All Entries in the "Spojené štáty & Európe" Category
Islam and the Making of State Power
seyyed vali reza nasr
In 1979 General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, declared that Pakistan would become an Islamic state. Islamic values and norms would serve as the foundation of national identity, law, economy, and social relations, and would inspire all policy making. In 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, the new prime minister of Malaysia, introduced a similar broad-based plan to anchor state policy making in Islamic values, and to bring his country’s laws and economic practices in line with the teachings of Islam. Why did these rulers choose the path of “Islamization” for their countries? A ako sa kedysi sekulárne postkoloniálne štáty stali agentmi islamizácie a predzvesťou „skutočného“ islamského štátu?
Malajzia a Pakistan sa od konca 70. do začiatku 80. rokov 20. storočia vydali jedinečnou cestou rozvoja, ktorá sa líši od skúseností iných štátov tretieho sveta.. V týchto dvoch krajinách bola náboženská identita integrovaná do štátnej ideológie, aby formovala cieľ a proces rozvoja s islamskými hodnotami.
Tento podnik tiež priniesol veľmi odlišný obraz o vzťahu medzi islamom a politikou v moslimských spoločnostiach. V Malajzii a Pakistane, boli to skôr štátne inštitúcie ako islamistickí aktivisti (tí, ktorí obhajujú politické čítanie islamu; tiež známy ako revivalisti alebo fundamentalisti) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, and more broadly how culture and religion serve the needs of state power and development. The analysis here relies on theoretical discussions
in the social sciences of state behavior and the role of culture and religion therein. More important, it draws inferences from the cases under examination to make broader conclusions of interest to the disciplines.
| Sep 25, 2010 | Komentáre 0
ISLAMISTICKÝ ŽENSKÝ AKTIVIZMUS V Okupovanej Palestíne
Rozhovory s Khaledom Amayrehom
Rozhovor so Sameerou Al-Halaykou
Sameera Al-Halayka je zvoleným členom Palestínskej legislatívnej rady. Bola
narodený v dedine Shoyoukh neďaleko Hebronu v r 1964. Má BA v šaríi (islamský
judikatúra) z Hebronskej univerzity. Pracovala ako novinárka od r 1996 do 2006 kedy
vstúpila do Palestínskej legislatívnej rady ako zvolená členka v 2006 voľby.
Je vydatá a má sedem detí.
Q: V niektorých západných krajinách panuje všeobecný dojem, že ženy prijímajú
podradné zaobchádzanie v rámci skupín islamského odporu, such as Hamas. Is this true?
How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.
They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone
else. Teda, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have
the same rights and duties as men. After all, women make up at least 50 per cent of
society. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,
the new generation.
Therefore, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her
status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Indeed, it would be
unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism
is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,
qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public
matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet
Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”
Moreover, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into
account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.
| Sep 19, 2010 | Komentáre 0
IRANIAN WOMEN AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Ansiia Khaz Allii
More than thirty years have passed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| Sep 19, 2010 | Komentáre 0
podmazávanie: Ako islamofóbi šíria strach, bigotnosť a dezinformácie
FÉR
Júlia Hollarová
Jim Naureckas
Urobiť islamofóbiu mainstreamom:
Ako moslimovia vysielajú svoju bigotnosť
V National Book Critics Circle sa stala pozoruhodná vec (NBCC) nominácií vo februári 2007: Normálne namyslená a tolerantná skupina nominovaná na najlepšiu knihu v oblasti kritiky, kniha, ktorá je všeobecne vnímaná ako hanobenie celej náboženskej skupiny.
Nominácia filmu Brucea Bawera Kým Európa spala: Ako radikálny islam zvnútra ničí Západ sa nezaobišlo bez kontroverzií. Minulý kandidát Eliot Weinberger knihu odsúdil na výročnom stretnutí NBCC, nazývať to „rasizmus ako kritika“ (New York Times, 2/8/07). Prezident predstavenstva NBCC John Freeman napísal na blog skupiny (Kritické množstvo, 2/4/07): ''Nikdy som nebol
viac v rozpakoch z voľby, ako som bol s Bruceom Bawerom Kým Európa spala…. Jeho hyperventilovaná rétorika vychádza zo skutočnej kritiky do islamofóbie.
Aj keď cenu nakoniec nezískal, Kým Európa spala, uznanie v najvyšších literárnych kruhoch bolo symbolom presadzovania islamofóbie, nielen v americkom vydavateľstve, ale aj v širších médiách. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotnosť a dezinformácie. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressions–like While Europe Slept–include evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. After all, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–without resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewish–for instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.
| Sep 16, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islam, Political Islam and America
Arabský pohľad
Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
khalil al-anani
“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.
| Sep 15, 2010 | Komentáre 0
islamská reformácia
Adnan Khan
Taliansky premiér, Silvio Berlusconi sa po udalostiach o 9/11:
„...musíme si byť vedomí nadradenosti našej civilizácie, systém, ktorý zaručuje
blahobyt, rešpektovanie ľudských práv a – na rozdiel od islamských krajín – rešpekt
za náboženské a politické práva, systém, ktorý má svoje hodnoty a chápe rozmanitosť
a tolerancia...Západ si podmaní národy, like it conquered communism, even if it
means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was
1,400 years ago…”1
And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of
ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”
Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute
The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the
history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical
Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified
their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to
apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Tí, ktorí sa stali
ovplyvnený gréckou filozofiou, ako sú moslimskí filozofi a niektorí z Mut'azilah
sa považovali za ľudí, ktorí opustili záhyb islamu, keďže Korán prestal byť základom ich štúdia. Teda pre
každý moslim, ktorý sa pokúša odvodiť pravidlá alebo pochopiť, aký postoj by mal zaujať ku konkrétnemu
vydanie Koránu je základom tejto štúdie.
Prvý pokus o reformu islamu sa uskutočnil na prelome 19. storočia. Na prelome
storočia bola Ummah v dlhom období úpadku, keď sa globálna rovnováha síl posunula
z Khilafahu do Británie. Narastajúce problémy zachvátili Khilafah, kým bola západná Európa
uprostred priemyselnej revolúcie. Ummah stratila svoje pôvodné chápanie islamu, a
v snahe zvrátiť úpadok, ktorý pohltil Uthmáncov (Osmani) niektorí moslimovia boli poslaní do
West, a v dôsledku toho boli ohromení tým, čo videli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi z Egypta (1801-1873),
pri návrate z Paríža, napísal životopisnú knihu s názvom Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Ťažba zlata, alebo Prehľad Paríža, 1834), chvália ich čistotu, láska k práci, a nad
všetku spoločenskú morálku. Vyhlásil, že musíme napodobňovať to, čo sa robí v Paríži, obhajovanie zmien
islamskej spoločnosti od liberalizácie žien k systémom vládnutia. Táto myšlienka, a ostatným sa to páči,
znamenal začiatok nového trendu v islame.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islam na Západe
Jocelyne Cesari
Imigrácia moslimov do Európy, Severná Amerika, Austrália a zložitá sociálno-náboženská dynamika, ktorá sa následne vyvinula, urobili z islamu na Západe presvedčivú novú oblasť výskumu. Aféra Salmana Rushdieho, hidžábové kontroverzie, útoky na Svetové obchodné centrum, a rozruch nad dánskymi karikatúrami sú príkladmi medzinárodných kríz, ktoré odhalili spojenie medzi moslimami na Západe a globálnym moslimským svetom.. Tieto nové situácie prinášajú teoretické a metodologické výzvy pre štúdium súčasného islamu, a stalo sa kľúčovým, aby sme sa vyhli esencializácii či už islamu alebo moslimov a odolali rétorickým štruktúram diskurzov, ktoré sú zaujaté bezpečnosťou a terorizmom..
V tomto článku, Tvrdím, že islam ako náboženská tradícia je terra incognita. Predbežným dôvodom tejto situácie je, že neexistuje konsenzus o náboženstve ako predmete výskumu. Náboženstvo, ako akademická disciplína, sa rozpoltená medzi historickými, sociologický, a hermeneutických metodológií. S islamom, situácia je ešte zamotanejšia. Na západe, štúdium islamu začalo ako odvetvie orientalistických štúdií, a preto nasledovalo samostatnú a osobitnú cestu od štúdia náboženstiev. Aj keď kritika orientalizmu bola ústredným prvkom objavenia sa islamu v oblasti spoločenských vied, napätie medzi islamistami a antropológmi a sociológmi zostáva silné. Téma islamu a moslimov na Západe je zakomponovaná do tohto boja. Jedným z dôsledkov tohto metodologického napätia je, že študenti islamu, ktorí začali svoju akademickú kariéru štúdiom islamu vo Francúzsku, Nemecko, alebo pre Ameriku je náročné vybudovať si dôveryhodnosť ako učenci islamu, najmä v akademickej oblasti Severnej Ameriky
kontext.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & SPOJENÉ ŠTÁTY AMERICKÉ:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Bohužiaľ, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Komentáre 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietzová
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Zároveň, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Komentáre 0
Islamic Political Culture, demokracia, and Human Rights
Daniele. cena
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, však, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Komentáre 0
PRESNOSŤ V GLOBÁLNEJ VOJNE PROTI TERORU:
Sherifa zuhur
Sedem rokov po septembri 11, 2001 (9/11) útokov, Mnohí experti sa domnievajú, že al-Káida opäť nabrala na sile a že jej napodobňovatelia alebo pridružení členovia sú smrteľnejší ako predtým. Národný spravodajský odhad z 2007 tvrdil, že al-Káida je teraz nebezpečnejšia ako predtým 9/11.1 Emulátori al-Káidy naďalej ohrozujú Západ, Stredný východ, a európske národy, ako na pozemku zmarenej v septembri 2007 v Nemecku. uvádza Bruce Riedel: Predovšetkým vďaka horlivosti Washingtonu ísť do Iraku a nie loviť vodcov al-Kájdy, organizácia má teraz pevnú základňu operácií v Badlands v Pakistane a efektívnu franšízu v západnom Iraku. Jeho dosah sa rozšíril po celom moslimskom svete a v Európe . . . Usáma bin Ládin spustil úspešnú propagandistickú kampaň. . . . Jeho nápady teraz priťahujú viac nasledovníkov ako kedykoľvek predtým.
Je pravda, že v celom islamskom svete stále vznikajú rôzne salafi-džihádistické organizácie. Prečo sa reakcie na islamistický terorizmus, ktoré nazývame globálnym džihádom, neukázali mimoriadne efektívne?
Prechod k nástrojom „mäkkej sily,“A čo účinnosť úsilia Západu posilniť moslimov v globálnej vojne proti terorizmu? (GWOT)? Prečo si Spojené štáty získali tak málo „sŕdc a myslí“ v širšom islamskom svete? Prečo americké strategické posolstvá o tejto otázke hrajú v regióne tak zle? Prečo?, napriek širokému moslimskému nesúhlasu s extrémizmom, ako ukazujú prieskumy a oficiálne vyjadrenia kľúčových moslimských vodcov, V Jordánsku a Pakistane sa podpora pre bin Ládina skutočne zvýšila?
Táto monografia sa nebude zaoberať pôvodom islamistického násilia. Namiesto toho sa zaoberá typom koncepčného zlyhania, ktoré nesprávne vytvára GWOT a ktoré odrádza moslimov od jeho podpory.. Nie sú schopní stotožniť sa s navrhovanými transformačnými protiopatreniami, pretože vnímajú niektoré zo svojich základných presvedčení a inštitúcií ako ciele v
toto úsilie.
Niekoľko hlboko problematických trendov mätie americké konceptualizácie GWOT a strategické posolstvá vytvorené na boj proti tejto vojne.. Tieto sa vyvíjajú z (1) postkoloniálne politické prístupy k moslimom a moslimským väčšinovým národom, ktoré sa veľmi líšia, a preto vytvárajú protichodné a mätúce dojmy a účinky; a (2) zvyšková všeobecná nevedomosť a predsudky voči islamu a subregionálnym kultúram. Pridajte k tomu americký hnev, strach, a úzkosť zo smrteľných udalostí 9/11, a určité prvky, ktoré, napriek naliehaniu chladnejších hláv, brať moslimov a ich náboženstvo na zodpovednosť za zločiny ich koreligistov, alebo ktorí to považujú za užitočné z politických dôvodov.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Komentáre 0
DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, viera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. However, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. However, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
demokracia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
západné vlády, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
EGYPTskí MUSLIMNÍ BRATIA: KONFRONTÁCIA ALEBO INTEGRÁCIA?
Výskum
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, režim by mal podniknúť predbežné kroky na normalizáciu účasti moslimských bratov na politickom živote. Moslimskí bratia, ktorých spoločenské aktivity boli dlho tolerované, ale ktorých úloha vo formálnej politike je prísne obmedzená, vyhral nevídaný 20 percent parlamentných kresiel v 2005 voľby. Urobili tak napriek tomu, že súťažili len o tretinu voľných miest a napriek značným prekážkam, vrátane policajných represií a volebných podvodov. Tento úspech potvrdil ich pozíciu mimoriadne dobre organizovanej a hlboko zakorenenej politickej sily. Zároveň, podčiarkol slabé stránky právnej opozície aj vládnucej strany. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Komentáre 0
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