中的所有條目 "火雞" 類別

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲外交政策

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲鄰國政策

邁克爾·愛默生

理查德·楊斯

自從 2001 以及隨之而來的西方與政治伊斯蘭之間關係性質的國際事件已成為外交政策的決定性問題. 近年來，對政治伊斯蘭問題進行了大量的研究和分析。. 這有助於糾正西方以前對伊斯蘭價值觀和意圖的性質的一些簡單化和危言聳聽的假設. 與此平行, 歐盟 (歐盟) 制定了許多政策舉措，主要是歐洲鄰里政策(ENP) 原則上致力於對話和更深入的參與(非暴力) 阿拉伯國家內的政治行為者和民間社會組織. 然而，許多分析家和政策制定者現在抱怨在概念辯論和政策制定中的某個獎杯. 已經確定，政治伊斯蘭教是一個不斷變化的景觀, 深受各種情況的影響, 但辯論似乎常常停留在“伊斯蘭主義者是否民主”這樣簡單的問題上?’ 許多獨立分析家仍然主張與伊斯蘭主義者接觸, 但西方政府與伊斯蘭組織之間的實際和解仍然有限 .

伊斯蘭政黨 , 他們是民主黨人嗎? 有關係嗎 ?

塔里克·馬蘇德

反對土耳其社會中心和邊緣的變革以及正義與發展黨的崛起

拉敏Ahmadov

土耳其和歐盟: 土耳其國會議員歐盟願景調查

庫德雷特鵯

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (歐盟) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

熱心的民主人士 : 埃及的伊斯蘭主義和民主, 印度尼西亞和土耳其

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. 同時, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. 確實, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

城市公共空間中的穆斯林公民社會: 全球化, 話語轉變, 和社會運動

土耳其正義與發展黨的成功絕不能淡化對阿拉伯伊斯蘭主義者的擔憂

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “伊斯蘭主義者” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. 事實上, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, 該 “西方”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

聲稱中心: 轉型中的政治伊斯蘭

約翰大號. 埃斯波西托

1990年代的政治伊斯蘭教, 有些人叫什麼 “伊斯蘭原教旨主義,” 從北非到東南亞，在政府和反對派政治中仍然佔有重要地位. 權力和政治中的政治伊斯蘭教提出了許多問題和疑問: “伊斯蘭教與現代化對立嗎?,” “伊斯蘭教和民主不相容嗎?,” “伊斯蘭政府對多元化有何影響, 少數群體和婦女權利,” “伊斯蘭主義者的代表性有多大,” “有伊斯蘭溫和派嗎?,” “西方是否應該害怕跨國伊斯蘭威脅或文明衝突?” 當代伊斯蘭復興主義 當今穆斯林世界的景觀揭示了新的伊斯蘭共和國的出現 (伊朗, 蘇丹, 阿富汗), 在現有系統中充當主要政治和社會行為者的伊斯蘭運動的擴散, 以及激進的暴力極端分子的對抗性政治。_ 與 1980 年代政治伊斯蘭被簡單地等同於革命的伊朗或具有伊斯蘭聖戰或上帝之軍等名稱的秘密團體形成鮮明對比, 1990 年代的穆斯林世界是伊斯蘭主義者參與選舉過程並以總理身份出現的世界, 內閣官員, 國民議會議長, 議員, 和埃及等不同國家的市長, 蘇丹, 火雞, 伊朗, 黎巴嫩, 科威特, 也門, 約旦, 巴基斯坦, 孟加拉國, 馬來西亞, 印度尼西亞, 和以色列/巴勒斯坦. 在二十一世紀初, 政治伊斯蘭教仍然是全球政治秩序和混亂的主要力量, 參與政治進程但也參與恐怖主義行為的人, 對穆斯林世界和西方的挑戰. 了解當今政治伊斯蘭教的本質, 特別是從最近的經驗中出現的問題和問題, 對政府仍然至關重要, 決策者, 和國際政治的學生一樣.

伊斯蘭教與民主

達利亞·莫加德

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, 埃及, 黎巴嫩, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, more than ever, 西方政府, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.

穆斯林兄弟會的歷史

米歇爾Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, 經濟, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;伊斯蘭教. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, 穆斯林兄弟會,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

“穆斯林民主”的興起”

瓦利納斯爾

一個幽靈困擾著穆斯林世界. 這個特殊的幽靈不是原教旨主義極端主義的惡毒和備受爭議的精神, 也沒有被稱為自由伊斯蘭教的幻影希望. 反而, 我心目中的幽靈是第三種力量, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) 政黨在孟加拉國成功爭奪選票, 印度尼西亞, 馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦 (之前 1999 軍事政變), 和土耳其。不像伊斯蘭主義者, 他們對伊斯蘭教法統治的願景 (伊斯蘭法) 甚至恢復哈里發, 穆斯林民主黨人以務實的眼光看待政治生活. 他們拒絕或至少貶低伊斯蘭主義者的經典主張，即伊斯蘭教命令追求伊斯蘭教法國家, 他們的主要目標是在他們尊重的民主領域內製定可行的選舉平台和穩定的執政聯盟，以服務於個人和集體利益——伊斯蘭和世俗的利益——更加平凡, 贏或輸. 伊斯蘭主義者認為民主不是非常合法的東西, 但充其量是一種工具或策略，可能有助於獲得建立伊斯蘭國家的權力.

揭開面紗

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. 今天,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. 埃及, 約旦, 突尼斯, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, 黎巴嫩, 伊拉克, 和巴勒斯坦領土,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, 我們. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

伊斯蘭運動: 政治自由 & 民主

優素福·卡拉達維博士

這是人的職責 (清真) 下一階段的運動堅決反對極權獨裁統治, 政治專制和篡奪民權. 運動應始終支持政治自由, 如真,不假, 民主. 它應該斷然宣布它拒絕暴君並避開所有獨裁者, 即使某些暴君似乎對它有良好的意圖，以獲取一些利益，而且時間通常很短, 正如經驗所表明的那樣。先知 (鋸) 說, “當你看到我的國家成為恐懼的犧牲品，而不是對做錯事的人說, “你錯了”, 那麼你可能會對他們失去希望。”那麼，一個強迫人們對自負的不法者說話的政權怎麼樣？, “怎麼剛剛, 你有多棒. 哦，我們的英雄, 我們的救世主和我們的解放者!”《古蘭經》譴責像努姆魯德這樣的暴君, 法老, 哈曼等, 但它也鄙視那些追隨暴君並服從他們命令的人. 這就是為什麼安拉蔑視諾亞比的人說, “但他們跟隨 (米) 他們的財富和孩子不會給他們增加，只會給他們帶來損失。” [諾亞的信; 21]安拉也提到了廣告, 胡德人, “並且聽從了每一個強者的命令, 頑固的違法者”. [胡德的信:59]也看看古蘭經是怎麼說法老的人民的, “但他們聽從了法老的命令, 法老的命令沒有得到正確的引導。[胡德的信: 97] “因此他愚弄了他的人民, 他們服從了他: 他們確實是一個叛逆的民族 (反對真主).” [蘇拉特·祖赫魯夫: 54]仔細研究穆斯林民族的歷史和現代伊斯蘭運動應該清楚地表明，伊斯蘭思想, 除非在民主和自由的氣氛中，否則伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒從未繁榮或結出果實, 只有在壓迫和暴政踐踏了堅持伊斯蘭教的人民的意誌時，它們才會枯萎和貧瘠. 這種壓迫政權強加了他們的世俗主義, 通過武力和脅迫對其人民實行社會主義或共產主義, 使用秘密酷刑和公開處決, 並使用那些撕裂肉體的惡魔工具,流血, 粉碎骨頭並摧毀靈魂。我們在許多穆斯林國家看到了這些做法, 包括土耳其, 埃及, 敘利亞, 伊拉克, (前者) 南也門, 不同時期的索馬里和北非國家, 取決於每個國家獨裁者的年齡或統治時期。另一方面, 我們看到伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒在自由和民主時代結出碩果並蓬勃發展, 在以恐懼和壓迫統治人民的帝國政權崩潰之後。因此, 我無法想像伊斯蘭運動會支持政治自由和民主以外的任何東西。暴君允許每個人發出聲音, 除了伊斯蘭教的聲音, 讓每一種趨勢都以政黨或某種團體的形式表現出來, 除了伊斯蘭潮流，它是唯一真正代表這個國家並表達它的趨勢, 價值觀, 本質和存在.

該 500 最有影響力的穆斯林

約翰·埃斯波西托

易卜拉欣卡林

您手中的出版物是我們希望成為年度系列的第一本，它為了解穆斯林世界的推動者和震動者提供了一個窗口. 我們努力突出顯示有影響力的穆斯林人, 那是, 影響來自他們的伊斯蘭教實踐或來自他們是穆斯林這一事實的人. 我們認為這為穆斯林影響世界的不同方式提供了寶貴的見解, 並且還展示了當今穆斯林生活的多樣性。影響是一個棘手的概念. 它的意思來源於拉丁詞influensmeaning to flow-in, 指向看不見的力量的古老占星術思想 (喜歡月亮) 影響人類. 這份名單上的人物也有影響人類的能力. 這份名單上的每個人都以各種不同的方式影響著地球上許多人的生活. 該 50 最具影響力的人物簡介. 他們的影響力來自多種來源; 然而，它們是統一的，因為它們每個都影響著大量的人類。然後我們打破了 500 領導者成 15 類別—學者, 政治,行政的, 血統, 傳教士, 婦女, 青年, 慈善事業, 發展歷程,科學和技術, 文化藝術, 媒體, 激進分子, 國際伊斯蘭網絡, 和今日問題——幫助您了解伊斯蘭教和穆斯林影響當今世界的不同方式。兩個綜合列表顯示了影響如何以不同方式發揮作用: 國際伊斯蘭網絡展示了穆斯林重要跨國網絡的領導者, 和“今日問題”突出了由於當前影響人類的問題而具有重要意義的個人.

伊斯蘭主義者和投票箱

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

JOOST LAGENDIJK

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, however. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 September 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.