Allar Færslur í "Bandaríkin & Evrópa" Flokkur

Í 1979 Muhammad Zia ul-Haq hershöfðingi, herforingi Pakistans, lýst því yfir að Pakistan yrði íslamskt ríki. Íslömsk gildi og viðmið myndu þjóna sem grundvöllur þjóðlegrar sjálfsmyndar, lögum, hagkerfi, og félagsleg samskipti, og myndi hvetja alla stefnumótun. Í 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, nýr forsætisráðherra Malasíu, kynnti svipaða víðtæka áætlun til að festa stefnumótun ríkisins í íslömskum gildum, og að koma lögum lands síns og efnahagsháttum í samræmi við kenningar íslams. Hvers vegna völdu þessir ráðamenn leið „íslamvæðingar“ fyrir lönd sín? Og hvernig urðu veraldleg ríki eftir nýlendutímann fulltrúar íslamsvæðingar og fyrirboði hins „sanna“ íslamska ríkis?

Malasía og Pakistan hafa síðan seint á áttunda áratugnum – byrjun þess níunda fylgt einstakri þróunarbraut sem er frábrugðin reynslu annarra þriðja heims ríkja.. Í þessum tveimur löndum var trúarleg sjálfsmynd samþætt í hugmyndafræði ríkisins til að upplýsa markmið og ferli þróunar með íslömskum gildum.

Þetta verkefni hefur einnig gefið allt aðra mynd af tengslum íslams og stjórnmála í múslimskum samfélögum. Í Malasíu og Pakistan, það hafa verið ríkisstofnanir frekar en aðgerðarsinnar íslamista (þeir sem aðhyllast pólitískan lestur á íslam; einnig þekkt sem vakningarsinnar eða bókstafstrúarmenn) sem hafa verið verndarar íslams og verndarar hagsmuna þess. Þetta bendir til a

very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.

What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?

This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, og víðar hvernig menning og trú þjóna þörfum ríkisvalds og þróunar. Greiningin hér byggir á fræðilegum umræðum

í félagsvísindum um ríkishegðun og hlutverk menningar og trúarbragða þar. Mikilvægara, það dregur ályktanir af málum sem eru til skoðunar til að draga víðtækari ályktanir sem skipta máli fyrir greinarnar.

A ótrúlegur hlutur gerðist á National Book Gagnrýnendur Circle (NBCC) Tilnefningar í febrúar 2007: Venjulegur highbrow og umburðarlyndur hópur tilnefndur fyrir bestu bók á sviði gagnrýni bók litið víða eins denigrating heilt trúflokki.

Útnefning Þó að Bruce Bawer er Evrópa Svaf: Hvernig Radical Islam er að eyðileggja Vesturlönd frá Innan ekki fara án deilum. Past tilnefndur Eliot Weinberger sagt bókina á árlegum safna NBCC er, kalla það '' rasisma og gagnrýni '' (New York Times, 2/8/07). John Freeman NBCC borð forseti skrifaði á bloggið hópsins (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ''Ég hef aldrei verið

meira vandræðalegur af vali en ég hef verið með Bruce Bawer meðan Evrópa svaf…. hyperventilated mælskulist hans ábendingar frá raunverulegri gagnrýni í Íslamsfælni. ''

Þó það hafi ekki á endanum að vinna verðlaun, Á meðan Evrópa Svaf er viðurkenning á hæsta bókmennta hringi var emblematic af samþættingu af íslamsfælni, ekki bara í American útgáfu en í víðara fjölmiðlum. Þessi skýrsla tekur nýja líta á Íslamsfælni í fjölmiðlum í dag og perpetratrators hennar, gerð er grein sumir af the bakvið tjöldin tengingar sem eru sjaldan fjallað í fjölmiðlum. Í skýrslunni er einnig fjórar skyndimynd, eða "dæmisögur,"Lýsir því hvernig Islamophobes áfram að vinna fjölmiðla til þess að mála múslima með breiðum, hatursfull bursta. Markmið okkar er að skrá smearcasting: opinber skrif og leikjum af Islamophobic aðgerðasinna og hálærður sem viljandi og reglulega dreifa ótta, þröngsýni og misinformation. Hugtakið "Íslamsfælni" vísar til óvild gagnvart íslam og múslimum sem hefur tilhneigingu til að dehumanize heilt trú, portraying það sem í grundvallaratriðum framandi og eigna henni felst, ómissandi sett af neikvæðum einkennum, svo sem óræðum, óþol og ofbeldi. Og ekki ólíkt gjöld gerðar í klassískum skjalinu gyðingahaturs, Bókanir af öldungum Síon, sumir meira sýkjandi tjáning Íslamsfælni er–eins meðan Evrópa svaf–eru mara í symbólískum sem íslömsk hönnun til að ráða yfir Vesturlönd.

Íslamskt stofnanir og múslimar, auðvitað, ætti að vera háð sams konar athugun og gagnrýni eins og einhver annar. Til dæmis, Þegar norska Islamic ráðið fjallar um hvort homma og lesbíur ættu að framkvæma, má kröftuglega dæma einstaklinga eða hópa sem deila því áliti án þess að draga alla evrópskum Múslímar í það, sem gerði Bawer er Pajamas Media færslu (8/7/08),

"European múslima Umræða: Ætti Gays að framkvæma?"

Á sama hátt, öfgamenn sem réttlæta ofbeldi aðgerðir sínar með því að beita einhverjum sérstaka túlkun á Íslam er hægt að gagnrýna án þess að implicating gríðarlega fjölbreytt íbúa múslima um allan heim. Eftir allt, fréttamenn tókst að ná Oklahoma City loftárásir með Timothy McVeigh–fylgismaður af kynþáttahatari Christian Identity Sértrúarsöfnuður–án þess að gripið er til almennar yfirlýsingar um "kristna hryðjuverkum." Sömuleiðis, fjölmiðlar hafa fjallað hryðjuverk með því að ofstækismenn sem eru gyðinga–til dæmis Hebron fjöldamorðin fara fram með Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–án implicating heild af gyðingatrú.

„Það er enginn möguleiki á að eiga samskipti við nein Bandaríkin. stjórnsýslu svo framarlega sem Bandaríkin halda við langvarandi skoðun sinni á íslam sem raunverulegri hættu, skoðun sem setur Bandaríkin í sama bát og óvinur zíonista. Við höfum engar fyrirfram gefnar hugmyndir varðandi bandarísku þjóðina eða Bandaríkin. samfélaginu og borgaralegum samtökum þess og hugveitum. Við eigum ekki í neinum vandræðum með að eiga samskipti við bandarísku þjóðina en ekki er reynt að færa okkur nær,“ sagði Dr. Issam al-Iryan, yfirmaður stjórnmáladeildar Bræðralags múslima í símaviðtali.

Orð Al-Iryan draga saman skoðanir Bræðralags múslima á bandarísku þjóðinni og Bandaríkjunum. ríkisstjórn. Aðrir meðlimir Bræðralags múslima myndu taka undir það, eins og hinn látni Hassan al-Banna, sem stofnaði hópinn í 1928. Al- Banna leit á Vesturlönd að mestu leyti sem tákn um siðferðisbrot. Aðrir salafistar – íslamskur hugsunarskóli sem treystir á forfeður sem fyrirmyndir – hafa tekið sömu skoðun á Bandaríkjunum, en skortir þann hugmyndafræðilega sveigjanleika sem Bræðralag múslima aðhyllist. Þó að Bræðralag múslima trúi því að Bandaríkjamenn taki þátt í borgaralegum viðræðum, aðrir öfgahópar sjá engan tilgang í viðræðum og halda því fram að hervald sé eina leiðin til að eiga við Bandaríkin.

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.

In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.

In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic

context.

In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.

America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?

Ennfremur, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi

c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nefnilega, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the

demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn

– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.

We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.

Birgit Krawietz

Helmut Reifeld

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Þar af leiðandi, fræðimenn, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, þó, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.

I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power

attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.

I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing

Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.

It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?

Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?

This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in

this endeavor.

Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; og (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, trú, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through

periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful

management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Hins vegar, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.

To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Hins vegar, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities

and new risks.

Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?

This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?

How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt

toward liberal democracy?

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic

Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 kosningar. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Á sama tíma, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.