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Uislamu wa Kisiasa na Sera ya Kigeni ya Ulaya

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, Umoja wa Ulaya (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) kwamba kimsingi jitoe kwenye mazungumzo na ushiriki wa kina wote(sio vurugu) watendaji wa kisiasa na asasi za kiraia ndani ya nchi za Kiarabu. Walakini wachambuzi wengi na watunga sera sasa wanalalamika juu ya nyara fulani katika mjadala wa dhana na maendeleo ya sera. Imebainika kuwa Uislamu wa kisiasa ni mazingira yanayobadilika, hali zilizoathiriwa sana za anuwai, lakini mjadala mara nyingi unaonekana kukwama kwenye swali rahisi la 'ni Waislam kidemokrasia?’Wachambuzi wengi wa kujitegemea hata hivyo wametetea ushirikiana na Waislam, lakini uhusiano wa kweli kati ya serikali za Magharibi na mashirika ya Kiisilamu bado ni mdogo .

Vyama vya Kiisilamu , WEWE NI WANADEMOKRASIA? Inajalisha ?

Tarek Masoud

Kuendeshwa na hisia kwamba "Waislam wanakuja,”Waandishi wa habari na watunga sera wamekuwa wakishirikiana na uvumi uliochelewa kuhusu ikiwa vyama vya Kiislam kama vile Muslim Brotherhood ya Misri (MB) au Hamas ya Palestina inaamini kweli katika demokrasia. Wakati ninajaribu kuonyesha mipaka ya kujitolea kwa demokrasia ya Kiislam, Nadhani kutazama ndani ya roho ya Kiislam ni matumizi mabaya ya nguvu. Waislam hawaji. Kwa kuongezea, kama Adam Przeworski na wengine wamesema, ahadi kwa demokrasia mara nyingi huzaliwa na vikwazo vya mazingira kuliko imani ya kweli. Badala ya kuwa na wasiwasi ikiwa Waislam ni wanademokrasia wa kweli,
lengo letu linapaswa kuwa kusaidia kuimarisha taasisi za kidemokrasia na za huria na wahusika ili kwamba hakuna kikundi-cha Kiislam au kingine-kinachoweza kuwaangusha.
Lakini ni nini harakati hii juu ya ambao wana demokrasia wanaonekana kuwa na wasiwasi? Uislamu ni dhana ya kuteleza. Kwa mfano, ikiwa tunataja kama Waislam vyama hivyo ambavyo vinataka matumizi ya shari‘a, lazima tutaondoa Chama cha Haki na Maendeleo cha Uturuki (ambayo inachukuliwa kuwa ya Kiisilamu) na ni pamoja na chama tawala cha Misri cha National Democratic Party (ambayo inakandamiza kabisa Waislam). Badala ya kuzama katika maswala ya ufafanuzi, tungefanya vizuri kuzingatia seti ya vyama vya siasa ambavyo vimekua kutoka mizizi ile ile ya kihistoria, hupata malengo na nafasi zao nyingi kutoka kwa wazo moja la maoni, na kudumisha uhusiano wa shirika kati yao - hiyo ni, vyama ambavyo vinatoka kwa MB ya kimataifa. Hizi ni pamoja na shirika mama la Misri (ilianzishwa mnamo 1928), lakini pia Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Harakati ya Algeria kwa Jamii yenye Amani, Chama cha Kiislamu cha Iraq, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

Mabadiliko ya Kukabiliana katika Kituo na pembezoni mwa Jumuiya ya Kituruki na Kuibuka kwa Chama cha Haki na Maendeleo

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Interestingly, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (from 8.35 % ndani 2002). hatimaye, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

Uturuki na EU: Utafiti juu ya Maono ya Wabunge wa Uturuki wa EU

Nguvu Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

wanademokrasia wenye bidii : UISLAMU NA DEMOKRASIA MISRI, INDONESIA NA UTALII

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

Hofu ya Waislam kuingia madarakani kupitia uchaguzi imekuwa kikwazo kwa muda mrefu kwa demokrasia katika mataifa yenye mamlaka ya ulimwengu wa Kiislamu.. Waislam wamekuwa, na kuendelea kuwa, harakati bora za upinzani zilizopangwa na zinazoaminika zaidi katika nyingi za nchi hizi.

Wao pia ni kawaida, ikiwa sio sawa kila wakati, kudhaniwa kuwa katika nafasi nzuri zaidi ya kutumia fursa yoyote ya kidemokrasia ya mifumo yao ya kisiasa. kuna idadi ya jumuiya za kanda mpya za Kiislamu ambapo dini na sheria zimefungamana kwa karibu na kuunganishwa leo kama ilivyokuwa kabla ya mwanzo wa enzi ya kisasa., kujitolea kwa Waislam kwa demokrasia mara nyingi kunatiliwa shaka. Kwa kweli, linapokuja suala la demokrasia, Urithi wa kiakili wa Uislamu na rekodi ya kihistoria (kwa kuzingatia mifano michache ya majimbo yanayoongozwa na Waislam, kama vile Sudan na Iran) hazikuwa za kutia moyo. Nguvu inayoonekana ya harakati za Kiislamu, pamoja na tuhuma kuhusu utangamano wa kidemokrasia wa Uislamu, imetumiwa na serikali za kimabavu kama hoja ya kukataa miito ya ndani na kimataifa ya mageuzi ya kisiasa na demokrasia..

Ndani, waliberali wa kilimwengu wamependelea kuishi kwa udikteta unaoitwa wa kilimwengu kuliko ule unaoweza kuwa wa kidini. Kimataifa, Serikali za Magharibi zimependelea watawala wa kidemokrasia marafiki kuliko waliochaguliwa kidemokrasia, lakini uwezekano wa uadui, Serikali zinazoongozwa na Waislam.

Lengo la karatasi hii ni kuangalia upya baadhi ya dhana kuhusu hatari za demokrasia katika nchi zenye mamlaka za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. (na sio Mashariki ya Kati pekee) ambapo vuguvugu au vyama vikali vya Kiislamu vipo.

Jumuiya ya Kiraia ya Waislamu katika Nafasi za Umma za Mjini: Utandawazi, Mabadiliko ya kibaguzi, na Harakati za Kijamii

Paulo M. Lubeck
Bryana Britt
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, kisha, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic cityhas been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,

Mafanikio ya Chama cha AK cha Uturuki hayapaswi kupunguza wasiwasi juu ya Waislamu wa Kiarabu

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Muislamu” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. kwa kweli, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Magharibi”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Kudai Kituo hicho: Uislamu wa Kisiasa Katika Mpito

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Uturuki, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

Uislamu na Demokrasia

Dalia Mogahed

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Misri, Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, more than ever, Western governments, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.

Historia ya Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

Sisi katika nchi za Magharibi !nd ni vigumu kwamba mawazo ya kiteolojia bado katika”Ame mawazo ya watu, kuchochea tamaa Masihi ambayo inaweza kuondoka jamii katika uharibifu. Sisi kudhani kwamba hii ilikuwa hakuna tena uwezekano,kwamba binadamu walikuwa wamejifunza kutenganisha maswali ya kidini kutoka kwa wale wa kisiasa, kwamba theolojia ya kisiasa alikufa katika 16h karne Ulaya. Tulikuwa wrong.1Islam tena peke dini, lakini itikadi ambayo hutoa mfumo jumla ya masuala yote ya kisiasa, kijamii, kiuchumi, na maisha ya utamaduni katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Ingawa Uislamu ina kuendelea alionyesha mandhari ya kuanza tena katika historia yake katika kukabiliana na vikosi vya ndani na nje ambavyo changamoto imani na jamii ya Waislamu, Madai ya Uislam kwa nguvu reemerged. Kutoridhika ni dhahiri njia ya harakati ya polepole kuelekea itikadi ya Kiislam, kama au wazo wa Uislamu kwa nguvu resonates kati wakazi. watu binafsi, despondentfrom ukandamizaji wa njia mbadala kutoka serikali za kikandamizaji, kuangalia kwa mabadiliko. Mashirika, kama vile Muslim Brotherhood nchini Misri, kutoa mifano ya wazi ya mwenendo kubwa zinazoendelea katika eneo ofthe Mashariki ya Kati na Afrika Kaskazini. #e nguvu za kisiasa na katika jamii”uenceheld na Brotherhood herufi juu Jamhuri ya Misri Falme failureto kusaidia watu wake. Hatimaye dissatis!zamu ed idadi ya watu harakati ina uwezo wa kutoa huduma muhimu kwa ajili ya kuishi;Islamism. #ni kuongeza maendeleo kusukuma wastani, tawala Uislamu ndani ya eneo la siasa kali kwa njia ya desperation.Part ya kuibuka kwa neorevivalism, Muslim Brotherhood,imara na Hassan al-Banna katika 1928, aliona jamii ya Kiislamu katika njia panda muhimu na kusisitiza kuwa Waislamu ingekuwa !nd nguvu katika totalself-su $ ciency wa Uislamu.

KUPANDA KWA “DEMOKRASI YA WAISLAMU”

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Kugawanya pazia

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Leo,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Misri, Jordan, Tunisia, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Lebanon, Iraq, na maeneo ya Palestina,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, Marekani. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Islamic Movement: Uhuru wa Kisiasa & Demokrasia

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamic) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokrasia. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Misri, Syria, Iraq, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

the 500 Waislamu wenye ushawishi mkubwa

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Wanawake, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Vyombo vya habari, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

YA WAISLAMU NA MABOKSI YA MPIRA

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

JOOST LAGENDIJK

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, however. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 September 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.