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Islam i demokracija: Tekst, Tradicija, i Povijest

Ahrar Ahmad

Popularni stereotipi na Zapadu naginju postuliranju progresivnog, racionalan, i slobodni Zapad protiv nazadnjaka, ugnjetavački, i prijeteći islamu. Istraživanja javnog mnijenja provedena u Sjedinjenim Državama tijekom 1990-ih otkrila su dosljedan obrazac Amerikanaca koji muslimane označavaju kao "vjerske fanatike" i smatraju islamski etos temeljno "antidemokratskim".1 Ove karakterizacije
i nedoumice imaju, iz očitih razloga, značajno pogoršalo od tragedije od 9/11. Međutim, te se percepcije ne odražavaju samo u popularnoj svijesti ili grubim medijskim prikazima. Cijenjeni znanstvenici također su pridonijeli ovoj klimi mišljenja pišući o navodno nepomirljivim razlikama između islama i Zapada, famozni “sukob civilizacija” koji je navodno skori i neizbježan, te o prividnoj nespojivosti islama i demokracije. Na primjer, Profesor Peter Rodman zabrinut je da smo "izvana izazvani militantnom atavističkom silom vođenom mržnjom prema cjelokupnoj zapadnoj političkoj misli koja se vraća na prastare pritužbe protiv kršćanskog svijeta." Dr. Daniel Pipes proglašava da muslimani izazivaju Zapad dublje nego što su komunisti ikada učinili, jer “dok se komunisti ne slažu s našom politikom, fundamentalistički muslimani preziru cijeli naš način života.” Profesor Bernard Lewis mračno upozorava na “povijesnu reakciju drevnog rivala protiv našeg judeo-kršćanskog nasljeđa, naša svjetovna sadašnjost, i širenje obojega.” pita se profesor Amos Perlmutter: “Je li islam, fundamentalistički ili neki drugi, kompatibilan s predstavničkom demokracijom zapadnog stila usmjerenom na ljudska prava? Odgovor je jasno NE.” A profesor Samuel Huntington sugerira s poletom da "problem nije islamski fundamentalizam, nego sam islam«. Bilo bi intelektualno lijeno i prostodušno odbaciti njihove stavove kao temeljene samo na inatu ili predrasudama. Zapravo, ako se zanemari neko retoričko pretjerano, neke od njihovih optužbi, iako nezgodan za muslimane, relevantni su za raspravu o odnosu islama i demokracije u modernom svijetu. Na primjer, položaj žena ili ponekad nemuslimana u nekim muslimanskim zemljama je problematičan u smislu navodne pravne jednakosti svih ljudi u demokraciji. Na sličan način, netrpeljivost koju su neki muslimani usmjerili prema piscima (npr., Salman Rushdie u Velikoj Britaniji, Taslima Nasrin u Bangladešu, i profesor Nasr Abu Zaid u Egiptu) tobože ugrožava načelo slobode govora, što je bitno za demokraciju.
Također je istina da manje od 10 od više od 50 članice Organizacije islamske konferencije institucionalizirale su demokratska načela ili procese kako ih se shvaća na Zapadu, i to također, samo okvirno. Konačno, vrsta unutarnje stabilnosti i vanjskog mira koji je gotovo preduvjet za funkcioniranje demokracije pokvarena je turbulencijama unutarnje implozije ili vanjske agresije vidljive u mnogim muslimanskim zemljama danas (npr., Somalija, Sudan, Indonezija, Pakistan, Irak, Afganistana, Alžir, i Bosne).

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

GLOBALIZACIJA I POLITIČKI ISLAM: SOCIJALNE OSNOVE TURSKE STRANKE BLAGOSTANJA

Haldun Gulalp

Politički islam je posljednjih desetljeća u Turskoj dobio povećanu vidljivost. Velik broj studentica počeo je pokazivati ​​svoju predanost nošenjem zabranjenog islamskog pokrivala za glavu u sveučilišnim kampusima, i utjecajna proislamistička TV
kanali su se proširili. Ovaj rad se fokusira na dobrobit (blagostanje) Stranka kao najistaknutiji institucionalni predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj.
Kratak boravak Stranke blagostanja na vlasti kao vodećeg koalicijskog partnera od sredine 1996. do sredine 1997. bio je vrhunac desetljeća postojanog rasta koji su potpomogle druge islamističke organizacije i institucije. Ove organizacije i ustanove
uključivao je novine i izdavačke kuće koje su privlačile islamističke pisce, brojne islamske zaklade, islamistička konfederacija radničkih sindikata, i islamističko udruženje poslovnih ljudi. Ove su institucije radile u tandemu s, i u prilog, Welfare kao neprikosnoveni vođa i predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj, iako su imali svoje partikularističke ciljeve i ideale, koji su često odudarali od političkih projekata Welfarea. Fokusirajući se na Stranku blagostanja, zatim, omogućuje analizu šire društvene baze na kojoj je izrastao islamistički politički pokret u Turskoj. Od svrgavanja Welfarea s vlasti i njegovog konačnog zatvaranja, islamistički pokret bio je u rasulu. Ovaj će rad, stoga, ograničiti na razdoblje stranke blagostanja.
Prethodnik Welfare-a, stranka nacionalnog spasa, djelovao je 1970-ih, ali ga je zatvorio vojni režim u 1980. godine osnovan je Welfare 1983 a veliku popularnost stekao je 1990-ih. Počevši s a 4.4 posto glasova na općinskim izborima u 1984, Stranka blagostanja stalno je povećavala svoje rezultate i umnožila svoje glasove gotovo pet puta u dvanaest godina. To je prvo uznemirilo turski sekularni establišment na općinskim izborima u 1994, s 19 posto svih glasova u cijeloj zemlji i gradonačelnička mjesta u Istanbulu i Ankari, zatim na općim izborima od 1995 kada je osvojio pluralitet sa 21.4 posto nacionalnih glasova. Štoviše, Stranka blagostanja je samo nakratko mogla voditi koalicijsku vladu u partnerstvu s desničarskom Strankom pravog puta Tansua C¸ illera.

Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime

JONATHAN GITHENS-MAZER

ROBERT LAMBERT MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Od 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Conflicts over Mosques in Europe

Stefano Allievi

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, i
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, i (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, posebno, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Španjolska, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, međutim, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (MI) or
that lie beyond its borders. For this reason, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Belgija). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 to 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Muslimanski arhipelag

Max L. Bruto

Ova knjiga nastajala je mnogo godina, kako autor objašnjava u svom Predgovoru, iako je većinu stvarnog teksta napisao tijekom godine u kojoj je bio viši znanstveni suradnik u Centru za strateška obavještajna istraživanja. Autor je bio dugogodišnji dekan Škole za obavještajne studije na Združenom vojnom obavještajnom učilištu. Iako se može činiti da je knjigu mogao napisati bilo koji dobar povjesničar ili regionalni stručnjak za jugoistočnu Aziju, ovo je djelo osvijetljeno autorovim više od tri desetljeća službe unutar nacionalne obavještajne zajednice. Njegova regionalna stručnost često se primjenjivala na posebne procjene za Zajednicu. S poznavanjem islama bez premca među svojim vršnjacima i neutaživom žeđu za određivanjem kako bi se ciljevi ove religije mogli odvijati u područjima daleko od fokusa trenutne pažnje većine kreatora politike, autor je maksimalno iskoristio ovu priliku da upozna obavještajnu zajednicu i šire čitateljstvo sa strateškom procjenom regije u jeku pomirenja sekularnih i vjerskih snaga.
Ured za sigurnosnu provjeru odobrio je ovu publikaciju za neograničenu distribuciju, Ministarstvo obrane.

ISLAMIC FAITH in AMERICA

JAMES A. BEVERLEY

AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.
The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.
People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home
ovdje, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through
American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. Međutim, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. U međuvremenu, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.
Today, more than ever, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. Vlast,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

Islam and the West

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. Zapravo, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

zašto ne postoje arapske demokracije ?

Larry Diamond

Tijekom “trećeg vala” demokratizacije,” demokracija je prestala biti uglavnom zapadnjački fenomen i “otišla je globalno”. Kad je treći val započeo u 1974, svijet je imao samo oko 40 demokracije, a samo nekoliko njih ležalo je izvan Zapada. U vrijeme kad je Journal of Democracy počeo izlaziti u 1990, bilo ih je 76 izborne demokracije (čineći nešto manje od polovice neovisnih država svijeta). Po 1995, taj je broj porastao na 117—tri u svakih pet država. Do tada, kritična masa demokracija postojala je u svakoj većoj svjetskoj regiji osim u jednoj—Bliskom istoku.1 Štoviše, svako od najvećih svjetskih kulturnih područja postalo je domaćin značajnoj demokratskoj prisutnosti, doduše opet s jednom jedinom iznimkom — arapskim svijetom.2 Petnaest godina kasnije, ova iznimka još uvijek postoji.
Stalna odsutnost čak i jednog demokratskog režima u arapskom svijetu je upečatljiva anomalija - glavna iznimka globalizacije demokracije. Zašto nema arapske demokracije? Doista, zašto je tako među šesnaest neovisnih arapskih država Bliskog istoka i obalne sjeverne Afrike, Libanon je jedini koji je ikada bio demokratija?
Najčešća pretpostavka o deficitu arapske demokracije je da to mora imati neke veze s religijom ili kulturom. Nakon svega, jedina stvar koju sve arapske zemlje dijele je da su arapske.

zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. U isto vrijeme, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Doista, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Demokracija, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

F. Gregory Gause

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Therefore, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? In other words, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; i 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

IS TAYYIP ERDOĞAN THE NEW NASSER

Hurriyet DailyNews
Mustafa Akyol

Last Thursday night, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan suddenly became the focus of all the news channels in the country. The reason was that he had stormed the diplomatic scene at a World Economic Forum panel in Davos by accusing Israeli President Shimon Peres forkilling people,” and reminding the biblical commandment, “Thou shall not kill.

This was not just breaking news to the media, but also music to the ears of millions of Turks who were deeply touched by the recent bloodshed that Israel caused in the Gaza Strip. Some of them even hit the streets in order to welcome Erdoğan, who had decided to come to Istanbul right away after the tense debate. Thousands of cars headed toward the Atatürk airport in the middle of the night in order to welcomethe conqueror of Davos.

’Turkey is proud of you’

I personally had a more mundane problem at that very moment. In order to catch my 5 a.m. flight, I had left home at a quite reasonable time, 2.30 a.m. But the traffic to the airport was completely locked because of the amazing number of cars destined toward it. So, after leaving the taxi at the start of the long river of vehicles, I had to walk on the highway for about two kilometers, my hands on my luggage and my eyes on the crowd. When Erdoğan finally stepped out of the terminal, while I just walking into it, thousands applauded him and started to chant, “Turkey is proud of you!”

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still iname the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social inuenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamizam. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.