Kõik kanded "Ameerika Ühendriigid & Euroopa" Kategooria
Islam ja riigivõimu kujunemine
seyyed Vali Reza Nasr
sisse 1979 Kindral Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistani sõjaväeline valitseja, teatas, et Pakistanist saab islamiriik. Islami väärtused ja normid oleksid rahvusliku identiteedi aluseks, seadus, majandust, ja sotsiaalsed suhted, ja see inspireeriks kogu poliitika kujundamist. sisse 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, Malaisia uus peaminister, võttis kasutusele sarnase laiapõhjalise plaani, et ankurdada riigi poliitika kujundamine islami väärtustesse, ning viia oma riigi seadused ja majandustavad kooskõlla islami õpetustega. Miks valisid need valitsejad oma riikide jaoks "islamiseerumise" tee?? Ja kuidas kunagistest ilmalikest postkoloniaalsetest riikidest said islamiseerumise agendid ja "tõelise" islamiriigi kuulutajad?
Malaisia ja Pakistan on alates 1970. aastate lõpust – 1980. aastate algusest järginud ainulaadset arenguteed, mis erineb teiste kolmanda maailma riikide kogemustest.. Nendes kahes riigis integreeriti religioosne identiteet riigi ideoloogiasse, et teavitada islami väärtustest lähtuva arengu eesmärki ja protsessi.
See ettevõtmine on andnud ka väga erineva pildi islami ja poliitika suhetest moslemiühiskondades. Malaisias ja Pakistanis, see on olnud pigem riiklikud institutsioonid kui islamistlikud aktivistid (need, kes propageerivad islami poliitilist lugemist; tuntud ka kui revivalistid või fundamentalistid) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, ja laiemalt, kuidas kultuur ja religioon teenivad riigivõimu ja arengu vajadusi. Siinne analüüs tugineb teoreetilistele aruteludele
riigikäitumise sotsiaalteadustes ning kultuuri ja religiooni rollis selles. Tähtsam, see teeb uuritavatest juhtumitest järeldusi, et teha teadusharudele huvi pakkuvaid laiemaid järeldusi.
| september 25, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islamistlike NAISTE aktivismi okupeeritud Palestiina
Interviews by Khaled Amayreh
Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was
born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islami
Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 kuni 2006 when
she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 valimised.
She is married and has seven children.
Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive
inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?
How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.
They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone
else. Thus, mis puudutab poliitilist kaasatust ja aktivismi, naistel üldiselt on
samad õigused ja kohustused mis meestel. Pealegi, naised moodustavad vähemalt 50 protsenti
ühiskond. Teatud mõttes, nad on kogu ühiskond, sest nad sünnitavad, ja tõsta,
uus põlvkond.
Seetõttu, Võin öelda, et naiste staatus Hamasis on temaga täielikult kooskõlas
staatus islamis endas. See tähendab, et ta on täispartner kõigil tasanditel. Tõepoolest, see oleks
islami jaoks ebaõiglane ja ebaõiglane (või islamist, kui soovite) naine olla kannatustes partner
samas kui ta on otsustusprotsessist välja jäetud. Sellepärast on naise roll selles
Hamas on alati olnud teerajaja.
Q: Kas teile tundub, et Hamasis on esile kerkinud naiste poliitiline aktiivsus?
loomulik areng, mis sobib kokku klassikaliste islami kontseptsioonidega
naiste staatuse ja rolli kohta, või on see lihtsalt vajalik vastus
modernsusest ja poliitilise tegevuse nõuetest ja jätkumisest
Iisraeli okupatsioon?
Islami kohtupraktikas ega Hamasi põhikirjas ei ole ühtegi teksti, mis takistaks naistel
poliitiline osalus. Usun, et see on vastupidine — seal on palju Koraani salme
ja prohvet Muhamedi ütlused, mis kutsuvad naisi üles olema poliitikas ja avalikkuses aktiivsed
moslemeid puudutavad probleemid. Aga see on tõsi ka naiste puhul, nagu meeste jaoks on, poliitiline aktiivsus
ei ole kohustuslik, vaid vabatahtlik, ja see otsustatakse suuresti iga naise võimete valguses,
kvalifikatsioonist ja individuaalsetest asjaoludest. Sellest hoolimata, ilmutades muret avalikkuse pärast
on kohustuslik igale moslemi mehele ja naisele. Prohvet
ütles Muhammed: "See, kes ei näita muret moslemite asjade pärast, pole moslem."
enamgi veel, Palestiina islamistlikud naised peavad arvesse võtma kõiki kohapealseid objektiivseid tegureid
otsustades, kas liituda poliitikaga või osaleda poliitilises aktivismis.
| september 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Iraani naistel pärast islamirevolutsiooni
Ansiia Khaz Allii
Iraani islamirevolutsiooni võidukäigust on möödunud üle kolmekümne aasta, siiski on jäänud a palju küsimusi ja ebaselgust islamivabariigi ja selle seaduste käsitlemise kohta tänapäeva probleemid ja hetkeolud, eriti naiste ja naiste õiguste osas. See lühike artikkel heidab neile küsimustele valgust ja uurib naiste praegust positsiooni erinevates valdkondades, kui võrrelda seda olukorraga enne islamirevolutsiooni. Kasutatud on usaldusväärseid ja autentitud andmeid kus vähegi võimalik. Sissejuhatuses tehakse kokkuvõte mitmetest teoreetilistest ja juriidilistest uuringutest, mis pakuvad on aluseks hilisemale praktilisemale analüüsile ja on allikad, kust andmed on saadud.
Esimene osa käsitleb Iraani Islamivabariigi juhtkonna suhtumist naistesse ja naiste õigused, ja seejärel heidab põhjaliku ülevaate pärast islamirevolutsiooni välja kuulutatud seadusi naiste ja nende positsiooni kohta ühiskonnas. Teises osas käsitletakse naiste kultuuri- ja educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| september 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
smearcasting: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jim Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” kirjeldab, kuidas islamofoobid jätkavad meediaga manipuleerimist, et maalida moslemeid laiapõhjaliselt, vihkav pintsel. Meie eesmärk on dokumenteerida määrdumist: tahtlikult ja regulaarselt hirmu levitavate islamofoobsete aktivistide ja asjatundjate avalikud kirjutised ja esinemised, bigotry and misinformation. Mõiste "islamofoobia" viitab vaenule islami ja moslemite vastu, mis kipub kogu usku dehumaniseerima, kujutades seda põhimõtteliselt võõrana ja omistades sellele omase, oluline kogum negatiivseid jooni, nagu irratsionaalsus, sallimatust ja vägivalda. Ja mitte erinevalt klassikalises antisemitismidokumendis esitatud süüdistustest, Siioni vanemate protokollid, mõned islamofoobia virulentsemad väljendid–nagu Kui Euroopa magas–sisaldama esilekutsumisi islami disainidest, et domineerida läänes.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Pealegi, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–kasutamata üldistavaid väiteid "kristliku terrorismi" kohta. Samamoodi, meedia on kajastanud juutidest fanaatikute terroriakte–näiteks Hebroni veresaun, mille viis läbi Baruch Goldstein (Lisa!, 5/6/94)–ilma et see hõlmaks kogu judaismi.
| september 16, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islam, Poliitiline islam ja Ameerika
Araabia Insight
Kas "vennaskond" Ameerikaga on võimalik?
khalil al-anani
"Pole mingit võimalust suhelda ühegi USA-ga. senikaua, kuni USA säilitab oma pikaajalise nägemuse islamist kui reaalsest ohust, vaade, mis paneb USA sionistliku vaenlasega ühte paati. Meil ei ole Ameerika rahva ega USA kohta eelarvamusi. ühiskond ja selle kodanikuorganisatsioonid ja mõttekojad. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Moslemivennaskonna poliitilise osakonna juhataja telefoniintervjuus.
Al-Iryani sõnad võtavad kokku Moslemivennaskonna vaated Ameerika rahvale ja USA-le. valitsus. Teised Moslemi Vennaskonna liikmed oleksid sellega nõus, nagu ka kadunud Hassan al-Banna, aastal grupi asutanud 1928. Al- Banna pidas läänt enamasti moraalse allakäigu sümboliks. Teised salafid – islami koolkond, mis toetub esivanematele kui eeskujulikele mudelitele – on võtnud USA suhtes sama seisukoha., kuid puudub ideoloogiline paindlikkus, mida toetab Moslemivennaskond. Samal ajal kui Moslemivennaskond usub ameeriklaste kaasamisse kodanikuühiskonna dialoogi, teised äärmusrühmitused ei näe dialoogil mõtet ja väidavad, et jõud on ainus viis USAga toimetulemiseks.
| september 15, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islami reformatsiooni
Adnan Khan
The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed
well being, respect for human rights and – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect
for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity
and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it
means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was
1,400 years ago…”1
And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of
ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”
Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute
The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the
history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical
Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified
their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to
apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became
smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah
were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Seega selleks
moslemid, kes üritavad tuletada reegleid või mõista, millist seisukohta konkreetse suhtes võtta
Koraani väljaandmine on selle uuringu aluseks.
Esimene katse islamit reformida toimus 19. sajandi vahetusel. aasta pöördeks
sajandil oli Ummas olnud pikaajaline langusperiood, kus ülemaailmne jõudude tasakaal muutus
Khilafah'st Suurbritanniasse. Paigaldusprobleemid haarasid Khilafahi Lääne-Euroopa ajal
keset tööstusrevolutsiooni. Ummah kaotas oma põlise arusaama islamist, ja
püüdes tagasi pöörata Uthmani omasid haaranud allakäik (Ottomanid) osa moslemeid saadeti sinna
Läände, ja selle tulemusel olid nad nähtust rabatud. Egiptuse Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873),
naastes Pariisist, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above
all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to
the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,
marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islam in the West
Jocelyne Cesari
The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
enamgi veel, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Kahjuks, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| september 06, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokraatia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Hind
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, siiski, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, demokraatia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| september 06, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) rünnakud, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; ja (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| september 06, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
ARUTELU DEMOKRAATIA ÜLE ARAABIA MAAILMAS
Ibtisam Ibrahim
Mis on demokraatia?
Lääne teadlased määratlevad demokraatiat kui meetodit üksikisikute kodaniku- ja poliitiliste õiguste kaitsmiseks. See näeb ette sõnavabaduse, vajutage, usk, arvamus, omandiõigus, ja kokkupanek, samuti hääleõigus, nimetada ja taotleda riigiametit. Huntington (1984) väidab, et poliitiline süsteem on demokraatlik sel määral, et selle võimsaimad kollektiivsed otsustajad valitakse
perioodilised valimised, kus kandidaadid võistlevad vabalt häälte pärast ja millel on hääleõiguslikud praktiliselt kõik täiskasvanud. Rothstein (1995) väidab, et demokraatia on valitsemisvorm ja valitsemisprotsess, mis muutub ja kohandub vastavalt oludele. Ta lisab ka, et läänelik demokraatia definitsioon — lisaks vastutusele, konkurentsi, teatud määral osalemist — sisaldab oluliste kodaniku- ja poliitiliste õiguste tagatist. Anderson (1995) väidab, et mõiste demokraatia tähendab süsteemi, kus kõige võimsamad kollektiivsed otsustajad valitakse perioodiliste valimiste kaudu, kus kandidaadid võistlevad vabalt häälte pärast ja kus peaaegu kogu täiskasvanud elanikkond on hääleõiguslik. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), Egiptuse õpetlane, näeb demokraatiat, mis võiks kehtida araabia maailmas, kui reeglite ja institutsioonide kogumit, mille eesmärk on võimaldada valitsemist rahumeelselt
konkureerivate rühmade ja/või vastandlike huvide juhtimine. Kuid, Samir Amin (1991) lähtus oma demokraatia määratlusest sotsiaalmarksistlikust perspektiivist. Ta jagab demokraatia kahte kategooriasse: kodanlik demokraatia, mis põhineb üksikisiku õigustel ja vabadusel, kuid ilma sotsiaalse võrdsuseta; ja poliitiline demokraatia, mis annab kõigile ühiskonnas elavatele inimestele õiguse hääletada ja valida oma valitsust ja institutsioonide esindajaid, mis aitavad saavutada nende võrdseid sotsiaalseid õigusi.
Selle lõigu lõpetuseks, Ütleksin, et demokraatiale pole ühest definitsiooni, mis näitaks täpselt, mis see on või mis mitte. Kuid, nagu märkasime, enamikul ülalmainitud määratlustel on olulised sarnased elemendid – vastutus, konkurentsi, ja mõningane osalus – mis on saanud domineerivaks läänemaailmas ja rahvusvaheliselt.
| september 05, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Demokraatia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| september 05, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (RAK) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 valimised. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| september 05, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
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