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Islamisme revisited
MAHA Azzam
Ada krisis politik dan keamanan sekitarnya apa yang disebut sebagai Islamisme, krisis yang pendahulunya lama mendahului 9/11. Selama masa lalu 25 tahun, ada penekanan yang berbeda tentang bagaimana menjelaskan dan memerangi Islam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| September 06, 2010 | Komentar 0
ISLAM DAN ATURAN HUKUM
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Pada waktu bersamaan, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, atau (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| September 06, 2010 | Komentar 0
Budaya Politik Islam, Demokrasi, dan Hak Asasi Manusia
Daniel E. Harga
Telah berpendapat bahwa Islam memfasilitasi otoriterisme, bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai masyarakat Barat, dan signifikan mempengaruhi hasil politik penting di negara-negara Muslim. Karenanya, sarjana, komentator, dan pejabat pemerintah sering menunjuk ke''''fundamentalisme Islam sebagai ancaman ideologis di samping demokrasi liberal. This view, Namun, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Karenanya, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, demokrasi, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, jika begitu, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| September 06, 2010 | Komentar 0
PRECISION DI GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Tujuh tahun setelah September 11, 2001 (9/11) serangan, banyak ahli percaya bahwa al-Qa'ida telah mendapatkan kembali kekuatannya dan bahwa para peniru atau afiliasinya lebih mematikan daripada sebelumnya. Perkiraan Intelijen Nasional dari 2007 menegaskan bahwa al-Qa'ida sekarang lebih berbahaya daripada sebelumnya 9/11.1 Emulator Al-Qaeda terus mengancam Barat, Timur Tengah, dan negara-negara Eropa, seperti dalam plot yang digagalkan pada bulan September 2007 di Jerman. Bruce Riedel menyatakan: Sebagian besar berkat keinginan Washington untuk pergi ke Irak daripada memburu para pemimpin al Qaeda, organisasi sekarang memiliki basis operasi yang kuat di tanah tandus Pakistan dan waralaba yang efektif di Irak barat. Jangkauannya telah menyebar ke seluruh dunia Muslim dan di Eropa . . . Osama bin Laden telah melakukan kampanye propaganda yang sukses. . . . Idenya sekarang menarik lebih banyak pengikut dari sebelumnya.
Memang benar bahwa berbagai organisasi salafi-jihadis masih bermunculan di seluruh dunia Islam. Mengapa tanggapan dengan sumber daya yang besar terhadap terorisme Islam yang kami sebut jihad global tidak terbukti sangat efektif??
Pindah ke alat "kekuatan lunak",” bagaimana dengan keberhasilan upaya Barat untuk mendukung umat Islam dalam Perang Global Melawan Teror? (GWOT)? Mengapa Amerika Serikat memenangkan begitu sedikit "hati dan pikiran" di dunia Islam yang lebih luas?? Mengapa pesan strategis Amerika tentang masalah ini bermain sangat buruk di kawasan?? Mengapa, terlepas dari ketidaksetujuan Muslim yang luas terhadap ekstremisme seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam survei dan pernyataan resmi oleh para pemimpin Muslim utama, memiliki dukungan untuk bin Ladin sebenarnya meningkat di Yordania dan di Pakistan?
Monograf ini tidak akan meninjau kembali asal-usul kekerasan Islamis. Alih-alih, ini berkaitan dengan jenis kegagalan konseptual yang secara keliru membangun GWOT dan yang membuat umat Islam enggan mendukungnya. Mereka tidak dapat mengidentifikasi dengan tindakan penanggulangan transformatif yang diusulkan karena mereka melihat beberapa keyakinan dan institusi inti mereka sebagai target dalam
usaha ini.
Beberapa tren yang sangat bermasalah mengacaukan konseptualisasi Amerika tentang GWOT dan pesan strategis yang dibuat untuk melawan Perang itu. Ini berevolusi dari (1) pendekatan politik pasca-kolonial terhadap Muslim dan negara-negara mayoritas Muslim yang sangat bervariasi dan karenanya menghasilkan kesan dan efek yang saling bertentangan dan membingungkan; dan (2) sisa ketidaktahuan umum dan prasangka terhadap Islam dan budaya subregional. Tambahkan ke kemarahan Amerika ini, takut, dan kecemasan tentang peristiwa mematikan 9/11, dan elemen tertentu yang, terlepas dari desakan kepala yang lebih dingin, meminta pertanggungjawaban umat Islam dan agama mereka atas perbuatan buruk para pemeluk agama mereka, atau yang merasa berguna untuk melakukannya karena alasan politik.
| September 06, 2010 | Komentar 0
Debating DEMOKRASI DI DUNIA ARAB
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
sarjana Barat mendefinisikan metode demokrasi untuk melindungi hak-hak individu sipil dan politik. Ini memberikan kebebasan berbicara, tekan, iman, pendapat, kepemilikan, dan perakitan, serta hak untuk memilih, mencalonkan dan mencari jabatan publik. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Namun, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Namun, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| September 05, 2010 | Komentar 0
Demokrasi, Pemilihan dan Ikhwanul Muslimin Mesir
Israel Elad-Altman
Amerika yang dipimpin Timur Tengah reformasi dan demokratisasi kampanye dua tahun terakhir telah membantu membentuk realitas politik baru di Mesir. Peluang telah terbuka untuk perbedaan pendapat. Bersama kami. dan dukungan Eropa, kelompok oposisi lokal telah mampu mengambil inisiatif, memajukan tujuan mereka dan mengekstrak konsesi dari negara. Gerakan Ikhwanul Muslimin Mesir (MB), yang telah resmi dilarang sebagai organisasi politik, sekarang berada di antara grup yang menghadapi kedua peluang baru
dan risiko baru.
Pemerintah Barat, termasuk pemerintah Amerika Serikat, sedang mempertimbangkan MB dan kelompok “Islam moderat” lainnya sebagai mitra potensial dalam membantu memajukan demokrasi di negara mereka, dan mungkin juga dalam memberantas terorisme Islam. Bisakah MB Mesir mengisi peran itu?? Mungkinkah itu mengikuti jejak Partai Keadilan dan Pembangunan Turki? (AKP) dan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Indonesia (PKS), dua partai Islam itu, menurut beberapa analis, berhasil beradaptasi dengan aturan demokrasi liberal dan memimpin negara mereka menuju integrasi yang lebih besar dengan, masing-masing, Eropa dan Asia "kafir"?
Artikel ini membahas bagaimana MB menanggapi realitas baru, bagaimana menangani tantangan dan dilema ideologis dan praktis yang muncul selama dua tahun terakhir. Sejauh mana gerakan itu mengakomodasi pandangannya terhadap keadaan baru? Apa tujuan dan visinya tentang tatanan politik?? Bagaimana reaksinya terhadap AS?. tawaran dan kampanye reformasi dan demokratisasi?
Bagaimana ia menavigasi hubungannya dengan rezim Mesir di satu sisi, dan kekuatan oposisi lainnya di sisi lain, saat negara itu menuju dua pemilihan dramatis di musim gugur 2005? Sejauh mana MB dapat dianggap sebagai kekuatan yang dapat memimpin Mesir
menuju demokrasi liberal?
| September 05, 2010 | Komentar 0
MESIR'S MUSLIM BROTHERS: KONFRONTASI ATAU INTEGRASI?
Riset
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. menanggapi, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, rezim harus mengambil langkah awal untuk menormalkan partisipasi Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam kehidupan politik. Saudara Muslim, yang aktivitas sosialnya telah lama ditoleransi tetapi perannya dalam politik formal sangat terbatas, memenangkan yang belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya 20 persen kursi parlemen di 2005 pemilihan. Mereka melakukannya meskipun bersaing hanya untuk sepertiga dari kursi yang tersedia dan meskipun ada banyak rintangan, termasuk represi polisi dan kecurangan pemilu. Keberhasilan ini menegaskan posisi mereka sebagai kekuatan politik yang sangat terorganisir dengan baik dan mengakar. Pada waktu bersamaan, itu menggarisbawahi kelemahan oposisi hukum dan partai yang berkuasa. Rezim mungkin telah bertaruh bahwa sedikit peningkatan dalam perwakilan parlemen Ikhwanul Muslimin dapat digunakan untuk memicu ketakutan akan pengambilalihan oleh kelompok Islam dan dengan demikian menjadi alasan untuk menghentikan reformasi.. Jika begitu, strateginya berisiko besar menjadi bumerang.
| September 05, 2010 | Komentar 0
Islam dan Demokrasi: Teks, Tradisi, dan Sejarah
Ahrar Ahmad
Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, berat, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. Namun, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Misalnya, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. Sebenarnya, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. Misalnya, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. Demikian pula, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Akhirnya, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Irak, Afganistan, Aljazair, and Bosnia).
| September 04, 2010 | Komentar 0
Irak dan Masa Depan Islam Politik
James Piscatori
Enam puluh lima tahun yang lalu salah satu ulama besar Islam modern menanyakan pertanyaan sederhana, "Ke Mana Islam?", mana dunia Islam akan? Itu adalah waktu kekacauan intens baik di Barat dan dunia Muslim - runtuhnya imperialisme dan kristalisasi dari sebuah sistem negara baru di luar Eropa; penciptaan dan pengujian neo- Wilsonian dunia ketertiban dalam Liga Bangsa-Bangsa; munculnya fasisme Eropa. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, sekularisme, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(sebuah) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| September 04, 2010 | Komentar 0
Islam dan Demokrasi
ITAC
Jika seseorang membaca pers atau mendengarkan komentator pada hubungan internasional, sering dikatakan - dan bahkan lebih sering tersirat tapi tidak mengatakan - bahwa Islam tidak kompatibel dengan demokrasi. Di tahun sembilan puluhan, Samuel Huntington memicu badai api intelektual ketika dia menerbitkan The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, di mana dia menyajikan ramalannya untuk dunia – ditulis besar-besaran. Di ranah politik, dia mencatat bahwa sementara Turki dan Pakistan mungkin memiliki beberapa klaim kecil untuk “legitimasi demokratis” semua negara lain “… negara-negara Muslim sangat non-demokratis.: monarki, sistem satu partai, rezim militer, kediktatoran pribadi atau beberapa kombinasi dari ini, biasanya bertumpu pada keluarga terbatas, klan, atau basis suku”. Premis yang mendasari argumennya adalah bahwa mereka tidak hanya 'tidak seperti kita', mereka sebenarnya bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai demokrasi esensial kita. Dia percaya, seperti yang dilakukan orang lain, bahwa sementara gagasan demokratisasi Barat sedang ditentang di bagian lain dunia, konfrontasi paling menonjol di daerah-daerah di mana Islam adalah agama yang dominan.
Argumen juga telah dibuat dari sisi lain. Seorang sarjana agama Iran, merenungkan krisis konstitusional awal abad kedua puluh di negaranya, menyatakan bahwa Islam dan demokrasi tidak kompatibel karena orang tidak setara dan badan legislatif tidak diperlukan karena sifat inklusif hukum agama Islam. Posisi serupa diambil baru-baru ini oleh Ali Belhadj, seorang guru sekolah menengah Aljazair, pengkhotbah dan (pada konteks ini) ketua FIS, ketika dia menyatakan "demokrasi bukan konsep Islam". Mungkin pernyataan paling dramatis tentang hal ini adalah pernyataan Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ., pemimpin pemberontak Sunni di Irak yang, ketika dihadapkan dengan prospek pemilihan, mencela demokrasi sebagai "prinsip jahat".
Namun menurut beberapa cendekiawan Muslim, demokrasi tetap menjadi cita-cita penting dalam Islam, dengan peringatan bahwa itu selalu tunduk pada hukum agama. Penekanan pada tempat terpenting syariah adalah elemen dari hampir setiap komentar Islam tentang pemerintahan, moderat atau ekstremis. Hanya jika penguasa, yang menerima otoritasnya dari Tuhan, membatasi tindakannya pada “pengawasan administrasi syariah” apakah dia harus dipatuhi. Jika dia melakukan selain ini, dia adalah seorang non-Muslim dan Muslim berkomitmen untuk memberontak melawan dia. Di sinilah letak pembenaran untuk sebagian besar kekerasan yang telah melanda dunia Muslim dalam perjuangan seperti yang terjadi di Aljazair selama tahun 90-an.
| September 04, 2010 | Komentar 0
Islam dan Islamisme di Afghanistan
Christine Mendoza
The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as
ideologi, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the
establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became
the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Namun, the earlier appearance of an
Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an
instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.
This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three
parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,
indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing
its own vision. Kemudian, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is
discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in
the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will
show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these
countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned
theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the
implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a
discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is
necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, dan
role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist
experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist
experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and
legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will
underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of
understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current
demands.
| September 03, 2010 | Komentar 0
GLOBALISASI DAN POLITIK ISLAM: DASAR SOSIAL PIHAK KESEJAHTERAAN TURKI
Haldun Gulalp
Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. Makalah ini akan, karena itu, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, dengan 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Namun, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.
| September 03, 2010 | Komentar 0
Islamophobia dan Kejahatan Hate Anti-Muslim
JONATHAN GITHENS-Mazer
ROBERT Lambert MBE
The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.
| September 02, 2010 | Komentar 0
Konflik Masjid di Eropa
Stefano Siswa
As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, dan
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, dan (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, khususnya, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Spanyol, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, Namun, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (SAYA) atau
that lie beyond its borders. Untuk alasan ini, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Belgia). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.
| September 02, 2010 | Komentar 0
Menantang Otoritarianisme, Kolonialisme, dan Perpecahan: Gerakan Reformasi Politik Islam al-Afghani dan Ridha
Ahmed Ali Salem
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Khususnya, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Oleh karena itu, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, tapi
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Hukum Islam). Namun, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. Di satu sisi,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Di sisi lain, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Memang,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, yang
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Namun, they disagreed on certain aspects
dan metode, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, yang
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| September 02, 2010 | Komentar 0
Mesir di Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
Pada awal 1980-an, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 untuk 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
| September 02, 2010 | Komentar 0
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