ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, acadêmicos, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

Profissão, Colonialismo, Apartheid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (nomeadamente, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, e
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Ao mesmo tempo, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, e, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Ao mesmo tempo, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAMISMO, DEMOCRACIA & OS ESTADOS UNIDOS:

Fundação Córdoba

Abdullah faliq

Introdução ,


Apesar de ser um debate perene e complexo, Arches Quarterly reexamina a partir de fundamentos teológicos e práticos, o importante debate sobre a relação e compatibilidade entre o Islã e a Democracia, como ecoou na agenda de esperança e mudança de Barack Obama. Enquanto muitos celebram a ascensão de Obama ao Salão Oval como uma catarse nacional para os EUA, outros permanecem menos otimistas de uma mudança de ideologia e abordagem na arena internacional. Embora grande parte da tensão e desconfiança entre o mundo muçulmano e os EUA possa ser atribuída à abordagem de promover a democracia, tipicamente favorecendo ditaduras e regimes fantoches que defendem os valores democráticos e os direitos humanos da boca para fora, a réplica de 9/11 realmente cimentou ainda mais as dúvidas através da posição da América sobre o Islã político. Ele criou um muro de negatividade como encontrado por worldpublicopinion.org, de acordo com qual 67% dos egípcios acreditam que globalmente a América está desempenhando um papel “principalmente negativo”.
A resposta da América foi, portanto, adequada. Ao eleger Obama, muitos ao redor do mundo estão depositando suas esperanças de desenvolver um, mas uma política externa mais justa para o mundo muçulmano. O teste para Obama, enquanto discutimos, é como a América e seus aliados promovem a democracia. Estará facilitando ou impondo?
além disso, pode ser importante um corretor honesto em zonas prolongadas de confl itos? Contando com a experiência e a visão da Prolifi
c estudiosos, acadêmicos, jornalistas e políticos experientes, Arches Quarterly traz à tona a relação entre Islã e Democracia e o papel da América – bem como as mudanças trazidas por Obama, na busca do terreno comum. Anas Altikriti, o CEO da Fundação The Cordoba dá a jogada de abertura para esta discussão, onde ele reflete sobre as esperanças e desafios que repousam no caminho de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o ex-assessor do presidente Nixon, Dr Robert Crane oferece uma análise completa do princípio islâmico do direito à liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro-ministro da Malásia, enriquece a discussão com as realidades práticas da implementação da democracia nas sociedades dominantes muçulmanas, nomeadamente, na Indonésia e na Malásia.
Temos também Dr Shireen Hunter, da Universidade de Georgetown, EUA, que explora países muçulmanos atrasados ​​em democratização e modernização. Isso é complementado pelo escritor de terrorismo, A explicação do Dr. Nafeez Ahmed sobre a crise da pós-modernidade e a
fim da democracia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Diretor do Monitor de Mídia do Oriente Médio), Alan Hart (ex-correspondente da ITN e BBC Panorama; autor do sionismo: O verdadeiro inimigo dos judeus) e Asem Sondos (Editor do semanário Sawt Al Omma do Egito) concentrar-se em Obama e seu papel vis-à-vis a promoção da democracia no mundo muçulmano, bem como as relações dos EUA com Israel e a Irmandade Muçulmana.
Ministro de relações exteriores, Maldivas, Ahmed Shaheed especula sobre o futuro do Islã e da Democracia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– um membro do Sinn Féin que suportou quatro anos de prisão por atividades republicanas irlandesas e um ativista do Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, reflete sobre sua recente viagem a Gaza, onde testemunhou o impacto da brutalidade e injustiça cometida contra os palestinos; Dra Marie Breen-Smyth, Diretor do Centro para o Estudo da Radicalização e da Violência Política Contemporânea discute os desafios de pesquisar criticamente o terror político; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, escritor e dramaturgo, discute as perspectivas de paz em Darfur; e finalmente o jornalista e ativista de direitos humanos Ashur Shamis analisa criticamente a democratização e a politização dos muçulmanos hoje.
Esperamos que tudo isso seja uma leitura abrangente e fonte de reflexão sobre questões que nos afetam a todos em um novo amanhecer de esperança.
obrigada

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA Azzam

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julho 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ao mesmo tempo, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, ou (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, Democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel E. Preço

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, Contudo, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, instituições, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; e (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, fé, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Contudo, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Contudo, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Democracia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleições. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Ao mesmo tempo, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islã e democracia: Texto, Tradição, e história

Ahrar Ahmad

Estereótipos populares no Ocidente tendem a postular uma progressiva, racional, e oeste livre contra um, opressivo, e ameaçando o Islã. Pesquisas de opinião pública conduzidas nos Estados Unidos durante a década de 1990 revelaram um padrão consistente de americanos rotulando os muçulmanos como "fanáticos religiosos" e considerando o ethos do Islã como fundamentalmente "antidemocrático". 1 Essas caracterizações
e apreensões têm, por razões óbvias, piorou significativamente desde a tragédia de 9/11. Contudo, essas percepções não são refletidas apenas na consciência popular ou nas representações da mídia grosseira. Estudiosos respeitados também contribuíram para esse clima de opinião ao escrever sobre as diferenças supostamente irreconciliáveis ​​entre o Islã e o Ocidente, o famoso “choque de civilizações” que se supõe ser iminente e inevitável, e sobre a aparente incompatibilidade entre o Islã e a democracia. Por exemplo, O professor Peter Rodman se preocupa com o fato de "sermos desafiados de fora por uma força atávica militante movida pelo ódio a todo pensamento político ocidental que remonta às antigas queixas contra a cristandade". Dr. Daniel Pipes proclama que os muçulmanos desafiam o Ocidente de forma mais profunda do que os comunistas jamais fizeram, pois “enquanto os comunistas discordam de nossas políticas, os muçulmanos fundamentalistas desprezam todo o nosso modo de vida ”. O professor Bernard Lewis adverte sombriamente sobre "a reação histórica de um antigo rival contra nossa herança judaico-cristã, nosso presente secular, e a expansão de ambos. ” Professor Amos Perlmutter pergunta: “É o Islã, fundamentalista ou não, compatível com a democracia representativa de estilo ocidental orientada para os direitos humanos? A resposta é um NÃO enfático. ” E o professor Samuel Huntington sugere com um floreio que “o problema não é o fundamentalismo islâmico, mas o próprio Islã. ” Seria intelectualmente preguiçoso e simplório descartar suas posições como baseadas apenas em rancor ou preconceito. Na verdade, se alguém ignorar algum exagero retórico, alguns de seus encargos, embora estranho para os muçulmanos, são relevantes para uma discussão sobre a relação entre o Islã e a democracia no mundo moderno. Por exemplo, a posição das mulheres ou às vezes de não muçulmanos em alguns países muçulmanos é problemática em termos da suposta igualdade legal de todas as pessoas em uma democracia. de forma similar, a intolerância dirigida por alguns muçulmanos contra escritores (por exemplo., Salman Rushdie no Reino Unido, Taslima Nasrin em Bangladesh, e o professor Nasr Abu Zaid no Egito) ostensivamente compromete o princípio da liberdade de expressão, que é essencial para uma democracia.
Também é verdade que menos de 10 do mais que 50 membros da Organização da Conferência Islâmica institucionalizaram princípios ou processos democráticos conforme entendidos no Ocidente, e isso também, apenas provisoriamente. Finalmente, o tipo de estabilidade interna e paz externa que é quase um pré-requisito para o funcionamento de uma democracia é viciado pela turbulência da implosão interna ou agressão externa evidente em muitos países muçulmanos hoje (por exemplo., Somália, Sudão, Indonésia, Paquistão, Iraque, Afeganistão, Argélia, e Bósnia).

Iraque e o futuro do Islã político

James Piscatori

Sessenta e cinco anos atrás, um dos maiores estudiosos do Islã moderno fez uma pergunta simples, “Para onde o Islã?”, para onde o mundo islâmico estava indo? Foi uma época de intensa turbulência tanto no mundo ocidental quanto no muçulmano - o fim do imperialismo e a cristalização de um novo sistema de estado fora da Europa; a criação e teste do neo- Ordem mundial wilsoniana na Liga das Nações; o surgimento do fascismo europeu. Sir Hamilton Gibb reconheceu que as sociedades muçulmanas, incapaz de evitar tais tendências mundiais, também foram confrontados com a penetração igualmente inevitável do nacionalismo, secularismo, e ocidentalização. Embora ele prudentemente advertisse contra fazer previsões - riscos para todos nós interessados ​​na política islâmica e do Oriente Médio - ele tinha certeza de duas coisas:
(uma) o mundo islâmico se moveria entre o ideal de solidariedade e as realidades da divisão;
(b) a chave para o futuro está na liderança, ou quem fala com autoridade pelo Islã.
Hoje, os prognósticos de Gibb podem ter relevância renovada, visto que enfrentamos uma crise cada vez mais profunda sobre o Iraque, o desenrolar de uma extensa e controversa guerra ao terror, e a continuação do problema palestino. Nesta palestra, gostaria de examinar os fatores que podem afetar o curso da política muçulmana no período presente e no futuro próximo.. Embora os pontos que levantarei provavelmente tenham uma relevância mais ampla, Vou me basear principalmente no caso do mundo árabe.
Suposições sobre o Islã político Não faltam previsões quando se trata de um Islã politizado ou islamismo. ‘Islamismo’ é mais bem entendido como a sensação de que algo deu errado com as sociedades muçulmanas contemporâneas e que a solução deve estar em uma série de ações políticas. Freqüentemente usado de forma intercambiável com "fundamentalismo", O islamismo é melhor equiparado ao "Islã político". Vários comentaristas proclamaram sua morte e o advento da era pós-islâmica. Eles argumentam que o aparato repressivo do estado provou ser mais durável do que a oposição islâmica e que a incoerência ideológica dos islamitas os tornou inadequados para a competição política moderna.. Os eventos de 11 de setembro pareciam contradizer essa previsão, ainda, inabalável, eles argumentaram que tal espetacular, atos virtualmente anárquicos apenas provam a falência das idéias islâmicas e sugerem que os radicais abandonaram qualquer esperança real de tomar o poder.

Islã e democracia

ITAC

Se alguém lê a imprensa ou ouve comentaristas sobre assuntos internacionais, muitas vezes é dito - e ainda mais frequentemente implícito, mas não dito - que o Islã não é compatível com a democracia. Nos anos noventa, Samuel Huntington desencadeou uma tempestade intelectual quando publicou O choque de civilizações e a reformulação da ordem mundial, em que ele apresenta suas previsões para o mundo - em letras grandes. Na esfera política, ele observa que, embora a Turquia e o Paquistão possam ter algumas pequenas reivindicações de "legitimidade democrática", todos os outros "... os países muçulmanos eram esmagadoramente não democráticos: monarquias, sistemas unipartidários, regimes militares, ditaduras pessoais ou alguma combinação destas, geralmente descansando em uma família limitada, clã, ou base tribal ”. A premissa em que seu argumento se baseia é que eles não são apenas ‘não são como nós’, eles se opõem aos nossos valores democráticos essenciais. Ele acredita, como fazem outros, que embora a ideia de democratização ocidental esteja sofrendo resistência em outras partes do mundo, o confronto é mais notável nas regiões onde o Islã é a fé dominante.
O argumento também foi feito do outro lado. Um estudioso religioso iraniano, refletindo sobre uma crise constitucional do início do século XX em seu país, declarou que o Islã e a democracia não são compatíveis porque as pessoas não são iguais e um corpo legislativo é desnecessário devido à natureza inclusiva da lei religiosa islâmica. Uma posição semelhante foi assumida mais recentemente por Ali Belhadj, um professor de ensino médio argelino, pregador e (nesse contexto) líder da FIS, quando ele declarou que "a democracia não era um conceito islâmico". Talvez a declaração mais dramática a esse respeito tenha sido a de Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, líder dos insurgentes sunitas no Iraque que, quando confrontado com a perspectiva de uma eleição, denunciou a democracia como "um princípio do mal".
Mas de acordo com alguns estudiosos muçulmanos, a democracia continua sendo um ideal importante no Islã, com a ressalva de que está sempre sujeito à lei religiosa. A ênfase no lugar primordial da sharia é um elemento de quase todos os comentários islâmicos sobre governança, moderado ou extremista. Só se o governante, quem recebe sua autoridade de Deus, limita suas ações à "supervisão da administração da sharia" se ele deve ser obedecido. Se ele fizer algo diferente disso, ele é um descrente e os muçulmanos comprometidos devem se rebelar contra ele. Aqui está a justificativa para grande parte da violência que assolou o mundo muçulmano em lutas como a que prevaleceu na Argélia durante os anos 90

In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism

Nadirsyah Pants

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Contudo, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
Primeiro, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts