RSSهمه ورودی ها در "تونس" دسته بندی

عرب فردا

دیوید بی. خارج از کشور

اکتبر 6, 1981, قرار بود روز جشن در مصر باشد. این سالگرد بزرگ ترین لحظه پیروزی مصر در سه درگیری اعراب و اسرائیل بود, زمانی که ارتش مستضعف این کشور در روزهای افتتاحیه کانال سوئز را عبور داد 1973 جنگ یوم کیپور و فرستادن سربازان اسرائیلی در حال عقب نشینی. در خنک, صبح بی ابر, استادیوم قاهره مملو از خانواده‌های مصری بود که برای دیدن تجهیزات نظامی ارتش آمده بودند. در جایگاه بازبینی, رئیس جمهور انور السادات,معمار جنگ, با رضایت به تماشای رژه مردان و ماشین آلات مقابل او نشست. من همین نزدیکی بودم, یک خبرنگار خارجی تازه وارد. ناگهان, یکی از کامیون‌های ارتش درست در مقابل جایگاه بازبینی متوقف شد، درست زمانی که شش جت میراژ در یک نمایش آکروباتیک از بالای سرشان غرش می‌کردند., رنگ آمیزی آسمان با مسیرهای طولانی قرمز, رنگ زرد, رنگ بنفش,و دود سبز. سادات برخاست, ظاهراً برای تبادل سلام با گروه دیگری از نیروهای مصری آماده می شود. او خود را به یک هدف عالی برای چهار قاتل اسلام گرا تبدیل کرد که از کامیون پریدند, به تریبون یورش بردند, و بدن او را با گلوله پر کرد. در حالی که قاتلان برای چیزی که به نظر می رسید برای ابدیت ادامه می دادند تا جایگاه را با آتش مرگبار خود بپاشند., من برای یک لحظه فکر کردم که آیا باید به زمین بخورم و خطر زیر پا گذاشتن توسط تماشاگران وحشت زده را به جان بخرم یا در راه بمانم و خطر گلوله سرگردان را بگیرم.. غریزه به من گفت که روی پاهایم بمان, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

اسلام, اسلام سیاسی و آمریکا

بینش عرب

آیا "برادری" با آمریکا امکان پذیر است؟?

خلیل الانانی

هیچ شانسی برای برقراری ارتباط با هیچ یک از ایالات متحده وجود ندارد. تا زمانی که ایالات متحده دیدگاه دیرینه خود را نسبت به اسلام به عنوان یک خطر واقعی حفظ کند, دیدگاهی که آمریکا را در قایق دشمن صهیونیستی قرار می دهد. ما هیچ تصور قبلی در مورد مردم آمریکا یا ایالات متحده نداریم. جامعه و سازمان های مدنی و اتاق های فکر آن. ما مشکلی در ارتباط با مردم آمریکا نداریم، اما هیچ تلاش کافی برای نزدیک‌تر کردن ما انجام نمی‌شود,گفت: دکتر. عصام العیریان, رئیس بخش سیاسی اخوان المسلمین در یک مصاحبه تلفنی.
سخنان العریان خلاصه ای از دیدگاه اخوان المسلمین نسبت به مردم آمریکا و ایالات متحده است.. دولت. سایر اعضای اخوان المسلمین با این موضوع موافق هستند, همان طور که مرحوم حسن البنا, که این گروه را در 1928. ال- بانا غرب را بیشتر به عنوان نمادی از زوال اخلاقی می دید. سایر سلفی ها - یک مکتب فکری اسلامی که به اجداد به عنوان الگوهای نمونه متکی است - همین دیدگاه را نسبت به ایالات متحده داشته اند., اما فاقد انعطاف ایدئولوژیک مورد حمایت اخوان المسلمین است. در حالی که اخوان المسلمین به مشارکت آمریکایی ها در گفتگوهای مدنی معتقد است, دیگر گروه های افراطی هیچ فایده ای در گفتگو نمی بینند و معتقدند که زور تنها راه مقابله با ایالات متحده است.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

دکتر. محمد اقبال

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. جست‌وجوی یک بنیان صرفاً روان‌شناختی برای وحدت انسانی تنها با این درک امکان‌پذیر می‌شود که همه زندگی انسان در منشأ خود معنوی است.1 چنین برداشتی خلاقانه از وفاداری‌های تازه و بدون هیچ تشریفاتی برای زنده نگه داشتن آنهاست., و رهایی انسان از زمین را ممکن می سازد. مسیحیت که در ابتدا به عنوان یک نظام رهبانی ظاهر شده بود توسط کنستانتین به عنوان یک سیستم وحدت آزموده شد. ناکامی آن در کارکردن به عنوان چنین سیستمی باعث شد امپراتور جولیان3 به خدایان قدیمی روم بازگردد، زیرا او تلاش کرد تا تفاسیر فلسفی را بر روی آنها بگذارد.. یک مورخ مدرن تمدن، بدین ترتیب، وضعیت جهان متمدن را در مورد زمانی که اسلام در صحنه تاریخ ظاهر شد، به تصویر کشیده است.: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, غرق در طوفان های جنگ, و تنها با طناب های آداب و رسوم و قوانین باستانی به هم چسبیده است, که هر لحظه ممکن است خراب شود. آیا فرهنگ عاطفی وجود داشت که بتوان وارد کرد؟, تا بار دیگر بشریت را در وحدت جمع کند و تمدن را نجات دهد? این فرهنگ باید از نوع جدیدی باشد, زیرا تحریم ها و تشریفات قدیمی مرده بودند, و ساختن دیگران از همین نوع کار کار خواهد بود
سپس نویسنده به ما می گوید که جهان به فرهنگ جدیدی نیاز دارد تا جای فرهنگ تاج و تخت را بگیرد., و نظام های اتحاد که بر اساس رابطه خونی استوار بود.
شگفت انگیز است, او اضافه می کند, که چنین فرهنگی باید درست در زمانی که بیشتر به آن نیاز بود، از عربستان برخاسته باشد. وجود دارد, با این حال, هیچ چیز شگفت انگیزی در این پدیده وجود ندارد. زندگی جهانی به طور شهودی نیازهای خود را می بیند, و در لحظات حساس جهت خود را مشخص می کند. این چیزی است که, به زبان دین, ما وحی نبوی می نامیم. طبیعی است که اسلام باید در آگاهی مردم ساده و دست نخورده به هیچ یک از فرهنگ های باستانی بتابد., و اشغال یک موقعیت جغرافیایی که در آن سه قاره در کنار هم قرار می گیرند. فرهنگ جدید اساس وحدت جهانی را در اصل توحد می‌یابد.»5 اسلام, به عنوان یک سیاست, تنها وسیله ای عملی برای تبدیل این اصل به عاملی زنده در زندگی فکری و عاطفی بشر است. وفاداری به خدا را می طلبد, نه به تاج و تخت. و از آنجایی که خدا اساس معنوی نهایی تمام زندگی است, وفاداری به خدا عملاً معادل وفاداری انسان به فطرت آرمانی خود است. اساس معنوی نهایی تمام زندگی, همانطور که اسلام تصور می کند, جاودانه است و در تنوع و تغییر خود را نشان می دهد. جامعه ای که مبتنی بر چنین تصوری از واقعیت است، باید آشتی کند, در زندگی اش, مقوله های ماندگاری و تغییر. برای تنظیم زندگی جمعی خود باید دارای اصول ابدی باشد, زیرا امر ابدی به ما جای پایی در دنیای تغییر دائمی می دهد.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

عبدالله Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
علاوه بر این, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, برای مثال, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ایالات متحده آمریکا, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

هنری Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

ماها اعظم

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 جولای 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights

دانیل E. قیمت

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, با این حال, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

دیوید B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, حسنی مبارک, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 به 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Roots Of Nationalism In The Muslim World

شبیر احمد

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. در واقع, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
علاوه بر این, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, عرب, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. For example, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

اعظم S. تمیمی

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, که در 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, که در 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

سکولاریسم, علم تفسیر, و امپراتوری: سیاست اصلاحات اسلامی

صبا محمود

از وقایع سپتامبر 11, 2001, بر خلاف

پس زمینه دو دهه عروج سیاست دینی جهانی, فوری
درخواست ها برای احیای سکولاریسم به اوج خود رسیده است که نمی تواند
نادیده گرفته شود. بارزترین هدف این دعوت های تند اسلام است, به ویژه
اعمال و گفتمان هایی در اسلام که مظنون به پرورش بنیادگرایی است
و ستیزه جویی. این امر برای چپ‌ها و لیبرال‌ها به یک اندازه امری نابخردانه شده است
پیوند دادن سرنوشت دموکراسی در جهان اسلام با نهادینه سازی

سکولاریسم - هم به عنوان یک دکترین سیاسی و هم به عنوان یک اخلاق سیاسی. این جفت
اکنون به طور گسترده در گفتمان نشأت گرفته از ایالات متحده منعکس شده است. دولت
بخش, به ویژه در تلاش های برنامه ای خود برای تغییر شکل و دگرگونی
"اسلام از درون" در این مقاله, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
جهان اسلام. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
اسلام, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights

دانیل E. قیمت

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, با این حال, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights

دانیل E. قیمت

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, با این حال, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, ایالات متحده آمریکا. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. به همین ترتیب, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (حزب عدالت و توسعه), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

حل معضل اسلام گرای آمریکا: درس هایی از جنوب و جنوب شرقی آسیا

شادی حمید
ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. تلاش‌ها برای ترویج دموکراسی در خاورمیانه مدت‌هاست که به دلیل «معضل اسلام‌گرایی» فلج شده است.: در تئوری, ما دموکراسی می خواهیم, ولی, در عمل, بیم آن است که احزاب اسلام گرا ذینفعان اصلی هر گشایش سیاسی باشند. غم انگیزترین جلوه آن، ناکامی الجزایر بود 1991 و 1992, زمانی که ایالات متحده در سکوت ایستاده بود در حالی که ارتش سکولار سرسخت انتخابات را پس از کسب اکثریت پارلمانی یک حزب اسلامگرا لغو کرد.. اخیرا, دولت بوش پس از اینکه اسلامگرایان در انتخابات در سراسر منطقه به طرز شگفت انگیزی خوب عمل کردند، از "برنامه آزادی" خود عقب نشینی کرد., از جمله در مصر, عربستان سعودی, و سرزمین های فلسطینی.
اما حتی ترس ما از احزاب اسلام‌گرا - و در نتیجه امتناع از تعامل با آنها - به خودی خود ناسازگار بوده است., برای برخی از کشورها صادق است اما برای برخی دیگر نه. هر چه بیشتر یک کشور برای منافع امنیت ملی آمریکا حیاتی تلقی شود, ایالات متحده تمایل کمتری به پذیرش گروه های اسلام گرا داشته است که نقش سیاسی برجسته ای در آنجا داشته باشند. با این حال, در کشورهایی که از نظر استراتژیک کمتر مرتبط هستند, و جایی که کمتر در خطر است, ایالات متحده گاهی رویکرد ظریف تری را در پیش گرفته است. اما این دقیقا همان جایی است که به رسمیت شناختن نقش اسلامگرایان غیرخشونت طلب مهمتر است., و, اینجا, سیاست آمریکا همچنان کوتاه است.
در سراسر منطقه, ایالات متحده به طور فعال از رژیم های خودکامه حمایت کرده و برای کمپین های سرکوب گروه هایی مانند اخوان المسلمین مصر چراغ سبز نشان داده است., قدیمی ترین و تاثیرگذارترین جنبش سیاسی در منطقه. در ماه مارس 2008, در دورانی که بسیاری از ناظران آن را بدترین دوره سرکوب ضد اخوان از دهه 1960 می دانند., کاندولیزا رایس، وزیر امور خارجه، از الف $100 کاهش کمک های نظامی به مصر توسط کنگره به میلیون ها نفر محکوم شد. وضعیت در اردن نیز مشابه است. دولت بوش و کنگره دموکرات از کشور به عنوان "الگوی" اصلاحات عربی استقبال کرده اند، دقیقاً در همان زمانی که در حال ابداع راه های جدیدی برای دستکاری در روند انتخابات برای محدود کردن نمایندگی اسلام گرایان بوده است., و درست همانطور که انتخاباتی را با اتهامات گسترده تقلب آشکار برگزار کرد
و تقلب.1 این تصادفی نیست. مصر و اردن تنها دو کشور عربی هستند که با اسرائیل پیمان صلح امضا کرده اند. علاوه بر این, آنها برای ایالات متحده حیاتی تلقی می شوند. تلاش برای مقابله با ایران, عراق را باثبات کند, و مبارزه با تروریسم.

The Mismeasure of Political Islam

مارتین کرامر

Perhaps no development of the last decade of the twentieth century has caused as much confusion in the West as the emergence of political Islam. Just what does it portend? Is it against modernity, or is it an effect of modernity? Is it against nationalism, or is it a
form of nationalism? Is it a striving for freedom, or a revolt against freedom?
One would think that these are difficult questions to answer, and that they would inspire deep debates. Yet over the past few years, a surprisingly broad consensus has emerged within academe about the way political Islam should be measured. This consensus has
begun to spread into parts of government as well, especially in the U.S. and Europe. A paradigm has been built, and its builders claim that its reliability and validity are beyond question.
This now-dominant paradigm runs as follows. The Arab Middle East and North Africa are stirring. The peoples in these lands are still under varieties of authoritarian or despotic rule. But they are moved by the same universal yearning for democracy that transformed Eastern Europe and Latin America. True, there are no movements we would easily recognize as democracy movements. But for historical and cultural reasons, this universal yearning has taken the form of Islamist protest movements. If these do not look
like democracy movements, it is only a consequence of our own age-old bias against Islam. When the veil of prejudice is lifted, one will see Islamist movements for what they are: the functional equivalents of democratic reform movements. True, on the edges of these movements are groups that are atavistic and authoritarian. Some of their members are prone to violence. These are theextremists.” But the mainstream movements are essentially open, pluralistic, and nonviolent, led bymoderatesorreformists.” Thesemoderatescan be strengthened if they are made partners in the political process, and an initial step must be dialogue. But ultimately, the most effective way to domesticate the Islamists is to permit them to share or possess power. There is no threat here unless the West creates it, by supporting acts of state repression that would deny Islamists access to participation or power.