RSSToutes les inscriptions au "Palestine" Catégorie

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

octobre 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

FEMINISM BETWEEN SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM: THE CASE OF PALESTINE

Dr, Islah Jad

Legislative elections held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2006 brought to power the Islamist movement Hamas, which went on to form the majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council and also the first majority Hamas government. These elections resulted in the appointment of the first female Hamas minister, who became the Minister of Women’s Affairs. Between March 2006 and June 2007, two different female Hamas ministers assumed this post, but both found it difficult to manage the Ministry since most of its employees were not Hamas members but belonged to other political parties, and most were members of Fatah, the dominant movement controlling most Palestinian Authority institutions. A tense period of struggle between the women of Hamas in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the female members of Fatah came to an end following Hamas’ takeover of power in the Gaza Strip and the resultant fall of its government in the West Bank – a struggle which sometimes took a violent turn. One reason later cited to explain this struggle was the difference between secular feminist discourse and Islamist discourse on women’s issues. In the Palestinian context this disagreement took on a dangerous nature as it was used to justify perpetuating the bloody political struggle, the removal of Hamas women from their positions or posts, and the political and geographical divides prevailing at the time in both the West Bank and the occupied Gaza Strip.
This struggle raises a number of important questions: should we punish the Islamist movement which has come to power, or should we consider the reasons which led to Fateh’s failure in the political arena? Can feminism offer a comprehensive framework for women, regardless of their social and ideological affiliations? Can a discourse of a shared common ground for women help them to realize and agree upon their common goals? Is paternalism only present in Islamist ideology, and not in nationalism and patriotism? What do we mean by feminism? Is there only one feminism, or several feminisms? What do we mean by Islamis it the movement known by this name or the religion, the philosophy, or the legal system? We need to go to the bottom of these issues and consider them carefully, and we must agree upon them so that we can later decide, as feminists, if our criticism of paternalism should be directed at religion (foi), which should be confined to the heart of the believer and not be allowed to take control of the world at large, or the jurisprudence, which relates to different schools of faith which explain the legal system contained in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophetthe Sunnah.

ISLAMIST WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islamique

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 à 2006 when

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 élections.

She is married and has seven children.

Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive

inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Thus, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have

the same rights and duties as men. After all, women make up at least 50 per cent of

society. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,

the new generation.

Par conséquent, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. En effet, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

En outre, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.


Islam, L'Islam politique et l'Amérique

Arabes Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

“there is no chance of communicating with any U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

RACINES DE LA FAUSSE

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Profession, Colonialisme, Apartheid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (namely, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, et
Gaz, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. À la fois, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, et, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, depuis 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. À la fois, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
En outre, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, Etats-Unis, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

L'islamisme revisité

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 ans, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juillet 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (Guerre contre le terrorisme)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; et (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

FRÈRES MUSULMANS ÉGYPTE: CONFRONTATION OU INTÉGRATION?

Rechercher

Le succès de la Society of Muslim Brothers en novembre-décembre 2005 les élections à l’Assemblée du peuple ont provoqué une onde de choc dans le système politique égyptien. En réponse, le régime a réprimé le mouvement, harcelé d'autres rivaux potentiels et annulé son processus de réforme naissant. C'est dangereusement myope. Il y a lieu de s'inquiéter du programme politique des Frères musulmans, et ils doivent au peuple de véritables clarifications sur plusieurs de ses aspects. Mais le national démocrate au pouvoir
Fête (NPD) le refus de desserrer son emprise risque d'exacerber les tensions à la fois dans une période d'incertitude politique entourant la succession présidentielle et de graves troubles socio-économiques. Bien que ce soit probablement un, processus graduel, le régime devrait prendre des mesures préliminaires pour normaliser la participation des Frères musulmans à la vie politique. Les Frères musulmans, dont les activités sociales ont longtemps été tolérées mais dont le rôle dans la politique formelle est strictement limité, a remporté un sans précédent 20 pour cent des sièges parlementaires au 2005 élections. Ils l'ont fait malgré la compétition pour seulement un tiers des sièges disponibles et malgré des obstacles considérables, y compris la répression policière et la fraude électorale. Ce succès a confirmé leur position de force politique extrêmement bien organisée et profondément enracinée. À la fois, il a souligné les faiblesses de l'opposition légale et du parti au pouvoir. Le régime aurait bien pu parier qu’une augmentation modeste de la représentation parlementaire des Frères musulmans pourrait être utilisée pour attiser les craintes d’une prise de contrôle islamiste et servir ainsi de raison pour bloquer la réforme.. Le cas échéant, la stratégie risque fort de se retourner contre vous.

L'Irak et l'avenir de l'islam politique

James Piscatori

Il y a soixante-cinq ans, l'un des plus grands savants de l'islam moderne posait la question simple, «Où l'islam?", où allait le monde islamique? C'était une période de troubles intenses dans les mondes occidental et musulman - la disparition de l'impérialisme et la cristallisation d'un nouveau système étatique en dehors de l'Europe; la création et le test du néo- L'ordre mondial wilsonien à la Société des Nations; l'émergence du fascisme européen. Sir Hamilton Gibb a reconnu que les sociétés musulmanes, incapable d'éviter de telles tendances mondiales, ont également été confrontés à la pénétration tout aussi incontournable du nationalisme, laïcité, et occidentalisation. Alors qu'il mettait prudemment en garde contre les prédictions - risques pour nous tous intéressés par la politique du Moyen-Orient et de l'islam - il était sûr de deux choses.:
(une) le monde islamique évoluerait entre l'idéal de solidarité et les réalités de la division;
(b) la clé de l'avenir réside dans le leadership, ou qui parle avec autorité pour l'Islam.
Aujourd'hui, les pronostics de Gibb pourraient bien avoir une pertinence renouvelée alors que nous sommes confrontés à une crise de plus en plus grave en Irak, le déroulement d'une guerre expansive et controversée contre le terrorisme, et le problème palestinien persistant. Dans cette conférence, je voudrais examiner les facteurs qui peuvent affecter le cours de la politique musulmane dans la période actuelle et dans un avenir proche.. Bien que les points que je vais soulever sont susceptibles d'avoir une pertinence plus large, Je m'appuierai principalement sur le cas du monde arabe.
Hypothèses sur l'islam politique Les prédictions ne manquent pas en ce qui concerne l'islam politisé ou l'islamisme. «L’islamisme» est mieux compris comme le sentiment que quelque chose ne va pas dans les sociétés musulmanes contemporaines et que la solution doit résider dans une série d’actions politiques.. Souvent utilisé de manière interchangeable avec «fondamentalisme», L’islamisme est mieux assimilé à «l’islam politique». Plusieurs commentateurs ont proclamé sa disparition et l'avènement de l'ère post-islamiste. Ils soutiennent que l'appareil répressif de l'État s'est avéré plus durable que l'opposition islamique et que l'incohérence idéologique des islamistes les a rendus inadaptés à la concurrence politique moderne.. Les événements du 11 septembre semblent contredire cette prédiction, encore, inébranlable, ils ont fait valoir qu'un tel spectaculaire, des actes pratiquement anarchiques ne font que prouver la faillite des idées islamistes et suggèrent que les radicaux ont abandonné tout espoir réel de s'emparer du pouvoir.

Islam et Démocratie

ITAC

Si l'on lit la presse ou écoute des commentateurs sur les affaires internationales, on dit souvent - et encore plus souvent sous-entendu mais pas dit - que l'islam n'est pas compatible avec la démocratie. Dans les années 90, Samuel Huntington a déclenché une tempête intellectuelle en publiant The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, dans lequel il présente ses prévisions pour le monde - en gros. Dans le domaine politique, il note que si la Turquie et le Pakistan peuvent prétendre à une «légitimité démocratique», tous les autres «… les pays musulmans étaient majoritairement non démocratiques: monarchies, systèmes à un seul parti, régimes militaires, dictatures personnelles ou une combinaison de celles-ci, reposant généralement sur une famille limitée, clan, ou base tribale ». La prémisse sur laquelle se fonde son argument est qu’ils ne sont pas seulement «pas comme nous», ils sont en fait opposés à nos valeurs démocratiques essentielles. Il croit, comme les autres, que tandis que l'idée de démocratisation occidentale est combattue dans d'autres parties du monde, la confrontation est la plus notable dans les régions où l'islam est la religion dominante.
L'argument a également été avancé de l'autre côté. Un érudit religieux iranien, réflexion sur une crise constitutionnelle du début du XXe siècle dans son pays, a déclaré que l'islam et la démocratie ne sont pas compatibles parce que les gens ne sont pas égaux et qu'un organe législatif n'est pas nécessaire en raison de la nature inclusive de la loi religieuse islamique. Une position similaire a été prise plus récemment par Ali Belhadj, un professeur de lycée algérien, prédicateur et (dans ce contexte) leader du FIS, lorsqu'il a déclaré que «la démocratie n'était pas un concept islamique». La déclaration la plus dramatique à cet effet est peut-être celle d'Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, chef des insurgés sunnites en Irak qui, face à la perspective d'une élection, a dénoncé la démocratie comme «un principe diabolique».
Mais selon certains érudits musulmans, la démocratie reste un idéal important de l'islam, avec la mise en garde qu'il est toujours soumis à la loi religieuse. L'accent mis sur la place primordiale de la charia est un élément de presque tous les commentaires islamiques sur la gouvernance, modéré ou extrémiste. Seulement si la règle, qui reçoit son autorité de Dieu, limite ses actions à la «supervision de l’administration de la charia» est-il à obéir. S'il fait autre chose que ça, il est un non-croyant et les musulmans engagés doivent se rebeller contre lui. C'est là que réside la justification d'une grande partie de la violence qui a frappé le monde musulman dans des luttes telles que celle qui prévalait en Algérie dans les années 90.

S'attaquant à l'autoritarisme, Colonialisme, et de la désunion: Les mouvements islamiques réformistes politiques d'al-Afghani et Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

Le déclin du monde musulman a précédé la colonisation européenne de la plupart

Terres musulmanes dans le dernier quart du XIXe siècle et le premier
quart du vingtième siècle. En particulier, l’Empire ottoman
la puissance et le statut mondial se détérioraient depuis le XVIIe siècle.
Mais, plus important pour les érudits musulmans, il avait cessé de se rencontrer

quelques exigences de base de sa position de califat, le suprême et
entité politique souveraine à laquelle tous les musulmans devraient être fidèles.
Par conséquent, certains des érudits et intellectuels musulmans de l’empire ont appelé
pour une réforme politique avant même l'empiètement européen sur
Terres musulmanes. Les réformes qu'ils envisageaient n'étaient pas seulement islamiques, mais
aussi ottoman - dans le cadre ottoman.

Ces réformateurs ont perçu le déclin du monde musulman en général,

et de l'Empire ottoman en particulier, être le résultat d'une augmentation

mépris de la mise en œuvre de la charia (loi islamique). Cependant, depuis le

fin du XVIIIe siècle, un nombre croissant de réformateurs, parfois pris en charge

par les sultans ottomans, a commencé à appeler à réformer l'empire le long

lignes européennes modernes. L’incapacité de l’empire à défendre ses terres et à

répondre avec succès aux défis de l’Occident n’a fait qu’alimenter cet appel

pour «moderniser» la réforme, qui a atteint son apogée dans le mouvement Tanzimat

dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle.

D'autres réformateurs musulmans ont appelé à une voie intermédiaire. D'un côté,

ils ont admis que le califat devrait être modelé selon le modèle islamique

sources d'orientation, en particulier le Coran et le Prophète Muhammad

enseignements (Sunnah), et que la ummah (la communauté musulmane mondiale)

l’unité est l’un des piliers politiques de l’islam. D'autre part, ils ont réalisé le

besoin de rajeunir l'empire ou de le remplacer par un plus viable. En effet,

leurs idées créatives sur les futurs modèles inclus, mais n'étaient pas limités à, le

Suivant: remplaçant l'Empire ottoman dirigé par la Turquie par un

califat, construire un califat musulman fédéral ou confédéré, établissement

une communauté de nations musulmanes ou orientales, et renforcer la solidarité

et la coopération entre les pays musulmans indépendants sans créer

une structure fixe. Ces idées et des idées similaires ont été désignées plus tard sous le nom de

Modèle de la ligue musulmane, qui était une thèse-cadre pour les différentes propositions

lié au futur califat.

Deux partisans d'une telle réforme étaient Jamal al-Din al-Afghani et

Muhammad `Abduh, qui ont tous deux joué un rôle clé dans la modernité

Mouvement de réforme politique islamique.1 Leur réponse au double défi

face au monde musulman à la fin du XIXe siècle - colonisation européenne

et le déclin musulman - était équilibré. Leur but ultime était de

raviver la Oummah en observant la révélation islamique et en bénéficiant

des réalisations de l’Europe. Cependant, ils n'étaient pas d'accord sur certains aspects

et méthodes, ainsi que les objectifs et stratégies immédiats, de réforme.

Alors qu'Al-Afghani appelait et luttait principalement pour une réforme politique,

`Abduh, une fois l'un de ses proches disciples, développé ses propres idées, lequel

mis l'accent sur l'éducation et sapé la politique.




Un archipel musulman

Max L. Brut

Ce livre a été de nombreuses années en cours d'élaboration, comme l'explique l'auteur dans sa préface, bien qu'il ait écrit la majeure partie du texte au cours de son année en tant que chercheur principal au Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. L'auteur a été pendant de nombreuses années doyen de la School of Intelligence Studies du Joint Military Intelligence College.. Même s'il peut sembler que le livre ait pu être écrit par n'importe quel bon historien ou spécialiste régional de l'Asie du Sud-Est, ce travail est éclairé par les plus de trois décennies de service de l’auteur au sein de la communauté nationale du renseignement. Son expertise régionale a souvent été appliquée à des évaluations spéciales pour la Communauté. Avec une connaissance de l’islam sans pareille parmi ses pairs et une soif inextinguible de déterminer comment les objectifs de cette religion pourraient jouer dans des domaines loin de l’attention actuelle de la plupart des décideurs politiques, l'auteur a profité de cette occasion pour familiariser la communauté du renseignement et un lectorat plus large avec une appréciation stratégique d'une région en proie à la réconciliation des forces laïques et religieuses.
Cette publication a été approuvée pour une distribution sans restriction par le Bureau de l'examen de la sécurité, département de la Défense.

La démocratie dans la pensée politique islamique

Azzam S. Tamimi

La démocratie préoccupe les penseurs politiques arabes depuis l'aube de la renaissance arabe moderne il y a environ deux siècles. Depuis, le concept de démocratie a changé et s'est développé sous l'influence de divers développements sociaux et politiques. La discussion sur la démocratie dans la littérature arabo-islamique remonte à Rifa'a Tahtawi, le père de la démocratie égyptienne selon Lewis Awad,[3] qui peu de temps après son retour au Caire de Paris a publié son premier livre, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, dans 1834. Le livre résumait ses observations sur les mœurs et les coutumes du français moderne,[4] et a fait l'éloge du concept de démocratie tel qu'il le voyait en France et en étant témoin de sa défense et de sa réaffirmation à travers le 1830 Révolution contre le roi Charles X.[5] Tahtawi a tenté de montrer que le concept démocratique qu'il expliquait à ses lecteurs était compatible avec la loi de l'islam. Il a comparé le pluralisme politique aux formes de pluralisme idéologique et jurisprudentiel qui existaient dans l'expérience islamique:
La liberté religieuse est la liberté de croyance, d'opinion et de secte, à condition de ne pas contredire les fondements de la religion . . . La même chose s'appliquerait à la liberté de pratique politique et d'opinion des principaux administrateurs, qui s'efforcent d'interpréter et d'appliquer les règles et les dispositions conformément aux lois de leur propre pays. Les rois et les ministres sont autorisés dans le domaine de la politique à suivre diverses voies qui, en fin de compte, servent un seul but.: bonne administration et justice.[6] Un jalon important à cet égard a été la contribution de Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader du mouvement de réforme du XIXe siècle en Tunisie, qui, dans 1867, a formulé un plan général de réforme dans un livre intitulé Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Revenir (La voie directe pour réformer les gouvernements). La principale préoccupation du livre était d'aborder la question de la réforme politique dans le monde arabe. Tout en appelant les politiciens et les universitaires de son temps à rechercher tous les moyens possibles afin d'améliorer le statut de la
communauté et développer sa courtoisie, il a mis en garde le grand public musulman de ne pas fuir les expériences d'autres nations sur la base de l'idée fausse que tous les écrits, inventions, les expériences ou les attitudes des non-musulmans doivent être rejetées ou ignorées.
Khairuddin a en outre appelé à la fin du régime absolutiste, qu'il a blâmé pour l'oppression des nations et la destruction des civilisations.