Tutte le voci della "Siria" Categoria
Il Domani arabo
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
ottobre 6, 1981, doveva essere un giorno di festa in Egitto. Ha segnato l'anniversario del più grande momento di vittoria dell'Egitto in tre conflitti arabo-israeliani, quando l'esercito sfavorito del paese attraversò il Canale di Suez nei giorni di apertura del 1973 Yom Kippur War e ha inviato le truppe israeliane in ritirata. Su un fresco, mattina senza nuvole, lo stadio del Cairo era gremito di famiglie egiziane venute a vedere i militari che si pavoneggiavano sul suo hardware, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,l'architetto della guerra, osservava con soddisfazione gli uomini e le macchine che sfilavano davanti a lui. Ero nelle vicinanze, un corrispondente estero appena arrivato, uno dei camion dell'esercito si fermò proprio davanti al banco di prova proprio mentre sei jet Mirage ruggivano in alto in un'esibizione acrobatica, dipingendo il cielo con lunghe scie di rosso, giallo, viola,e fumo verde. Sadat si alzò, apparentemente si preparava a scambiare saluti con un altro contingente di truppe egiziane. Si è reso un bersaglio perfetto per quattro assassini islamisti che sono saltati dal camion, ha preso d'assalto il podio, e crivellò il suo corpo di proiettili, mentre gli assassini continuavano per quella che sembrava un'eternità a spruzzare il supporto con il loro fuoco mortale, Ho considerato per un istante se toccare il suolo e rischiare di essere calpestato a morte da spettatori in preda al panico o restare a piedi e rischiare di prendere un proiettile vagante. L'istinto mi ha detto di restare in piedi, e il mio senso del dovere giornalistico mi spinse a scoprire se Sadat fosse vivo o morto.
| Settembre 26, 2010 | Commenti 0
Islam, L'Islam politico e l'America
Arabo Insight
Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
khalil al-anani
"Non vi è alcuna possibilità di comunicare con qualsiasi Stati Uniti. amministrazione fino a quando gli Stati Uniti mantiene la sua visione di lunga data di Islam come un pericolo reale, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna considerava l'Occidente principalmente come un simbolo di decadenza morale. Altri salafiti – una scuola di pensiero islamica che si basa sugli antenati come modelli esemplari – hanno avuto la stessa visione degli Stati Uniti, ma manca della flessibilità ideologica sposata dai Fratelli Musulmani. Mentre i Fratelli Musulmani credono nel coinvolgere gli americani nel dialogo civile, altri gruppi estremisti non vedono senso nel dialogo e sostengono che la forza sia l'unico modo di trattare con gli Stati Uniti.
| Settembre 15, 2010 | Commenti 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRAZIA & GLI USA:
Fondazione Cordoba
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
Nonostante sia un dibattito sia perenne che complesso, Arches Quarterly riesamina da basi teologiche e pratiche, l'importante dibattito sul rapporto e la compatibilità tra Islam e Democrazia, come riecheggiato nell'agenda di speranza e cambiamento di Barack Obama. Mentre molti celebrano l'ascesa di Obama allo Studio Ovale come catarsi nazionale per gli Stati Uniti, altri rimangono meno ottimisti riguardo a un cambiamento nell'ideologia e nell'approccio nell'arena internazionale. Mentre gran parte della tensione e della sfiducia tra il mondo musulmano e gli Stati Uniti può essere attribuita all'approccio della promozione della democrazia, favorendo tipicamente dittature e regimi fantoccio che rispettano i valori democratici e i diritti umani, la scossa di assestamento di 9/11 ha davvero cementato ulteriormente i dubbi attraverso la posizione dell'America sull'Islam politico. Ha creato un muro di negatività come scoperto da worldpublicopinion.org, secondo cui 67% degli egiziani crede che globalmente l'America stia giocando un ruolo “principalmente negativo”.
La risposta dell'America è stata quindi azzeccata. Eleggendo Obama, molti in tutto il mondo ripongono le loro speranze per lo sviluppo di una meno belligerante, ma una politica estera più giusta nei confronti del mondo musulmano. Il test per Obama, mentre discutiamo, è così che l'America ei suoi alleati promuovono la democrazia. Sarà facilitante o imponente?
inoltre, può essere, soprattutto, un broker onesto in zone di conflitto prolungate? Arruolando l'esperienza e l'intuizione di prolifi
c studiosi, accademici, giornalisti e politici esperti, Arches Quarterly porta alla luce il rapporto tra Islam e Democrazia e il ruolo dell'America - così come i cambiamenti portati da Obama, nella ricerca del terreno comune. Anas Altikriti, il CEO della Fondazione Th e Cordoba fornisce la mossa di apertura di questa discussione, dove riflette sulle speranze e le sfide che riposa sul percorso di Obama. A seguito di Altikriti, l'ex consigliere del presidente Nixon, Il dottor Robert Crane offre un'analisi approfondita del principio islamico del diritto alla libertà. Anwar Ibrahim, ex Vice Primo Ministro della Malaysia, arricchisce la discussione con le realtà pratiche dell'attuazione della democrazia nelle società a predominanza musulmana, vale a dire, in Indonesia e Malesia.
Abbiamo anche il dottor Shireen Hunter, della Georgetown University, Stati Uniti, che esplora i paesi musulmani in ritardo nella democratizzazione e nella modernizzazione. Questo è completato dallo scrittore di terrorismo, La spiegazione del dottor Nafeez Ahmed della crisi della postmodernità e del
fine della democrazia. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Direttore del Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (ex corrispondente ITN e BBC Panorama; autore di Sionism: Il vero nemico degli ebrei) e Asem Sondos (Direttore del settimanale egiziano Sawt Al Omma) concentrarsi su Obama e sul suo ruolo nei confronti della promozione della democrazia nel mondo musulmano, così come le relazioni degli Stati Uniti con Israele e la Fratellanza Musulmana.
Il Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Maldive, Ahmed Shaheed specula sul futuro dell'Islam e della Democrazia; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– un membro dello Sinn Féin che ha sopportato quattro anni di carcere per attività repubblicane irlandesi e un attivista per il Guildford 4 e Birmingham 6, riflessioni sul suo recente viaggio a Gaza, dove ha assistito all'impatto della brutalità e dell'ingiustizia inflitte ai palestinesi; Dott.ssa Marie Breen-Smyth, Il direttore del Center for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence discute le sfide della ricerca critica sul terrorismo politico; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scrittore e drammaturgo, discute le prospettive di pace in Darfur; e infine il giornalista e attivista per i diritti umani Ashur Shamis guarda in modo critico alla democratizzazione e politicizzazione dei musulmani oggi.
Ci auguriamo che tutto ciò sia una lettura completa e una fonte di riflessione su questioni che ci riguardano tutti in una nuova alba di speranza.
Grazie
| Settembre 07, 2010 | Commenti 0
Stati Uniti la politica di Hamas blocchi pace in Medio Oriente
Henry Siegman
Impossibile colloqui bilaterali in questi ultimi 16 anni hanno dimostrato che un accordo di pace in Medio Oriente non può mai essere raggiunto dalle parti stesse. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Purtroppo, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Settembre 07, 2010 | Commenti 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| Settembre 06, 2010 | Commenti 0
Islamic Political Culture, Democrazia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Prezzo
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, però, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democrazia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| Settembre 06, 2010 | Commenti 0
Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialismo, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particolare, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ma
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Tuttavia, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. D'altro canto, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Infatti,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, il
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Tuttavia, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, quale
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| Settembre 02, 2010 | Commenti 0
Egypt at the Tipping Point ?
David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 a 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
| Settembre 02, 2010 | Commenti 0
A Muslim Archipelago
Max L. Lordo
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| Ago 27, 2010 | Commenti 0
Democracy in Islamic Political Thought
Azzam S. Tamimi
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, nel 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, nel 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| Ago 27, 2010 | Commenti 0
Islamic Political Culture, Democrazia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Prezzo
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, però, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democrazia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| Ago 24, 2010 | Commenti 0
Islamic Political Culture, Democrazia, and Human Rights
Daniel E. Prezzo
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, però, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democrazia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,
and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| Ago 22, 2010 | Commenti 0
I partiti islamisti di opposizione e il potenziale di coinvolgimento dell'UE
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Alla luce della crescente importanza dei movimenti islamisti nel mondo musulmano e
il modo in cui la radicalizzazione ha influenzato gli eventi globali dall'inizio del secolo, esso
è importante che l'UE valuti le sue politiche nei confronti degli attori all'interno di ciò che può essere vagamente
chiamato il "mondo islamico". È particolarmente importante chiedersi se e come impegnarsi
con i vari gruppi islamisti.
Questo rimane controverso anche all'interno dell'UE. Alcuni ritengono che l'Islam apprezzi questo
mentire dietro i partiti islamisti sono semplicemente incompatibili con gli ideali occidentali di democrazia e
diritti umani, mentre altri vedono l'impegno come una necessità realistica a causa della crescita
importanza interna dei partiti islamisti e il loro crescente coinvolgimento in ambito internazionale
affari. Un'altra prospettiva è che la democratizzazione nel mondo musulmano aumenterebbe
sicurezza europea. La validità di questi e altri argomenti sul se e come il
L'impegno dell'UE può essere messo alla prova solo studiando i diversi movimenti islamisti e
loro circostanze politiche, paese per paese.
La democratizzazione è un tema centrale delle azioni di politica estera comune dell'UE, come previsto
fuori nell'art 11 del Trattato sull'Unione Europea. Molti degli stati considerati in questo
rapporto non sono democratici, o non del tutto democratico. Nella maggior parte di questi paesi, islamista
partiti e movimenti costituiscono un'opposizione significativa ai regimi prevalenti, e
in alcuni formano il più grande blocco di opposizione. Le democrazie europee hanno dovuto farlo da tempo
affrontare regimi di governo che sono autoritari, ma è un fenomeno nuovo da premere
per la riforma democratica negli stati in cui potrebbero averne i beneficiari più probabili, dal
Il punto di vista dell'UE, approcci diversi e talvolta problematici alla democrazia e alla sua
valori correlati, come i diritti delle minoranze e delle donne e lo stato di diritto. Queste accuse sono
spesso contro i movimenti islamisti, quindi è importante che i responsabili politici europei lo facciano
avere un quadro accurato delle politiche e delle filosofie dei potenziali partner.
Esperienze provenienti da diversi paesi tende a suggerire che la maggiore libertà islamista
sono ammesse feste, più sono moderati nelle loro azioni e idee. In molti
casi I partiti ei gruppi islamisti si sono da tempo allontanati dal loro scopo originario
di stabilire uno Stato islamico governato dalla legge islamica, e sono arrivato ad accettare di base
principi democratici della competizione elettorale per il potere, l'esistenza di altri politici
concorrenti, e pluralismo politico.
| Ago 21, 2010 | Commenti 0
Political Islam in the Middle East
Se Knudsen
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, nel
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.
| Ago 20, 2010 | Commenti 0
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA Kadlec
Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Allo stesso modo, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. Stati Uniti. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (Pjd), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.
| Ago 19, 2010 | Commenti 0
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. Marrone, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Movimenti islamisti, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, però, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Giordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politica, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
| Ago 18, 2010 | Commenti 0
IkhwanScope Su Facebook
IkhwanScope su Scribd
IkhwanScope su Twitter