همه ورودی ها در "مطالعات & تحقیق و پژوهش" دسته بندی
عرب فردا
دیوید بی. خارج از کشور
اکتبر 6, 1981, قرار بود روز جشن در مصر باشد. این سالگرد بزرگ ترین لحظه پیروزی مصر در سه درگیری اعراب و اسرائیل بود, زمانی که ارتش مستضعف این کشور در روزهای افتتاحیه کانال سوئز را عبور داد 1973 جنگ یوم کیپور و فرستادن سربازان اسرائیلی در حال عقب نشینی. در خنک, صبح بی ابر, استادیوم قاهره مملو از خانواده‌های مصری بود که برای دیدن تجهیزات نظامی ارتش آمده بودند. در جایگاه بازبینی, رئیس جمهور انور السادات,معمار جنگ, با رضایت به تماشای رژه مردان و ماشین آلات مقابل او نشست. من همین نزدیکی بودم, یک خبرنگار خارجی تازه وارد. ناگهان, یکی از کامیون‌های ارتش درست در مقابل جایگاه بازبینی متوقف شد، درست زمانی که شش جت میراژ در یک نمایش آکروباتیک از بالای سرشان غرش می‌کردند., رنگ آمیزی آسمان با مسیرهای طولانی قرمز, رنگ زرد, رنگ بنفش,و دود سبز. سادات برخاست, ظاهراً برای تبادل سلام با گروه دیگری از نیروهای مصری آماده می شود. او خود را به یک هدف عالی برای چهار قاتل اسلام گرا تبدیل کرد که از کامیون پریدند, به تریبون یورش بردند, و بدن او را با گلوله پر کرد. در حالی که قاتلان برای چیزی که به نظر می رسید برای ابدیت ادامه می دادند تا جایگاه را با آتش مرگبار خود بپاشند., من برای یک لحظه فکر کردم که آیا باید به زمین بخورم و خطر زیر پا گذاشتن توسط تماشاگران وحشت زده را به جان بخرم یا در راه بمانم و خطر گلوله سرگردان را بگیرم.. غریزه به من گفت که روی پاهایم بمان, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| سپتامبر 26, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islam and the Making of State Power
سید ولی رضا نصر
In 1979 General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, declared that Pakistan would become an Islamic state. Islamic values and norms would serve as the foundation of national identity, law, economy, and social relations, and would inspire all policy making. In 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, the new prime minister of Malaysia, introduced a similar broad-based plan to anchor state policy making in Islamic values, and to bring his country’s laws and economic practices in line with the teachings of Islam. Why did these rulers choose the path of “Islamization” for their countries? و چگونه دولت‌های سکولار پسااستعماری، عامل اسلامی‌سازی و منادی دولت اسلامی واقعی شدند.?
مالزی و پاکستان از اواخر دهه 1970 تا اوایل دهه 1980 مسیر منحصر به فردی را برای توسعه دنبال کرده اند که با تجربیات سایر کشورهای جهان سوم متفاوت است.. در این دو کشور هویت دینی در ایدئولوژی دولتی ادغام شد تا هدف و روند توسعه را با ارزش های اسلامی بیان کند.
این اقدام همچنین تصویر بسیار متفاوتی از رابطه اسلام و سیاست در جوامع مسلمان ارائه کرده است. در مالزی و پاکستان, این نهادهای دولتی بوده اند تا فعالان اسلامگرا (کسانی که طرفدار قرائت سیاسی از اسلام هستند; به احیاگرها یا بنیادگرایان نیز معروف است) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, و به طور گسترده تر چگونه فرهنگ و مذهب در خدمت نیازهای قدرت و توسعه دولتی است. تحلیل در اینجا متکی بر مباحث نظری است
در علوم اجتماعی رفتار دولتی و نقش فرهنگ و مذهب در آن. مهمتر, از موارد مورد بررسی استنباط می کند تا نتیجه گیری های گسترده تری را که مورد علاقه رشته ها است، بدست آورد.
| سپتامبر 25, 2010 | نظرات 0
زنان ایرانی پس از انقلاب اسلامی
Ansiia Khaz Allii
بیش از سی سال از پیروزی انقلاب اسلامی ایران می گذرد, هنوز وجود دارد a سوالات و ابهامات متعددی در مورد نحوه برخورد جمهوری اسلامی و قوانین آن وجود دارد مشکلات معاصر و شرایط کنونی, به ویژه در مورد زنان و حقوق زنان. این مقاله کوتاه به روشنگری این موضوعات و بررسی جایگاه کنونی زنان در عرصه های مختلف می پردازد, در مقایسه با وضعیت قبل از انقلاب اسلامی. داده های معتبر و تایید شده استفاده شده است هر جا که ممکن است. مقدمه تعدادی از مطالعات نظری و حقوقی را خلاصه می کند مبنایی برای تحلیل عملی بعدی و منابعی هستند که داده ها از آنجا به دست آمده اند.
بخش اول به نگرش رهبری جمهوری اسلامی ایران نسبت به زنان و حقوق زنان, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| سپتامبر 19, 2010 | نظرات 0
Women in Islam
امیره Burghul
Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the
اصول و آموزه های اسلام باعث تحولی اساسی در جایگاه زن شد
در مقایسه با وضعیت حاکم بر کشورهای شرق و غرب در آن زمان, و با وجود
موافقت تعداد زیادی از متفکران و قانونگذاران که زنان در دوران
نبی - پیامبر (ص) به آنها حقوق و امتیازات قانونی اعطا شد که توسط قوانین ساخت بشر اعطا نشده بود
به تازگی, کمپین های تبلیغاتی غربی ها و افراد با دیدگاه غرب زدگی
پیوسته اسلام را به ظلم نسبت به زنان متهم می کنند, اعمال محدودیت برای آنها, و
به حاشیه راندن نقش آنها در جامعه.
این وضعیت به دلیل جو و شرایط حاکم در سراسر کشور بدتر شده است
جهان اسلام, جایی که جهل و فقر درک محدودی از دین ایجاد کرده است
و روابط خانوادگی و انسانی که مانع عدالت و سبک زندگی متمدن است, به ویژه
بین زن و مرد. گروه کوچکی از افرادی که به آنها فرصت داده شده است
به دست آوردن تحصیلات و توانایی ها نیز در دام اعتقاد به تحقق عدالت افتاده است
برای زنان و سرمایه گذاری بر توانایی های آنان در گرو نفی دین و تقوا و
اتخاذ سبک زندگی غربی, در نتیجه مطالعات سطحی آنها از اسلام از یک سو
و تأثیر انحرافات زندگی بر دیگری.
تنها تعداد بسیار کمی از افراد این دو گروه موفق به فرار و فرار شده اند
ردای جهل و سنت آنها. این افراد میراث خود را عمیقاً مطالعه کرده اند
و جزئیات, و با دیدی باز به نتایج تجربیات غربی نگاه کرده اند. آنها دارند
بین گندم و کاه در گذشته و حال تمایز قائل شد, و معامله کرده اند
علمی و عینی با مشکلات پیش آمده. باطل را رد کرده اند
اتهاماتی که علیه اسلام با دلایل شیوا مطرح می شود, و به عیوب پنهان اعتراف کرده اند.
همچنین احادیث و آداب معصومین را مورد بررسی مجدد قرار داده اند تا بتوانند
تمایز بین آنچه ثابت و مقدس است و آنچه تغییر یافته و تحریف شده است.
رفتار مسئولانه این گروه، جهت‌گیری‌ها و شیوه‌های نوین برخورد را ایجاد کرده است
با مسئله زن در جوامع اسلامی. آنها به وضوح هنوز به همه مشکلات رسیدگی نکرده اند
و راه حل های نهایی را برای بسیاری از خلاءها و کاستی های قانونی پیدا کرد, اما آنها گذاشته اند
زمینه ای برای ظهور الگویی جدید برای زنان مسلمان, که هم قوی هستند و هم
متعهد به مبانی قانونی و مؤثر جامعه خود هستند.
با پیروزی انقلاب اسلامی ایران و به برکت رهبران آن, که هست
مرجع اصلی دینی برای مشارکت زنان و مؤثر سیاسی و اجتماعی آنان
مشارکت, دامنه بحث های قوی در مورد زنان در اسلام به طور قابل توجهی گسترش یافته است.
الگوی زنان مسلمان در ایران به جنبش های مقاومت اسلامی در لبنان سرایت کرده است,
فلسطین دیگر کشورهای عربی و حتی جهان غرب, و در نتیجه, تبلیغات
مبارزات علیه اسلام تا حدودی کاهش یافته است.
ظهور جنبش های اسلامی سلفی مانند طالبان در افغانستان و مانند آن
جنبش های سلفی در عربستان سعودی و شمال آفریقا, و روش متعصبانه آنها در برخورد با زنان,
ناظران عصبی را برانگیخته اند که ترس از ظهور مجدد اسلامی برای راه اندازی تبلیغات جدید دارند
کمپین هایی که اسلام را به الهام بخشیدن به تروریسم و عقب ماندگی و ظلم نسبت به آنها متهم می کنند
زنان.
| سپتامبر 17, 2010 | نظرات 0
smearcasting: اسلام هراسان چگونه ترس را گسترش می دهند, تعصب و اطلاعات غلط
نمایشگاه
جولی Hollar
جیم Naureckas
تبدیل اسلام هراسی به جریان اصلی:
چگونه مسلمانان مسلمان تعصب خود را پخش می کنند
اتفاق قابل توجهی در حلقه ملی منتقدان کتاب رخ داد (NBCC) نامزدها در ماه فوریه 2007: گروهی که معمولاً سرسخت و بردبار بود، نامزد بهترین کتاب در زمینه نقد شد، کتابی که به طور گسترده به عنوان تحقیرکننده کل یک گروه مذهبی شناخته می‌شود..
نامزدی بروس باور در حالی که اروپا خواب بود: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (نیویورک تایمز, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. این گزارش نگاهی تازه به اسلام هراسی در رسانه های امروزی و عاملان آن دارد, تشریح برخی از ارتباطات پشت صحنه که به ندرت در رسانه ها مورد بررسی قرار می گیرند. این گزارش همچنین چهار عکس فوری ارائه می دهد, یا «مطالعات موردی,توصیف می کند که چگونه اسلام هراسان به دستکاری رسانه ها ادامه می دهند تا مسلمانان را به شکل گسترده ای ترسیم کنند, برس نفرت انگیز. هدف ما مستندسازی لکه گیری است: نوشته ها و ظواهر علنی فعالان و صاحب نظران اسلام هراس که به طور عمدی و منظم ترس را منتشر می کنند., تعصب و اطلاعات غلط. اصطلاح «اسلام هراسی» به دشمنی با اسلام و مسلمانان اشاره دارد که می‌خواهد کل یک دین را غیرانسانی کند., آن را اساساً بیگانه نشان می دهد و به آن امری ذاتی نسبت می دهد, مجموعه ای ضروری از صفات منفی مانند غیرمنطقی بودن, عدم تحمل و خشونت. و نه بی شباهت به اتهاماتی که در سند کلاسیک یهودستیزی مطرح شده است, پروتکل های بزرگان صهیون, برخی از عبارات خشونت بارتر اسلام هراسی–مثل وقتی اروپا خواب بود–شامل تداعی طرح های اسلامی برای تسلط بر غرب است.
نهادهای اسلامی و مسلمانان, البته, باید مانند دیگران مورد بررسی و انتقاد قرار گیرد. برای مثال, زمانی که شورای اسلامی نروژ در مورد اینکه آیا مردان و همجنسگرایان همجنس‌گرا باید اعدام شوند، بحث می‌کند, می‌توان افراد یا گروه‌هایی را که در این عقیده سهیم هستند، بدون کشاندن همه مسلمانان اروپایی به آن، به شدت محکوم کرد, همانطور که در پست رسانه پیژامه باور (8/7/08),
مناظره مسلمانان اروپا: آیا همجنسگرایان باید اعدام شوند?”
به همین ترتیب, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. گذشته از همه اینها, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–without resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewish–for instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.
| سپتامبر 16, 2010 | نظرات 0
توتالیتاریسم اسلام گرایی جهادی و چالش آن با اروپا و اسلام
باسو تیبی
When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, با این حال, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, به عنوان واکنشی به سکولاریزاسیون شدید آن ناشی از جهانی شدن.
تحلیل ایدئولوژی های سیاسی مبتنی بر ادیان, و در نتیجه این امر می تواند به عنوان یک دین سیاسی جذابیت داشته باشد, شامل درک علوم اجتماعی از نقش دین توسط سیاست جهانی است, به ویژه پس از اینکه سیستم دو قطبی جنگ سرد جای خود را به دنیای چند قطبی داد. در پروژه ای که در موسسه هانا آرنت برای کاربرد توتالیتاریسم در مطالعه ادیان سیاسی انجام شد., من تمایز بین ایدئولوژی های سکولار را پیشنهاد کردم که به عنوان جانشین دین عمل می کنند, و ایدئولوژی های دینی مبتنی بر ایمان واقعی دینی, که در بنیادگرایی دینی وجود دارد (یادداشت را ببینید
24). پروژه دیگری با موضوع «مذهب سیاسی», در دانشگاه بازل انجام شد, این نکته را روشن‌تر کرده است که وقتی دین دینی در لباس سیاسی پوشیده شد، رویکردهای جدید به سیاست ضروری می‌شود. با استفاده از منابع معتبر اسلام سیاسی., این مقاله پیشنهاد می‌کند که طیف وسیعی از سازمان‌های الهام‌گرفته از ایدئولوژی اسلامگرا هم به عنوان ادیان سیاسی و هم به عنوان جنبش‌های سیاسی مفهوم‌سازی شوند.. ویژگی منحصر به فرد اسلام سیاسی در این واقعیت است که مبتنی بر یک دین فراملی است (یادداشت را ببینید 26).
| سپتامبر 15, 2010 | نظرات 0
لیبرال دموکراسی و اسلام سیاسی: جستجوی زمینه مشترک.
مصطفی Benhenda
This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
رژیم, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, که اغلب به عنوان بخشی از دموکراسی در نظر گرفته می شود (حداقل, دموکراسی که امروزه در ایالات متحده شناخته می شود). با توجه به این ارزیابی مختلط از اصول دموکراتیک, به نظر می رسد تعیین مفهوم دموکراسی زیربنای مدل های سیاسی اسلامی جالب باشد. به عبارت دیگر, ما باید سعی کنیم دریابیم که در «تئودموکراسی» چه چیزی دموکراتیک است.. در این راستا, در میان تنوع و کثرت چشمگیر سنت های اسلامی اندیشه سیاسی هنجاری, ما اساساً بر جریان فکری گسترده ای تمرکز می کنیم که به ابوعلاء مودودی و روشنفکر مصری سید قطب برمی گردد.8 این گرایش خاص فکری جالب توجه است زیرا در جهان اسلام, اساس برخی از چالش برانگیزترین مخالفت ها با اشاعه ارزش های نشات گرفته از غرب است.. بر اساس ارزش های دینی, این روند یک الگوی سیاسی جایگزین برای لیبرال دموکراسی ارائه کرد. به طور کلی, مفهوم دموکراسی که در این مدل سیاسی اسلامی گنجانده شده است، رویه ای است. با کمی تفاوت, این مفهوم الهام گرفته از نظریه های دموکراتیک است که توسط برخی از مشروطه خواهان و دانشمندان علوم سیاسی حمایت می شود., تا یک نقطه خاص. For example, بر هیچ مفهومی از حاکمیت مردمی تکیه ندارد و نیازی به جدایی بین دین و سیاست ندارد.. هدف اول این مقاله، تشریح این مفهوم مینیمالیستی است. ما به منظور جداسازی این مفهوم از اخلاقی آن، به تفصیل آن را بیان می کنیم (لیبرال) پایه ها, که از دیدگاه اسلامی خاص مورد بحث در اینجا بحث برانگیز است. در واقع, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.
| سپتامبر 09, 2010 | نظرات 0
اسلام و چشم انداز سیاسی جدید
بازگشت, مایکل کیت, عذرا خان,
کلبیر شکرا و جان سولوموس
در پی حمله به مرکز تجارت جهانی در 11 سپتامبر 2001, و بمباران مادرید و لندن 2004 و 2005, ادبیاتی که به اشکال و روش‌های بیان دینی – به‌ویژه بیان دینی اسلامی – می‌پردازد، در مناطق نیمه‌جمعی که جریان اصلی علوم اجتماعی را به طراحی سیاست‌های اجتماعی مرتبط می‌کند، شکوفا شده است., اتاق های فکر و روزنامه نگاری. بسیاری از کارها تلاش کرده اند نگرش ها یا استعدادهای یک جمعیت مسلمان را در یک مکان خاص تنش مانند لندن یا بریتانیا تعریف کنند. (بارنز, 2006; مشاوره اتنوس, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; پوپولوس, 2006), یا اشکال خاصی از مداخله در سیاست اجتماعی را نقد کرد (روشن, 2006آ; میرزا و همکاران, 2007). مطالعات اسلام گرایی و جهادگرایی تمرکز ویژه ای بر پیوندهای ترکیبی و پیچیده بین ایمان دینی اسلامی و اشکال جنبش اجتماعی و بسیج سیاسی ایجاد کرده است. (حسین, 2007; کپل, 2004, 2006; مک روی, 2006; نویل جونز و همکاران, 2006, 2007; فیلیپس, 2006; روی, 2004, 2006). به صورت متعارف, تمرکز تحلیلی، فرهنگ اسلام را مورد توجه قرار داده است, سیستم های اعتقادی مؤمنان, و سیر تاریخی و جغرافیایی جمعیت های مسلمان در سراسر جهان به طور کلی و در غرب به طور خاص. (عباس, 2005; انصاری, 2002; ایاد و گاربین, 2002; حسین, 2006; حالت ها, 2005; رمضان, 1999, 2005). در این مقاله تاکید متفاوت است. ما استدلال می‌کنیم که مطالعات مشارکت سیاسی اسلامی بدون توسل به کلیات کلان در مورد فرهنگ و ایمان باید با دقت زمینه‌سازی شود.. این به این دلیل است که فرهنگ و ایمان هر دو توسط فرهنگ ساخته شده اند و به نوبه خود ساختار فرهنگی دارند, مناظر نهادی و مشورتی که از طریق آنها بیان می شوند. در مورد تجربه بریتانیا, ردپای پنهان مسیحیت در شکل گیری دولت رفاه در قرن گذشته, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
| سپتامبر 08, 2010 | نظرات 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
اشتغال, استعمار, آپارتاید?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (برای مثال, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, و
غزه, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. همزمان, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, و, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, مشاوره, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. همزمان, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
عبدالله Faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
علاوه بر این, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, برای مثال, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ایالات متحده آمریکا, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
هنری Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
بریجیت Krawietz
هلموت Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. همزمان, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| سپتامبر 06, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights
دانیل E. قیمت
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, با این حال, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| سپتامبر 06, 2010 | نظرات 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (سهمیه)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; و (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| سپتامبر 06, 2010 | نظرات 0
دموکراسی, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| سپتامبر 05, 2010 | نظرات 0
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