RSSAlle Einträge in der "Naher Osten" Kategorie

Islamische Politische Kultur, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte

Daniel E. Preis

Es wurde argumentiert, dass der Islam den Autoritarismus erleichtert, widerspricht den Werten westlicher Gesellschaften, und beeinflusst wichtige politische Ergebnisse in muslimischen Nationen erheblich. Folglich, Gelehrte, Kommentatoren, und Regierungsbeamte verweisen häufig auf den „islamischen Fundamentalismus“ als die nächste ideologische Bedrohung für liberale Demokratien. Diese Aussicht, jedoch, basiert in erster Linie auf der Analyse von Texten, Islamische politische Theorie, und Ad-hoc-Studien einzelner Länder, die andere Faktoren nicht berücksichtigen. Ich behaupte, dass die Texte und Traditionen des Islam, wie die anderer Religionen, kann verwendet werden, um eine Vielzahl von politischen Systemen und Richtlinien zu unterstützen. Länderspezifische und deskriptive Studien helfen uns nicht, Muster zu finden, die uns helfen, die unterschiedlichen Beziehungen zwischen Islam und Politik in den Ländern der muslimischen Welt zu erklären. Somit, Ein neuer Ansatz für das Studium der
Verbindung von Islam und Politik gefordert.
Ich schlage vor, durch strenge Bewertung der Beziehung zwischen dem Islam, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte auf länderübergreifender Ebene, dass zu viel Wert auf die Macht des Islam als politische Kraft gelegt wird. Ich verwende zunächst vergleichende Fallstudien, die sich auf Faktoren konzentrieren, die sich auf das Zusammenspiel zwischen islamischen Gruppen und Regimen beziehen, wirtschaftliche Einflüsse, ethnische Spaltungen, und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, um die Varianz im Einfluss des Islam auf die Politik in acht Nationen zu erklären. Ich behaupte, dass viel von der Macht
dem Islam als treibende Kraft hinter Politik und politischen Systemen in muslimischen Ländern zugeschrieben wird, lässt sich besser durch die zuvor genannten Faktoren erklären. find ich auch, entgegen der landläufigen Meinung, dass die zunehmende Stärke islamischer politischer Gruppen oft mit einer bescheidenen Pluralisierung politischer Systeme in Verbindung gebracht wird.
Ich habe einen Index der islamischen politischen Kultur erstellt, basierend auf dem Ausmaß, in dem islamisches Recht angewendet wird und ob und, wenn ja, wie,Westliche Ideen, Institutionen, und Technologien implementiert werden, um die Art der Beziehung zwischen Islam und Demokratie und Islam und Menschenrechten zu testen. Dieser Indikator wird in der statistischen Analyse verwendet, die eine Stichprobe von dreiundzwanzig überwiegend muslimischen Ländern und eine Kontrollgruppe von dreiundzwanzig nichtmuslimischen Entwicklungsländern umfasst. Neben dem Vergleich
Islamische Nationen zu nicht-islamischen Entwicklungsländern, Die statistische Analyse ermöglicht es mir, den Einfluss anderer Variablen zu kontrollieren, die sich nachweislich auf das Demokratieniveau und den Schutz individueller Rechte auswirken. Das Ergebnis sollte ein realistischeres und genaueres Bild des Einflusses des Islam auf Politik und Politik sein.

PRÄZISION IM WELTWEITEN KRIEG GEGEN DEN TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Sieben Jahre nach dem September 11, 2001 (9/11) Anschläge, Viele Experten glauben, dass Al-Qaida wieder an Stärke gewonnen hat und dass ihre Nachahmer oder Partner tödlicher sind als zuvor. Die Schätzung des National Intelligence of 2007 behauptete, al-Qaida sei jetzt gefährlicher als zuvor 9/11.1 Die Emulatoren von Al-Qaida bedrohen weiterhin den Westen, Mittlerer Osten, und europäischen Nationen, wie in der im September vereitelten Handlung 2007 in Deutschland. Bruce Riedel erklärt: Das ist vor allem Washingtons Eifer zu verdanken, in den Irak zu gehen, anstatt die Anführer von Al-Qaida zu jagen, Die Organisation verfügt jetzt über eine solide Operationsbasis in den Ödländern Pakistans und über ein effektives Franchise im Westirak. Seine Reichweite hat sich in der gesamten muslimischen Welt und in Europa ausgebreitet . . . Osama bin Laden hat eine erfolgreiche Propagandakampagne gestartet. . . . Seine Ideen ziehen heute mehr Anhänger denn je an.
Es stimmt, dass in der gesamten islamischen Welt immer noch verschiedene salafistisch-dschihadistische Organisationen entstehen. Warum haben sich Antworten auf den islamistischen Terrorismus, den wir als globalen Dschihad bezeichnen, nicht als äußerst effektiv erwiesen??
Der Wechsel zu den Werkzeugen der „Soft Power,„Was ist mit der Wirksamkeit westlicher Bemühungen, Muslime im globalen Krieg gegen den Terror zu stärken? (GWOT)? Warum haben die Vereinigten Staaten in der breiteren islamischen Welt so wenige „Herzen und Köpfe“ gewonnen?? Warum spielen amerikanische strategische Botschaften zu diesem Thema in der Region so schlecht?? Warum, trotz einer breiten muslimischen Missbilligung des Extremismus, wie aus Umfragen und offiziellen Äußerungen wichtiger muslimischer Führer hervorgeht, In Jordanien und Pakistan hat die Unterstützung für bin Laden tatsächlich zugenommen?
Diese Monographie wird die Ursprünge islamistischer Gewalt nicht erneut aufgreifen. Stattdessen geht es um eine Art konzeptionelles Scheitern, das die GWOT falsch konstruiert und Muslime davon abhält, sie zu unterstützen. Sie sind nicht in der Lage, sich mit den vorgeschlagenen transformativen Gegenmaßnahmen zu identifizieren, weil sie einige ihrer Grundüberzeugungen und -institutionen als Ziele in erkennen
dieses Unterfangen.
Mehrere zutiefst problematische Trends verwirren die amerikanische Konzeptualisierung des GWOT und die strategischen Botschaften, die zur Bekämpfung dieses Krieges entwickelt wurden. Diese entwickeln sich aus (1) postkolonialer politischer Umgang mit Muslimen und muslimischen Mehrheitsnationen, die sehr unterschiedlich sind und daher widersprüchliche und verwirrende Eindrücke und Wirkungen erzeugen; und (2) verbleibende allgemeine Ignoranz und Vorurteile gegenüber dem Islam und subregionalen Kulturen. Hinzu kommt die amerikanische Wut, Furcht, und Angst vor den tödlichen Ereignissen von 9/11, und bestimmte Elemente, die, trotz des Drängens kühler Köpfe, Muslime und ihre Religion für die Missetaten ihrer Glaubensgenossen verantwortlich machen, oder die es aus politischen Gründen für sinnvoll halten.

DEBATTE DEMOKRATIE IN DER ARABISCHEN WELT

Ibtisam Ibrahim

Was ist Demokratie?
Westliche Gelehrte definieren Demokratie als eine Methode zum Schutz der bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte des Einzelnen. Es sorgt für Meinungsfreiheit, Drücken Sie, Glauben, Meinung, Eigentum, und Montage, sowie das Wahlrecht, ein öffentliches Amt ernennen und anstreben. Huntington (1984) argumentiert, dass ein politisches System in dem Maße demokratisch ist, in dem seine mächtigsten kollektiven Entscheidungsträger ausgewählt werden
regelmäßige Wahlen, bei denen Kandidaten frei um Stimmen konkurrieren und bei denen praktisch alle Erwachsenen wahlberechtigt sind. Rothstein (1995) besagt, dass Demokratie eine Regierungsform und ein Governance-Prozess ist, der sich an die Umstände ändert und anpasst. Er fügt auch hinzu, dass die westliche Definition von Demokratie — zusätzlich zur Rechenschaftspflicht, Wettbewerb, ein gewisses Maß an Partizipation — enthält eine Garantie wichtiger bürgerlicher und politischer Rechte. Anderson (1995) argumentiert, dass der Begriff Demokratie ein System bezeichnet, in dem die mächtigsten kollektiven Entscheidungsträger durch regelmäßige Wahlen ausgewählt werden, bei denen die Kandidaten frei um Stimmen konkurrieren und in dem praktisch die gesamte erwachsene Bevölkerung wahlberechtigt ist. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), ein ägyptischer Gelehrter, sieht die Demokratie, die für die arabische Welt gelten könnte, als eine Reihe von Regeln und Institutionen, die entworfen wurden, um eine Regierung durch die Friedlichen zu ermöglichen
Umgang mit konkurrierenden Gruppen und/oder widersprüchlichen Interessen. Aber, Samir Amin (1991) stützte seine Definition von Demokratie auf die sozialmarxistische Perspektive. Er teilt die Demokratie in zwei Kategorien ein: bürgerliche Demokratie, die auf individuellen Rechten und Freiheit für den Einzelnen beruht, aber ohne soziale Gleichberechtigung; und politische Demokratie, die allen Menschen in der Gesellschaft das Recht gibt, zu wählen und ihre Regierung und institutionelle Vertreter zu wählen, die dazu beitragen, ihre gleichen sozialen Rechte zu erlangen.
Zum Abschluss dieses Abschnitts, Ich würde sagen, dass es keine einheitliche Definition von Demokratie gibt, die genau angibt, was Demokratie ist oder was nicht. Aber, wie wir festgestellt haben, Die meisten der oben genannten Definitionen haben im Wesentlichen ähnliche Elemente – Rechenschaftspflicht, Wettbewerb, und ein gewisses Maß an Beteiligung – die in der westlichen Welt und international dominant geworden sind.

Demokratie, Wahlen und die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
westliche Regierungen, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (VFD), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

ÄGYPTENS MUSLIMISCHE BRÜDER: KONFRONTATION ODER INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In Beantwortung, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 Wahlen. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Zur selben Zeit, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islam und Demokratie: Text, Tradition, und Geschichte

Ahrar Ahmad

Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, bedrückend, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. Aber, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Beispielsweise, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. Tatsächlich, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. Beispielsweise, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. Ähnlich, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Schließlich, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, Indonesien, Pakistan, Irak, Afghanistan, Algerien, and Bosnia).

Irak und die Zukunft des politischen Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?", where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(ein) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam und Demokratie

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Islam und Islamismus in Afghanistan

Christine Mendoza

The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as

Ideologie, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the

establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became

the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. Aber, the earlier appearance of an

Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an

instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.

This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three

parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,

indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing

its own vision. Then, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is

discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in

the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will

show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these

countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned

theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the

implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a

discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is

necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, und die

role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist

experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist

experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and

legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will

underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of

understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current

demands.


GLOBALISIERUNG UND POLITISCHER ISLAM: DIE SOZIALEN GRUNDLAGEN DER TÜRKISCHEN WOHLFAHRTSPARTEI

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, dann, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. Dieses Papier wird, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, mit 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nichtsdestotrotz, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

herausfordernde Autoritarismus, Kolonialismus, und Uneinheit: Die islamische politische Reformbewegungen von al-Afghani Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Im Speziellen, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Deshalb, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, aber
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamisches Gesetz). Aber, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Auf der anderen Seite, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Tatsächlich,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, das

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Aber, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, welche

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Ägypten am Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In den frühen 1980er Jahren, Ich habe in Kairo als Bürochef der Washington Post gelebt und über solche historischen Ereignisse wie den Rückzug des letzten berichtet
Israelische Truppen aus ägyptischem Territorium, das während der 1973 Arabisch-israelischer Krieg und die Ermordung des Präsidenten
Anwar Sadat von islamischen Fanatikern im Oktober 1981.
Letzteres Nationaldrama, was ich persönlich miterlebt habe, hatte sich als ein entscheidender Meilenstein erwiesen. Es zwang Sadats Nachfolger, Hosni Mubarak, sich nach innen zu wenden, um sich einer islamistischen Herausforderung unbekannten Ausmaßes zu stellen und Ägyptens Führungsrolle in der arabischen Welt effektiv zu beenden.
Mubarak zeigte sich sofort als sehr vorsichtig, einfallsloser Führer, eher irrsinnig reaktiv als proaktiv im Umgang mit den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Problemen, die seine Nation wie dem explosiven Bevölkerungswachstum überwältigen (1.2 Millionen weitere Ägypter pro Jahr) und wirtschaftlicher Niedergang.
In einer vierteiligen Washington Post-Serie, die geschrieben wurde, als ich früh abreiste 1985, Ich bemerkte, dass der neue ägyptische Führer immer noch ziemlich viel war
ein totales Rätsel für sein eigenes Volk, bietet keine Vision und befehligt ein scheinbar steuerloses Staatsschiff. Die sozialistische Wirtschaft
geerbt aus der Ära von Präsident Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 zu 1970) war ein Chaos. Die Währung des Landes, das Pfund, war in Betrieb
zu acht verschiedenen Wechselkursen; seine staatlichen Fabriken waren unproduktiv, nicht wettbewerbsfähig und hoch verschuldet; und die Regierung steuerte auf den Bankrott zu, teilweise wegen der Subventionen für Lebensmittel, Strom und Benzin verbrauchten ein Drittel ($7 Milliarde) seines Budgets. Kairo war in einen hoffnungslosen Sumpf aus festgefahrenem Verkehr und einer wimmelnden Menschheit versunken – 12 Millionen Menschen drängten sich auf einem schmalen Landstreifen am Ufer des Nils, Lebendiger in baufälligen Mietskasernen in den immer größer werdenden Slums der Stadt.

Organisatorische Kontinuität in Ägyptens Muslimbruderschaft

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Seit seiner Gründung im 1928, Die Bruderschaft (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, jedoch, die Bruderschaft hat
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
Regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Stattdessen, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Rede von Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

ZWISCHEN GESTERN UND HEUTE

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in es, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (saw), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, und provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. Der Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Wurzeln des Nationalismus in der muslimischen Welt

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Tatsächlich, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Außerdem, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Araber, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Beispielsweise, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Vielmehr, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.