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Arabska Jutri

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, Politični islam in America

Arabska Insight

Ali je »bratstvo« z Ameriko možno?

khalil al-anani

"Ni nobene možnosti komuniciranja z vsemi zunaj ZDA. administracije, dokler ZDA ohranjajo svoj dolgoletni pogled na islam kot resnično nevarnost, pogled, ki Združene države postavlja v isti čoln kot cionistični sovražnik. Nimamo nobenih vnaprejšnjih predstav o ameriških ljudeh ali ZDA. družbe ter njenih civilnih organizacij in možganskih trustov. Nimamo težav pri komuniciranju z ameriškim ljudstvom, vendar ni vloženih ustreznih naporov, da bi nas zbližali,” je dejal dr. Issam al-Iryan, vodja političnega oddelka Muslimanske bratovščine v telefonskem intervjuju.
Al-Iryanove besede povzemajo poglede Muslimanske bratovščine na Američane in ZDA. vlada. Drugi člani Muslimanske bratovščine bi se strinjali, tako kot pokojni Hassan al-Banna, ki je skupino ustanovil v 1928. Al- Banna je na Zahod gledal predvsem kot na simbol moralnega propada. Drugi salafisti – islamska miselna šola, ki se opira na prednike kot vzorne modele – so zavzeli enako stališče do ZDA, vendar nimajo ideološke prožnosti, ki jo zagovarja Muslimanska bratovščina. Medtem ko Muslimanska bratovščina verjame v vključitev Američanov v civilni dialog, druge skrajne skupine ne vidijo smisla v dialogu in trdijo, da je sila edini način za obravnavo Združenih držav.

Načelo gibanja v strukturi islama

dr. Muhammad Iqbal

Kot kulturnega gibanja Islam zavrača stari statični pogled na vesolje, in doseže dinamično pogled. Kot čustveno sistema poenotenja priznava vrednost posameznika, kot je na primer, in zavrača bloodrelationship kot osnova človekove enotnosti. Krvno sorodstvo je ukoreninjenost. Iskanje čisto psihološke podlage človeške enotnosti postane možno le z zaznavo, da je vse človeško življenje po svojem izvoru duhovno.1 Takšna zaznava ustvarja sveže zvestobe brez kakršnih koli ceremonialov, ki bi jih ohranjali pri življenju., in omogoča človeku, da se osvobodi zemlje. Krščanstvo, ki se je prvotno pojavilo kot meniški red, je Konstantin preizkusil kot sistem združevanja.2 Njegov neuspeh kot takšen sistem je gnal cesarja Julijana3, da se je vrnil k starim rimskim bogovom, na katere je poskušal postaviti filozofske razlage.. Sodobni civilizacijski zgodovinar je tako orisal stanje civiliziranega sveta v času, ko je islam nastopil na odru zgodovine.: Takrat se je zdelo, da je velika civilizacija, ki je gradila štiri tisoč let, tik pred razpadom., in da se bo človeštvo verjetno vrnilo v tisto stanje barbarstva, kjer je vsako pleme in sekta proti drugemu, in zakon in red sta bila neznana . . . The
stare plemenske sankcije so izgubile svojo moč. Zato stare imperialne metode ne bi več delovale. Nove sankcije, ki jih je uvedel
Krščanstvo je delalo delitev in uničenje namesto enotnosti in reda. To je bil čas, poln tragedij. Civilizacija, kot velikansko drevo, katerega listje je prekrilo svet in katerega veje so rodile zlate sadove umetnosti, znanosti in literature, stal opotekajoč, njegovo deblo ni več živo od tekočega soka vdanosti in spoštovanja, vendar je zgnil do srži, razklana od vojnih viharjev, in jih držijo skupaj samo vrvi starodavnih običajev in zakonov, ki lahko vsak trenutek zaskoči. Ali je bilo mogoče vnesti kakšno čustveno kulturo, ponovno zbrati človeštvo v enotnost in rešiti civilizacijo? Ta kultura mora biti nekaj novega tipa, kajti stare sankcije in obredi so bili mrtvi, in zgraditi druge iste vrste bi bilo delo
stoletja.« Pisatelj nam nato pove, da je svet potreboval novo kulturo, ki bi prevzela mesto kulture prestola., in sistemi združevanja, ki so temeljili na krvnem sorodstvu.
Čudovito je, dodaja, da bi morala taka kultura iz Arabije priti ravno v času, ko je bila najbolj potrebna. Tukaj je, vendar, nič neverjetnega v tem pojavu. Svet-življenje intuitivno vidi svoje potrebe, in v kritičnih trenutkih določi svojo smer. To je kaj, v jeziku vere, imenujemo preroško razodetje. Povsem naravno je, da je islam zablestel v zavesti preprostega ljudstva, ki se ga nobena starodavna kultura ni dotaknila., in zaseda geografski položaj, kjer se tri celine srečajo. Nova kultura najde temelj svetovne enotnosti v načelu Tauhâd.«5 Islam, kot politiko, je le praktično sredstvo, da to načelo postane živi dejavnik v intelektualnem in čustvenem življenju človeštva. Zahteva zvestobo Bogu, ne na prestole. In ker je Bog končna duhovna osnova vsega življenja, zvestoba Bogu dejansko pomeni človekovo zvestobo svoji idealni naravi. Najvišja duhovna osnova vsega življenja, kot ga pojmuje islam, je večna in se razodeva v raznolikosti in spreminjanju. Družba, ki temelji na takšnem pojmovanju Realnosti, se mora uskladiti, v svojem življenju, kategorije stalnosti in spreminjanja. Imeti mora večna načela za urejanje svojega skupnega življenja, kajti večno nam daje oporo v svetu nenehnih sprememb.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Na žalost, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Ta pogled, vendar, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamska politična teorija, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, kot druge religije, se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom, demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe, in družbeni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institucije, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 do 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Korenine nacionalizma v muslimanskem svetu

Shabir Ahmed

Muslimanski svet je značilna neuspeh, neenotnosti, prelivanje krvi, zatiranje in zaostalost. Trenutno, ni muslimanska država na svetu, lahko upravičeno trdijo, da so vodilni na vseh področjih človekovega delovanja. Prav zares, ne-muslimani iz Vzhoda in Zahoda
zdaj narekujejo socialne, gospodarski in politični program za muslimanske Ummah.
Poleg tega, Muslimani se identificirajo kot turška, Arabska, Afriških in pakistanski. Če to ni dovolj, Muslimani so nadalje razdeljena v vsaki državi ali celini. na primer:, V Pakistanu so ljudje razvrščeni kot Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis in
Pathans. Muslimanska Ummah bila nikoli soočena s takšno dilemo v preteklosti med islamskim pravilom. Nikoli ne trpi zaradi neenotnosti, razširjena zatiranje, stagnacija na področju znanosti in tehnologije ter zagotovo ne iz notranjih konfliktov, ki smo jim bili priča v tem stoletju kot vojni Iran, Irak. Torej, kaj je šlo narobe z muslimani tega stoletja? Zakaj je toliko Feuds med njimi in zakaj so videli, da se borijo med seboj? Kaj je povzročilo svojo šibkost in kako bodo nikoli opomogla od sedanje stagnacije?
Obstaja veliko dejavnikov, ki so prispevali k temu stanju, ampak najpomembnejše so opustitev arabski jezik kot jezik razumevanja islama pravilno in opravljanje ijtihad, absorpcija tujih kultur, kot so filozofij Grki, Perzijskih in hindujci, postopna izguba osrednjega organa po nekaterih pokrajinah, in vzpon nacionalizma od 19. stoletja.
Ta knjiga se osredotoča na izvor nacionalizma v muslimanskem svetu. Nacionalizem ni pojavilo v muslimanskem svetu naravno, niti ni nastala kot odziv na morebitne stiske, ki jih ljudje s katerimi se soočajo, niti zaradi frustracije se jim je zdelo, ko se Evropa začeli prevlado na svetu po industrijski revoluciji. Precej, nacionalizem je bil vsadi v glavah muslimanov z dobro premišljen sistem, ki ga v evropskih sil, po njihovem neuspehu, da uniči državo islamski s silo. Knjiga predstavlja tudi islamski sodbo o nacionalizmu in praktičnih ukrepih, ki jih je mogoče sprejeti za izkoreninjenje bolezni nacionalizma iz muslimanske Ummah tako, da ga ponovno nazaj v svojo nekdanjo slavo.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, v 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, v 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

posvetnost, hermenevtika, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, posebej
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
muslimanski svet. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
Islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate

pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada

uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"

ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na

o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije

posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je

da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,

se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država

specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali

razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi

države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju

zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,

demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč

poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi

uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje

med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politični islam je danes najbolj aktivna politična sila na Bližnjem vzhodu. Njegova prihodnost je tesno povezana z prihodnostjo regije. Če bi se ZDA in Evropska unija zavezali podpirati politične reforme v regiji, morali bodo izmisliti beton, skladne strategije za vključevanje islamističnih skupin. Pa vendar, ZDA. na splošno ni želel odpreti dialoga s temi gibanji. podobno, Izjema je bila sodelovanje EU z islamisti, ne pravilo. Tam, kjer obstajajo stiki na nizki ravni, služijo predvsem za zbiranje informacij, ne strateških ciljev. ZDA. EU ima številne programe, ki se ukvarjajo z gospodarskim in političnim razvojem v regiji - med njimi pobuda za partnerstvo na Bližnjem vzhodu (MEPI), korporacijo Millennium Challenge (MCC), Unija za Sredozemlje, in evropsko sosedsko politiko (ENP) - vendar pa le malo govorijo o tem, kako se izziv islamistične politične opozicije ujema s širšimi regionalnimi cilji. zunaj ZDA. Pomoč in programiranje demokracije v EU so skoraj v celoti usmerjeni bodisi k avtoritarnim vladam bodisi bodisi sekularnim skupinam civilne družbe z minimalno podporo v njihovih družbah..
Prišel je čas za ponovno oceno trenutnih politik. Od septembra septembra 11, 2001, podpiranje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu je dobilo večji pomen za zahodne oblikovalce politike, ki vidijo povezavo med pomanjkanjem demokracije in političnim nasiljem. Večja pozornost je bila namenjena razumevanju različic političnega islama. Nova ameriška administracija je bolj odprta za širjenje komunikacije z muslimanskim svetom. Medtem, velika večina osrednjih islamističnih organizacij - tudi Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu, Jordanska fronta islamske akcije (IAF), Maroška stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD), islamsko ustavno gibanje Kuvajta, in jemenska stranka Islama - so podpora politični reformi in demokraciji vedno bolj osrednja sestavina njihovih političnih platform. Poleg tega, mnogi so izrazili veliko zanimanje za odpiranje dialoga s ZDA. in vlade EU.
Prihodnost odnosov med zahodnimi državami in Bližnjim vzhodom je lahko v veliki meri odvisna od stopnje, v kateri prvi vključujejo nenasilne islamistične stranke v širok dialog o skupnih interesih in ciljih. V zadnjem času se je razširilo število raziskav o povezanosti z islamisti, toda le malo jih jasno obravnava, kaj bi lahko pomenilo v praksi. Kot Zoé Nautré, gostujoči kolega na nemškem svetu za zunanje odnose, postavlja, „EU razmišlja o angažmaju, vendar ne ve, kako.“ 1 V upanju, da razpravlja razpravo, ločimo med tremi stopnjami „angažiranosti,"Vsak z različnimi sredstvi in ​​konci: stiki na nizki ravni, strateški dialog, in partnerstvo.

Reševanje ameriške islamistične dileme: Lekcije iz južne in jugovzhodne Azije

Shadi Hamid
zunaj ZDA. prizadevanja za spodbujanje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu so že dolgo paralizirala "islamistična dilema": v teoriji, hočemo demokracijo, ampak, v praksi, se bojijo, da bodo islamistične stranke glavni prejemniki političnega odpiranja. Najbolj tragična manifestacija tega dogodka je bil alžirski debakul iz 1991 in 1992, ko so ZDA molče stale, medtem ko je odločna sekularna vojska odpovedala volitve, potem ko je islamistična stranka dobila parlamentarno večino. V zadnjem času, Busheva administracija se je oddaljila od svoje "agende svobode", potem ko so islamisti na volitvah v celotni regiji presenetljivo uspeli, tudi v Egiptu, Savdska Arabija, in palestinska ozemlja.
Toda tudi naš strah pred islamističnimi strankami - in posledična zavrnitev sodelovanja z njimi - je bil sam nedosleden, velja za nekatere države, za druge pa ne. Bolj kot to, da je država pomembna za ameriške nacionalne varnostne interese, manj so ZDA pripravljene sprejeti islamistične skupine, ki imajo tam vidno politično vlogo. Vendar pa, v državah, ki so manj strateško pomembne, in kjer je ogroženo manj, ZDA so občasno uporabile bolj odmeven pristop. Toda prav tam je bolj na vrsti, da je prepoznavanje vloge nenasilnih islamistov najpomembnejše, in, tukaj, Ameriška politika še naprej primanjkuje.
Po vsej regiji, ZDA aktivno podpirajo avtokratske režime in dajejo zeleno luč za zatiranje kampanj proti skupinam, kot je egipčanska Muslimanska bratovščina, najstarejše in najvplivnejše politično gibanje v regiji. V marcu 2008, med tem, kar mnogi opazovalci ocenjujejo kot najhujše obdobje zatiranja bratovščine od šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, Državna sekretarka Condoleezza Rice se je odrekla a $100 milijon kongresno pooblaščenih zmanjšanja vojaške pomoči Egiptu. Podobno je v Jordaniji. Busheva administracija in Demokratski kongres sta državo pozdravila kot "model" arabske reforme istočasno, ko je zasnovala nove načine manipulacije volilnega procesa, da bi omejila islamistično zastopanost, in ravno tako, ko so bile volitve, ki so jih pestile široke obtožbe o neposredni goljufiji
in togovanja.1 To ni naključje. Egipt in Jordanija sta edini dve arabski državi, ki sta z Izraelom podpisali mirovne pogodbe. Še več, menijo, da so ključnega pomena za ZDA. prizadevanja za boj proti Iranu, stabilizirati Irak, in boj proti terorizmu.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.