Όλες οι συμμετοχές στο "Τουρκία" Κατηγορία

Πολιτικό Ισλάμ και Ευρωπαϊκή Εξωτερική Πολιτική

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Islamist Parties , ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΕΣ? Εχει σημασία ?

Tarek Μασούντ

Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramin Ahmadov

Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Κουντρέτ Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

ζηλωτές δημοκράτες : ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟ, ΙΝΔΟΝΗΣΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Την ίδια στιγμή, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Πράγματι, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Μουσουλμανική Κοινωνία Πολιτών σε Αστικούς Δημόσιους Χώρους: Παγκοσμιοποίηση, Λογικές μετατοπίσεις, και Κοινωνικών Κινημάτων

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Ισλαμιστής” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, ο “δυτικά”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Διεκδίκηση του Κέντρου: Πολιτικό Ισλάμ σε Μετάβαση

John L. Esposito

Στη δεκαετία του 1990 το πολιτικό Ισλάμ, αυτό που λένε κάποιοι “Ισλαμικός φονταμενταλισμός,” παραμένει μια σημαντική παρουσία στην κυβέρνηση και στην αντιπολιτευτική πολιτική από τη Βόρεια Αφρική έως τη Νοτιοανατολική Ασία. Το πολιτικό Ισλάμ στην εξουσία και στην πολιτική έχει εγείρει πολλά ζητήματα και ερωτήματα: “Είναι το Ισλάμ αντίθετο με τον εκσυγχρονισμό?,” “Είναι ασυμβίβαστο το Ισλάμ και η δημοκρατία?,” “Ποιες είναι οι επιπτώσεις μιας ισλαμικής κυβέρνησης για τον πλουραλισμό, δικαιώματα των μειονοτήτων και των γυναικών,” “Πόσο αντιπροσωπευτικοί είναι οι ισλαμιστές,” “Υπάρχουν ισλαμιστές μετριοπαθείς?,” “Εάν η Δύση φοβάται μια διεθνική ισλαμική απειλή ή σύγκρουση πολιτισμών?” Σύγχρονη Ισλαμική Αναγέννηση Το τοπίο του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου σήμερα αποκαλύπτει την εμφάνιση νέων ισλαμικών δημοκρατιών (Ιράν, Σουδάν, Αφγανιστάν), ο πολλαπλασιασμός των ισλαμικών κινημάτων που λειτουργούν ως κύριοι πολιτικοί και κοινωνικοί παράγοντες στα υπάρχοντα συστήματα, και η συγκρουσιακή πολιτική των ριζοσπαστικών βίαιων εξτρεμιστών._ Σε αντίθεση με τη δεκαετία του 1980, όταν το πολιτικό Ισλάμ απλώς εξισωνόταν με το επαναστατικό Ιράν ή με λαθρομάδες με ονόματα όπως Ισλαμική Τζιχάντ ή Στρατός του Θεού, ο μουσουλμανικός κόσμος της δεκαετίας του 1990 είναι ένας κόσμος στον οποίο οι ισλαμιστές συμμετείχαν στην εκλογική διαδικασία και είναι ορατοί ως πρωθυπουργοί, στελέχη του υπουργικού συμβουλίου, ομιλητές εθνικών συνελεύσεων, βουλευτές, και δήμαρχοι σε χώρες τόσο διαφορετικές όπως η Αίγυπτος, Σουδάν, Τουρκία, Ιράν, Λίβανος, Κουβέιτ, Γέμενη, Ιορδανία, Πακιστάν, Μπαγκλαντές, Μαλαισία, Ινδονησία, και Ισραήλ/Παλαιστίνη. Στην αυγή του εικοστού πρώτου αιώνα, Το πολιτικό Ισλάμ συνεχίζει να είναι μια σημαντική δύναμη τάξης και αταξίας στην παγκόσμια πολιτική, αυτός που συμμετέχει στην πολιτική διαδικασία αλλά και σε τρομοκρατικές ενέργειες, μια πρόκληση για τον μουσουλμανικό κόσμο και τη Δύση. Κατανόηση της φύσης του πολιτικού Ισλάμ σήμερα, και ειδικότερα τα ζητήματα και τα ερωτήματα που προέκυψαν από την εμπειρία του πρόσφατου παρελθόντος, παραμένει κρίσιμο για τις κυβερνήσεις, φορείς χάραξης πολιτικής, και φοιτητές της διεθνούς πολιτικής.

Ισλάμ και Δημοκρατία

Dalia Mogahed

Το Ισλάμ στην πολιτική έχει επιβεβαιωθεί σε πολλές χώρες του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου μέσω δημοκρατικών εκλογών. Τα ισλαμιστικά κόμματα έχουν αποκτήσει διαφορετικούς βαθμούς πολιτικής ισχύος στην Τουρκία, Αίγυπτος, Λίβανος, και τα κατεχόμενα παλαιστινιακά εδάφη, και έχουν ευρεία επιρροή στο Μαρόκο και την Ιορδανία. Τώρα, περισσότερο από ποτέ, Δυτικές κυβερνήσεις, ανησυχούν από αυτό το αποτέλεσμα, έθεσαν το διαχρονικό ερώτημα: Είναι το Ισλάμ συμβατό με τη δημοκρατία?Μια πρόσφατη εις βάθος έρευνα του Gallup στο 10 κυρίως μουσουλμανικές χώρες,που αντιπροσωπεύουν περισσότερα από 80% του παγκόσμιου μουσουλμανικού πληθυσμού, δείχνει ότι όταν ρωτήθηκαν τι θαυμάζουν περισσότερο στη Δύση, Οι μουσουλμάνοι αναφέρουν συχνά την πολιτική ελευθερία, ελευθερία, δίκαια δικαστικά συστήματα, και ελευθερία του λόγου. Όταν τους ζητήθηκε να ασκήσουν κριτική στις δικές τους κοινωνίες, Ο εξτρεμισμός και η ανεπαρκής προσήλωση στις ισλαμικές διδασκαλίες ήταν τα κύρια παράπονά τους.Ωστόσο, ενώ οι μουσουλμάνοι λένε ότι θαυμάζουν την ελευθερία και ένα ανοιχτό πολιτικό σύστημα,Οι έρευνες της Gallup δείχνουν ότι δεν πιστεύουν ότι πρέπει να επιλέξουν μεταξύ Ισλάμ και δημοκρατίας, αλλά μάλλον, ότι τα δύο μπορούν να συνυπάρξουν μέσα σε μια λειτουργική κυβέρνηση.

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;ισλαμισμός. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, η Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY”

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Ινδονησία, Μαλαισία, Πακιστάν (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Ισλαμικός νόμος) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Σήμερα,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Αίγυπτος, Ιορδανία, Τυνησία, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Λίβανος, Ιράκ, και των παλαιστινιακών εδαφών,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, ΜΑΣ. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

ισλαμικό Κίνημα: Political Freedom & Δημοκρατία

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Ισλαμικής) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, Δημοκρατία. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Αίγυπτος, Συρία, Ιράκ, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

ο 500 οι μουσουλμάνοι με τη μεγαλύτερη επιρροή

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Η έκδοση που έχετε στα χέρια σας είναι η πρώτη από τις ετήσιες σειρές που ελπίζουμε ότι θα παρέχει ένα παράθυρο στους κινητές και τους δονητές του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου. Προσπαθήσαμε να αναδείξουμε ανθρώπους που έχουν επιρροή ως μουσουλμάνους, αυτό είναι, άτομα των οποίων η επιρροή πηγάζει από την πρακτική τους στο Ισλάμ ή από το γεγονός ότι είναι μουσουλμάνοι. Πιστεύουμε ότι αυτό δίνει πολύτιμη εικόνα για τους διαφορετικούς τρόπους με τους οποίους οι Μουσουλμάνοι επηρεάζουν τον κόσμο, και δείχνει επίσης την ποικιλομορφία του πώς ζουν οι άνθρωποι ως μουσουλμάνοι σήμερα. Η επιρροή είναι μια δύσκολη έννοια. Η σημασία του προέρχεται από τη λατινική λέξη influens που σημαίνει εισροή, δείχνοντας σε μια παλιά αστρολογική ιδέα ότι αόρατες δυνάμεις (σαν το φεγγάρι) επηρεάζουν την ανθρωπότητα. Τα στοιχεία αυτής της λίστας έχουν την ικανότητα να επηρεάσουν και την ανθρωπότητα. Με διάφορους τρόπους, κάθε άτομο σε αυτήν τη λίστα έχει επιρροή στη ζωή ενός μεγάλου αριθμού ανθρώπων στη γη. ο 50 Τα πρόσωπα με τη μεγαλύτερη επιρροή παρουσιάζονται προφίλ. Η επιρροή τους προέρχεται από ποικίλες πηγές; Ωστόσο, τους ενώνει το γεγονός ότι το καθένα επηρεάζει τεράστια τμήματα της ανθρωπότητας. 500 ηγέτες σε 15 κατηγορίες — Ακαδημαϊκά, Πολιτικός,Διοικητικός, Καταγωγή, Κήρυκες, γυναίκες, Νεολαία, Φιλανθρωπία, Ανάπτυξη,Επιστήμη και Τεχνολογία, Τέχνες και Πολιτισμός, Μεσο ΜΑΖΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΣΗΣ, Ριζοσπάστες, Διεθνή Ισλαμικά Δίκτυα, και Θέματα της Ημέρας—για να σας βοηθήσουν να κατανοήσετε τους διαφορετικούς τρόπους με τους οποίους το Ισλάμ και οι Μουσουλμάνοι επηρεάζουν τον κόσμο σήμερα. Δύο σύνθετες λίστες δείχνουν πώς λειτουργεί η επιρροή με διαφορετικούς τρόπους: Το InternationalIslamic Networks δείχνει ανθρώπους που βρίσκονται επικεφαλής σημαντικών διεθνικών δικτύων μουσουλμάνων, και τα Θέματα της Ημέρας επισημαίνουν άτομα των οποίων η σημασία οφείλεται σε τρέχοντα ζητήματα που επηρεάζουν την ανθρωπότητα.

OF ISLAMISTS AND BALLOT BOXES

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

JOOST LAGENDIJK

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, however. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 September 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.