Vsi vnosi v "Palestina" Kategorija
Arabska Jutri
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| sep 26, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Feminizem MED laičnosti in islamizma: PRIMER Palestine
dr, Islah Jad
Zakonodajne volitve na Zahodnem bregu in v Gazi v 2006 na oblast pripeljal islamistično gibanje Hamas, ki je nato oblikovala večino palestinskega zakonodajnega sveta in tudi prvo večinsko vlado Hamasa. Rezultat teh volitev je bilo imenovanje prve ministrice Hamasa, ki je postala ministrica za ženske zadeve. Med marcem 2006 in junija 2007, to mesto sta prevzeli dve različni ministrici Hamasa, vendar sta oba težko vodila ministrstvo, saj večina njegovih zaposlenih ni bila članov Hamasa, ampak je pripadala drugim političnim strankam, večina pa je bila članov Fataha, prevladujoče gibanje, ki nadzoruje večino institucij palestinske oblasti. Napeto obdobje boja med ženskami Hamasa na ministrstvu za ženske zadeve in članicami Fataha se je končalo po Hamasovem prevzemu oblasti na območju Gaze in posledičnem padcu njegove vlade na Zahodnem bregu – boj ki je včasih dobilo silovit preobrat. Eden od razlogov, ki so ga kasneje navedli za razlago tega boja, je bila razlika med sekularnim feminističnim diskurzom in islamističnim diskurzom o ženskih vprašanjih.. V palestinskem kontekstu je to nesoglasje postalo nevarno, saj je bilo uporabljeno za opravičevanje nadaljevanja krvavega političnega boja., odstranitev Hamasovih žensk z njihovih položajev ali delovnih mest, ter politične in geografske ločnice, ki so takrat prevladovale tako na Zahodnem bregu kot na okupiranem območju Gaze.
Ta boj odpira številna pomembna vprašanja: bi morali kaznovati islamistično gibanje, ki je prišlo na oblast, ali bi morali razmisliti o razlogih, ki so pripeljali do Fatehovega neuspeha na političnem prizorišču? Ali lahko feminizem ponudi celovit okvir za ženske?, ne glede na njihovo socialno in ideološko pripadnost? Ali lahko diskurz skupne skupne osnove za ženske pomaga pri uresničevanju in dogovoru o skupnih ciljih?? Je paternalizem prisoten samo v islamistični ideologiji, in ne v nacionalizmu in domoljubju? Kaj mislimo s feminizmom? Ali obstaja samo en feminizem, ali več feminizmov? Kaj mislimo z islamom – ali je to gibanje, znano pod tem imenom, ali religija, filozofija, ali pravni sistem? Tem težavam moramo iti do dna in jih natančno preučiti, in o njih se moramo dogovoriti, da se lahko kasneje odločimo, kot feministke, če naj bo naša kritika paternalizma usmerjena proti veri (vera), ki bi morala biti omejena na srce vernika in ne bi smela prevzeti nadzora nad svetom na splošno, ali sodna praksa, ki se nanaša na različne verske šole, ki pojasnjujejo pravni sistem, ki ga vsebujejo Koran in izreki preroka – suna.
| sep 19, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamski ŽENSKI aktivizma v okupirani Palestini
Intervju Khaled Amayreh
Intervju z Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka je izvoljena članica palestinskega zakonodajnega sveta. Bila je
rojen v vasi Shoyoukh blizu Hebrona v 1964. Ima diplomo iz šeriata (Islamska
Pravna praksa) z univerze Hebron. Delala je kot novinarka iz 1996 do 2006 kdaj
vstopila je v palestinski zakonodajni svet kot izvoljena članica v 2006 volitve.
Je poročena in ima sedem otrok.
Q: V nekaterih zahodnih državah obstaja splošen vtis, da so ženske deležne
slabšega ravnanja znotraj islamskih odporniških skupin, kot je Hamas. Je to res?
Kako v Hamasu ravnajo z aktivistkami?
Pravice in dolžnosti muslimank izhajajo predvsem iz islamskega šeriatskega prava.
To niso prostovoljna ali dobrodelna dejanja ali geste, ki jih prejmemo od Hamasa ali kogarkoli drugega
drugače. torej, kar zadeva politično udejstvovanje in aktivizem, imajo ženske na splošno
enake pravice in dolžnosti kot moški. Konec koncev, ženske ličijo vsaj 50 odstotkov
družbe. V določenem smislu, so celotna družba, ker rojevajo, in dvigniti,
nova generacija.
Zato, Lahko rečem, da je status žensk v Hamasu popolnoma v skladu z njo
status v samem islamu. To pomeni, da je polnopravni partner na vseh ravneh. Prav zares, bi bilo
nepravično in nepravično za islama (ali islamist, če vam je ljubše) ženska, da bo partnerica v trpljenju
medtem ko je ona izločena iz procesa odločanja. Zato je vloga ženske v
Hamas je bil vedno pionir.
Q: Ali menite, da je pojav ženskega političnega aktivizma znotraj Hamasa
naravni razvoj, ki je združljiv s klasičnimi islamskimi koncepti
glede položaja in vloge žensk, ali je le nujen odziv na
pritiski modernosti in zahteve političnega delovanja ter nadaljevanja
izraelska okupacija?
V islamski sodni praksi niti v Hamasovi listini ni besedila, ki bi ženskam preprečevalo
politično sodelovanje. Verjamem, da je ravno nasprotno — obstajajo številni koranski verzi
in izreki preroka Mohameda, ki pozivajo ženske, naj bodo aktivne v politiki in javnosti
vprašanja, ki zadevajo muslimane. Res pa je tudi, da za ženske, kot velja za moške, politični aktivizem
ni obvezno, temveč prostovoljno, in se v veliki meri odloča glede na sposobnosti vsake ženske,
kvalifikacije in individualne okoliščine. Nič manj, izkazovanje skrbi za javnost
zadeve je obvezno za vsakega muslimana in muslimanko. Prerok
je rekel Muhammed: "Tisti, ki ne kaže skrbi za zadeve muslimanov, ni musliman."
Še več, Palestinske islamistke morajo upoštevati vse objektivne dejavnike na terenu
pri odločanju, ali se vključiti v politiko ali vključiti v politični aktivizem.
| sep 19, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam, Politični islam in America
Arabska Insight
Ali je »bratstvo« z Ameriko možno?
khalil al-anani
"Ni nobene možnosti komuniciranja z vsemi zunaj ZDA. administracije, dokler ZDA ohranjajo svoj dolgoletni pogled na islam kot resnično nevarnost, pogled, ki Združene države postavlja v isti čoln kot cionistični sovražnik. Nimamo nobenih vnaprejšnjih predstav o ameriških ljudeh ali ZDA. družbe ter njenih civilnih organizacij in možganskih trustov. Nimamo težav pri komuniciranju z ameriškim ljudstvom, vendar ni vloženih ustreznih naporov, da bi nas zbližali,” je dejal dr. Issam al-Iryan, vodja političnega oddelka Muslimanske bratovščine v telefonskem intervjuju.
Al-Iryanove besede povzemajo poglede Muslimanske bratovščine na Američane in ZDA. vlada. Drugi člani Muslimanske bratovščine bi se strinjali, tako kot pokojni Hassan al-Banna, ki je skupino ustanovil v 1928. Al- Banna je na Zahod gledal predvsem kot na simbol moralnega propada. Drugi salafisti – islamska miselna šola, ki se opira na prednike kot vzorne modele – so zavzeli enako stališče do ZDA, vendar nimajo ideološke prožnosti, ki jo zagovarja Muslimanska bratovščina. Medtem ko Muslimanska bratovščina verjame v vključitev Američanov v civilni dialog, druge skrajne skupine ne vidijo smisla v dialogu in trdijo, da je sila edini način za obravnavo Združenih držav.
| sep 15, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Zaposlitev, kolonializem, apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (namreč, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Ob istem času, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, in, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Ob istem času, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Na žalost, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAM
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (kvota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; in (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Raziskave
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) zavračanje popuščanja njenega primeža tvega zaostrovanje napetosti v času tako politične negotovosti glede predsedniškega nasledstva kot resnih socialno-ekonomskih nemirov. Čeprav bo to verjetno dolgotrajno, postopen proces, režim bi moral sprejeti predhodne korake za normalizacijo sodelovanja Muslimanskih bratov v političnem življenju. Muslimanski bratje, katerih družbene dejavnosti so bile dolgo tolerirane, njihova vloga v formalni politiki pa je strogo omejena, zmagal brez primere 20 odstotkov poslanskih sedežev v 2005 volitve. To jim je uspelo kljub temu, da so se potegovali le za tretjino razpoložljivih mest in ne glede na precejšnje ovire, vključno s policijsko represijo in volilnimi goljufijami. Ta uspeh je potrdil njihov položaj izjemno dobro organizirane in globoko zakoreninjene politične sile. Ob istem času, poudarila je slabosti tako legalne opozicije kot vladajoče stranke. Režim je morda stavil, da bi lahko skromno povečanje parlamentarne zastopanosti Muslimanskih bratov uporabili za podžiganje strahov pred islamističnim prevzemom in s tem služilo kot razlog za zastoj reform. Če je tako, obstaja veliko tveganje, da bo strategija imela povratne rezultate.
| sep 05, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
James Piscatori
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| sep 04, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| sep 04, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Challenging Authoritarianism, kolonializem, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most
Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Še posebej, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
Ampak, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet
some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Zato, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ampak
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamsko pravo). Vendar pa, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Po drugi strani, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Prav zares,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Vendar pa, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| sep 02, 2010 | Komentarji 0
A Muslim Archipelago
Max L. bruto
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| avgust 27, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Democracy in Islamic Political Thought
Azzam S. Tamimi
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, v 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, v 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| avgust 27, 2010 | Komentarji 0
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