RSSMaingizo zote "Masomo & Tafiti" Kundi

Arab Kesho

Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'

Oktoba 6, 1981, Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan' 1973 Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan',Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.,moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., na hisia yangu ya wajibu wa uandishi wa habari ilinisukuma kwenda kujua kama Sadat alikuwa hai au amekufa.

Uislamu na Uundaji wa Madaraka ya Serikali

seyyed vali Reza Nasr

katika 1979 Jenerali Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, mtawala wa kijeshi wa Pakistan, alitangaza kuwa Pakistan itakuwa taifa la Kiislamu. Maadili na kanuni za Kiislamu zingetumika kama msingi wa utambulisho wa kitaifa, sheria, uchumi, na mahusiano ya kijamii, na ingehimiza uundaji wa sera zote. katika 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, waziri mkuu mpya wa Malaysia, ilianzisha mpango mpana sawa wa kusisitiza uundaji wa sera za serikali katika maadili ya Kiislamu, na kuleta sheria za nchi yake na mwenendo wa kiuchumi sambamba na mafundisho ya Uislamu. Kwa nini watawala hawa walichagua njia ya “Uislamu” kwa ajili ya nchi zao? Na ni vipi mataifa ya wakati mmoja baada ya ukoloni yaligeuka kuwa mawakala wa Uislamu na ishara ya dola ya "kweli" ya Kiislamu??
Malaysia na Pakistan tangu mwishoni mwa miaka ya 1970-mapema miaka ya 1980 zimefuata njia ya kipekee ya maendeleo ambayo inatofautiana na uzoefu wa mataifa mengine ya Dunia ya Tatu.. Katika nchi hizi mbili utambulisho wa kidini uliunganishwa katika itikadi ya serikali ili kufahamisha lengo na mchakato wa maendeleo na maadili ya Kiislamu.
Ahadi hii pia imetoa taswira tofauti kabisa ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na siasa katika jamii za Kiislamu. Katika Malaysia na Pakistan, imekuwa taasisi za serikali badala ya wanaharakati wa Kiislamu (wale wanaotetea usomaji wa kisiasa wa Uislamu; pia wanajulikana kama waamsho au wafuasi wa kimsingi) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, na kwa upana zaidi jinsi utamaduni na dini zinavyohudumia mahitaji ya mamlaka na maendeleo ya serikali. Uchambuzi hapa unategemea mijadala ya kinadharia
katika sayansi ya kijamii ya tabia ya serikali na jukumu la utamaduni na dini ndani yake. Muhimu zaidi, huchota makisio kutoka kwa kesi zinazochunguzwa ili kufanya hitimisho pana la maslahi kwa taaluma.

WANAWAKE Iran baada ya Mapinduzi ya Kiislamu

Ansiia Khaz Allii


Zaidi ya miaka thelathini imepita tangu ushindi wa Mapinduzi ya Kiislamu nchini Iran, bado kuna a idadi ya maswali na utata kuhusu namna Jamhuri ya Kiislamu na sheria zake inavyoshughulikia matatizo ya kisasa na hali ya sasa, hasa kuhusu haki za wanawake na wanawake. Karatasi hii fupi itaangazia masuala haya na kusoma nafasi ya sasa ya wanawake katika nyanja mbalimbali, wakilinganisha hali hii na ilivyokuwa kabla ya Mapinduzi ya Kiislamu. Data ya kuaminika na kuthibitishwa imetumika wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Wanawake katika Uislamu

Amira Burghul

Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the

principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women

compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite

the agreement of a large number of thinkers and legislators that women during the time of the

Prophet (PBUH) were granted rights and legal privileges not granted by man-made laws until

recently, propaganda campaigns by Westerners and people with a Westernised perspective

consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, ya kuwawekea vikwazo, na

kudharau nafasi yao katika jamii.

Hali hii imefanywa kuwa mbaya zaidi kutokana na angahewa na hali iliyoenea kote kote

Ulimwengu wa Kiislamu, ambapo ujinga na umasikini umezalisha uelewa mdogo wa dini

na mahusiano ya kifamilia na kibinadamu ambayo yanazuia haki na njia ya maisha ya kistaarabu, hasa

kati ya wanaume na wanawake. Kikundi kidogo cha watu ambao wamepewa fursa

kupata elimu na uwezo pia wameingia katika mtego wa kuamini kwamba kupatikana kwa haki

kwa wanawake na kutumia uwezo wao kunategemea kukataa dini na uchamungu na

kufuata mtindo wa maisha wa Magharibi, kama matokeo ya masomo yao ya juu juu ya Uislamu kwa upande mmoja

na athari za mabadiliko ya maisha kwa upande mwingine.

Ni idadi ndogo sana ya watu kutoka katika makundi haya mawili wameweza kutoroka na kutupwa mbali

vazi lao la ujinga na mila. Watu hawa wamesoma urithi wao kwa kina sana

na undani, na tumeangalia matokeo ya uzoefu wa Magharibi kwa nia iliyo wazi. Wana

kutofautisha kati ya ngano na makapi katika siku zilizopita na za sasa, na wameshughulikia

kisayansi na kimalengo na matatizo yaliyojitokeza. Wamewakanusha uwongo

mashtaka yaliyotolewa dhidi ya Uislamu kwa hoja fasaha, na wamekiri kuwa na dosari zilizofichika.

Pia wamechunguza tena kauli na desturi za Maasumin ili

tofautisha kati ya kile kilichowekwa na kitakatifu na kilichobadilishwa na kupotoshwa.

The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing

with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems

and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the

ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and

committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.

With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the

main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social

participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.

The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,

Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda

campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.

The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar

Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,

have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda

campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards

women.

smearcasting: Jinsi Islamophobes kuenea hofu, bigotry na taarifa potofu

FAIR

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
Jambo ajabu kilichotokea katika Wakosoaji National Book Circle (NBCC) uteuzi katika Februari 2007: kawaida highbrow na kundi kuhimili ameshinda kwa kitabu bora katika uwanja wa upinzani kitabu na wengi kama matamshi ya yote kundi la kidini.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry na taarifa potofu. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, bila shaka, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
vile vile, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Baada ya yote, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

Totalitarianism ya jihadi Uislam na changamoto zake za Ulaya na kwa Uislamu

Bassam Tibi

Wakati wa kusoma idadi kubwa ya maandiko ya kuwa wanaunda maandiko kubwa ambayo imekuwa kuchapishwa na pundits binafsi kutangazwa kwenye siasa Uislamu, ni rahisi kukosa ukweli kwamba harakati mpya ametokea. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, hata hivyo, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

Demokrasia huria na Uislamu wa Kisiasa: Utafutaji wa Sehemu ya Kawaida.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Kwa mfano, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Kwa mfano, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Kwa kweli, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

Uislamu na New Landscape Siasa

Back, Keith Michael, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra na John Solomos

KUTOKANA na shambulio la World Trade Center tarehe 11 Septemba 2001, na milipuko ya mabomu ya Madrid na London ya 2004 na 2005, fasihi ambayo inashughulikia aina na taratibu za usemi wa kidini - haswa usemi wa kidini wa Kiislamu - imestawi katika maeneo ambayo yanaunganisha sayansi kuu ya kijamii na muundo wa sera za kijamii., think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

MIZIZI ya mbaya

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, wapiganaji, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, wasomi, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Kazi, Ukoloni, Ubaguzi wa rangi?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (yaani, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, na
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, na, ikiwa ni hivyo, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

Uislamu, DEMOKRASIA & MAREKANI:

Msingi wa Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


Licha ya kuwa mjadala wa kudumu na tata, Arches Kila mara huchunguza tena kutoka kwa misingi ya kitheolojia na ya vitendo, mjadala muhimu kuhusu uhusiano na utangamano kati ya Uislamu na Demokrasia, kama ilivyoonyeshwa katika ajenda ya Barack Obama ya matumaini na mabadiliko. Wakati wengi wanasherehekea kupanda kwa Obama kwa Ofisi ya Oval kama katari ya kitaifa kwa Merika, wengine hubaki na matumaini kidogo juu ya mabadiliko ya itikadi na njia katika uwanja wa kimataifa. Wakati mvutano na uaminifu mwingi kati ya ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na USA unaweza kuhusishwa na njia ya kukuza demokrasia, kawaida hupendelea udikteta na serikali za vibaraka ambazo hulipa huduma ya mdomo kwa maadili ya kidemokrasia na haki za binadamu, tetemeko la ardhi la 9/11 kweli imesisitiza mashaka zaidi kupitia msimamo wa Amerika juu ya Uislamu wa kisiasa. Imeunda ukuta wa uzembe kama unavyopatikana na worldpublicopinion.org, kulingana na ambayo 67% Wamisri wanaamini kwamba ulimwenguni Amerika inacheza jukumu "hasi hasi".
Jibu la Amerika limekuwa sawa. Kwa kumchagua Obama, wengi kote ulimwenguni wanaweka matumaini yao kwa kuendeleza vita kidogo, lakini sera nzuri za kigeni kuelekea ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Jaribio la Obama, tunapojadili, ni jinsi Amerika na washirika wake wanavyoendeleza demokrasia. Itakuwa kuwezesha au kuweka?
Kwa kuongezea, inaweza kuwa muhimu kuwa broker mwaminifu katika maeneo ya muda mrefu ya confts icts? Kuorodhesha utaalam na ufahamu wa profauti
c wasomi, wasomi, waandishi wa habari wenye uzoefu na wanasiasa, Arches Kila mwaka huonyesha uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na Demokrasia na jukumu la Amerika - na vile vile mabadiliko yaliyoletwa na Obama, katika kutafuta msingi wa pamoja. Anas Altikriti, Mkurugenzi Mtendaji wa Taasisi ya Th e Cordoba hutoa kamari ya ufunguzi wa mjadala huu, ambapo anaelezea matumaini na changamoto ambazo zinategemea njia ya Obama. Kufuatia Altikriti, mshauri wa zamani wa Rais Nixon, Dr Robert Crane ameondoa uchambuzi kamili wa kanuni ya Kiislam ya haki ya uhuru. Anwar Ibrahim, Naibu Waziri Mkuu wa zamani wa Malaysia, huimarisha majadiliano na ukweli wa vitendo wa kutekeleza demokrasia katika jamii kubwa za Waislamu, yaani, nchini Indonesia na Malaysia.
Pia tuna Dr Shireen Hunter, wa Chuo Kikuu cha Georgetown, Marekani, ambaye anachunguza nchi za Kiislamu ambazo ziko nyuma katika demokrasia na kisasa. Hii inakamilishwa na mwandishi wa ugaidi, Maelezo ya Dk Nafeez Ahmed juu ya mzozo wa baada ya usasa na
kufa kwa demokrasia. Dk Daud Abdullah (Mkurugenzi wa Mashariki ya Kati Media Monitor), Alan Hart (aliyekuwa mwandishi wa ITN na BBC Panorama; mwandishi wa Uzayuni: Adui wa Kweli wa Wayahudi) na Asem Sondos (Mhariri wa Sawt Al Omma ya kila wiki ya Misri) zingatia Obama na jukumu lake dhidi ya demokrasia-kukuza katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu, pamoja na uhusiano wa Marekani na Israel na Muslim Brotherhood.
Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje atangaza, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed anakisia juu ya mustakabali wa Uislamu na Demokrasia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– mwanachama wa Sinn Féin ambaye alivumilia miaka minne gerezani kwa shughuli za Republican na mpiganiaji wa Guildford 4 na Birmingham 6, anafikiria juu ya safari yake ya hivi karibuni huko Gaza ambapo alishuhudia athari za ukatili na udhalimu uliopatikana dhidi ya Wapalestina; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Mkurugenzi wa Kituo cha Utafiti wa Ukadiriaji na Unyanyasaji wa Kisiasa wa kisasa anajadili changamoto za kutafiti kwa kina ugaidi wa kisiasa; Dk Khalid al-Mubarak, mwandishi na mwandishi wa michezo, inazungumzia matarajio ya amani katika Darfur; na mwandishi wa habari na mwanaharakati wa haki za binadamu Ashur Shamis anaangalia vibaya demokrasia na siasa za Waislamu leo.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

amani Marekani Hamas sera vitalu Mashariki ya Kati

Henry Siegman


Imeshindwa mazungumzo baina ya nchi zaidi ya hizi siku za nyuma 16 Miaka umeonyesha kuwa Mashariki ya Kati amani wa haiwezi kufikiwa na vyama vya wenyewe. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Kwa bahati mbaya, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Uislamu na UTAWALA WA SHERIA

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.), kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. 57 kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (1) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., (2) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (3) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa..

Islamic Culture Political, Demokrasia, na Haki za Binadamu

Daniel E. Bei

Imesemekana kwamba Uislamu kuwezesha ubabe, inapingana thamani za jamii za Magharibi, na kwa kiasi kikubwa huathiri matokeo muhimu ya kisiasa katika nchi za Kiislamu. Kwa hiyo, wasomi, wachambuzi, na viongozi wa serikali mara nyingi wanasema kuwa '' fundamentalism Kiislamu '' kama ya kiitikadi tishio kwa demokrasia huria. Mtazamo huu, hata hivyo, inategemea hasa uchambuzi wa maandishi, Nadharia ya kisiasa ya Kiislamu, na masomo ya muda ya nchi binafsi, ambazo hazizingatii mambo mengine. Ni hoja yangu kwamba maandiko na mila ya Uislamu, kama zile za dini zingine, inaweza kutumika kusaidia mifumo na sera anuwai za kisiasa. Masomo maalum na ya kuelezea ya nchi hayatusaidii kupata mifumo ambayo itatusaidia kuelezea uhusiano tofauti kati ya Uislamu na siasa katika nchi zote za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu.. Kwa hivyo, mbinu mpya ya utafiti wa
uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na siasa unahitajika.
ninashauri, kupitia tathmini kali ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu, demokrasia, na haki za binadamu katika ngazi ya kitaifa, mkazo mkubwa sana umewekwa juu ya nguvu ya Uislamu kama nguvu ya kisiasa. Kwanza mimi hutumia tafiti za kulinganisha, ambayo huzingatia mambo yanayohusiana na mwingiliano kati ya vikundi vya Kiislamu na tawala, ushawishi wa kiuchumi, machafuko ya kikabila, na maendeleo ya jamii, kuelezea utofauti wa ushawishi wa Uislamu juu ya siasa katika mataifa manane. Ninasema kuwa nguvu nyingi
kuhusishwa na Uislamu kama nguvu ya kuendesha sera na mifumo ya kisiasa katika mataifa ya Waislamu inaweza kuelezewa vizuri na mambo yaliyotajwa hapo awali. Mimi pia kupata, kinyume na imani ya kawaida, kwamba nguvu inayoongezeka ya vikundi vya siasa vya Kiisilamu mara nyingi imekuwa ikihusishwa na ujumlishaji wa kawaida wa mifumo ya kisiasa.
Nimeunda faharisi ya utamaduni wa kisiasa wa Kiislamu, kulingana na kiwango ambacho sheria ya Kiislamu inatumika na ikiwa na, ikiwa ni hivyo, vipi,Mawazo ya Magharibi, taasisi, na teknolojia zinatekelezwa, kujaribu asili ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na demokrasia na Uislamu na haki za binadamu. Kiashiria hiki kinatumika katika uchambuzi wa takwimu, ambayo inajumuisha sampuli ya nchi ishirini na tatu zenye Waislamu wengi na kikundi cha kudhibiti cha nchi ishirini na tatu zisizo za Kiislamu zinazoendelea. Mbali na kulinganisha
Mataifa ya Kiislamu kwa mataifa yasiyo ya Kiislamu yanayoendelea, uchambuzi wa takwimu unaniruhusu kudhibiti ushawishi wa anuwai zingine ambazo zimepatikana kuathiri viwango vya demokrasia na ulinzi wa haki za mtu binafsi. Matokeo yake yanapaswa kuwa picha halisi na sahihi ya ushawishi wa Uislamu juu ya siasa na sera.

Usahihi katika vita vya ulimwengu juu ya hofu:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; na (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokrasia, Uchaguzi na Udugu wa Kiislamu wa Misri

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?