RSSMaingizo zote "Mikoa" Kundi

Uislam upya

Matta Azzam

Kuna siasa na usalama mgogoro jirani kile ni inajulikana kama Uislam, mgogoro ambao utangulizi Hutangulia muda 9/11. Katika kipindi cha 25 miaka, kumekuwa na msisitizo tofauti juu ya jinsi ya kuelezea na kupambana Uislam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji..
imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julai 2005 ilidhihirika zaidi kuwa baadhi ya vijana walikuwa wakisisitiza kujitolea kwa kidini kama njia ya kudhihirisha ukabila. Uhusiano kati ya Waislamu kote ulimwenguni na mtazamo wao kwamba Waislamu wako hatarini kumesababisha watu wengi katika sehemu mbali mbali za dunia kuunganisha matatizo yao ya ndani na kuwa Waislamu wengi zaidi., kuwa na kitambulisho kitamaduni, ama kimsingi au sehemu, na Uislamu unaojulikana kwa mapana.

Uislamu na UTAWALA WA SHERIA

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

Katika jamii yetu ya kisasa ya Magharibi, mifumo ya kisheria iliyopangwa na serikali kwa kawaida huchora mstari bainifu unaotenganisha dini na sheria.. Kinyume chake, kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.), kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. 57 kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (1) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., (2) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa. (3) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa..

Islamic Culture Political, Demokrasia, na Haki za Binadamu

Daniel E. Bei

Imesemekana kwamba Uislamu kuwezesha ubabe, inapingana thamani za jamii za Magharibi, na kwa kiasi kikubwa huathiri matokeo muhimu ya kisiasa katika nchi za Kiislamu. Kwa hiyo, wasomi, wachambuzi, na viongozi wa serikali mara nyingi wanasema kuwa '' fundamentalism Kiislamu '' kama ya kiitikadi tishio kwa demokrasia huria. Mtazamo huu, hata hivyo, inategemea hasa uchambuzi wa maandishi, Nadharia ya kisiasa ya Kiislamu, na masomo ya muda ya nchi binafsi, ambazo hazizingatii mambo mengine. Ni hoja yangu kwamba maandiko na mila ya Uislamu, kama zile za dini zingine, inaweza kutumika kusaidia mifumo na sera anuwai za kisiasa. Masomo maalum na ya kuelezea ya nchi hayatusaidii kupata mifumo ambayo itatusaidia kuelezea uhusiano tofauti kati ya Uislamu na siasa katika nchi zote za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu.. Kwa hivyo, mbinu mpya ya utafiti wa
uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na siasa unahitajika.
ninashauri, kupitia tathmini kali ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu, demokrasia, na haki za binadamu katika ngazi ya kitaifa, mkazo mkubwa sana umewekwa juu ya nguvu ya Uislamu kama nguvu ya kisiasa. Kwanza mimi hutumia tafiti za kulinganisha, ambayo huzingatia mambo yanayohusiana na mwingiliano kati ya vikundi vya Kiislamu na tawala, ushawishi wa kiuchumi, machafuko ya kikabila, na maendeleo ya jamii, kuelezea utofauti wa ushawishi wa Uislamu juu ya siasa katika mataifa manane. Ninasema kuwa nguvu nyingi
kuhusishwa na Uislamu kama nguvu ya kuendesha sera na mifumo ya kisiasa katika mataifa ya Waislamu inaweza kuelezewa vizuri na mambo yaliyotajwa hapo awali. Mimi pia kupata, kinyume na imani ya kawaida, kwamba nguvu inayoongezeka ya vikundi vya siasa vya Kiisilamu mara nyingi imekuwa ikihusishwa na ujumlishaji wa kawaida wa mifumo ya kisiasa.
Nimeunda faharisi ya utamaduni wa kisiasa wa Kiislamu, kulingana na kiwango ambacho sheria ya Kiislamu inatumika na ikiwa na, ikiwa ni hivyo, vipi,Mawazo ya Magharibi, taasisi, na teknolojia zinatekelezwa, kujaribu asili ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na demokrasia na Uislamu na haki za binadamu. Kiashiria hiki kinatumika katika uchambuzi wa takwimu, ambayo inajumuisha sampuli ya nchi ishirini na tatu zenye Waislamu wengi na kikundi cha kudhibiti cha nchi ishirini na tatu zisizo za Kiislamu zinazoendelea. Mbali na kulinganisha
Mataifa ya Kiislamu kwa mataifa yasiyo ya Kiislamu yanayoendelea, uchambuzi wa takwimu unaniruhusu kudhibiti ushawishi wa anuwai zingine ambazo zimepatikana kuathiri viwango vya demokrasia na ulinzi wa haki za mtu binafsi. Matokeo yake yanapaswa kuwa picha halisi na sahihi ya ushawishi wa Uislamu juu ya siasa na sera.

Usahihi katika vita vya ulimwengu juu ya hofu:

Sherifa Zuhur

Miaka saba baada ya Septemba 11, 2001 (9/11) mashambulizi, wataalamu wengi wanaamini al-Qa’ida imepata nguvu tena na kwamba nakala zake au washirika wake ni hatari zaidi kuliko hapo awali.. Makadirio ya Kijasusi ya Kitaifa ya 2007 alidai kuwa al-Qa’ida ni hatari zaidi sasa kuliko hapo awali 9/11.1 Waigaji wa Al-Qaida wanaendelea kutishia Magharibi, Mashariki ya Kati, na mataifa ya Ulaya, kama katika njama iliyoharibika mnamo Septemba 2007 kwa Kijerumani. Bruce Riedel inasema: Shukrani kwa kiasi kikubwa kwa shauku ya Washington ya kwenda Iraq badala ya kuwawinda viongozi wa al Qaeda, shirika sasa ina msingi imara wa shughuli katika maeneo mabaya ya Pakistan na franchise ufanisi katika magharibi ya Iraq. Ufikiaji wake umeenea katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na Ulaya . . . Osama bin Laden ameanzisha kampeni ya propaganda yenye mafanikio. . . . Mawazo yake sasa yanavutia wafuasi zaidi kuliko hapo awali.
Ni kweli kwamba mashirika mbalimbali ya salafi-jihadi bado yanajitokeza katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Kwa nini majibu yenye rasilimali nyingi kwa ugaidi wa Kiislamu tunayoita jihad ya kimataifa haijathibitishwa kuwa ya ufanisi sana??
Kuhamia kwa zana za "nguvu laini,” vipi kuhusu ufanisi wa juhudi za nchi za Magharibi kuimarisha Waislamu katika Vita vya Ulimwengu dhidi ya Ugaidi (GWOT)? Kwa nini Marekani imeshinda "mioyo na akili" chache katika ulimwengu mpana wa Kiislamu? Kwa nini ujumbe wa kimkakati wa Marekani juu ya suala hili hucheza vibaya sana katika eneo hilo? Kwa nini, licha ya Waislamu kutoidhinishwa na itikadi kali kama inavyoonyeshwa katika tafiti na matamshi rasmi ya viongozi wakuu wa Kiislamu., ina msaada kwa bin Ladin kweli kuongezeka katika Jordan na katika Pakistan?
Mtazamo huu hautaangalia upya chimbuko la ghasia za Kiislamu. Badala yake inahusika na aina ya kushindwa kwa dhana ambayo inajenga kimakosa GWOT na ambayo inakatisha tamaa Waislamu kuiunga mkono.. Hawawezi kutambuliwa na hatua zinazopendekezwa za kuleta mabadiliko kwa sababu wanatambua baadhi ya imani zao za kimsingi na taasisi kama shabaha katika
jitihada hii.
Mitindo kadhaa yenye matatizo makubwa inachanganya dhana za Marekani za GWOT na ujumbe wa kimkakati ulioundwa kupigana Vita hivyo.. Haya yanaibuka kutoka (1) mitazamo ya kisiasa ya baada ya ukoloni kwa Waislamu na mataifa mengi ya Kiislamu ambayo inatofautiana sana na hivyo kuleta hisia na athari zinazokinzana na zinazotatanisha.; na (2) mabaki ya ujinga wa jumla na chuki dhidi ya Uislamu na tamaduni za kanda. Ongeza kwa hasira hii ya Marekani, hofu, na wasiwasi juu ya matukio ya mauti ya 9/11, na vipengele fulani hivyo, licha ya matakwa ya vichwa baridi, kuwawajibisha Waislamu na dini yao kwa maovu ya washika dini wao, au wanaoona inafaa kufanya hivyo kwa sababu za kisiasa.

KUJADILI DEMOKRASIA KATIKA ULIMWENGU WA WARABU

Ibtisam Ibrahim

Demokrasia ni nini?
Wasomi wa Magharibi wanafafanua demokrasia njia ya kulinda haki za kiraia na kisiasa za watu binafsi. Inatoa uhuru wa kujieleza, vyombo vya habari, imani, maoni, umiliki, na mkusanyiko, pamoja na haki ya kupiga kura, kuteua na kutafuta ofisi ya umma. Huntington (1984) anasema kuwa mfumo wa kisiasa ni wa kidemokrasia kiasi kwamba watoa maamuzi wa pamoja wenye nguvu zaidi wanachaguliwa kupitia
uchaguzi wa mara kwa mara ambapo wagombeaji hushindana kwa uhuru kwa kura na ambapo takriban watu wazima wote wanastahili kupiga kura. Rothstein (1995) inasema kwamba demokrasia ni aina ya serikali na mchakato wa utawala unaobadilika na kubadilika kulingana na mazingira. Pia anaongeza kuwa ufafanuzi wa Magharibi wa demokrasia — pamoja na uwajibikaji, ushindani, kiwango fulani cha ushiriki — ina dhamana ya haki muhimu za kiraia na kisiasa. Anderson (1995) anasema kuwa neno demokrasia linamaanisha mfumo ambapo watoa maamuzi wa pamoja wenye nguvu zaidi huchaguliwa kupitia chaguzi za mara kwa mara ambapo wagombeaji hushindana kwa uhuru ili kupata kura na ambapo takriban watu wazima wote wanastahili kupiga kura.. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), msomi wa Misri, inaona demokrasia ambayo inaweza kutumika kwa ulimwengu wa Kiarabu kama seti ya sheria na taasisi iliyoundwa kuwezesha utawala kwa njia ya amani.
usimamizi wa vikundi shindani na/au maslahi yanayokinzana. Hata hivyo, Samir Amin (1991) kulingana na ufafanuzi wake wa demokrasia kwenye mtazamo wa kijamii wa Umaksi. Anagawanya demokrasia katika makundi mawili: demokrasia ya ubepari ambayo msingi wake ni haki na uhuru wa mtu binafsi, lakini bila kuwa na usawa wa kijamii; na demokrasia ya kisiasa ambayo inawapa watu wote katika jamii haki ya kupiga kura na kuchagua wawakilishi wao wa serikali na taasisi ambao watasaidia kupata haki zao sawa za kijamii..
Kuhitimisha sehemu hii, Ningesema kwamba hakuna fasili moja ya demokrasia inayoonyesha kwa hakika ni nini au si nini.. Hata hivyo, kama tulivyoona, fasili nyingi zilizotajwa hapo juu zina vipengele muhimu vinavyofanana – uwajibikaji, ushindani, na kiwango fulani cha ushiriki – ambazo zimetawala katika ulimwengu wa Magharibi na kimataifa.

Demokrasia, Uchaguzi na Udugu wa Kiislamu wa Misri

Israel Elad-Altman

Kampeni ya mageuzi ya Mashariki ya Kati na demokrasia iliyoongozwa na Amerika ya miaka miwili iliyopita imesaidia kuunda ukweli mpya wa kisiasa nchini Misri.. Fursa zimefunguliwa kwa upinzani. Na sisi. na msaada wa Ulaya, vikundi vya upinzani vya ndani vimeweza kuchukua hatua, kuendeleza sababu zao na kutoa makubaliano kutoka kwa serikali. Harakati ya Ikhwanul Muslimin ya Misri (MB), ambayo imepigwa marufuku rasmi kama shirika la kisiasa, sasa ni miongoni mwa makundi yanayokabiliwa na fursa zote mbili mpya
na hatari mpya.
Serikali za Magharibi, ikiwa ni pamoja na serikali ya Marekani, wanazingatia MB na vikundi vingine vya "Waislamu wenye msimamo wa wastani" kama washirika wanaowezekana katika kusaidia kuendeleza demokrasia katika nchi zao., na pengine pia katika kutokomeza ugaidi wa Kiislamu. Je, MB wa Misri anaweza kuchukua nafasi hiyo? Je, inaweza kufuata wimbo wa Chama cha Haki na Maendeleo cha Uturuki (AKP) na Chama cha Haki ya Ufanisi cha Indonesia (PKS), vyama viwili vya Kiislamu hivyo, kulingana na baadhi ya wachambuzi, wanafaulu kuendana na sheria za demokrasia huria na kuziongoza nchi zao kuelekea kuunganishwa zaidi na, kwa mtiririko huo, Ulaya na Asia "ya kipagani".?
Nakala hii inachunguza jinsi MB imejibu ukweli mpya, jinsi imeshughulikia changamoto na matatizo ya kiitikadi na kiutendaji ambayo yamejitokeza katika kipindi cha miaka miwili iliyopita. Ni kwa kiasi gani vuguvugu limeshughulikia mtazamo wake kwa hali mpya? Nini malengo yake na maono yake ya utaratibu wa kisiasa? Imeitikiaje U.S. mabadiliko na kampeni ya mageuzi na demokrasia?
Je, imepitia vipi mahusiano yake na utawala wa Misri kwa upande mmoja, na vikosi vingine vya upinzani kwa upande mwingine, wakati nchi inaelekea kwenye chaguzi mbili za vuli 2005? Ni kwa kiasi gani MB inaweza kuchukuliwa kuwa ni nguvu ambayo inaweza kuongoza Misri
kuelekea demokrasia huria?

NDUGU WAISLAMU WA MISRI: KUPINGANA AU KUUNGANISHWA?

Utafiti

Mafanikio ya Jumuiya ya Ndugu wa Kiislamu mnamo Novemba-Desemba 2005 uchaguzi wa Bunge la Wananchi ulileta mshtuko kupitia mfumo wa kisiasa wa Misri. Kwa majibu, utawala ulikandamiza harakati, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, serikali inapaswa kuchukua hatua za awali za kuhalalisha ushiriki wa Ndugu wa Kiislamu katika maisha ya kisiasa. Ndugu Waislam, ambao shughuli zao za kijamii zimevumiliwa kwa muda mrefu lakini nafasi yao katika siasa rasmi ni ndogo sana, alishinda isiyo na kifani 20 asilimia ya viti vya ubunge 2005 uchaguzi. Walifanya hivyo licha ya kuwania theluthi moja tu ya viti vilivyokuwepo na licha ya vikwazo vingi, ikiwa ni pamoja na ukandamizaji wa polisi na udanganyifu katika uchaguzi. Mafanikio haya yalithibitisha msimamo wao kama nguvu ya kisiasa iliyojipanga vizuri na iliyokita mizizi. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., ilisisitiza udhaifu wa vyama vya upinzani kisheria na chama tawala. Huenda serikali ilisema kwamba ongezeko la wastani la uwakilishi bungeni la Muslim Brothers lingeweza kutumiwa kuzua hofu ya kunyakuliwa kwa Waislam na hivyo kuwa sababu ya kusimamisha mageuzi.. Ikiwa ndivyo, mkakati uko katika hatari kubwa ya kurudisha nyuma.

Uislamu na Demokrasia: Nakala, utamaduni, na Historia

Ahrar Ahmad

Popular ubaguzi katika nchi za Magharibi huwa na wanadai maendeleo, mantiki, na bure West dhidi nyuma, ukandamizaji, na kutishia Islam. Public uchunguzi wa maoni uliofanywa nchini Marekani katika miaka ya 1990 ulionyesha muundo thabiti ya Wamarekani uwekaji Waislamu kama "wafuasi wa dini" na kuzingatia ethos Uislamu kama kimsingi "anti-kidemokrasia." 1 characterizations hizi
na wasi na, kwa sababu za wazi, kwa kiasi kikubwa kuwa mbaya zaidi tangu janga la 9/11. Hata hivyo, mitizamo hizi si yalijitokeza tu katika fahamu maarufu au vyombo vya habari ghafi uwakilishi. Wanafunzi walioheshimika pia zimechangia hali ya hewa hii ya maoni kwa kuandika kuhusu tofauti allegiance zilizoko kati ya Uislamu na Magharibi, maarufu "mgongano wa ustaarabu" ambayo wanatakiwa kuwa imminent na kuepukika, na juu ya kutopatana Wanajidai kati ya Uislamu na demokrasia. Kwa mfano, Profesa Peter Rodman wasiwasi kwamba "sisi ni changamoto kutoka nje na wapiganaji atavistic nguvu inayotokana na chuki ya wote Western kisiasa mawazo harking nyuma malalamiko umri wa miaka juu ya Kikristo." Dr. Daniel Mabomba anatangaza kwamba Waislamu changamoto West zaidi kama ya ya Wakomunisti aliyepata, kwa ajili ya "wakati Wakomunisti hawakubaliani na sera zetu, Waislamu fundamentalist kumdharau njia yetu yote ya maisha. " Profesa Bernard Lewis anaonya darkly kuhusu "majibu ya kihistoria ya mpinzani kale dhidi turathi zetu Judeo-Christian, sasa yetu ya kimwili, na upanuzi wa zote mbili. " Profesa Amos Perlmutter anauliza: "Ni Uislamu, fundamentalist au vinginevyo, sambamba na haki za binadamu oriented Western style mwakilishi demokrasia? Jibu ni mkazo NO. " Na Profesa Samuel Huntington unaonyesha na kushamiri kwamba "tatizo si fundamentalism Kiislamu, lakini Uislamu wenyewe. " Itakuwa kielimu wavivu na rahisi wenye nia kumfukuza nafasi zao kama msingi tu juu ya Pamoja au chuki. kwa kweli, kama mtu huacha baadhi overkill kejeli, baadhi ya madai yao, ingawa Awkward kwa Waislamu, ni muhimu kwa mjadala wa uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na demokrasia katika ulimwengu wa kisasa. Kwa mfano, nafasi ya wanawake au wakati mwingine wasiokuwa Waislamu katika baadhi ya nchi za Kiislamu ni tatizo katika suala la wanatakiwa usawa wa kisheria wa watu wote katika demokrasia. vile vile, kutovumilia iliyoongozwa na baadhi ya Waislamu dhidi ya waandishi (kwa mfano, Salman Rushdie nchini Uingereza, Taslima Nasrin Bangladesh, na Profesa Nasr Abu Zaid Misri) ostensibly inahatarisha kanuni ya uhuru wa kujieleza, ambayo ni muhimu kwa demokrasia.
Pia ni kweli kwamba chini ya 10 zaidi ya 50 wanachama wa Shirika la Kiislam na institutionalized misingi ya kidemokrasia au michakato kama kueleweka katika West, na kwamba pia, tu tentatively. hatimaye, aina ya utulivu wa ndani na amani ya nje ambayo ni karibu muhimu kwa demokrasia kazi unadhoofishwa na masumbuko ya kutokana na mgogoro wa ndani au wa nje uchokozi dhahiri katika nchi nyingi za Kiislamu leo (kwa mfano, Somalia, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria, na Bosnia).

Iraq na Baadaye ya Uislamu wa Kisiasa

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Uislamu na Demokrasia

ITAC

kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia: inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia. inasemwa mara nyingi - na hata mara nyingi zaidi inadokezwa lakini haisemwi - kwamba Uislamu hauendani na demokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia.
kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia. kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia (kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia) kwa hakika wanapinga maadili yetu muhimu ya kidemokrasia, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Uislamu na Islamism nchini Afghanistan

Christine Mendoza

The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as

itikadi, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the

establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became

the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Hata hivyo, the earlier appearance of an

Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an

instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.

This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three

parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,

indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing

its own vision. Then, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is

discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in

the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will

show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these

countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned

theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the

implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a

discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is

necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, and the

role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist

experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist

experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and

legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will

underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of

understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current

demands.


UTANDAwazi NA UISLAMU WA KISIASA: MISINGI YA KIJAMII YA CHAMA CHA USTAWI WA TURKI

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, kisha, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, kwa hiyo, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, kwa 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Hata hivyo, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Uislamu na Uhalifu wa chuki dhidi ya Waislamu

Jonathan GITHENS-MAZER

Robert Lambert MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Migogoro juu ya Misikiti huko Uropa

Wanafunzi Stefano

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, na
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, na (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, in particular, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Spain, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, hata hivyo, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (EU) kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa.
that lie beyond its borders. For this reason, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Ubelgiji). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

Utawala wa changamoto, Ukoloni, na Disunity: Siasa ya Kiislamu ya Kurekebisha Harakati ya Afghani al-na Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Hasa, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Kwa hiyo, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, lakini
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Hata hivyo, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. Kwa upande mmoja,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Kwa upande mwingine, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Kwa kweli,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Hata hivyo, they disagreed on certain aspects

na mbinu, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, ambayo

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Misri kwenye Kituo cha Tipping ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 kwa 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja ($7 umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja) umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja. umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja.