All Entries in the "Studijos & Tyrimai" Category
Arabų rytoj
DAVIDAS B. OTAVEJUS
Spalio mėn 6, 1981, turėjo būti švenčiama Egipte. Ji pažymėjo didžiausios Egipto pergalės trijuose arabų ir Izraelio konfliktuose metines, kai šalies nepalankioji armija veržėsi per Sueco kanalą atidarymo dienomis 1973 Jom Kipuro karas ir išsiuntė Izraelio karius besitraukiančius. Ant vėsaus, debesuotas rytas, Kairo stadionas buvo sausakimšas egiptiečių šeimų, atvykusių pažiūrėti kariškių. Ant apžvalgos stendo, Prezidentas Anwaras el-Sadatas,karo architektas, su pasitenkinimu stebėjo, kaip prieš jį demonstruoja vyrai ir mašinos. Aš buvau šalia, ką tik atvykęs užsienio korespondentas.Staiga, vienas iš armijos sunkvežimių sustojo tiesiai prieš apžvalgos stendą, kai šeši „Mirage“ reaktyviniai lėktuvai riaumoja virš galvos ir atliko akrobatinį pasirodymą., dangų nudažius ilgais raudonos spalvos takais, geltona, violetinė,ir žali dūmai. Sadatas atsistojo, matyt, ruošiasi keistis sveikinimais su dar vienu egiptiečių karių kontingentu. Jis tapo puikiu taikiniu keturiems islamistams, iššokusiems iš sunkvežimio, šturmavo podiumą, ir apipylė jo kūną kulkomis.Kai žudikai tęsė, atrodytų, amžinybę, apipurškę stovą mirtina ugnimi., Akimirksniu svarsčiau, ar atsitrenkti į žemę ir rizikuoti, kad panikuoti žiūrovai mane mirtinai sutryps, ar likti toliau ir rizikuoti paimti užklydusią kulką. Instinktas liepė man stovėti ant kojų, ir mano žurnalistinės pareigos jausmas paskatino mane eiti išsiaiškinti, ar Sadatas gyvas, ar miręs.
| Rugsėjo mėn 26, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamas ir valstybės valdžios kūrimas
seyyed vali reza nasr
Į 1979 Generolas Muhammadas Zia ul-Haqas, karinis Pakistano valdovas, paskelbė, kad Pakistanas taps islamo valstybe. Islamo vertybės ir normos būtų nacionalinės tapatybės pagrindas, įstatymas, ekonomika, ir socialinius santykius, ir įkvėptų visą politiką. Į 1980 Mahathiras Mahometas, naujasis Malaizijos ministras pirmininkas, pristatė panašų platų planą, skirtą valstybės politikai įtvirtinti islamo vertybes, ir suderinti savo šalies įstatymus bei ekonominę praktiką su islamo mokymu. Kodėl šie valdovai pasirinko savo šalių „islamizacijos“ kelią?? Ir kaip kažkada pasaulietinės postkolonijinės valstybės tapo islamizacijos agentais ir „tikrosios“ islamo valstybės pranašais?
Malaizija ir Pakistanas nuo aštuntojo dešimtmečio pabaigos – devintojo dešimtmečio pradžios ėjo unikaliu vystymosi keliu, kuris skiriasi nuo kitų trečiojo pasaulio valstybių patirties.. Šiose dviejose šalyse religinė tapatybė buvo integruota į valstybės ideologiją, siekiant informuoti apie islamo vertybių vystymosi tikslą ir procesą.
Šis įsipareigojimas taip pat pateikė labai skirtingą musulmonų visuomenės santykio tarp islamo ir politikos vaizdą. Malaizijoje ir Pakistane, tai buvo valstybės institucijos, o ne islamistų aktyvistai (tų, kurie pasisako už politinį islamo skaitymą; dar vadinami atgimimo šalininkais arba fundamentalistais) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, ir plačiau, kaip kultūra ir religija tarnauja valstybės valdžios ir vystymosi poreikiams. Analizė čia remiasi teorinėmis diskusijomis
socialiniuose moksluose apie valstybės elgesį ir kultūros bei religijos vaidmenį juose. Svarbesnis, iš nagrinėjamų atvejų daromos išvados, leidžiančios daryti platesnes disciplinas dominančias išvadas.
| Rugsėjo mėn 25, 2010 | Komentarai 0
IRANIAN WOMEN AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Ansiia Khaz Allii
More than thirty years have passed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, į relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| Rugsėjo mėn 19, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Women in Islam
Amira Burghul
Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the
islamo principai ir mokymai iš esmės pakeitė moterų padėtį
palyginti su tuo metu vyravusia padėtimi tiek Rytų, tiek Vakarų šalyse, ir nepaisant
daugelio mąstytojų ir įstatymų leidėjų susitarimas, kad moterys per 2010 m
Pranašas (PBUH) buvo suteiktos žmogaus sukurtų įstatymų nesuteiktos teisės ir teisinės privilegijos iki
neseniai, vakariečių ir vakarietiškos perspektyvos žmonių propagandinės kampanijos
nuosekliai kaltina islamą neteisingumu moterų atžvilgiu, nustatyti jiems apribojimus, ir
marginalizuodami savo vaidmenį visuomenėje.
Šią situaciją dar labiau pablogino atmosfera ir visame pasaulyje vyraujančios sąlygos
Musulmonų pasaulis, kur nežinojimas ir skurdas sukūrė ribotą religijos supratimą
ir šeimos bei žmonių santykiai, kurie užkerta kelią teisingumui ir civilizuotam gyvenimo būdui, ypač
tarp vyrų ir moterų. Maža žmonių grupė, kuriai buvo suteiktos galimybės
įgyti išsilavinimą ir gebėjimus taip pat pateko į spąstus tikėdami, kad teisingumas pasiekiamas
moterims ir pasinaudoti jų gebėjimais priklauso nuo religijos ir pamaldumo atmetimo ir
perima vakarietišką gyvenimo būdą, viena vertus, dėl jų paviršutiniškų islamo studijų
o gyvenimo nukrypimų poveikis kitam.
Tik labai nedaugeliui žmonių iš šių dviejų grupių pavyko pabėgti ir išmesti
jų nežinojimo ir tradicijų skraiste. Šie žmonės nuodugniai išstudijavo savo paveldą
ir detales, ir į Vakarų patirties rezultatus žiūrėjo atvirai. Jie turi
tiek praeityje, tiek dabar skiria kviečius ir pelus, ir susitvarkė
moksliškai ir objektyviai su iškilusiomis problemomis. Jie paneigė melą
kaltinimai islamui iškalbingais argumentais, ir prisipažino padaręs nuslėptus trūkumus.
Jie taip pat iš naujo išnagrinėjo neklystančiųjų posakius ir papročius
atskirti, kas nustatyta ir šventa, nuo to, kas pakeista ir iškreipta.
Atsakingas šios grupės elgesys nustatė naujas kryptis ir naujus elgesio būdus
su moterų islamo visuomenėse klausimu. Akivaizdu, kad jie dar neišsprendė visų problemų
ir rado galutinius daugelio teisės aktų spragų ir trūkumų sprendimus, bet jie padėjo
dirvą naujam modeliui musulmonėms moterims atsirasti, kurie yra ir stiprūs, ir
įsipareigoję teisiniams ir veiksmingiems savo visuomenės pagrindams.
Su islamo revoliucijos Irane triumfu ir jos lyderių palaiminimu, kuris yra
pagrindinis religinis autoritetas moterų dalyvavimui ir veiksmingas politinis bei socialinis
dalyvavimas, stiprių debatų apie moteris islame erdvė buvo gerokai išplėsta.
Musulmonų moterų modelis Irane išplito į islamo pasipriešinimo judėjimus Libane,
Palestina kitos arabų šalys ir net Vakarų pasaulis, ir dėl to, propaganda
kampanijos prieš islamą tam tikru mastu sumažėjo.
Salafi islamo judėjimų, tokių kaip Talibanas Afganistane ir panašių, atsiradimas
Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,
have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda
campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards
women.
| Rugsėjo mėn 17, 2010 | Komentarai 0
tepimasis: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jimas Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (Niujorko laikas, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. Ir ne kitaip, kaip klasikiniame antisemitizmo dokumente pateikti kaltinimai, Siono vyresniųjų protokolai, kai kurios žiauresnės islamofobijos išraiškos–kaip Kol Europa miegojo–apima islamo dizaino, dominuojančio Vakaruose, prisiminimus.
Islamo institucijos ir musulmonai, žinoma, turėtų būti vertinamas ir kritikuojamas taip pat, kaip ir bet kas kitas. Pavyzdžiui, kai Norvegijos islamo taryba diskutuoja, ar gėjams ir lesbietėms turi būti įvykdyta mirties bausmė, galima griežtai pasmerkti asmenis ar grupes, kurios laikosi tokios nuomonės, neįtraukiant visų Europos musulmonų, kaip ir Bawer's Pajamas Media įrašas (8/7/08),
„Europos musulmonų debatai: Ar gėjai turėtų būti įvykdyti mirties bausme?“
Panašiai, ekstremistai, kurie pateisina savo smurtinius veiksmus remdamiesi tam tikra islamo interpretacija, gali būti kritikuojami, neįtraukiant į labai skirtingą musulmonų populiaciją visame pasaulyje.. Po visko, žurnalistams pavyko nušviesti Oklahomos miesto sprogdinimą, kurį surengė Timothy McVeigh–rasistinės krikščioniškos tapatybės sektos šalininkas–nesiimant apibendrintų teiginių apie „krikščionišką terorizmą“. taip pat, žiniasklaida nušvietė žydų fanatikų teroro aktus–pavyzdžiui, Hebrono žudynės, kurias įvykdė Baruchas Goldsteinas (Papildomai!, 5/6/94)–neįtraukiant judaizmo visumos.
| Rugsėjo mėn 16, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Džihadistinio islamizmo totalitarizmas ir jo iššūkis Europai ir islamui
Basso blauzdikaulis
When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Toliau, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, tačiau, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, kaip reakcija į jos intensyvią sekuliarizaciją, atsirandančią dėl globalizacijos.
Religijomis pagrįstų politinių ideologijų analizė, ir tai gali būti patraukli kaip politinė religija dėl to, apima socialinių mokslų supratimą apie religijos vaidmenį pasaulio politikoje, ypač po to, kai Šaltojo karo dvipolė sistema užleido vietą daugiapoliam pasauliui. Hannos Arendt instituto projekte, skirtame totalitarizmo taikymui tiriant politines religijas, Aš pasiūliau skirtumą tarp pasaulietinių ideologijų, kurios veikia kaip religijos pakaitalas, ir religinės ideologijos, pagrįstos tikru religiniu tikėjimu, kas yra religinio fundamentalizmo atveju (žr. pastabą
24). Kitas projektas „Politinė religija“, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (žr. pastabą 26).
| Rugsėjo mėn 15, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: pavyzdžiui, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. For example, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Iš tikrųjų, demokratinis procesas paprastai kildinamas iš asmens autonomijos principo, kuriam šios islamo teorijos nepatvirtina.11 Čia, parodome, kad toks principas nėra būtinas demokratiniam procesui pateisinti.
| Rugsėjo mėn 09, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islam and the New Political Landscape
„Les Back“, Michaelas Keithas, Azra Khanas,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Rugsėjo mėn 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 ir 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, sparčiai besikeičianti politinių erdvių kartografija ir „tikėjimo organizacijų“ vaidmuo pertvarkant gerovės teikimą sukuria materialų socialinį kontekstą, nulemiantį naujų politinio dalyvavimo formų galimybes ir kontūrus..
| Rugsėjo mėn 08, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, akademikai, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Okupacija, Kolonializmas, Apartheidas?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (būtent, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, ir
Gazoje, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Tuo pačiu metu, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, ir, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Tuo pačiu metu, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMAS, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Prolifi patirties ir įžvalgos panaudojimas
c mokslininkai, akademikai, patyrę žurnalistai ir politikai, Arches Quarterly atskleidžia islamo ir demokratijos santykius bei Amerikos vaidmenį, taip pat Obamos sukeltus pokyčius., ieškant bendros kalbos. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation generalinis direktorius pateikia šios diskusijos pradžią, kur jis apmąsto Obamos kelyje esančias viltis ir iššūkius. Sekant Altikriti, buvęs prezidento Niksono patarėjas, Daktaras Robertas Crane'as siūlo išsamią islamo teisės į laisvę principo analizę. Anvaras Ibrahimas, buvęs Malaizijos ministro pirmininko pavaduotojas, praturtina diskusiją praktine demokratijos įgyvendinimo musulmonų dominuojančiose visuomenėse realijomis, būtent, Indonezijoje ir Malaizijoje.
Taip pat turime daktarę Shireen Hunter, Džordžtauno universitete, JAV, kuris tyrinėja musulmoniškas šalis, atsilikusias demokratizacijos ir modernizavimo srityje. Ją papildo terorizmo rašytojas, Dr Nafeez Ahmed paaiškino postmodernybės krizę ir
demokratijos žlugimas. Daktaras Daudas Abdullah (Vidurio Rytų žiniasklaidos monitoriaus direktorius), Alanas Hartas (buvęs ITN ir BBC Panoramos korespondentas; sionizmo autorius: Tikrasis žydų priešas) ir Asemas Sondosas (Egipto savaitraščio Sawt Al Omma redaktorius) sutelkti dėmesį į Obamą ir jo vaidmenį skatinant demokratiją musulmonų pasaulyje, taip pat JAV santykius su Izraeliu ir Musulmonų brolija.
Užsienio reikalų ministras, Maldyvai, Ahmedas Shaheedas spėlioja apie islamo ir demokratijos ateitį; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
Tikimės, kad visa tai suteiks išsamų skaitymą ir šaltinį apmąstymams apie problemas, kurios liečia mus visus naujoje vilties aušroje.
Ačiū
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henris Siegmanas
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMAS IR TEISĖS TAISYKLĖ
Birgit Krawietz
Helmutas Reifeldas
Mūsų šiuolaikinėje Vakarų visuomenėje, valstybės organizuotos teisinės sistemos paprastai nubrėžia skiriamąją liniją, atskiriančią religiją ir teisę. Ir atvirkščiai, yra nemažai islamo regioninių visuomenių, kuriose religija ir įstatymai šiandien yra taip glaudžiai susiję ir susipynę, kaip buvo iki šių laikų pradžios. Tuo pačiu metu, religinės teisės proporcija (šariato arabų kalba) ir viešoji teisė (įstatymas) įvairiose šalyse skiriasi. Kas daugiau, skiriasi ir islamo, taigi ir islamo teisės, statusas. Remiantis Islamo konferencijos organizacijos pateikta informacija (OIC), šiuo metu yra 57 Islamo valstybės visame pasaulyje, apibrėžta kaip šalys, kuriose religija yra islamas (1) valstija, (2) gyventojų dauguma, arba (3) didelė mažuma. Visa tai turi įtakos islamo teisės raidai ir formai.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokratija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Kaina
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tačiau, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Artimųjų Rytų, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; ir (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Demokratija, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| Rugsėjo mėn 05, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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