partnerluse "raames dokumendi, (Kodakondsus, 2005) Prantsuse peaminister esitab, et see valik on tegelikult üks võimalikke alternatiive.
kirglik demokraadid : Islamismi ja demokraatia EGIPTUS, Indoneesia ja TÜRGI
Hirm islamistide võimuletulekut valimiste kaudu on pikka aega olnud takistuseks demokratiseerimise autoritaarsetes riikides moslemimaailma. Islamistid on, ja jätkuvalt, kõige paremini korraldatud ja kõige usaldusväärsema opositsiooniliikumise paljudes neist riikidest.
They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. At the same time, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Tõepoolest, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.
Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.
Edu Türgi AK lepinguosaline ei tohi lahjendada mure Araabia islamistide
Mona Eltahawy
It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Islamist” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Läände”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.
Erdogan on New Nasser Tayyip
Last Thursday night, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan suddenly became the focus of all the news channels in the country. The reason was that he had stormed the diplomatic scene at a World Economic Forum panel in Davos by accusing Israeli President Shimon Peres for “killing people,” and reminding the biblical commandment, “Thou shall not kill.”
This was not just breaking news to the media, but also music to the ears of millions of Turks who were deeply touched by the recent bloodshed that Israel caused in the Gaza Strip. Some of them even hit the streets in order to welcome Erdoğan, who had decided to come to Istanbul right away after the tense debate. Thousands of cars headed toward the Atatürk airport in the middle of the night in order to welcome “the conqueror of Davos.
” ’Turkey is proud of you’
I personally had a more mundane problem at that very moment. In order to catch my 5 a.m. flight, I had left home at a quite reasonable time, 2.30 a.m. But the traffic to the airport was completely locked because of the amazing number of cars destined toward it. Nii, after leaving the taxi at the start of the long river of vehicles, I had to walk on the highway for about two kilometers, my hands on my luggage and my eyes on the crowd. When Erdoğan finally stepped out of the terminal, while I just walking into it, thousands applauded him and started to chant, “Turkey is proud of you!”
RISE OF "moslemi DEMOKRAATIA”
Kuberner Nasr
Tont kummitavad moslemimaailma. See konkreetne tont on notthe kole ja palju räägitud vaimus fundamentalistlike äärmuslike, ega veel phantom loodan tuntud liberaalne islam. Selle asemel, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indoneesia, Malaisia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islami seaduste) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.
Jumalagajätt Veil
shadi hamid
America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Today,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egiptus, Jordaania, Tuneesia, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Liibanon, Iraak, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, USA. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.
Islamic Movement: Poliitiline vabadus & Demokraatia
Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi
On tollimaks (Islami) Liikumine järgmise etapi tostand firma vastu totalitaarsete ja diktatuuri, poliitilise võimutsemine ja anastamine inimeste õiguste. Liikumine peaks alati seista poliitilise vabaduse, mida esindab tõsi,ei ole vale, demokraatia. Tuleb otsustavalt kuulutada see keeldumine tyrantsand juhtida selge kõigi diktaatorite, isegi kui mõned türann tundub havegood kavatsusi suunas juba mõnda saada ja aega, mis on tavaliselt lühike, nagu on näidanud experience.The Prohvet (Saed) ütles, "Kui sa näed oma rahva ohvriks hirm ja ei ütle, et vale-tegija, "Te eksite", thenyou võib kaotada lootust neid. "Niisiis, kuidas umbes korra, mis sunnib inimesi öelda ennasttäis kurjategija, "Kuidas just, kui suur sa oled. O meie kangelane, meie päästja ja meie vabastaja!"Koraan denonsseeri tyranneja nagu Numrudh, Vaarao, Haamanin ja teised, kuid see ka dispraises kes järgivad tyranneja andobey oma tellimused. See on põhjus, miks Jumal dispraises inimesed Noahby öelda, "Aga nad järgivad (m) mille rikkus ja childrengive neid ei suurene, vaid ainult kahju. " [Surat nuh; 21]Jumal ka ütleb Kuulutus, inimesed Hud, "Ja järgneb thecommand iga võimas, jonnakas üleastujaks ". [Surat Hud:59]Vt ka, mida Koraan räägib isikute vaarao, "Butthey järgneb käsu vaarao, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] "Nii ta tegi lollid oma rahva, ja nad kuuletusid talle: tõeliselt need inimesed mässavad (Jumala eest).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Lähemal ajalugu moslemi Rahvus ja IslamicMovement tänapäeval peaks näitama selgelt, et Islamicidea, Islamic Movement ja islami Awakening ole kunagi õitsenud või kandnud vilja kui õhkkonnas ofdemocracy ja vabadus, ja on närtsinud ja muutunud viljatu ainult aegadel rõhumise ja türannia et trod üle willof rahvaste mis kiskusid islam. Selline ängistav regimesimposed oma ilmalikkuse, sotsialism või kommunism nende rahvaste jõu ja sunni, kasutades varjatud piinamise ja publicexecutions, ja kus töötab nende kuratlik tööriistu, rebis liha,valatud veri, purustatud luude ja hävitatakse soul.We nägin neid tavasid paljudes islamiriikides, sealhulgas Türgiga, Egiptus, Süüria, Iraak, (endine) Lõuna-Jeemen, Somaliaand Põhja-Aafrika riikide lühemaks ajaks, sõltuvalt vanusest või valitsemisaeg diktaator igas country.On Teisest küljest, nägime Islamic Movement ja islami Awakening vilja kandma ja õitseda aegadel vabaduse ja demokraatia, ja pärast kokkuvarisemist Imperial režiimide et välistada rahvaste hirmu ja oppression.Therefore, Ma ei usu, et islami liikumine võiks toetada millegi muu kui poliitilise vabaduse ja democracy.The tyranneja lubatud iga hääl tuleb tõsta, va häälega ofIslam, ja lase iga trend väljenduda kujul politicalparty või organi mingisuguse, välja arvatud islami praeguse mis on theonly trend, et tegelikult räägib see rahvas ning väljendab ta tasandusprussidega, väärtused, olemus ja olemasolu.
The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt
Nazih N. M. Ayubi
he Middle East was the cradle of the world’s three great monotheistic religions,and to this day they continue to play a very important role it its affairs.The recent events in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, and in Libya andPakistan, as well as the less widely publicized events in Turkey, Süüria, Egyptand the Gulf, have stimulated and renewed people’s interest in understandingboth the role of religion and the religious revival in the Middle East.It should be observed here that I speak of religious revival, not only of Islamicrevival, for in addition to Islamic movements we have the Likud bloc(with its important religious component) in power in Israel for the first time inthat state’s three decades of existence, while in Lebanon and in Egypt we canobserve Christian revivalist movements that cannot be regarded entirely ascounterreactions.However, it is the so-called Islamic revival that has drawn people’s attentionmost in the West, owing in part to political and international considerations.