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The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

octobre 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, L'Islam politique et l'Amérique

Arabes Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . Le
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, cependant, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
En outre, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, Etats-Unis, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

L'islamisme revisité

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 ans, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juillet 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Cette vue, cependant, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Théorie politique islamique, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, comme ceux des autres religions, peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des
un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam, la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, influences économiques, clivages ethniques, et développement sociétal, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

L'Égypte au point de basculement ?

David B. Ottaway
Au début des années 80, J'ai vécu au Caire en tant que chef de bureau du Washington Post couvrant des événements historiques tels que le retrait du dernier
Les forces israéliennes du territoire égyptien occupé pendant la 1973 Guerre israélo-arabe et assassinat du président
Anouar Sadate par des fanatiques islamiques en octobre 1981.
Le dernier drame national, dont j'ai été témoin personnellement, s'était avéré être une étape décisive. Il a forcé le successeur de Sadate, Hosni Moubarak, se tourner vers l’intérieur pour faire face à un défi islamiste aux proportions inconnues et mettre fin au rôle de leader de l’Égypte dans le monde arabe.
Moubarak s'est immédiatement montré très prudent, leader sans imagination, terriblement réactif plutôt que pro-actif pour faire face aux problèmes sociaux et économiques qui accablent sa nation comme sa croissance démographique explosive (1.2 millions d'Egyptiens de plus par an) et déclin économique.
Dans une série en quatre parties du Washington Post écrite alors que je partais tôt 1985, J'ai noté que le nouveau dirigeant égyptien était encore à peu près
une énigme totale pour son propre peuple, n'offrant aucune vision et commandant ce qui semblait être un navire d'État sans gouvernail. L'économie socialiste
hérité de l'époque du président Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 à 1970) était un gâchis. La monnaie du pays, la livre, fonctionnait
sur huit taux de change différents; ses usines gérées par l'État étaient improductives, non compétitif et très endetté; et le gouvernement se dirigeait vers la faillite en partie parce que les subventions alimentaires, l'électricité et l'essence consommaient un tiers ($7 milliard) de son budget. Le Caire avait sombré dans un marais sans espoir de trafic embouteillé et d'humanité grouillante - 12 millions de personnes coincées dans une étroite bande de terre bordant le Nil, la plupart des vivants joue par bajoue dans des immeubles délabrés dans les bidonvilles en constante expansion de la ville.

Les racines du nationalisme dans le monde musulman

Shabir Ahmed

Le monde musulman a été caractérisé par l'échec, désunion, effusion de sang, oppression et arriération. Maintenant, aucun pays musulman au monde ne peut prétendre à juste titre être un chef de file dans aucun domaine de l'activité humaine. En effet, les non-musulmans d'Orient et d'Occident
dictez maintenant le social, agenda économique et politique de la Oummah musulmane.
en outre, les musulmans s'identifient comme turcs, Arabe, Africain et pakistanais. Si cela ne suffit pas, Les musulmans sont encore subdivisés au sein de chaque pays ou continent. Par exemple, au Pakistan, les gens sont classés comme Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis et
Pathans. La Oummah musulmane n'a jamais été confrontée à un tel dilemme dans le passé sous la domination islamique. Ils n'ont jamais souffert de désunion, oppression généralisée, stagnation de la science et de la technologie et certainement pas des conflits internes auxquels nous avons assisté ce siècle comme la guerre Iran-Irak. Alors qu'est-ce qui ne va pas avec les musulmans ce siècle? Pourquoi y a-t-il tant de querelles entre eux et pourquoi sont-ils perçus comme se battant? Qu'est-ce qui a causé leur faiblesse et comment se remettront-ils jamais de la stagnation actuelle?
De nombreux facteurs ont contribué à l'état actuel des choses, mais les principaux sont l'abandon de la langue arabe comme langue permettant de comprendre correctement l'islam et de pratiquer l'ijtihad, l'absorption de cultures étrangères telles que les philosophies des Grecs, Persan et les hindous, la perte progressive de l'autorité centrale sur certaines provinces, et la montée du nationalisme depuis le XIXe siècle.
Ce livre se concentre sur les origines du nationalisme dans le monde musulman. Le nationalisme n'est pas apparu naturellement dans le monde musulman, il ne s'est pas non plus produit en réponse aux difficultés rencontrées par le peuple, ni en raison de la frustration qu'ils ont ressentie lorsque l'Europe a commencé à dominer le monde après la révolution industrielle. Plutôt, le nationalisme a été implanté dans l'esprit des musulmans grâce à un plan bien pensé par les puissances européennes, après leur échec à détruire l'État islamique par la force. Le livre présente également le verdict islamique sur le nationalisme et les mesures pratiques qui peuvent être prises pour éradiquer la maladie du nationalisme de la Oummah musulmane afin de la restaurer à son ancienne gloire..

La démocratie dans la pensée politique islamique

Azzam S. Tamimi

La démocratie préoccupe les penseurs politiques arabes depuis l'aube de la renaissance arabe moderne il y a environ deux siècles. Depuis, le concept de démocratie a changé et s'est développé sous l'influence de divers développements sociaux et politiques. La discussion sur la démocratie dans la littérature arabo-islamique remonte à Rifa'a Tahtawi, le père de la démocratie égyptienne selon Lewis Awad,[3] qui peu de temps après son retour au Caire de Paris a publié son premier livre, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, dans 1834. Le livre résumait ses observations sur les mœurs et les coutumes du français moderne,[4] et a fait l'éloge du concept de démocratie tel qu'il le voyait en France et en étant témoin de sa défense et de sa réaffirmation à travers le 1830 Révolution contre le roi Charles X.[5] Tahtawi a tenté de montrer que le concept démocratique qu'il expliquait à ses lecteurs était compatible avec la loi de l'islam. Il a comparé le pluralisme politique aux formes de pluralisme idéologique et jurisprudentiel qui existaient dans l'expérience islamique:
La liberté religieuse est la liberté de croyance, d'opinion et de secte, à condition de ne pas contredire les fondements de la religion . . . La même chose s'appliquerait à la liberté de pratique politique et d'opinion des principaux administrateurs, qui s'efforcent d'interpréter et d'appliquer les règles et les dispositions conformément aux lois de leur propre pays. Les rois et les ministres sont autorisés dans le domaine de la politique à suivre diverses voies qui, en fin de compte, servent un seul but.: bonne administration et justice.[6] Un jalon important à cet égard a été la contribution de Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader du mouvement de réforme du XIXe siècle en Tunisie, qui, dans 1867, a formulé un plan général de réforme dans un livre intitulé Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Revenir (La voie directe pour réformer les gouvernements). La principale préoccupation du livre était d'aborder la question de la réforme politique dans le monde arabe. Tout en appelant les politiciens et les universitaires de son temps à rechercher tous les moyens possibles afin d'améliorer le statut de la
communauté et développer sa courtoisie, il a mis en garde le grand public musulman de ne pas fuir les expériences d'autres nations sur la base de l'idée fausse que tous les écrits, inventions, les expériences ou les attitudes des non-musulmans doivent être rejetées ou ignorées.
Khairuddin a en outre appelé à la fin du régime absolutiste, qu'il a blâmé pour l'oppression des nations et la destruction des civilisations.

Laïcité, Herméneutiques, et de l'Empire: La politique de la Réforme islamique

Saba Mahmood

Depuis les événements de septembre 11, 2001, contre la

toile de fond de deux décennies d'ascension de la politique religieuse mondiale, urgent
les appels au rétablissement de la laïcité ont atteint un crescendo qui ne peut
Etre ignoré. La cible la plus évidente de ces appels stridents est l'islam, particulièrement
les pratiques et discours au sein de l'islam qui sont soupçonnés de favoriser le fondamentalisme
et militantisme. Il est devenu de rigueur pour les gauchistes et les libéraux
lier le sort de la démocratie dans le monde musulman à l'institutionnalisation

de la laïcité - à la fois comme doctrine politique et comme éthique politique. Ce couplage
est maintenant largement repris dans le discours émanant des États-Unis. État
département, en particulier dans ses efforts programmatiques pour remodeler et transformer
«L'Islam de l'intérieur.» Dans cette rédaction, J'examinerai à la fois la conception particulière
de la laïcité qui sous-tend le consensus actuel selon lequel l'islam doit être
réformé - que sa sécularisation est une étape nécessaire pour amener la «démocratie» à
le monde musulman - et les moyens stratégiques par lesquels cette vision programmatique est
étant institué aujourd'hui. Dans la mesure où la laïcité est une catégorie historiquement changeante
avec une généalogie variée, mon objectif n'est pas d'obtenir une définition faisant autorité de
la laïcité ou pour retracer sa transformation historique aux États-Unis ou
Monde musulman. Mon objectif ici est plus limité: Je veux esquisser le particulier
compréhension de la laïcité sous-jacente aux discours américains contemporains sur
Islam, une compréhension profondément façonnée par les États-Unis. sécurité et politique étrangère
préoccupations dans le monde musulman.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants

dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement

les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain

menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement

sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc

de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument

que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,

peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne

des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront

nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le

pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des

un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,

la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop

l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier

utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction

entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants
dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement
les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain
menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement
sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc
de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument
que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,
peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne
des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront
nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le
pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des
un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,
la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop
l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier
utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction
entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Encore, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. États-Unis. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Résoudre les islamistes en Amérique's Dilemma: Leçons du Sud et Asie du Sud-

Shadi Hamid
États-Unis. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, mais, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 et 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Cependant, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, et, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt. The situation in Jordan is similar. The Bush administration and the Democratic congress have hailed the country as a “model” of Arab reform at precisely the same time that it has been devising new ways to manipulate the electoral process to limit Islamist representation, and just as it held elections plagued by widespread allegations of outright fraud
and rigging.1 This is not a coincidence. Egypt and Jordan are the only two Arab countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel. En outre, they are seen as crucial to U.S. efforts to counter Iran, stabilize Iraq, and combat terrorism.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

Martin Kramer

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.