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RADICALITZACIÓ ISLAMISTA

Les qüestions relacionades amb l'islam polític continuen presentant reptes a les polítiques exteriors europees a l'Orient Mitjà i al nord d'Àfrica (MENA). A mesura que la política de la UE ha intentat fer front a aquests reptes durant l'última dècada aproximadament, l'islam polític mateix ha evolucionat. Els experts assenyalen la creixent complexitat i varietat de tendències dins de l'islam polític. Algunes organitzacions islamistes han reforçat el seu compromís amb les normes democràtiques i s'han compromès plenament a la pau, política nacional dominant. Altres continuen casats amb mitjans violents. I encara d'altres han derivat cap a una forma més quietista de l'islam, desvinculat de l'activitat política. L'islam polític a la regió MENA no presenta cap tendència uniforme per als responsables polítics europeus. El debat analític ha crescut al voltant del concepte de "radicalització". Això, al seu torn, ha generat investigacions sobre els factors que impulsen la "desradicalització", i a la inversa, 're-radicalització'. Gran part de la complexitat deriva de la visió generalitzada que aquests tres fenòmens es produeixen al mateix temps.. Fins i tot els termes en si són impugnats. Sovint s'ha assenyalat que la dicotomia moderat-radical no aconsegueix captar completament els matisos de les tendències dins de l'islam polític.. Alguns analistes també es queixen que parlar de "radicalisme" està carregat ideològicament. A nivell de terminologia, entenem que la radicalització s'associa a l'extremisme, però les opinions difereixen sobre la centralitat del seu contingut religiós-fundamentalista versus polític, i sobre si la voluntat de recórrer a la violència està implícita o no.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

James Piscatori

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD JOVES

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) ha desenvolupat una sèrie d'iniciatives polítiques, principalment la Política Europea de Veïnatge(ENP) que en principi es comprometen amb el diàleg i un compromís més profund de tots(no violent) actors polítics i organitzacions de la societat civil dels països àrabs. No obstant això, molts analistes i responsables polítics es queixen ara d'un cert trofeu tant en el debat conceptual com en el desenvolupament de polítiques. S'ha establert que l'islam polític és un panorama canviant, profundament afectat per una sèrie de circumstàncies, però el debat sovint sembla que s'ha quedat en la qüestió simplista de "els islamistes són democràtics".?No obstant això, molts analistes independents han defensat el compromís amb els islamistes, però l'acostament real entre els governs occidentals i les organitzacions islamistes segueix sent limitat .

Els Germans Musulmans Moderats

Robert S. aspecte

Steven Brooke

Dinamitzar les relacions EUA-Síria: Aprofitament de vehicles diplomàtics auxiliars

Benjamin I. poder,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

POLICY AND PRACTICE NOTES

KENNETH ROTH

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. A més, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

AN INQUIRY INTO A WESTERN FEAR

If one can point to an overarching characteristic of our time, concern with justice would surely be

near the top of the list. Never in the history of man has there been such a quest for justice, a quest

pursued by both individuals and groups in all walks of life and around the world. In this quest,

religions have played a vital role, while at the same time, religious movements are continually misunderstood

and mis-characterized by opposing groups. The Muslim movements which the Western

media refer to as representative of a dangerous Islamic fundamentalism with militant overtones

is one example where a misunderstanding has resulted in widespread fear and prohibited

what could potentially be a useful partnership. It is not an exaggeration to say that upon hearing

the words ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, many otherwise educated Westerners tend to think only of a

terrorist organization, and it is not inconceivable to think that some Muslims may in fact look at

the World Council of Churches as yet another example of Western imperialism. The truth is that

although Islamic fundamentalism or perhaps more appropriately ‘revivalism’ does have its extremists,

a major focal point of some Muslim movements is an attempt to balance the scales of

social justice in much the same way that the Christians of the West–through the World Council of

Churches–are attempting to rectify situations of poverty, abuse of human rights and other social

issues. This is not to dismiss the violence inherent in some Islamic fundamentalist movements,

merely to show that the terrorist like activities of these movements are emphatically not the

movements’ main program of action, and are, for instance in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood,

more a reaction to events of the time that many organizations, including the Brotherhood,

responded to in a violent manner.

Escalation in the Middle East: a lasting damage to peace and democracy

Paolo Cotta

The rapid and dangerous escalation of war operations in the Middle East has resulted in a very significant loss of life among Lebanese, Palestinians and Israelis, and serious damage to civilian infrastructures. Major operations began with a low-level conflict around Gaza,that involved the launching of some missiles into Israel, some (more deadly) Israeli retaliation on Gaza, and the attack on an Israeli military post outside Gaza to which Israel reacted swiftly and very strongly. In the chain reaction that followed, admittedly Israel’ sintention was, and is, to inflict on the other side a far heavier punishment than that taken by Israel—which may appear as a militarily sound posture aimed at avoiding incidents andattacks, but, de fet, it is the civilian population that has been mainly affected. Com a resultat,the suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations (in terms of deaths,wounded and destroyed infrastructures) has to date been largely disproportionate to that of Israel. When, in the case of Palestine, this discrimination already follows about 40 years of discrimination in the same direction, hostility and adversarial relations are bound toincrease. So while Israel’s heavy deterrence through punishment may work temporarily and occasionally in preventing or reducing attacks, the general sentiment of hostility in the region is increased, and creates in the long range a bigger obstacle to peace.

The Syrian Opposition

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & política

Stimson Center & Institut d'Estudis de Política

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Egipte, India,Indonèsia, Kenya, Malàisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Finalment, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Transicions polítiques al món àrab

en Shehata

L'any 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. A més,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, els Germans Musulmans, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. a 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. malgrat això, en 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. A més, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

Reptes per a la democràcia al món àrab i musulmà

Alon Ben-Meir

Les idees del president Bush que la democratització de l'Iraq tindrà un efecte dominó a la resta del món àrab, aportant prosperitat i pau a la regió, i que la democràcia és la panacea perquè el terrorisme islàmic sigui infundat i molt enganyós. Fins i tot una revisió superficial del panorama polític àrab indica que l'auge de la democràcia no es traduirà automàticament en l'establiment de democràcies liberals duradores ni soscava el terrorisme a la regió.. La mateixa conclusió es pot fer en general per al panorama polític musulmà. De fet, donada l'oportunitat de competir lliurement i justament a les eleccions, Les organitzacions extremistes islàmiques probablement sortiran triomfants. A les recents eleccions al Líban i Egipte, Hezbollah i els Germans Musulmans respectivament, va obtenir guanys substancials, i a Palestina, Hamàs va guanyar les eleccions parlamentàries nacionals de manera directa. Que ho fessin és alhora un clar exemple de les realitats polítiques actuals i un indicador de les tendències futures. I si els sentiments actuals als estats àrabs ofereixen una guia, qualsevol govern format per partits polítics islamistes electes serà més antagònic amb Occident que els règims autoritaris encara en el poder.. A més, No hi ha indicis que la democràcia sigui un requisit previ per vèncer el terrorisme ni cap dada empírica que doni suport a l'afirmació de la vinculació entre els règims autoritaris existents i el terrorisme..

Civil society and Democratization in the Arab World

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Even if Islam is the Answer, Arab Muslims are the Problem

In May 2008, the Arab nation experienced a number of fires, or rather, armed conflicts—en

Líban, Iraq, Palestina, Iemen, and Somalia. In these conflicts,

the warring parties used Islam as the instrument for mobilization

and amassing support. Collectively, Muslims are

waging war against Muslims.

After some Muslims raised the slogan of “Islam is the solution,”

it

became apparent “their Islam is the problem.” No sooner have some of them acquired weapons,

than they raised it against the state and its ruling regime regardless of

whether that regime was ruling in the name of Islam or not.

We have

seen this in recent years between the followers of Osama bin Laden

and the Al-Qaeda organization on the one hand, and the authorities in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the other. We have also seen an

explosive example of this phenomenon in Morocco, whose king rules in the name of Islam and

whose title is the ‘Prince of the Faithful.’ Thus each Muslim faction kills other Muslims in the

name of Islam.

A quick glance at the contents of the media confirms how the

term Islam and its associated symbols have become mere tools in the hands of these Muslims.

Prominent examples of these Islam-exploiting factions are:

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypt

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, in Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

and Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Lebanon The Houthi Zayadi rebels and the Islamic Reform Grouping

(Islah), inYemen The Islamic courts, in Somalia The Islamic Front ,

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COMPARING THREE MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA, JORDAN, EGYPT

Barry Rubin

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (al-Qa'ida, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.