Todas as entradas no "Palestina" Categoría
O mañá árabe
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Outubro 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Exipto. Foi o aniversario do maior momento de vitoria de Exipto en tres conflitos árabe-israelís, cando o exército desfavorecido do país atravesou a canle de Suez nos primeiros días do 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur e enviou as tropas israelís en retirada. Ao fresco, mañá sen nubes, o estadio do Cairo estaba ateigado de familias exipcias que viñeron a ver como os militares pavoneaban o seu hardware., O presidente Anwar el-Sadat,arquitecto da guerra, observaba con satisfacción como homes e máquinas desfilaban diante del. Estaba preto, un correspondente estranxeiro recén chegado.De súpeto, un dos camións do exército detívose directamente diante do posto de revisión xusto cando seis avións Mirage rugían sobre a cabeza nunha actuación acrobática., pintando o ceo con longas estelas de vermello, amarelo, roxo,e fume verde. Sadat levantouse, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saúdos con outro continxente de tropas exipcias. Fíxose un branco perfecto para catro asasinos islamitas que saltaron do camión, asaltou o podio, e acribillaron o seu corpo de balas. Mentres os asasinos continuaron durante o que parecía unha eternidade rociando o posto co seu lume mortal., Penseime por un instante se chocar contra o chan e correr o risco de ser pisoteado por espectadores aterrorizados ou permanecer a pé e arriscarse a recibir unha bala perdida.. O instinto díxome que me quedara de pé, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| setembro 26, 2010 | comentarios 0
O FEMINISMO ENTRE O LAICismo E O ISLAMISMO: O CASO DE PALESTINA
Dr, Islah Jad
Eleccións lexislativas celebradas en Cisxordania e na Franxa de Gaza 2006 levou ao poder ao movemento islamita Hamás, que pasou a formar a maioría do Consello Lexislativo Palestino e tamén o primeiro goberno maioritario de Hamás. Estas eleccións resultaron no nomeamento da primeira muller ministra de Hamás, que chegou a ser ministra de Asuntos da Muller. Entre marzo 2006 e xuño 2007, dúas ministras de Hamás asumiron este cargo, pero a ambos lles resultou difícil xestionar o Ministerio xa que a maioría dos seus empregados non eran membros de Hamás senón que pertencían a outros partidos políticos., e a maioría eran membros de Fatah, o movemento dominante que controla a maioría das institucións da Autoridade Palestina. Un tenso período de loita entre as mulleres de Hamás no Ministerio de Asuntos da Muller e as mulleres membros de Fatah chegou ao seu fin tras a toma de poder por Hamás na Franxa de Gaza e a consecuente caída do seu goberno en Cisxordania, unha loita. que ás veces deu un xiro violento. Unha das razóns que se citou máis tarde para explicar esta loita foi a diferenza entre o discurso feminista secular e o discurso islamista sobre os problemas das mulleres.. No contexto palestino este desacordo adquiriu un carácter perigoso xa que se utilizaba para xustificar a perpetuación da cruenta loita política., a destitución das mulleres de Hamás dos seus postos ou postos, e as divisións políticas e xeográficas que imperaban nese momento tanto en Cisxordania como na Franxa de Gaza ocupada.
Esta loita suscita unha serie de preguntas importantes: debemos castigar ao movemento islamita que chegou ao poder, ou debemos considerar as razóns que levaron ao fracaso de Fateh no ámbito político? O feminismo pode ofrecer un marco integral para as mulleres, independentemente das súas filiacións sociais e ideolóxicas? Pode un discurso sobre un terreo común compartido para as mulleres axudarlles a realizar e consensuar os seus obxectivos comúns?? O paternalismo só está presente na ideoloxía islamita, e non no nacionalismo e no patriotismo? Que entendemos por feminismo? Hai só un feminismo, ou varios feminismos? Que entendemos por islam? – é o movemento coñecido con este nome ou a relixión, a filosofía, ou o sistema xurídico? Temos que ir ao fondo destas cuestións e consideralas coidadosamente, e hai que consensualas para despois decidir, como feministas, se a nosa crítica ao paternalismo debe dirixirse á relixión (fe), que debería limitarse ao corazón do crente e non permitirse tomar o control do mundo en xeral, ou a xurisprudencia, que se relaciona con diferentes escolas de fe que explican o sistema legal contido no Corán e os ditos do Profeta – a Sunnah.
| setembro 19, 2010 | comentarios 0
O ACTIVISMO DAS MULLERES ISLAMISTAS NA PALESTINA OCUPADA
Entrevistas de Khaled Amayreh
Entrevista a Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka é membro electo do Consello Lexislativo Palestino. Ela foi
naceu na aldea de Shoyoukh preto de Hebrón en 1964. Ela ten unha licenciatura en Sharia (islámico
Xurisprudencia) da Universidade de Hebrón. Ela traballou como xornalista desde 1996 a 2006 cando
ela entrou no Consello Lexislativo Palestino como membro electo no 2006 eleccións.
Está casada e ten sete fillos.
Q: Hai unha impresión xeral nalgúns países occidentais que reciben as mulleres
trato inferior dentro dos grupos de resistencia islámica, como Hamás. Isto é certo??
Como son tratadas as mulleres activistas en Hamás?
Os dereitos e deberes das mulleres musulmás emanan en primeiro lugar da sharia ou da lei islámica.
Non son actos ou xestos voluntarios ou benéficos que recibimos de Hamás ou de ninguén
outra cousa. Así, no que a implicación política e activismo se refire, as mulleres xeralmente teñen
os mesmos dereitos e deberes que os homes. Despois de todo, as mulleres compoñen polo menos 50 por cento de
sociedade. En certo sentido, son toda a sociedade porque dan a luz, e levantar,
a nova xeración.
Polo tanto, Podo dicir que a condición da muller dentro de Hamás está en plena conformidade con ela
status no propio Islam. Isto significa que é unha compañeira completa en todos os niveis. Por suposto, sería
inxusto e inxusto para un islámico (ou islamista se o prefires) muller para ser compañeira de sufrimento
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, activismo político
non é obrigatorio senón voluntario, e decídese en gran medida en función das capacidades de cada muller,
cualificacións e circunstancias individuais. Non obstante, mostrando preocupación polo público
asuntos é obrigatorio para todos os homes e mulleres musulmáns. O Profeta
dixo Muhammed: "Quen non mostra preocupación polos asuntos dos musulmáns non é musulmán".
Ademais, As mulleres islamitas palestinas teñen que incorporar todos os factores obxectivos sobre o terreo
ter en conta á hora de decidir se participar en política ou involucrarse no activismo político.
| setembro 19, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islam, Islam político e América
introspección árabe
Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
khalil al-anani
“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.
| setembro 15, 2010 | comentarios 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, académicos, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
Ocupación, colonialismo, apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (a saber, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, e
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, e, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consulta, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, adoita favorecer as ditaduras e os réximes de títeres que fan de boca en boca os valores democráticos e os dereitos humanos, a réplica de 9/11 verdadeiramente cimentou aínda máis os receos a través da posición de Estados Unidos sobre o islam político. Creou un muro de negatividade como atopou worldpublicopinion.org, segundo o cal 67% dos exipcios cren que a nivel mundial América está a desempeñar un papel "principalmente negativo"..
Así, a resposta de Estados Unidos foi axeitada. Ao elixir a Obama, moitos en todo o mundo están poñendo as súas esperanzas para desenvolver un menos belixerante, pero unha política exterior máis xusta cara ao mundo musulmán. A proba para Obama, como comentamos, é como Estados Unidos e os seus aliados promoven a democracia. Será facilitador ou impoñente?
Ademais, pode ser importante un corredor honesto en zonas prolongadas de confl ictos? Reclutando a experiencia e a percepción de prolifi
c estudosos, académicos, xornalistas e políticos experimentados, Arches Quarterly saca á luz a relación entre o Islam e a Democracia e o papel de América, así como os cambios provocados por Obama., na procura do terreo común. Anas Altikriti, o conselleiro delegado da Fundación Córdoba ofrece a táctica de apertura deste debate, onde reflexiona sobre as esperanzas e os retos que descansa no camiño de Obama. Seguindo Altikriti, o antigo conselleiro do presidente Nixon, O doutor Robert Crane ofrece unha análise exhaustiva do principio islámico do dereito á liberdade. Anwar Ibrahim, ex-vice-primeiro ministro de Malaisia, enriquece a discusión coas realidades prácticas da implantación da democracia nas sociedades dominantes musulmás, a saber, en Indonesia e Malaisia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, EUA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| setembro 07, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islamism revisited
Maha Azzam
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 xullo 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| setembro 06, 2010 | comentarios 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (cota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; e (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| setembro 06, 2010 | comentarios 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleccións. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| setembro 05, 2010 | comentarios 0
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
James Piscatori
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| setembro 04, 2010 | comentarios 0
Islam e Democracia
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| setembro 04, 2010 | comentarios 0
Desafiando o autoritarismo, colonialismo, e Desunión: Os movementos de reforma política islámica de al-Afghani e Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
O declive do mundo musulmán precedeu á colonización europea da maioría
Terras musulmás no último cuarto do século XIX e no primeiro
cuarto do século XX. En particular, do Imperio Otomán
o poder e o status mundial foron deteriorando dende o século XVII.
Pero, máis importante para os eruditos musulmáns, deixara de reunirse
algúns requisitos básicos da súa posición como califato, o supremo e
entidade política soberana á que todos os musulmáns deberían ser leais.
Polo tanto, algúns dos eruditos e intelectuais musulmáns do imperio chamaron
para a reforma política mesmo antes da invasión europea
Terras musulmás. As reformas que contemplaban non eran só islámicas, pero
tamén otomán – dende o marco otomán.
Estes reformadores percibiron o declive do mundo musulmán en xeral,
e do Imperio Otomán en particular, ser o resultado dun aumento
desconsiderar a aplicación da Sharia (Dereito islámico). con todo, dende o
finais do século XVIII, un número crecente de reformadores, ás veces apoiado
polos sultáns otománs, comezou a pedir a reforma do imperio
liñas europeas modernas. O fracaso do imperio para defender as súas terras e para
responder con éxito aos desafíos de Occidente só alimentou aínda máis esta convocatoria
para "modernizar" a reforma, que alcanzou o seu apoxeo no movemento Tanzimat
na segunda metade do século XIX.
Outros reformadores musulmáns pediron un curso medio. Por un lado,
admitían que o califato debía modelarse segundo o islámico
fontes de orientación, especialmente o Corán e o do profeta Mahoma
ensinanzas (Sunnah), e que a ummah (a comunidade musulmá mundial)
a unidade é un dos piares políticos do Islam. Por outra banda, déronse conta do
necesidade de rexuvenecer o imperio ou substituílo por outro máis viable. Por suposto,
incluídas as súas ideas creativas sobre modelos futuros, pero non se limitaron a, o
seguindo: substituíndo o Imperio Otomán liderado polos turcos por un liderado polos árabes
califato, construír un califato musulmán federal ou confederado, establecendo
unha mancomunidade de nacións musulmás ou orientais, e reforzar a solidariedade
e cooperación entre países musulmáns independentes sen crear
unha estrutura fixa. Estas e ideas similares foron máis tarde referidas como o
Modelo de liga musulmá, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. con todo, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, que
emphasized education and undermined politics.
| setembro 02, 2010 | comentarios 0
A Muslim Archipelago
Max L. bruto
This book has been many years in the making, as the author explains in his Preface, though he wrote most of the actual text during his year as senior Research Fellow with the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author was for many years Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College. Even though it may appear that the book could have been written by any good historian or Southeast Asia regional specialist, this work is illuminated by the author’s more than three decades of service within the national Intelligence Community. His regional expertise often has been applied to special assessments for the Community. With a knowledge of Islam unparalleled among his peers and an unquenchable thirst for determining how the goals of this religion might play out in areas far from the focus of most policymakers’ current attention, the author has made the most of this opportunity to acquaint the Intelligence Community and a broader readership with a strategic appreciation of a region in the throes of reconciling secular and religious forces.
This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense.
| Agosto 27, 2010 | comentarios 0
Democracy in Islamic Political Thought
Azzam S. Tamimi
Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, en 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, en 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.
| Agosto 27, 2010 | comentarios 0
IkhwanScope en Facebook
IkhwanScope No Scribd
IkhwanScope en Twitter