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There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 godine, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers

in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, postalo je uobičajeno pronaći da ideologiju i religiju suprotstavljene strane koriste kao izvore legitimizacije, nadahnuće i neprijateljstvo.

Situacija je danas dodatno komplicirana rastućim antagonizmom i strahom od islama na Zapadu zbog terorističkih napada koji zauzvrat utiču na stavove prema imigraciji, vjera i kultura. Granice umma ili zajednice vjernika protegle su se izvan muslimanskih država do europskih gradova. Umma potencijalno postoji gdje god postoje muslimanske zajednice. Zajednički osjećaj pripadnosti zajedničkoj vjeri povećava se u okruženju gdje je osjećaj integracije u okolnu zajednicu nejasan i gdje diskriminacija može biti očita. Što je veće odbacivanje vrijednosti društva,

bilo na Zapadu ili čak u muslimanskoj državi, veća je konsolidacija moralne snage islama kao kulturnog identiteta i sustava vrijednosti.

Nakon bombaških napada u Londonu na 7 srpanj 2005 postalo je očiglednije da neki mladi ljudi ističu vjersko opredjeljenje kao način izražavanja etničke pripadnosti. Veze između muslimana diljem svijeta i njihova percepcija da su muslimani ranjivi naveli su mnoge u vrlo različitim dijelovima svijeta da spoje vlastite lokalne nevolje sa širim muslimanskim problemima, identificiravši se kulturno, bilo prvenstveno ili djelomično, sa široko definiranim islamom.

Birgit Krawietz

Helmut Reifeld

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, a vladini dužnosnici često ističu ‘’islamski fundamentalizam’’ kao sljedeću ideološku prijetnju liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno na analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. Moja je tvrdnja da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija, može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Deskriptivne studije specifične za zemlju ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi nam pomogli objasniti različite odnose između islama i politike u zemljama muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju

traži se veza između islama i politike.

predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama, demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, da se previše naglašava moć islama kao političke snage. Prvo koristim komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi, i društveni razvoj, objasniti razlike u utjecaju islama na politiku u osam nacija. Tvrdim da velik dio moći

pripisuje islamu kao pokretačkoj snazi ​​iza politika i političkih sustava u muslimanskim nacijama može se bolje objasniti prethodno spomenutim čimbenicima. Također nalazim, suprotno uvriježenom mišljenju, da je sve veća snaga islamskih političkih skupina često bila povezana sa skromnom pluralizacijom političkih sustava.

Konstruirao sam indeks islamske političke kulture, na temelju toga u kojoj se mjeri islamsko pravo koristi i je li i, ako je tako, kako,zapadne ideje, institucija, i tehnologije se implementiraju, ispitati prirodu odnosa između islama i demokracije i islama i ljudskih prava. Ovaj se pokazatelj koristi u statističkoj analizi, koji uključuje uzorak od dvadeset i tri pretežno muslimanske zemlje i kontrolnu skupinu od dvadeset i tri nemuslimanske zemlje u razvoju. Osim uspoređivanja

Islamske nacije neislamskim nacijama u razvoju, statistička analiza omogućuje mi kontrolu utjecaja drugih varijabli za koje je utvrđeno da utječu na razine demokracije i zaštitu prava pojedinca. Rezultat bi trebao biti realnija i točnija slika utjecaja islama na politiku i politiku.

Sedam godina nakon rujna 11, 2001 (9/11) napadi, mnogi stručnjaci vjeruju da je al-Qa'ida ponovno ojačala i da su njezini imitatori ili podružnice smrtonosniji nego prije. Nacionalna obavještajna procjena 2007 ustvrdio da je al-Qa'ida sada opasnija nego prije 9/11.1 Al-Qa'idini emulatori nastavljaju prijetiti Zapadu, Srednji istok, i europskih naroda, kao u zavjeri osujećenoj u rujnu 2007 u Njemačkoj. Bruce Riedel navodi: Uvelike zahvaljujući spremnosti Washingtona da ode u Irak umjesto da lovi vođe Al Qaide, organizacija sada ima solidnu bazu operacija u pustoši Pakistana i učinkovitu franšizu u zapadnom Iraku. Njegov doseg se proširio po muslimanskom svijetu i Europi . . . Osama bin Laden je pokrenuo uspješnu propagandnu kampanju. . . . Njegove ideje sada privlače više sljedbenika nego ikada.

Istina je da se razne selefijsko-džihadističke organizacije još uvijek pojavljuju diljem islamskog svijeta. Zašto se odgovori na islamistički terorizam koji zovemo globalni džihad nisu pokazali iznimno učinkovitima?

Prelazak na alate „meke moći,” što je s učinkovitošću zapadnih nastojanja da podupre muslimane u Globalnom ratu protiv terorizma (GWOT)? Zašto su Sjedinjene Države osvojile tako malo “srca i umova” u širem islamskom svijetu? Zašto američke strateške poruke o ovom pitanju tako loše igraju u regiji? Zašto, usprkos širokom muslimanskom neodobravanju ekstremizma kao što je prikazano u anketama i službenim izjavama ključnih muslimanskih vođa, je zapravo porasla podrška bin Ladinu u Jordanu i Pakistanu?

Ova monografija neće se ponovno baviti podrijetlom islamističkog nasilja. Umjesto toga, bavi se vrstom konceptualnog neuspjeha koji krivo konstruira GWOT i koji obeshrabruje muslimane da ga podrže. Ne mogu se identificirati s predloženim transformativnim protumjerama jer prepoznaju neka od svojih temeljnih uvjerenja i institucija kao mete u

ovaj pothvat.

Nekoliko duboko problematičnih trendova zbunjuje američke konceptualizacije GWOT-a i strateških poruka osmišljenih za vođenje tog rata. Ovi se razvijaju iz (1) postkolonijalni politički pristupi muslimanima i muslimanskim većinskim narodima koji se uvelike razlikuju i stoga proizvode proturječne i zbunjujuće dojmove i učinke; i (2) zaostalo generalizirano neznanje i predrasude prema islamu i subregionalnim kulturama. Dodajte ovome američki bijes, strah, i tjeskoba zbog smrtonosnih događaja 9/11, a pojedini elementi koji, unatoč nagovaranjima hladnijih glava, smatrati muslimane i njihovu vjeru odgovornima za nedjela njihovih istovjeraca, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, vjera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through

periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful

management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Međutim, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.

To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Međutim, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities

and new risks.

Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?

This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?

How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt

toward liberal democracy?

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. Odgovarajući na, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic

Party’s (NDP) odbijanje popuštanja stiska riskira pogoršanje napetosti u vrijeme političke neizvjesnosti oko nasljeđivanja predsjednika i ozbiljnih socioekonomskih nemira. Iako će to vjerojatno biti produljeno, postupan proces, režim bi trebao poduzeti preliminarne korake za normalizaciju sudjelovanja Muslimanske braće u političkom životu. Muslimanska braća, čije su se društvene aktivnosti dugo tolerirale, ali čija je uloga u formalnoj politici strogo ograničena, osvojio neviđenu 20 posto zastupničkih mjesta u 2005 izbori. Učinili su to unatoč tome što su se natjecali za samo trećinu raspoloživih mjesta i unatoč značajnim preprekama, uključujući policijsku represiju i izbornu prijevaru. Ovim uspjehom potvrdili su svoju poziciju izuzetno dobro organizirane i duboko ukorijenjene političke snage. U isto vrijeme, ona je naglasila slabosti i legalne oporbe i vladajuće stranke. Režim se mogao kladiti da bi se skromno povećanje zastupljenosti Muslimanske braće u parlamentu moglo iskoristiti za raspirivanje straha od islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti i time poslužiti kao razlog za odugovlačenje reforme. Ako je tako, strategija je pod velikim rizikom od povratnog učinka.

Popularni stereotipi na Zapadu naginju postuliranju progresivnog, racionalan, i slobodni Zapad protiv nazadnjaka, ugnjetavački, i prijeteći islamu. Istraživanja javnog mnijenja provedena u Sjedinjenim Državama tijekom 1990-ih otkrila su dosljedan obrazac Amerikanaca koji muslimane označavaju kao "vjerske fanatike" i smatraju islamski etos temeljno "antidemokratskim".1 Ove karakterizacije

i nedoumice imaju, iz očitih razloga, značajno pogoršalo od tragedije od 9/11. Međutim, te se percepcije ne odražavaju samo u popularnoj svijesti ili grubim medijskim prikazima. Cijenjeni znanstvenici također su pridonijeli ovoj klimi mišljenja pišući o navodno nepomirljivim razlikama između islama i Zapada, famozni “sukob civilizacija” koji je navodno skori i neizbježan, te o prividnoj nespojivosti islama i demokracije. Na primjer, Profesor Peter Rodman zabrinut je da smo "izvana izazvani militantnom atavističkom silom vođenom mržnjom prema cjelokupnoj zapadnoj političkoj misli koja se vraća na prastare pritužbe protiv kršćanskog svijeta." Dr. Daniel Pipes proglašava da muslimani izazivaju Zapad dublje nego što su komunisti ikada učinili, jer “dok se komunisti ne slažu s našom politikom, fundamentalistički muslimani preziru cijeli naš način života.” Profesor Bernard Lewis mračno upozorava na “povijesnu reakciju drevnog rivala protiv našeg judeo-kršćanskog nasljeđa, naša svjetovna sadašnjost, i širenje obojega.” pita se profesor Amos Perlmutter: “Je li islam, fundamentalistički ili neki drugi, kompatibilan s predstavničkom demokracijom zapadnog stila usmjerenom na ljudska prava? Odgovor je jasno NE.” A profesor Samuel Huntington sugerira s poletom da "problem nije islamski fundamentalizam, nego sam islam«. Bilo bi intelektualno lijeno i prostodušno odbaciti njihove stavove kao temeljene samo na inatu ili predrasudama. Zapravo, ako se zanemari neko retoričko pretjerano, neke od njihovih optužbi, iako nezgodan za muslimane, relevantni su za raspravu o odnosu islama i demokracije u modernom svijetu. Na primjer, položaj žena ili ponekad nemuslimana u nekim muslimanskim zemljama je problematičan u smislu navodne pravne jednakosti svih ljudi u demokraciji. Na sličan način, netrpeljivost koju su neki muslimani usmjerili prema piscima (npr., Salman Rushdie u Velikoj Britaniji, Taslima Nasrin u Bangladešu, i profesor Nasr Abu Zaid u Egiptu) tobože ugrožava načelo slobode govora, što je bitno za demokraciju.

Također je istina da manje od 10 od više od 50 članice Organizacije islamske konferencije institucionalizirale su demokratska načela ili procese kako ih se shvaća na Zapadu, i to također, samo okvirno. Konačno, vrsta unutarnje stabilnosti i vanjskog mira koji je gotovo preduvjet za funkcioniranje demokracije pokvarena je turbulencijama unutarnje implozije ili vanjske agresije vidljive u mnogim muslimanskim zemljama danas (npr., Somalija, Sudan, Indonezija, Pakistan, Irak, Afganistana, Alžir, i Bosne).

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:

(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;

(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.

Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.

Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.

The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.

But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Politički islam je posljednjih desetljeća u Turskoj dobio povećanu vidljivost. Velik broj studentica počeo je pokazivati ​​svoju predanost nošenjem zabranjenog islamskog pokrivala za glavu u sveučilišnim kampusima, i utjecajna proislamistička TV

kanali su se proširili. Ovaj rad se fokusira na dobrobit (blagostanje) Stranka kao najistaknutiji institucionalni predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj.

Kratak boravak Stranke blagostanja na vlasti kao vodećeg koalicijskog partnera od sredine 1996. do sredine 1997. bio je vrhunac desetljeća postojanog rasta koji su potpomogle druge islamističke organizacije i institucije. Ove organizacije i ustanove

uključivao je novine i izdavačke kuće koje su privlačile islamističke pisce, brojne islamske zaklade, islamistička konfederacija radničkih sindikata, i islamističko udruženje poslovnih ljudi. Ove su institucije radile u tandemu s, i u prilog, Welfare kao neprikosnoveni vođa i predstavnik političkog islama u Turskoj, iako su imali svoje partikularističke ciljeve i ideale, koji su često odudarali od političkih projekata Welfarea. Fokusirajući se na Stranku blagostanja, zatim, omogućuje analizu šire društvene baze na kojoj je izrastao islamistički politički pokret u Turskoj. Od svrgavanja Welfarea s vlasti i njegovog konačnog zatvaranja, islamistički pokret bio je u rasulu. Ovaj će rad, stoga, ograničiti na razdoblje stranke blagostanja.

Prethodnik Welfare-a, stranka nacionalnog spasa, djelovao je 1970-ih, ali ga je zatvorio vojni režim u 1980. godine osnovan je Welfare 1983 a veliku popularnost stekao je 1990-ih. Počevši s a 4.4 posto glasova na općinskim izborima u 1984, Stranka blagostanja stalno je povećavala svoje rezultate i umnožila svoje glasove gotovo pet puta u dvanaest godina. To je prvo uznemirilo turski sekularni establišment na općinskim izborima u 1994, s 19 posto svih glasova u cijeloj zemlji i gradonačelnička mjesta u Istanbulu i Ankari, zatim na općim izborima od 1995 kada je osvojio pluralitet sa 21.4 posto nacionalnih glasova. Štoviše, Stranka blagostanja je samo nakratko mogla voditi koalicijsku vladu u partnerstvu s desničarskom Strankom pravog puta Tansua C¸ illera.

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas

of work which we should explain at the outset. Od 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.

This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, i

which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, i (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, posebno, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, Španjolska, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, međutim, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.

This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (MI) ili

that lie beyond its borders. Zbog ovog razloga, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration

from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (Belgija). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

David B. Ottaway

Početkom 1980-ih, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last

Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President

Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.

The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.

Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.

In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much

a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy

inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 do 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating

on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.