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ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Ta pogled, vendar, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamska politična teorija, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, kot druge religije, se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom, demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe, in družbeni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institucije, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (kvota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; in (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Raziskave

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) zavračanje popuščanja njenega primeža tvega zaostrovanje napetosti v času tako politične negotovosti glede predsedniškega nasledstva kot resnih socialno-ekonomskih nemirov. Čeprav bo to verjetno dolgotrajno, postopen proces, režim bi moral sprejeti predhodne korake za normalizacijo sodelovanja Muslimanskih bratov v političnem življenju. Muslimanski bratje, katerih družbene dejavnosti so bile dolgo tolerirane, njihova vloga v formalni politiki pa je strogo omejena, zmagal brez primere 20 odstotkov poslanskih sedežev v 2005 volitve. To jim je uspelo kljub temu, da so se potegovali le za tretjino razpoložljivih mest in ne glede na precejšnje ovire, vključno s policijsko represijo in volilnimi goljufijami. Ta uspeh je potrdil njihov položaj izjemno dobro organizirane in globoko zakoreninjene politične sile. Ob istem času, poudarila je slabosti tako legalne opozicije kot vladajoče stranke. Režim je morda stavil, da bi lahko skromno povečanje parlamentarne zastopanosti Muslimanskih bratov uporabili za podžiganje strahov pred islamističnim prevzemom in s tem služilo kot razlog za zastoj reform. Če je tako, obstaja veliko tveganje, da bo strategija imela povratne rezultate.

Islam and Democracy: Text, Tradition, and History

Ahrar Ahmad

Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, oppressive, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. Vendar pa, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. na primer:, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. Pravzaprav, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. na primer:, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. podobno, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Končno, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., Somalija, Sudan, Indonezija, Pakistan, Irak, Afganistan, Alžirija, and Bosnia).

GLOBALIZACIJA IN POLITIČNI ISLAM: SOCIALNE OSNOVE TURŠKE STRANKE BLAGINJE

Haldun Gulalp

Politični islam je v zadnjih desetletjih v Turčiji pridobil večjo prepoznavnost. Veliko število študentk je začelo izkazovati svojo predanost z nošenjem prepovedanih islamskih pokrival v univerzitetnih kampusih, in vplivna proislamistična TV
kanali so se razširili. Ta dokument se osredotoča na dobro počutje (blaginja) Stranka kot najpomembnejši institucionalni predstavnik političnega islama v Turčiji.
Kratek mandat Stranke blaginje na oblasti kot vodilne koalicijske partnerice od sredine leta 1996 do sredine leta 1997 je bil vrhunec desetletja stalne rasti, ki so ji pomagale druge islamistične organizacije in institucije.. Te organizacije in institucije
vključevala časopise in založbe, ki so pritegnile islamistične pisce, številne islamske fundacije, islamistična sindikalna konfederacija, in združenje islamističnih poslovnežev. Te institucije so delovale v tandemu z, in v podporo, Welfare kot nesporen voditelj in predstavnik političnega islama v Turčiji, čeprav so imeli svoje partikularne cilje in ideale, ki so se pogosto razlikovali od političnih projektov Welfareja. Osredotočanje na stranko blaginje, potem, omogoča analizo širše družbene baze, na kateri je zraslo islamistično politično gibanje v Turčiji. Od vrnitve Welfareja z oblasti in njegovega končnega zaprtja, islamistično gibanje je bilo v razsulu. Ta dokument bo, torej, biti omejen na obdobje stranke blaginje.
Predhodnik družbe Welfare, stranka narodne rešitve, je deloval v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, vendar ga je vojaški režim leta zaprl 1980. Welfare je bil ustanovljen l 1983 in je v devetdesetih letih pridobil veliko popularnost. Začenši z a 4.4 odstotka glasov občinskih volitvah v 1984, stranka blaginje je v dvanajstih letih vztrajno povečevala svoje rezultate in pomnožila svoje glasove skoraj petkrat. To je najprej vznemirilo turški sekularni establišment na občinskih volitvah leta 1994, z 19 odstotkov vseh glasov po vsej državi in ​​županska mesta v Istanbulu in Ankari, nato splošnih volitvah v 1995 ko je osvojila pluralnost z 21.4 odstotkov državnih glasov. Kljub temu, Stranka blaginje je le za kratek čas lahko vodila koalicijsko vlado v partnerstvu z desno Stranko prave poti Tansuja C¸ illerja.

A Muslim Archipelago

Max L. bruto

This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, v 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, v 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

Islamistične opozicijske stranke in potencial za sodelovanje v EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Glede na vse večji pomen islamističnih gibanj v muslimanskem svetu in

način, kako je radikalizacija vplivala na svetovne dogodke od preloma stoletja, to

Pomembno je, da EU oceni svoje politike do akterjev znotraj tistega, kar je lahko ohlapno

imenovan "islamski svet". Še posebej pomembno je vprašati, ali in kako se vključiti

z različnimi islamističnimi skupinami.

To ostaja sporno tudi v EU. Nekateri menijo, da islamske vrednote to

ležijo za islamističnimi strankami preprosto niso združljive z zahodnimi ideali demokracije in

človekove pravice, medtem ko drugi zaradi naraščajočega vidika angažiranost vidijo kot realno potrebo

domačega pomena islamističnih strank in njihovega vse večjega vključevanja v mednarodne

zadeve. Druga perspektiva je, da bi se demokratizacija v muslimanskem svetu povečala

Evropska varnost. Veljavnost teh in drugih argumentov glede tega, ali in kako

EU bi se morala vključiti v preizkus le s preučevanjem različnih islamističnih gibanj in

njihove politične okoliščine, po državi.

Demokratizacija je osrednja tema skupnih zunanjepolitičnih ukrepov EU, kot je bilo položeno

v členu 11 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji. Pri tem so upoštevale številne države

Poročilo ni demokratično, ali ne povsem demokratičen. V večini teh držav, Islamistični

stranke in gibanja predstavljajo veliko nasprotovanje prevladujočim režimom, in

v nekaterih tvorijo največji opozicijski blok. Evropske demokracije so že dolgo morale

ukvarjajo se z vladnimi režimi, ki so avtoritarni, vendar je nov pritisk nov

za demokratično reformo v državah, v katerih imajo najverjetnejši upravičenci, Iz

Stališče EU, različni in včasih problematični pristopi k demokraciji in njeni

povezane vrednosti, kot so manjšinske in ženske pravice ter pravna država. Te obtožbe so

pogosto nasprotovan islamističnim gibanjem, zato je pomembno, da evropski oblikovalci politike to storijo

imeti natančno sliko o politikah in filozofijah potencialnih partnerjev.

Izkušnje iz različnih držav kažejo, da je islamistično več svobode

zabave so dovoljene, bolj zmerni so v svojih dejanjih in idejah. V veliko

primeri, ko se islamistične stranke in skupine že zdavnaj odmikajo od svojega prvotnega cilja

o ustanovitvi Islamske države, ki jo ureja islamsko pravo, in sprejeli osnovne

demokratična načela volilne konkurence za oblast, obstoj drugih političnih

tekmovalci, in politični pluralizem.

Politični islam na Bližnjem vzhodu

so Knudsen

To poročilo predstavlja uvod v izbrane vidike pojava

imenovani "politični islam". Poročilo daje poseben poudarek na Bližnjem vzhodu, v

zlasti levantinske države, in opisuje dva vidika islamističnega gibanja, ki lahko

velja za polarna nasprotja: demokracija in politično nasilje. V tretjem delu poročila

pregleda nekatere glavne teorije, ki se uporabljajo za razlago islamskega vstajenja na Bližnjem vzhodu

(Slika 1). V pismu, poročilo kaže, da islam ni treba združiti z demokracijo in

da je pogosto zanemarjati dejstvo, da so bile številne države Bližnjega vzhoda

vključeni v brutalno zatiranje islamističnih gibanj, jih povzroča, nekateri trdijo, da se lotijo

orožje proti državi, in redkeje, tuje države. Uporaba političnega nasilja je

razširjena na Bližnjem vzhodu, vendar ni niti nelogičen niti neracionalen. V mnogih primerih celo

Islamistične skupine, znane po uporabi nasilja, so se spremenile v mirne politične

stranke, ki uspešno kandidirajo na občinskih in državnih volitvah. Kljub temu, islamisti

oživitev na Bližnjem vzhodu ostaja deloma nepojasnjena kljub številnim teorijam, ki si jih prizadevajo

za njegovo rast in priljubljenost. Na splošno, večina teorij meni, da je islamizem a

reakcija na relativno pomanjkanje, zlasti socialna neenakost in politično zatiranje. Alternativa

teorije iščejo odgovor na islamistični preporod znotraj meja same religije in

močan, evokativni potencial verske simbolike.

Zaključek trdi v prid prehodu iz pristopa "mračnost in usoda"

predstavlja islamizem kot nelegitimen politični izraz in potencialno grožnjo Zahodu ("Star

Islamizem ”), in bolj zatemnjenega razumevanja sedanje demokratizacije islamistov

gibanje, ki se zdaj odvija po vsem Bližnjem vzhodu ("Novi islamizem"). Tole

pomembnost razumevanja ideoloških korenin "novega islamizma" je v ospredju

skupaj s potrebo po temeljitem poznavanju islamističnih gibanj in njihovih izkušenj iz prve roke

pristaši. Kot družbena gibanja, Trdimo, da je treba dati večji poudarek

razumevanje načinov, kako so lahko uresničevali težnje ne le

revnejših slojev družbe, pa tudi srednjega razreda.

STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politični islam je danes najbolj aktivna politična sila na Bližnjem vzhodu. Njegova prihodnost je tesno povezana z prihodnostjo regije. Če bi se ZDA in Evropska unija zavezali podpirati politične reforme v regiji, morali bodo izmisliti beton, skladne strategije za vključevanje islamističnih skupin. Pa vendar, ZDA. na splošno ni želel odpreti dialoga s temi gibanji. podobno, Izjema je bila sodelovanje EU z islamisti, ne pravilo. Tam, kjer obstajajo stiki na nizki ravni, služijo predvsem za zbiranje informacij, ne strateških ciljev. ZDA. EU ima številne programe, ki se ukvarjajo z gospodarskim in političnim razvojem v regiji - med njimi pobuda za partnerstvo na Bližnjem vzhodu (MEPI), korporacijo Millennium Challenge (MCC), Unija za Sredozemlje, in evropsko sosedsko politiko (ENP) - vendar pa le malo govorijo o tem, kako se izziv islamistične politične opozicije ujema s širšimi regionalnimi cilji. zunaj ZDA. Pomoč in programiranje demokracije v EU so skoraj v celoti usmerjeni bodisi k avtoritarnim vladam bodisi bodisi sekularnim skupinam civilne družbe z minimalno podporo v njihovih družbah..
Prišel je čas za ponovno oceno trenutnih politik. Od septembra septembra 11, 2001, podpiranje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu je dobilo večji pomen za zahodne oblikovalce politike, ki vidijo povezavo med pomanjkanjem demokracije in političnim nasiljem. Večja pozornost je bila namenjena razumevanju različic političnega islama. Nova ameriška administracija je bolj odprta za širjenje komunikacije z muslimanskim svetom. Medtem, velika večina osrednjih islamističnih organizacij - tudi Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu, Jordanska fronta islamske akcije (IAF), Maroška stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD), islamsko ustavno gibanje Kuvajta, in jemenska stranka Islama - so podpora politični reformi in demokraciji vedno bolj osrednja sestavina njihovih političnih platform. Poleg tega, mnogi so izrazili veliko zanimanje za odpiranje dialoga s ZDA. in vlade EU.
Prihodnost odnosov med zahodnimi državami in Bližnjim vzhodom je lahko v veliki meri odvisna od stopnje, v kateri prvi vključujejo nenasilne islamistične stranke v širok dialog o skupnih interesih in ciljih. V zadnjem času se je razširilo število raziskav o povezanosti z islamisti, toda le malo jih jasno obravnava, kaj bi lahko pomenilo v praksi. Kot Zoé Nautré, gostujoči kolega na nemškem svetu za zunanje odnose, postavlja, „EU razmišlja o angažmaju, vendar ne ve, kako.“ 1 V upanju, da razpravlja razpravo, ločimo med tremi stopnjami „angažiranosti,"Vsak z različnimi sredstvi in ​​konci: stiki na nizki ravni, strateški dialog, in partnerstvo.

Islamistične stranke : udeležba brez moči

Malika Zeghal

V zadnjih dveh desetletjih, družbena in politična gibanja, ki utemeljujejo svoje ideologije s sklicevanjem na islam, si prizadevajo postati legalne politične stranke v mnogih državah Bližnjega vzhoda in Severne Afrike. Nekaterim od teh islamističnih gibanj je bilo dovoljeno zakonito sodelovati v volilni konkurenci. Med najbolj znanimi je turška Stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (AKP), ki je dobila parlamentarno večino v 2002 in od takrat vodi vlado. Marokova lastna Stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD) je zakonita od sredine- 1990in poveljuje velik del sedežev v Parlamentu. V Egiptu, Muslimanska bratovščina (MB) nikoli ni bil pooblaščen za oblikovanje politične stranke, vendar je kljub državni represiji uspešno kandidiral kot kandidati kot nacionalni neodvisni na nacionalnih in lokalnih volitvah.
Od začetka devetdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, ta trend je šel z roko v roki z uradnimi politikami omejene politične liberalizacije. Skupaj, Oba trenda sta se sprožila razprava o tem, ali se ta gibanja zavzemajo za »demokracijo«. Obstajala je obsežna literatura, ki je poudarila paradokse ter možna tveganja in koristi vključevanja islamističnih strank v volilni postopek. Glavna paradigma, ki jo najdemo v tem besedilu, je osredotočena na posledice, ki bi lahko nastale, če islamisti uporabljajo demokratične instrumente, in skuša uresničiti "prave" namere, ki jih bodo islamisti izrazili, če bodo prišli na oblast.

Reševanje ameriške islamistične dileme: Lekcije iz južne in jugovzhodne Azije

Shadi Hamid
zunaj ZDA. prizadevanja za spodbujanje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu so že dolgo paralizirala "islamistična dilema": v teoriji, hočemo demokracijo, ampak, v praksi, se bojijo, da bodo islamistične stranke glavni prejemniki političnega odpiranja. Najbolj tragična manifestacija tega dogodka je bil alžirski debakul iz 1991 in 1992, ko so ZDA molče stale, medtem ko je odločna sekularna vojska odpovedala volitve, potem ko je islamistična stranka dobila parlamentarno večino. V zadnjem času, Busheva administracija se je oddaljila od svoje "agende svobode", potem ko so islamisti na volitvah v celotni regiji presenetljivo uspeli, tudi v Egiptu, Savdska Arabija, in palestinska ozemlja.
Toda tudi naš strah pred islamističnimi strankami - in posledična zavrnitev sodelovanja z njimi - je bil sam nedosleden, velja za nekatere države, za druge pa ne. Bolj kot to, da je država pomembna za ameriške nacionalne varnostne interese, manj so ZDA pripravljene sprejeti islamistične skupine, ki imajo tam vidno politično vlogo. Vendar pa, v državah, ki so manj strateško pomembne, in kjer je ogroženo manj, ZDA so občasno uporabile bolj odmeven pristop. Toda prav tam je bolj na vrsti, da je prepoznavanje vloge nenasilnih islamistov najpomembnejše, in, tukaj, Ameriška politika še naprej primanjkuje.
Po vsej regiji, ZDA aktivno podpirajo avtokratske režime in dajejo zeleno luč za zatiranje kampanj proti skupinam, kot je egipčanska Muslimanska bratovščina, najstarejše in najvplivnejše politično gibanje v regiji. V marcu 2008, med tem, kar mnogi opazovalci ocenjujejo kot najhujše obdobje zatiranja bratovščine od šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, Državna sekretarka Condoleezza Rice se je odrekla a $100 milijon kongresno pooblaščenih zmanjšanja vojaške pomoči Egiptu. Podobno je v Jordaniji. Busheva administracija in Demokratski kongres sta državo pozdravila kot "model" arabske reforme istočasno, ko je zasnovala nove načine manipulacije volilnega procesa, da bi omejila islamistično zastopanost, in ravno tako, ko so bile volitve, ki so jih pestile široke obtožbe o neposredni goljufiji
in togovanja.1 To ni naključje. Egipt in Jordanija sta edini dve arabski državi, ki sta z Izraelom podpisali mirovne pogodbe. Še več, menijo, da so ključnega pomena za ZDA. prizadevanja za boj proti Iranu, stabilizirati Irak, in boj proti terorizmu.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. rjav, amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, vendar, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA

PREDGOVOR
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Vprašanja v zvezi s političnim islamom še naprej predstavljajo izziv za evropsko zunanjo politiko na Bližnjem vzhodu in v Severni Afriki (MENA). Ko se je politika EU v zadnjem desetletju skušala soočiti s takšnimi izzivi, se je sam politični islam razvil. Strokovnjaki opozarjajo na vse večjo kompleksnost in raznolikost trendov znotraj političnega islama. Nekatere islamistične organizacije so okrepile svojo zavezanost demokratičnim normam in se v celoti vključile v mir, mainstream nacionalne politike. Drugi ostajajo zavezani nasilnim sredstvom. In spet drugi so se usmerili k bolj tihi obliki islama, izločil iz političnega delovanja. Politični islam v regiji Bližnjega vzhoda in severne Afrike evropskim oblikovalcem politike ne predstavlja enotnega trenda. Analitična razprava se je razvila okoli koncepta "radikalizacije". To pa je sprožilo raziskave o dejavnikih, ki spodbujajo "deradikalizacijo", in obratno, "ponovna radikalizacija". Velik del kompleksnosti izhaja iz splošno razširjenega mnenja, da se vsi ti trije pojavi pojavljajo hkrati. Tudi izrazi sami so sporni. Pogosto je bilo poudarjeno, da zmerno-radikalna dihotomija ne uspe v celoti zajeti odtenkov trendov znotraj političnega islama.. Nekateri analitiki se tudi pritožujejo, da je govorjenje o "radikalizmu" ideološko obremenjeno. Na ravni terminologije, razumemo, da je radikalizacija povezana z ekstremizmom, vendar se pogledi razlikujejo glede osrednjega pomena njegove versko-fundamentalistične v primerjavi s politično vsebino, in o tem, ali je pripravljenost zateči se k nasilju implicirana ali ne.

Takšne razlike se odražajo v pogledih samih islamistov, kot tudi v dojemanju zunanjih.