Visi ieraksti "Pētījumi & Pētījumi" Kategorija
Arābu rītdiena
DEIVIDS B. OTAVEJA
Oktobris 6, 1981, bija paredzēta kā svinību diena Ēģiptē. Tā atzīmēja gadadienu kopš Ēģiptes grandiozākā uzvaras brīža trīs arābu un Izraēlas konfliktos, kad valsts zemākā armija šķērsoja Suecas kanālu tā atklāšanas dienās 1973 Jomkipuras karā un nosūtīja Izraēlas karaspēku atkāpjoties. Uz vēsuma, bez mākoņiem rīts, Kairas stadions bija pārpildīts ar ēģiptiešu ģimenēm, kas bija ieradušās, lai apskatītu militāros spēkus. Uz apskates stenda, prezidents Anvars el-Sadats,kara arhitekts, ar gandarījumu vēroja, kā viņa priekšā defilēja vīri un mašīnas. Es biju tuvumā, tikko ieradies ārzemju korespondents.Pēkšņi, viena no armijas kravas automašīnām apstājās tieši pretī apskates stendam, kamēr sešas Mirage lidmašīnas rūca virs galvas akrobātiskā priekšnesumā, krāsojot debesis ar garām sarkanām takām, dzeltens, violets,un zaļie dūmi. Sadats piecēlās, acīmredzot gatavojas apmainīties salūtam ar vēl vienu Ēģiptes karaspēka kontingentu. Viņš padarīja sevi par ideālu mērķi četriem islāmistu slepkavām, kas izlēca no kravas automašīnas, iebruka tribīnē, un apbēra viņa ķermeni ar lodēm.Kamēr slepkavas turpināja kādu mūžību apsmidzināt stendu ar savu nāvējošo uguni., Uz mirkli apsvēru, vai trāpīt zemē un riskēt, ka panikā esošie skatītāji mani samīdīs līdz nāvei, vai arī palikt kājās un riskēt saņemt nomaldījušos lodi. Instinkts lika man palikt uz kājām, un mana žurnālista pienākuma apziņa mudināja mani doties noskaidrot, vai Sadats ir dzīvs vai miris.
| sept 26, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islāms un valsts varas veidošana
seyyed vali reza nasr
In 1979 Ģenerālis Muhameds Zia ul-Haks, Pakistānas militārais valdnieks, gadā paziņoja, ka Pakistāna kļūs par islāma valsti. Islāma vērtības un normas kalpotu par nacionālās identitātes pamatu, likumu, ekonomika, un sociālās attiecības, un tas iedvesmotu visu politikas veidošanu. In 1980 Mahathirs Muhameds, jaunais Malaizijas premjerministrs, ieviesa līdzīgu plašu plānu, lai valsts politikas veidošanu nostiprinātu islāma vērtībās, un saskaņot savas valsts likumus un ekonomisko praksi ar islāma mācībām. Kāpēc šie valdnieki izvēlējās savām valstīm “islamizācijas” ceļu?? Un kā kādreizējās sekulārās postkoloniālās valstis kļuva par islamizācijas aģentiem un “īstās” islāma valsts priekšvēstnesi?
Malaizija un Pakistāna kopš 1970. gadu beigām līdz 80. gadu sākumam ir gājušas unikālu attīstības ceļu, kas atšķiras no citu trešās pasaules valstu pieredzes.. Šajās divās valstīs reliģiskā identitāte tika integrēta valsts ideoloģijā, lai informētu par attīstības mērķi un procesu ar islāma vērtībām.
Šis pasākums ir arī parādījis ļoti atšķirīgu priekšstatu par attiecībām starp islāmu un politiku musulmaņu sabiedrībās. Malaizijā un Pakistānā, tās ir bijušas valsts institūcijas, nevis islāmistu aktīvisti (tie, kas iestājas par islāma politisko interpretāciju; pazīstami arī kā revivalisti vai fundamentālisti) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, un plašākā nozīmē, kā kultūra un reliģija kalpo valsts varas un attīstības vajadzībām. Šeit veiktā analīze balstās uz teorētiskām diskusijām
sociālajās zinātnēs par valsts uzvedību un kultūras un reliģijas lomu tajā. Svarīgāks, tā izdara secinājumus no pārbaudāmajām lietām, lai izdarītu plašākus secinājumus, kas interesē disciplīnas.
| sept 25, 2010 | Komentāri 0
IRANIAN WOMEN AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Ansiia Khaz Allii
More than thirty years have passed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| sept 19, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Women in Islam
Amira Burghul
Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the
principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women
compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite
the agreement of a large number of thinkers and legislators that women during the time of the
Prophet (PBUH) were granted rights and legal privileges not granted by man-made laws until
recently, propaganda campaigns by Westerners and people with a Westernised perspective
consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, of imposing restrictions on them, un
marginalising their role in society.
This situation has been made worse by the atmosphere and conditions prevalent across the
Muslim world, where ignorance and poverty have produced a limited understanding of religion
and family and human relations which occlude justice and a civilised way of life, particularly
between men and women. The small group of people who have been granted opportunities to
acquire an education and abilities have also fallen into the trap of believing that achieving justice
for women and capitalising on their abilities is dependent upon rejecting religion and piety and
adopting a Western way of life, as a result of their superficial studies of Islam on the one hand
and the effect of life’s diversions on the other.
Only a very small number of people from these two groups have managed to escape and cast off
their cloaks of ignorance and tradition. These people have studied their heritage in great depth
and detail, and have looked at the results of Western experiences with an open mind. They have
distinguished between the wheat and the chaff in both the past and the present, and have dealt
scientifically and objectively with the problems which have arisen. They have refuted the false
charges made against Islam with eloquent arguments, and have admitted to concealed flaws.
They have also re-examined the sayings and customs of the Infallible Ones in order to
distinguish between what is established and holy and what has been altered and distorted.
The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing
with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems
and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the
ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and
committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.
With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the
main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social
participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.
The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,
Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda
campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.
The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar
Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,
have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda
campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards
women.
| sept 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
smērēšanās: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Džūlija Holāra
Džims Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (Ņujorkas Laiks, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressions–like While Europe Slept–include evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. After all, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–without resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewish–for instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.
| sept 16, 2010 | Komentāri 0
The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam
Basso stilba kauls
When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, tomēr, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).
| sept 15, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. For example, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Indeed, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.
| sept 09, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islam and the New Political Landscape
Les Back, Maikls Kīts, Azra Khana,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Septembris 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 un 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
| sept 08, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, akadēmiķi, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Nodarbošanās, Koloniālisms, Aparteīds?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (proti, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, un
Gazā, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, un, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, konsultācija, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:
Kordovas fonds
Abdullah Faliq |
Ievads ,
Neskatoties uz to, ka tā ir gan daudzgadīga, gan sarežģīta diskusija, Arkas ceturkšņa izdevums atkārtoti pārbauda no teoloģijas un praktiskā viedokļa, svarīgās debates par islāma un demokrātijas attiecībām un savietojamību, kā tas atskanēja Baraka Obamas cerību un pārmaiņu programmā. Lai gan daudzi atzīmē Obamas ieņemšanu Ovālajā kabinetā kā nacionālo katarsi ASV, citi joprojām ir mazāk optimistiski par ideoloģijas un pieejas maiņu starptautiskajā arēnā. Lai gan lielu daļu spriedzes un neuzticības starp musulmaņu pasauli un ASV var saistīt ar demokrātijas veicināšanas pieeju., parasti dod priekšroku diktatūrām un marionešu režīmiem, kas runā par demokrātiskām vērtībām un cilvēktiesībām, gada pēcgrūdiens 9/11 ir patiesi nostiprinājis bažas, izmantojot Amerikas nostāju pret politisko islāmu. Tas ir izveidojis negatīvisma sienu, kā to atklāja worldpublicopinion.org, saskaņā ar kuru 67% ēģiptiešu uzskata, ka Amerika globāli spēlē “galvenokārt negatīvu” lomu.
Tādējādi Amerikas reakcija ir bijusi piemērota. Ievēlot Obamu, daudzi visā pasaulē saista savas cerības attīstīt mazāk kareivīgu, bet godīgāka ārpolitika pret musulmaņu pasauli. Pārbaudījums Obamam, kā mēs apspriežam, ir tas, kā Amerika un viņas sabiedrotie veicina demokrātiju. Vai tas atvieglos vai uzspiež?
Turklāt, vai tas var būt godīgs brokeris ilgstošās konfliktu zonās? Prolifi pieredzes un ieskatu piesaistīšana
c zinātnieki, akadēmiķi, pieredzējuši žurnālisti un politiķi, Arches Quarterly atklāj islāma un demokrātijas attiecības un Amerikas lomu, kā arī Obamas radītās izmaiņas., meklējot kopīgu valodu. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation izpilddirektors nodrošina šīs diskusijas ievadu, kur viņš pārdomā cerības un izaicinājumus, kas ir Obamas ceļā. Sekojot Altikriti, bijušais prezidenta Niksona padomnieks, Dr Robert Crane piedāvā rūpīgu analīzi par islāma principu par tiesībām uz brīvību. Anvars Ibrahims, bijušais Malaizijas premjerministra vietnieks, bagātina diskusiju ar demokrātijas īstenošanas praktisko realitāti musulmaņu dominējošās sabiedrībās, proti, Indonēzijā un Malaizijā.
Mums ir arī Dr Shireen Hunter, Džordžtaunas universitātē, ASV, kurš pēta musulmaņu valstis, kas atpaliek demokratizācijas un modernizācijas jomā. To papildina rakstnieks par terorismu, Dr Nafeez Ahmed skaidrojums par postmodernitātes krīzi un
demokrātijas bojāeja. Doktors Dauds Abdulla (Tuvo Austrumu mediju monitora direktors), Alans Hārts (bijušais ITN un BBC Panorama korespondents; cionisma autors: Īstais ebreju ienaidnieks) un Asem Sondos (Ēģiptes iknedēļas Sawt Al Omma redaktors) koncentrēties uz Obamu un viņa lomu demokrātijas veicināšanā musulmaņu pasaulē, kā arī ASV attiecības ar Izraēlu un Musulmaņu brālību.
Ārlietu ministrs airē, Maldīvija, Ahmeds Šahīds spekulē par islāma un demokrātijas nākotni; Cllr. Gerijs Makločlains
– Sinn Féin biedrs, kurš izturēja četrus gadus cietumā par Īrijas republikāņu aktivitātēm un Gildfordas aizstāvis 4 un Birmingema 6, atspoguļo viņa neseno braucienu uz Gazu, kur viņš bija liecinieks pret palestīniešiem vērstās brutalitātes un netaisnības ietekmei; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalizācijas un mūsdienu politiskās vardarbības pētījumu centra direktore apspriež izaicinājumus kritiski pētot politisko teroru; Dr Halids al Mubaraks, rakstnieks un dramaturgs, apspriež miera izredzes Darfūrā; un visbeidzot žurnālists un cilvēktiesību aktīvists Ašurs Šamiss kritiski skatās uz musulmaņu demokratizāciju un politizāciju mūsdienās.
Mēs ceram, ka tas viss radīs visaptverošu lasījumu un pārdomu avotu par jautājumiem, kas skar mūs visus jaunā cerību rītausmā.
Paldies
| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henrijs Zīgmans
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmuts Reifelds
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; un (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
Demokrātija, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| sept 05, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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