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Islám a Making of státní moci

Vali Nasr Seyyed Reza

V 1979 General Mohamed Zia ul-Haq, vojenský vládce Pákistánu, prohlásil, že Pákistán by se stal islámský stát. Islámských hodnot a norem by sloužil jako základ národní identity, zákon, ekonomika, a společenských vztahů, a stane inspirací pro všechny politiky. V 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, nového premiéra Malajsie, představil podobný široce založený plán na zakotvení státní politiky v islámských hodnotách, a uvést zákony a ekonomické praktiky své země do souladu s učením islámu. Proč si tito vládci zvolili pro své země cestu „islamizace“.? A jak se kdysi sekulární postkoloniální státy staly agenty islamizace a předzvěstí „pravého“ islámského státu?
Malajsie a Pákistán šly od konce 70. do počátku 80. let 20. století jedinečnou cestou k rozvoji, která se liší od zkušeností jiných států třetího světa.. V těchto dvou zemích byla náboženská identita integrována do státní ideologie, aby informovala o cíli a procesu rozvoje s islámskými hodnotami.
This undertaking has also presented a very different picture of the relation between Islam and politics in Muslim societies. In Malaysia and Pakistan, it has been state institutions rather than Islamist activists (those who advocate a political reading of Islam; also known as revivalists or fundamentalists) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, and more broadly how culture and religion serve the needs of state power and development. The analysis here relies on theoretical discussions
in the social sciences of state behavior and the role of culture and religion therein. More important, it draws inferences from the cases under examination to make broader conclusions of interest to the disciplines.

Aktivismus islamistické žen v okupované Palestině

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

Rozhovor s Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islámský

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 na 2006 když

vstoupila do Palestinské legislativní rady jako zvolená členka v 2006 volby.

Je vdaná a má sedm dětí.

Q: V některých západních zemích panuje obecný dojem, že ženy přijímají

podřadné zacházení v rámci skupin islámského odporu, jako je Hamás. Je to pravda?

Jak se zachází s aktivistkami v Hamasu?
Práva a povinnosti muslimských žen vycházejí především z islámského práva šaría nebo práva.

Nejsou to dobrovolné nebo charitativní činy nebo gesta, která dostáváme od Hamasu nebo kohokoli jiného

jiný. Tím pádem, pokud jde o politickou angažovanost a aktivismus, ženy obecně mají

stejná práva a povinnosti jako muži. Po všem, ženy tvoří alespoň 50 procent z

společnost. V jistém smyslu, jsou celou společností, protože rodí, a zvýšit,

nová generace.

Proto, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Vskutku, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

navíc, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

zohlednit při rozhodování, zda vstoupit do politiky nebo se zapojit do politického aktivismu.


Íránské ženy po islámské revoluci

Ansiia Khaz Allii


Více než třicet let, které uplynuly od vítězství islámské revoluce v Íránu, přesto zůstává a množství otázek a nejasností ohledně způsobu, jakým islámská republika a její zákony řeší současných problémů a současných okolností, zejména s ohledem na ženy a ženská práva. Tento krátký příspěvek osvětlí tyto problémy a prostuduje současné postavení žen v různých oblastech, srovnání se situací před islámskou revolucí. Byla použita spolehlivá a ověřená data kdekoli je to možné. Úvod shrnuje řadu teoretických a právních studií, které poskytují základ pro následnou praktičtější analýzu a jsou zdroji, ze kterých byla data získána.
První část se zabývá postoji vedení Íránské islámské republiky k ženám a women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, a relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

smearcasting: Jak Islamophobes šíří strach, fanatismu a dezinformace

FAIR

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
Pozoruhodná věc se stala v Národním kritici knihy Kruh (NBCC) nominace v únoru 2007: Normálně intelektuálské a tolerantní skupina nominována za nejlepší knihu v oblasti kritiky knihy široce viděn jako pomlouvat celou náboženskou skupinu.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, fanatismu a dezinformace. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, samozřejmě, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, když Norská islámská rada diskutuje o tom, zda by gayové a lesbičky měli být popraveni, lze důrazně odsoudit jednotlivce nebo skupiny sdílející tento názor, aniž by do něj vtáhli všechny evropské muslimy, stejně jako příspěvek Bawer's Pyjamas Media (8/7/08),
„Debata evropských muslimů: Gayové by měli být popraveni?“
Podobně, extremisté, kteří ospravedlňují své násilné činy tím, že se odvolávají na nějakou konkrétní interpretaci islámu, mohou být kritizováni, aniž by tím byla implikována nesmírně různorodá populace muslimů po celém světě. Po všem, reportérům se podařilo pokrýt bombardování Oklahoma City Timothy McVeighem–přívrženec rasistické sekty křesťanské identity–aniž bychom se uchýlili ke zobecněným prohlášením o „křesťanském terorismu“. Rovněž, média pokryla teroristické činy židovských fanatiků–for instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

Islám, Politického islámu a Amerika

Arab Insight

Je „bratrství“ s Amerikou možné?

khalil al-anani

"Není tam žádná naděje na komunikaci s USA. administrativa, pokud si Spojené státy udrží svůj dlouhodobý pohled na islám jako na skutečné nebezpečí, názor, který staví Spojené státy na stejnou loď jako sionistického nepřítele. Nemáme žádné předem vytvořené představy o americkém lidu nebo USA. společnost a její občanské organizace a think-tanky. Nemáme problém komunikovat s americkým lidem, ale nevyvíjíme žádné adekvátní úsilí, abychom se sblížili,“ řekl Dr. Issam al-Iryan, šéf politického oddělení Muslimského bratrstva v telefonickém rozhovoru.
Slova Al-Iryana shrnují názory Muslimského bratrstva na americký lid a USA. vláda. Ostatní členové Muslimského bratrstva by souhlasili, stejně jako zesnulý Hassan al-Banna, který skupinu založil 1928. Al- Banna viděl Západ většinou jako symbol morálního úpadku. Ostatní salafiové – islámský myšlenkový směr, který se opírá o předky jako o vzorové modely – zaujali stejný názor na Spojené státy, ale postrádá ideologickou flexibilitu, kterou zastávalo Muslimské bratrstvo. Zatímco Muslimské bratrstvo věří v zapojení Američanů do občanského dialogu, jiné extremistické skupiny nevidí v dialogu smysl a tvrdí, že síla je jediný způsob, jak se vypořádat se Spojenými státy.

Islámské reformace

Adnan Khan

The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed

well being, respect for human rights andin contrast with Islamic countriesrespect

for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity

and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reforma) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to

apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the

Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time

understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined

principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of

study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became

smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah

were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for

any Muslim attempting to deduce rules or understand what stance should be taken upon a particular

issue the Qur’an is the basis of this study.

The first attempt at reforming Islam took place at the turn of the 19th century. By the turn of the

century the Ummah had been in a lengthy period of decline where the global balance of power shifted

from the Khilafah to Britain. Mounting problems engulfed the Khilafah whilst Western Europe was in

the midst of the industrial revolution. The Ummah came to lose her pristine understanding of Islam, a

in an attempt to reverse the decline engulfing the Uthmani’s (Ottomans) some Muslims were sent to the

Západ, and as a result became smitten by what they saw. Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi of Egypt (1801-1873),

on his return from Paris, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The

Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above

all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to

the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,

marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, akademiků, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islám na Západě

Jocelyne Cesari

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLÁM, DEMOKRACIE & SPOJENÉ STÁTY AMERICKÉ:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


Navzdory tomu, že je to jak trvalá, tak složitá debata, Arches čtvrtletní reexamines od teologického a praktického základu, důležitá debata o vztahu a kompatibilitě mezi islámem a demokracií, jak se odráží v programu naděje a změny Baracka Obamy. Zatímco mnozí oslavují Obamův nástup do Oválné pracovny jako národní katarzi pro USA, jiní zůstávají méně optimističtí, pokud jde o posun v ideologii a přístupu na mezinárodní scéně. Zatímco velkou část napětí a nedůvěry mezi muslimským světem a USA lze přičíst přístupu prosazování demokracie, typicky upřednostňují diktatury a loutkové režimy, které naříkají na demokratické hodnoty a lidská práva, následný otřes 9/11 skutečně upevnil obavy prostřednictvím amerického postoje k politickému islámu. Vytvořila zeď negativity, jak ji objevil worldpublicopinion.org, podle kterého 67% Egypťanů věří, že globálně Amerika hraje „hlavně negativní“ roli.
Reakce Ameriky byla tedy výstižná. Volbou Obamy, mnoho lidí po celém světě vkládá své naděje do rozvoje méně agresivních, ale spravedlivější zahraniční politiku vůči muslimskému světu. Test pro Obamu, jak diskutujeme, je to, jak Amerika a její spojenci prosazují demokracii. Bude to usnadňující nebo vnucující?
navíc, může to důležité být čestný makléř v prodloužených zónách konfliktů? Získávání odborných znalostí a náhledu na prolifi
c učenci, akademiků, ostřílení novináři a politici, Arches Quarterly přibližuje vztah mezi islámem a demokracií a roli Ameriky – stejně jako změny, které přinesl Obama, při hledání společného základu. Anas Altikriti, generální ředitel Th e Cordoba Foundation poskytuje úvodní gamut této diskuse, kde reflektuje naděje a výzvy, které stojí na Obamově cestě. Po Altikriti, bývalý poradce prezidenta Nixona, Dr. Robert Crane nabízí důkladnou analýzu islámského principu práva na svobodu. Anwar Ibrahim, bývalý místopředseda vlády Malajsie, obohacuje diskusi o praktickou realitu zavádění demokracie v muslimských dominantních společnostech, a to, v Indonésii a Malajsii.
Máme také Dr Shireen Hunter, z Georgetownské univerzity, USA, který zkoumá muslimské země zaostávající v demokratizaci a modernizaci. To je doplněno spisovatelem terorismu, Vysvětlení Dr. Nafeeze Ahmeda o krizi postmoderny a
zánik demokracie. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Ředitel Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (bývalý zpravodaj ITN a BBC Panorama; autor sionismu: Skutečný nepřítel Židů) a Asem Sondos (Redaktor egyptského týdeníku Sawt Al Omma) soustředit se na Obamu a jeho roli ve vztahu k podpoře demokracie v muslimském světě, stejně jako vztahy USA s Izraelem a Muslimským bratrstvem.
Ministr zahraničních věcí, Maledivy, Ahmed Shaheed spekuluje o budoucnosti islámu a demokracie; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– člen Sinn Féin, který vydržel čtyři roky ve vězení za aktivity irských republikánů a bojovník za Guildford 4 a Birminghamu 6, odráží svou nedávnou cestu do Gazy, kde byl svědkem dopadu brutality a nespravedlnosti páchané na Palestincích; doktorka Marie Breen-Smythová, Ředitel Centra pro studium radikalizace a současného politického násilí diskutuje o výzvách kritického výzkumu politického teroru; doktor Khalid al-Mubarak, spisovatel a dramatik, diskutuje o vyhlídkách na mír v Dárfúru; a konečně novinář a aktivista za lidská práva Ashur Shamis se kriticky dívá na demokratizaci a politizaci muslimů v současnosti.
Doufáme, že toto vše poslouží k obsáhlému čtení a zdroji pro úvahy o problémech, které se nás všech dotýkají v novém úsvitu naděje.
Děkuji

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegmana


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. bohužel, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ve stejnou dobu, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, nebo (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islámská politická kultura, Demokracie, a lidská práva

Daniel E. Cena

Tvrdilo se, že islám usnadňuje autoritářství, odporuje hodnotám západních společností, a významně ovlivňuje důležité politické výsledky v muslimských zemích. tudíž, učenci, komentátoři, a vládní úředníci často poukazují na „islámský fundamentalismus“ jako na další ideologickou hrozbu pro liberální demokracie. Tento pohled, nicméně, je založena především na analýze textů, Islámská politická teorie, a ad hoc studie jednotlivých zemí, které neberou v úvahu další faktory. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, jako u jiných náboženství, lze použít k podpoře různých politických systémů a politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Proto, nový přístup ke studiu
Požaduje se spojení mezi islámem a politikou.
navrhuji, přes přísné hodnocení vztahu mezi islámem, demokracie, a lidská práva na mezinárodní úrovni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomické vlivy, etnické štěpení, a společenského rozvoje, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, že rostoucí síla islámských politických skupin byla často spojována se skromnou pluralizací politických systémů.
Vytvořil jsem index islámské politické kultury, na základě toho, do jaké míry je islámské právo využíváno a zda a, pokud ano, jak,Západní myšlenky, institucí, a technologie jsou implementovány, testovat povahu vztahu mezi islámem a demokracií a islámem a lidskými právy. Tento ukazatel se používá ve statistické analýze, který zahrnuje vzorek 23 převážně muslimských zemí a kontrolní skupinu 23 nemuslimských rozvojových zemí. Kromě srovnání
Islámské národy k neislámským rozvojovým zemím, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; a (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

Ibtisam Ibrahim

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, víra, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Nicméně, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Nicméně, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

Demokracie, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 volby. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Ve stejnou dobu, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.