RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "It-Tuneżija" Kategorija

L-Għarab Għarbi

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Ottubru 6, 1981, kien maħsub li jkun jum ta’ ċelebrazzjoni fl-Eġittu. Immarka l-anniversarju tal-akbar mument ta’ rebħa tal-Eġittu fi tliet kunflitti Għarab-Iżraeljani, meta l-armata underdog tal-pajjiż imbuttat tul il-Kanal ta 'Suez fil-ġranet tal-ftuħ tal- 1973 Il-Gwerra ta’ Yom Kippur u bagħtet truppi Iżraeljani tkebbib f’irtir. Fuq jibred, filgħodu bla sħab, l-istadium tal-Kajr kien ippakkjat bil-familji Eġizzjani li kienu ġew biex jaraw il-militar jissawwab il-hardware tiegħu.Fuq l-istand tar-reviżjoni, President Anwar el-Sadat,il-perit tal-gwerra, raw b'sodisfazzjon kif irġiel u magni parad quddiemu. Kont fil-qrib, korrispondent barrani li għadu kif wasal.F’daqqa waħda, wieħed mit-trakkijiet tal-armata waqaf direttament quddiem l-istand tar-reviżjoni eżatt kif sitt ġettijiet Mirage ħarġu fuq rashom fi prestazzjoni akrobatika, pittura s-sema bi traċċi twal aħmar, isfar, vjola,u duħħan aħdar. Sadat qam bil-wieqfa, milli jidher qed jipprepara biex jiskambja tislima ma’ kontinġent ieħor ta’ truppi Eġizzjani. Huwa għamel lilu nnifsu mira perfetta għal erba’ assassini Iżlamiċi li qabżu minn fuq it-trakk, daħlet fuq il-podju, u mifni ġismu bil-balal. Hekk kif il-qattiela komplew għal dik li dehret eternità biex isprejjaw l-istand bin-nar fatali tagħhom, Jien ikkunsidrajt għal instant jekk għandux nolqot l-art u nirriskjax li niġi maqtula sal-mewt minn spettaturi ippanikjati jew jekk nibqax bil-mixi u nirriskja li nieħu balla mitlufa. L-istint qalli biex nibqa’ fuq saqajja, u s-sens ta’ dmir ġurnalistiku tiegħi ġegħluni biex immur insir naf jekk Sadat kienx ħaj jew mejjet.

Iżlam, Iżlam politiku u l-Amerika

Għarfien Għarbi

Hija "Fratellanza" ma 'l-Amerika Possibbli?

khalil al-anani

“M'hemm l-ebda ċans li tikkomunika ma' xi U.S. amministrazzjoni sakemm l-Istati Uniti żżomm il-ħarsa fit-tul tagħha tal-Islam bħala periklu reali, fehma li tpoġġi lill-Istati Uniti fl-istess dgħajsa tal-għadu Żjonista. M'għandna l-ebda ideat minn qabel dwar il-poplu Amerikan jew l-Istati Uniti. is-soċjetà u l-organizzazzjonijiet ċiviċi u t-think tanks tagħha. M'għandna l-ebda problema biex nikkomunikaw mal-poplu Amerikan iżda m'huma qed isiru l-ebda sforzi adegwati biex iressquna eqreb,” qal Dr. Issam al-Iryan, kap tad-dipartiment politiku tal-Fratellanza Musulmana f’intervista bit-telefon.
Kliem Al-Iryan jiġbor il-fehmiet tal-Fratellanza Musulmana dwar il-poplu Amerikan u l-Istati Uniti.. gvern. Membri oħra tal-Fratellanza Musulmana jaqblu, kif kien il-mibki Hassan al-Banna, li waqqaf il-grupp fi 1928. Al- Banna qieset il-Punent l-aktar bħala simbolu ta’ tħassir morali. Salafi oħra – skola ta’ ħsieb Iżlamiku li tiddependi fuq l-antenati bħala mudelli eżemplari – ħadu l-istess fehma tal-Istati Uniti, iżda m'għandhomx il-flessibbiltà ideoloġika mħaddna mill-Fratellanza Musulmana. Filwaqt li l-Fratellanza Musulmana temmen fl-involviment tal-Amerikani fi djalogu ċivili, gruppi estremisti oħra ma jaraw l-ebda punt fid-djalogu u jsostnu li l-forza hija l-uniku mod kif tittratta l-Istati Uniti.

Il-Prinċipju tal-Moviment fl-Istruttura tal-Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

Bħala moviment kulturali l-Islam jirrifjuta l-veduta statika l-antika ta 'l-univers, u jilħaq veduta dinamika. Bħala sistema emozzjonali ta 'unifikazzjoni tagħraf il-valur tal-individwu bħala tali, u jirrifjuta r-relazzjoni tad-demm bħala bażi tal-għaqda umana. Ir-relazzjoni tad-demm hija earthrootedness. It-tfittxija għal pedament purament psikoloġiku tal-għaqda umana ssir possibbli biss bil-perċezzjoni li l-ħajja umana kollha hija spiritwali fl-oriġini tagħha.1 Perċezzjoni bħal din hija kreattiva ta’ lealtajiet ġodda mingħajr ebda ċerimonjali biex iżżommhom ħajjin., u jagħmilha possibbli għall-bniedem li jemanċipa ruħu mill-art. Il-Kristjaneżmu li oriġinarjament kien deher bħala ordni monastika ġie ppruvat minn Kostantinu bħala sistema ta’ unifikazzjoni.2 In-nuqqas tiegħu li jaħdem bħala sistema bħal din wassal lill-Imperatur Ġiljan3 biex jirritorna lejn l-allat qodma ta’ Ruma li fuqhom ipprova jpoġġi interpretazzjonijiet filosofiċi.. B’hekk storiku modern taċ-ċivilizzazzjoni wera l-istat tad-dinja ċivilizzata dwar iż-żmien meta l-Islam deher fuq il-palk tal-Istorja: Kien jidher allura li ċ-ċiviltà kbira li kienet ħadet erbat elef sena biex tinbena kienet fuq il-ponta tad-diżintegrazzjoni., u li l-umanità x’aktarx terġa’ lura għal dik il-kundizzjoni ta’ barbariżmu fejn kull tribù u setta kienet kontra l-oħra, u l-liġi u l-ordni ma kinux magħrufa . . . Il
sanzjonijiet tribali qodma kienu tilfu s-setgħa tagħhom. Għalhekk il-metodi imperjali qodma ma jibqgħux joperaw. Is-sanzjonijiet il-ġodda maħluqa minn
Il-Kristjaneżmu kienu qed jaħdmu diviżjoni u qerda minflok għaqda u ordni. Kien żmien mimli traġedja. Ċiviltà, bħal siġra ġiganteska li l-weraq tagħha kien fuq id-dinja u li l-fergħat tagħha kienu taw il-frott tad-deheb tal-arti u x-xjenza u l-letteratura, baqa’ jitħawwad, iz-zokk tiegħu m'għadux ħaj bl-imnieħer ta' devozzjoni u riverenza, iżda mħassra sal-qalba, imqatta mill-maltempati tal-gwerra, u miżmuma flimkien biss mill-kurduni tad-drawwiet u l-liġijiet antiki, li jistgħu snap fi kwalunkwe mument. Kien hemm xi kultura emozzjonali li setgħet tiddaħħal, biex tiġbor l-umanità għal darb'oħra fl-unità u biex issalva ċ-ċiviltà? Din il-kultura trid tkun xi ħaġa ta’ tip ġdid, għax is-sanzjonijiet u ċ-ċerimonjali qodma kienu mejta, u li jibnu oħrajn tal-istess tip ikun ix-xogħol
ta’ sekli.’Il-kittieb imbagħad jipproċedi biex jgħidilna li d-dinja kellha bżonn kultura ġdida biex tieħu post il-kultura tat-tron., u s-sistemi ta’ għaqda li kienu bbażati fuq relazzjoni tad-demm.
Huwa aqwa, huwa jżid, li kultura bħal din kellha tfaċċat mill-Għarabja proprju fiż-żmien meta kienet l-aktar meħtieġa. Hemm, madankollu, xejn aqwa fil-fenomenu. Il-ħajja tad-dinja b'mod intuwittiv tara l-bżonnijiet tagħha stess, u f’mumenti kritiċi jiddefinixxi d-direzzjoni tiegħu stess. Dan huwa dak, fil-lingwa tar-reliġjon, insejħu rivelazzjoni profetika. Huwa naturali li l-Islam kellu jitfa' fuq il-kuxjenza ta' poplu sempliċi mhux mimsus minn xi kulturi antiki., u jokkupa pożizzjoni ġeografika fejn tliet kontinenti jiltaqgħu flimkien. Il-kultura l-ġdida ssib il-pedament tal-għaqda tad-dinja fil-prinċipju ta’ Tauhâd.’5 Iżlam, bħala politika, huwa biss mezz prattiku biex dan il-prinċipju jsir fattur ħaj fil-ħajja intellettwali u emozzjonali tal-umanità. Hija titlob lealtà lejn Alla, mhux għat-troni. U peress li Alla huwa l-bażi spiritwali aħħarija tal-ħajja kollha, il-lealtà lejn Alla prattikament tammonta għal-lealtà tal-bniedem lejn in-natura ideali tiegħu stess. Il-bażi spiritwali aħħarija tal-ħajja kollha, kif maħsub mill-Islam, hija eterna u tiżvela ruħha fil-varjetà u l-bidla. Soċjetà bbażata fuq kunċett bħal dan tar-Realtà trid tirrikonċilja, fil-ħajja tagħha, il-kategoriji tal-permanenza u l-bidla. Għandu jkollu prinċipji eterni biex jirregola l-ħajja kollettiva tiegħu, għax l-etern jagħtina sieq fid-dinja tal-bidla perpetwu.

L-ISLAM, DEMOKRAZIJA & L-Istati Uniti:

Fondazzjoni Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


Minkejja li huwa kemm dibattitu perenni kif ukoll kumpless, Arches Quarterly jeżamina mill-ġdid minn raġunijiet teoloġiċi u prattiċi, id-dibattitu importanti dwar ir-relazzjoni u l-kompatibilità bejn l-Islam u d-Demokrazija, kif imtenni fl-aġenda ta’ tama u bidla ta’ Barack Obama. Filwaqt li ħafna jiċċelebraw l-axxendent ta’ Obama fl-Uffiċċju Ovali bħala katarsi nazzjonali għall-Istati Uniti, oħrajn jibqgħu inqas ottimisti dwar bidla fl-ideoloġija u l-approċċ fl-arena internazzjonali. Filwaqt li ħafna mit-tensjoni u n-nuqqas ta’ fiduċja bejn id-dinja Musulmana u l-Istati Uniti jistgħu jiġu attribwiti għall-approċċ tal-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija, tipikament jiffavorixxu dittatorjati u reġimi tal-pupazzi li jħallsu s-servizz bla xkiel għall-valuri demokratiċi u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem, il-konsegwenza ta ' 9/11 tassew ikkummenta aktar id-dubji permezz tal-pożizzjoni ta ’l-Amerika dwar l-Islam politiku. Ħoloq ħajt ta ’negattività kif jinstab minn worldpublicopinion.org, skond liema 67% tal-Eġizzjani jemmnu li globalment l-Amerika għandha rwol "prinċipalment negattiv".
Ir-rispons ta ’l-Amerika b’hekk kien xieraq. Billi jeleġġi lil Obama, ħafna madwar id-dinja qed jagħżlu t-tamiet tagħhom biex jiżviluppaw inqas beligeranti, iżda politika barranija aktar ġusta lejn id-dinja Musulmana. It-test għal Obama, kif niddiskutu, huwa kif l-Amerika u l-alleati tagħha jippromwovu d-demokrazija. Se jkun qed jiffaċilita jew jimponi?
Barra minn hekk, jista 'jkun importanti li jkun sensar onest f'żoni mtawla ta' kunflitti? Ir-rikors għall-għarfien espert u għarfien tal-prolifi
c studjużi, akkademiċi, ġurnalisti u politiċi imħawwar, Arches Quarterly joħroġ għar-relazzjoni bejn l-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija u r-rwol tal-Amerika - kif ukoll il-bidliet li ġab Obama, fit-tfittxija tal-bażi komuni. Anas Altikriti, il-Kap Eżekuttiv tal-Fondazzjoni Cordoba jipprovdi l-gambit tal-ftuħ għal din id-diskussjoni, fejn jirrifletti fuq it-tamiet u l-isfidi li jistrieħu fit-triq ta ’Obama. Wara Altikriti, l-eks konsulent tal-President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane joffri analiżi bir-reqqa tal-prinċipju Iżlamiku tad-dritt għal-libertà. Anwar Ibrahim, eks Deputat Prim Ministru tal-Malasja, tarrikkixxi d-diskussjoni bir-realtajiet prattiċi tal-implimentazzjoni tad-demokrazija f'soċjetajiet dominanti Musulmani, jiġifieri, fl-Indoneżja u l-Malasja.
Għandna wkoll lil Dr Shireen Hunter, ta 'l-Università ta' Georgetown, L-Istati Uniti, li jesplora pajjiżi Musulmani li għadhom lura fid-demokratizzazzjoni u l-modernizzazzjoni. Dan huwa kkumplimentat minn kittieb tat-terroriżmu, L-ispjegazzjoni ta ’Dr Nafeez Ahmed dwar il-kriżi ta’ wara l-modernità u l-
mewt tad-demokrazija. Dr Daud Abdullah (Direttur tal-Lvant Nofsani Media Monitor), Alan Hart (ex korrispondent tal-ITN u tal-BBC Panorama; awtur taż-Żjoniżmu: L-Għedewwa Veru tal-Lhud) u Asem Sondos (Editur ta ’kull ġimgħa ta’ l-Eġittu Sawt Al Omma) tikkonċentra fuq Obama u r-rwol tiegħu vis-à-vis il-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija fid-dinja Musulmana, kif ukoll ir-relazzjonijiet tal-Istati Uniti mal-Iżrael u l-Fratellanza Musulmana.
Il-Ministru tal-Affarijiet Barranin jixxandar, Maldivi, Ahmed Shaheed jispekula dwar il-futur tal-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– membru tas-Sinn Féin li ġarrab erba' snin ħabs għal attivitajiet Repubblikani Irlandiżi u kampanjatur għall-Guildford 4 u Birmingham 6, jirrifletti fuq il-vjaġġ reċenti tiegħu f'Gaża fejn ra l-impatt tal-brutalità u l-inġustizzja li saru kontra l-Palestinjani; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Id-Direttur taċ-Ċentru għall-Istudju tar-Radikalizzazzjoni u l-Vjolenza Politika Kontemporanja jiddiskuti l-isfidi tar-riċerka kritika tat-terrur politiku; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, kittieb u drammaturgu, jiddiskuti prospetti ta' paċi fid-Darfur; u fl-aħħar il-ġurnalist u attivist tad-drittijiet tal-bniedem Ashur Shamis iħares b’mod kritiku lejn id-demokratizzazzjoni u l-politiċizzazzjoni tal-Musulmani llum.
Nittamaw li dan kollu jagħmel qari komprensiv u sors ta 'riflessjoni fuq kwistjonijiet li jaffettwawna lkoll f'dawl ġdid ta' tama.
Grazzi

Il-politika tal-Ħamas tal-Istati Uniti timblokka l-paċi fil-Lvant Nofsani

Henry Siegman


Taħditiet bilaterali falluti fuq dawn il-passat 16 snin urew li ftehim ta’ paċi fil-Lvant Nofsani qatt ma jista’ jintlaħaq mill-partijiet infushom. Il-gvernijiet Iżraeljani jemmnu li jistgħu jisfidaw il-kundanna internazzjonali tal-proġett kolonjali illegali tagħhom fix-Xatt tal-Punent għax jistgħu joqogħdu fuq l-Istati Uniti biex jopponu sanzjonijiet internazzjonali. Taħditiet bilaterali li mhumiex inkwadrati minn parametri fformulati mill-Istati Uniti (ibbażata fuq riżoluzzjonijiet tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà, il-ftehim ta’ Oslo, l-Inizjattiva Għarbija għall-Paċi, ir-“road map” u ftehimiet oħra preċedenti Iżraeljani-Palestinjani) ma jistax jirnexxi. Il-gvern tal-Iżrael jemmen li l-Kungress tal-Istati Uniti mhux se jippermetti lil president Amerikan joħroġ tali parametri u jitlob l-aċċettazzjoni tagħhom. X'tama hemm għat-taħditiet bilaterali li jerġgħu jibdew f'Washington DC f'Settembru 2 jiddependi kompletament fuq il-President Obama jipprova li dak it-twemmin huwa żbaljat, u dwar jekk il-“bridging proposals” hu wiegħed, jekk it-taħditiet jaslu f’impass, huma ewfemiżmu għas-sottomissjoni tal-parametri Amerikani. Inizjattiva ta’ l-Istati Uniti bħal din trid toffri lill-Iżrael assigurazzjonijiet miksija bil-ħadid għas-sigurtà tiegħu fil-fruntieri tiegħu ta’ qabel l-1967., iżda fl-istess ħin irid jagħmilha ċara li dawn l-assigurazzjonijiet mhumiex disponibbli jekk l-Iżrael jinsisti li jiċħad lill-Palestinjani stat vijabbli u sovran fix-Xatt tal-Punent u f'Gaża.. Dan id-dokument jiffoka fuq l-ostaklu kbir ieħor għal ftehim ta' status permanenti: in-nuqqas ta’ interlokutur Palestinjan effettiv. Jindirizzaw l-ilmenti leġittimi tal-Ħamas - u kif innutat f'rapport riċenti tas-CENTCOM, Il-Ħamas għandu lmenti leġittimi - jista' jwassal għar-ritorn tiegħu għal gvern ta' koalizzjoni Palestinjan li jipprovdi lill-Iżrael b'sieħeb ta' paċi kredibbli. Jekk dak it-tixrid ifalli minħabba ċ-ċaħda tal-Ħamas, l-abbiltà tal-organizzazzjoni li tipprevjeni ftehim raġonevoli nnegozjat minn partiti politiċi Palestinjani oħra se tkun ġiet imfixkla b'mod sinifikanti. Jekk l-amministrazzjoni Obama mhux se tmexxi inizjattiva internazzjonali biex tiddefinixxi l-parametri ta’ ftehim Iżraeljan-Palestinjan u tippromwovi b’mod attiv ir-rikonċiljazzjoni politika Palestinjana, L-Ewropa trid tagħmel hekk, u nittama li l-Amerika ssegwi. Sfortunatament, m’hemm l-ebda bulit tal-fidda li jista’ jiggarantixxi l-għan ta’ “żewġ stati jgħixu spalla ma’ spalla fil-paċi u s-sigurtà.”
Iżda l-kors preżenti tal-President Obama jipprekludih assolutament.

Iżlamiżmu rivedut

MAHA AZZAM

Hemm kriżi politika u ta’ sigurtà madwar dak li jissejjaħ l-Iżlamiżmu, kriżi li l-anteċedenti tagħha ħafna qabel 9/11. Matul il-passat 25 snin, kien hemm enfasi differenti dwar kif tispjega u tiġġieled l-Iżlamiżmu. Analisti u dawk li jfasslu l-politika
fis-snin tmenin u disgħin tkellmu dwar il-kawżi ewlenin tal-militanza Iżlamika bħala mard ekonomiku u emarġilizzazzjoni. Iktar reċentement kien hemm enfasi fuq ir-riforma politika bħala mezz biex jimmina l-appell tar-radikaliżmu. Illum dejjem aktar, l-aspetti ideoloġiċi u reliġjużi tal-Iżlamiżmu jeħtieġ li jiġu indirizzati għaliex saru karatteristiċi ta’ dibattitu politiku u ta’ sigurtà usa’. Kemm jekk b’rabta mat-terroriżmu tal-Al-Qaeda, riforma politika fid-dinja Musulmana, il-kwistjoni nukleari fl-Iran jew żoni ta’ kriżi bħall-Palestina jew il-Libanu, sar komuni li ssib li l-ideoloġija u r-reliġjon jintużaw minn partiti opposti bħala sorsi ta’ leġittimizzazzjoni, ispirazzjoni u mibdija.
Is-sitwazzjoni hija kkumplikata aktar illum bl-antagoniżmu dejjem jikber lejn u l-biża’ tal-Iżlam fil-Punent minħabba attakki terroristiċi li mbagħad jolqtu l-attitudnijiet lejn l-immigrazzjoni., reliġjon u kultura. Il-konfini tal-umma jew tal-komunità tal-fidili jiġġebbed lil hinn mill-istati Musulmani għal bliet Ewropej. L-umma potenzjalment teżisti kull fejn hemm komunitajiet Musulmani. Is-sens kondiviż ta’ appartenenza għal fidi komuni jiżdied f’ambjent fejn is-sens ta’ integrazzjoni fil-komunità tal-madwar mhuwiex ċar u fejn id-diskriminazzjoni tista’ tkun apparenti. Iktar ma jkun kbir iċ-ċaħda tal-valuri tas-soċjetà,
kemm jekk fil-Punent jew anke fi stat Musulman, akbar tkun il-konsolidazzjoni tal-forza morali tal-Iżlam bħala identità kulturali u sistema ta’ valuri.
Wara l-bumbardamenti f’Londra fuq 7 Lulju 2005 deher aktar ċar li xi żgħażagħ kienu qed jasserixxu l-impenn reliġjuż bħala mod kif jesprimu l-etniċità. Ir-rabtiet bejn il-Musulmani madwar id-dinja u l-perċezzjoni tagħhom li l-Musulmani huma vulnerabbli wasslu lil ħafna f’partijiet differenti ħafna tad-dinja biex jingħaqdu l-qagħdiet lokali tagħhom stess f’wieħed Musulman usa’., wara li identifika kulturalment, jew primarjament jew parzjalment, b’Islam definit b’mod wiesa’.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, jikkontradixxi l-valuri tas-soċjetajiet tal-Punent, u taffettwa b'mod sinifikanti riżultati politiċi importanti fin-nazzjonijiet Musulmani. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, u l-uffiċjali tal-gvern ta’ spiss jindikaw ‘‘fundamentaliżmu Iżlamiku’’ bħala t-theddida ideoloġika li jmiss għad-demokraziji liberali. Din il-fehma, madankollu, hija bbażata primarjament fuq l-analiżi tat-testi, Teorija politika Islamika, u studji ad hoc ta’ pajjiżi individwali, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. Hija l-argument tiegħi li t-testi u t-tradizzjonijiet tal-Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra, jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Studji speċifiċi għall-pajjiż u deskrittivi ma jgħinunax insibu mudelli li jgħinuna nispjegaw ir-relazzjonijiet differenti bejn l-Islam u l-politika madwar il-pajjiżi tad-dinja Musulmana.. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam, demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, li qed titpoġġa wisq enfasi fuq il-qawwa tal-Iżlam bħala forza politika. L-ewwel nuża studji ta' każijiet komparattivi, li jiffokaw fuq fatturi relatati mal-interazzjoni bejn gruppi u reġimi Iżlamiċi, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku, u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, biex tispjega l-varjanza fl-influwenza tal-Islam fuq il-politika madwar tmien nazzjonijiet. Nargumenta li ħafna mill-poter
attribwit lill-Iżlam bħala l-mutur wara l-politiki u s-sistemi politiċi fin-nazzjonijiet Musulmani jistgħu jiġu spjegati aħjar mill-fatturi msemmija qabel. Insib ukoll, kuntrarju għat-twemmin komuni, li s-saħħa dejjem tikber tal-gruppi politiċi Iżlamiċi spiss ġiet assoċjata ma’ pluralizzazzjoni modesta tas-sistemi politiċi.
Bnejt indiċi tal-kultura politika Iżlamika, ibbażat fuq il-punt sa fejn il-liġi Iżlamika tiġi utilizzata u jekk u, jekk iva, kif,Ideat tal-Punent, istituzzjonijiet, u t-teknoloġiji huma implimentati, biex tittestja n-natura tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam u d-demokrazija u l-Islam u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem. Dan l-indikatur jintuża fl-analiżi statistika, li jinkludi kampjun ta’ tlieta u għoxrin pajjiż fil-biċċa l-kbira Musulmani u grupp ta’ kontroll ta’ tlieta u għoxrin pajjiż li qed jiżviluppaw mhux Musulmani. Minbarra li tqabbel
Nazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi għal nazzjonijiet li qed jiżviluppaw mhux Iżlamiċi, analiżi statistika tippermettili nikkontrolla għall-influwenza ta’ varjabbli oħra li nstabu li jaffettwaw il-livelli ta’ demokrazija u l-protezzjoni tad-drittijiet individwali. Ir-riżultat għandu jkun stampa aktar realistika u preċiża tal-influwenza tal-Islam fuq il-politika u l-politiki.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 biex 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Roots Of Nationalism In The Muslim World

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Tabilħaqq, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Furthermore, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Għarbi, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Pereżempju, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Anzi, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, fi 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, fi 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Sekulariżmu, Ermenewtika, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, partikolarment
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
Dinja Musulmana. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
Iżlam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,

jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-

konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,

demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,
jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,
demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

STRATEĠIJI GĦALL-IMPENĠĠ TAL-IŻLAM POLITIKU

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

L-Iżlam Politiku huwa l-aktar forza politika waħda attiva fil-Lvant Nofsani llum. Il-futur tagħha huwa marbut mill-qrib ma’ dak tar-reġjun. Jekk l-Istati Uniti u l-Unjoni Ewropea huma impenjati li jappoġġaw ir-riforma politika fir-reġjun, se jkollhom bżonn ifasslu l-konkrit, strateġiji koerenti għall-involviment ta' gruppi Iżlamiċi. Madankollu, l-U.S. ġeneralment ma kienx lest li jiftaħ djalogu ma’ dawn il-movimenti. Bl-istess mod, L-impenn tal-UE mal-Iżlamisti kien l-eċċezzjoni, mhux ir-regola. Fejn jeżistu kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, huma prinċipalment iservu għal skopijiet ta' ġbir ta' informazzjoni, mhux għanijiet strateġiċi. L-U.S. u l-UE għandhom għadd ta’ programmi li jindirizzaw l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u politiku fir-reġjun – fosthom l-Inizjattiva ta’ Sħubija fil-Lvant Nofsani (MEPI), il-Korporazzjoni tal-Isfida tal-Millenju (MCC), l-Unjoni għall-Mediterran, u l-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat (ENP) – iżda ftit għandhom xi jgħidu dwar kif l-isfida tal-oppożizzjoni politika Iżlamista tidħol fi ħdan objettivi reġjonali usa'. L-Istati Uniti. u l-assistenza u l-ipprogrammar tad-demokrazija tal-UE huma diretti kważi kollha kemm lejn gvernijiet awtoritarji nfushom jew gruppi sekulari tas-soċjetà ċivili b’appoġġ minimu fis-soċjetajiet tagħhom stess..
Wasal iż-żmien għal valutazzjoni mill-ġdid tal-politiki attwali. Mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001, l-appoġġ għad-demokrazija fil-Lvant Nofsani ħa importanza akbar għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika tal-Punent, li jaraw rabta bejn in-nuqqas ta’ demokrazija u l-vjolenza politika. Attenzjoni akbar ġiet iddedikata għall-fehim tal-varjazzjonijiet fi ħdan l-Islam politiku. L-amministrazzjoni l-ġdida Amerikana hija aktar miftuħa biex twessa’ l-komunikazzjoni mad-dinja Musulmana. Sadanittant, il-maġġoranza l-kbira tal-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream – inkluż il-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu, Front ta’ Azzjoni Iżlamika tal-Ġordan (IAF), Partit tal-Ġustizzja u l-Iżvilupp tal-Marokk (PJD), il-Moviment Kostituzzjonali Iżlamiku tal-Kuwajt, u l-Jemen Islah Party – għamlu dejjem aktar l-appoġġ għar-riforma politika u d-demokrazija komponent ċentrali fil-pjattaformi politiċi tagħhom. Barra minn hekk, ħafna wrew interess qawwi fil-ftuħ ta’ djalogu mal-U.S. u l-gvernijiet tal-UE.
Il-futur tar-relazzjonijiet bejn in-nazzjonijiet tal-Punent u l-Lvant Nofsani jista’ jkun iddeterminat fil-biċċa l-kbira mill-grad sa liema l-ewwel jimpenjaw partiti Iżlamiċi mhux vjolenti fi djalogu wiesa’ dwar interessi u għanijiet kondiviżi.. Kien hemm proliferazzjoni riċenti ta 'studji dwar l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda ftit jindirizzaw b'mod ċar x'jista' jinvolvi fil-prattika. Bħala Zoe Nautre, sħabi viżitatur fil-Kunsill Ġermaniż dwar ir-Relazzjonijiet Barranin, tpoġġiha, “l-UE qed taħseb dwar l-impenn iżda ma tafx verament kif.”1 Bit-tama li tiċċara d-diskussjoni, niddistingwu bejn tliet livelli ta’ “ingaġġ,” kull wieħed b’mezzi u għanijiet differenti: kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, djalogu strateġiku, u sħubija.

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma: Lessons from South and Southeast Asia

Shadi Hamid
L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. Barra minn hekk, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderates” jew “reformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.