中的所有條目 "摩洛哥" 類別
阿拉伯的明天
大衛乙. 渥太威
十月 6, 1981, 本來是埃及慶祝的一天. 它標誌著埃及在三場阿以沖突中取得勝利的最偉大時刻的周年紀念, 當該國處於劣勢的軍隊在蘇伊士運河上突進時 1973 贖罪日戰爭並派遣以色列軍隊撤退. 在一個很酷的, 萬里無雲的早晨, 開羅體育場擠滿了前來觀看軍隊展示其硬件的埃及家庭。在檢閱台上, 安瓦爾·薩達特總統,戰爭的建築師, 滿意地看著人和機器在他面前遊行. 我在附近, 一位新來的外國記者。突然, 一輛軍用卡車直接停在檢閱台前，六架幻影噴氣式飛機在頭頂進行雜技表演, 用長長的紅色畫出天空, 黃色, 紫色的,和綠煙. 薩達特站了起來, 顯然準備與另一支埃及軍隊交換敬意. 他使自己成為四名從卡車上跳下來的伊斯蘭刺客的完美目標, 衝上講台, 並用子彈打滿了他的身體。當兇手繼續用他們致命的火焰噴射看台似乎是永恆的, 我考慮了一下，是摔倒在地，冒著被驚慌失措的觀眾踩死的風險，還是留在原地，冒著被流彈擊中的風險. 本能告訴我要站穩腳跟, 我的新聞責任感驅使我去查明薩達特是死是活.
伊斯蘭教, 政治伊斯蘭教與美國
阿拉伯洞察
與美國的“兄弟情誼”是否可能?
哈利勒阿納尼
伊斯蘭教, 民主 & 美國:
科爾多瓦基金會
阿卜杜拉Faliq
介紹 ,
重新審視伊斯蘭主義
MAHA阿扎姆
挑戰威權主義, 殖民主義, 和不團結: 阿富汗和里達的伊斯蘭政治改革運動
艾哈邁德·阿里·薩利姆
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (伊斯蘭法). 然而, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. 另一方面, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 確實,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 該
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, 哪一個
emphasized education and undermined politics.
伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力
托比·阿徹
海蒂Huuhtanen
參與政治伊斯蘭的策略
沙迪哈米德
AMANDA卡德萊茨
伊斯蘭運動和阿拉伯世界的民主進程: 探索灰色地帶
彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色, 阿穆爾·哈薩,
瑪麗娜奧特維
伊斯蘭激進化
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲外交政策
政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲鄰國政策
邁克爾·愛默生
理查德·楊斯
自從 2001 以及隨之而來的西方與政治伊斯蘭之間關係性質的國際事件已成為外交政策的決定性問題. 近年來，對政治伊斯蘭問題進行了大量的研究和分析。. 這有助於糾正西方以前對伊斯蘭價值觀和意圖的性質的一些簡單化和危言聳聽的假設. 與此平行, 歐盟 (歐盟) 制定了許多政策舉措，主要是歐洲鄰里政策(ENP) 原則上致力於對話和更深入的參與(非暴力) 阿拉伯國家內的政治行為者和民間社會組織. 然而，許多分析家和政策制定者現在抱怨在概念辯論和政策制定中的某個獎杯. 已經確定，政治伊斯蘭教是一個不斷變化的景觀, 深受各種情況的影響, 但辯論似乎常常停留在“伊斯蘭主義者是否民主”這樣簡單的問題上?’ 許多獨立分析家仍然主張與伊斯蘭主義者接觸, 但西方政府與伊斯蘭組織之間的實際和解仍然有限 .
伊斯蘭運動: 政治自由 & 民主
優素福·卡拉達維博士
這是人的職責 (清真) 下一階段的運動堅決反對極權獨裁統治, 政治專制和篡奪民權. 運動應始終支持政治自由, 如真,不假, 民主. 它應該斷然宣布它拒絕暴君並避開所有獨裁者, 即使某些暴君似乎對它有良好的意圖，以獲取一些利益，而且時間通常很短, 正如經驗所表明的那樣。先知 (鋸) 說, “當你看到我的國家成為恐懼的犧牲品，而不是對做錯事的人說, “你錯了”, 那麼你可能會對他們失去希望。”那麼，一個強迫人們對自負的不法者說話的政權怎麼樣？, “怎麼剛剛, 你有多棒. 哦，我們的英雄, 我們的救世主和我們的解放者!”《古蘭經》譴責像努姆魯德這樣的暴君, 法老, 哈曼等, 但它也鄙視那些追隨暴君並服從他們命令的人. 這就是為什麼安拉蔑視諾亞比的人說, “但他們跟隨 (米) 他們的財富和孩子不會給他們增加，只會給他們帶來損失。” [諾亞的信; 21]安拉也提到了廣告, 胡德人, “並且聽從了每一個強者的命令, 頑固的違法者”. [胡德的信:59]也看看古蘭經是怎麼說法老的人民的, “但他們聽從了法老的命令, 法老的命令沒有得到正確的引導。[胡德的信: 97] “因此他愚弄了他的人民, 他們服從了他: 他們確實是一個叛逆的民族 (反對真主).” [蘇拉特·祖赫魯夫: 54]仔細研究穆斯林民族的歷史和現代伊斯蘭運動應該清楚地表明，伊斯蘭思想, 除非在民主和自由的氣氛中，否則伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒從未繁榮或結出果實, 只有在壓迫和暴政踐踏了堅持伊斯蘭教的人民的意誌時，它們才會枯萎和貧瘠. 這種壓迫政權強加了他們的世俗主義, 通過武力和脅迫對其人民實行社會主義或共產主義, 使用秘密酷刑和公開處決, 並使用那些撕裂肉體的惡魔工具,流血, 粉碎骨頭並摧毀靈魂。我們在許多穆斯林國家看到了這些做法, 包括土耳其, 埃及, 敘利亞, 伊拉克, (前者) 南也門, 不同時期的索馬里和北非國家, 取決於每個國家獨裁者的年齡或統治時期。另一方面, 我們看到伊斯蘭運動和伊斯蘭覺醒在自由和民主時代結出碩果並蓬勃發展, 在以恐懼和壓迫統治人民的帝國政權崩潰之後。因此, 我無法想像伊斯蘭運動會支持政治自由和民主以外的任何東西。暴君允許每個人發出聲音, 除了伊斯蘭教的聲音, 讓每一種趨勢都以政黨或某種團體的形式表現出來, 除了伊斯蘭潮流，它是唯一真正代表這個國家並表達它的趨勢, 價值觀, 本質和存在.
馬格里布的激進伊斯蘭教
Carlos Echeverría Jesús
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, 黎巴嫩, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. 在 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,士兵, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.
該 500 最有影響力的穆斯林
約翰·埃斯波西托
易卜拉欣卡林
您手中的出版物是我們希望成為年度系列的第一本，它為了解穆斯林世界的推動者和震動者提供了一個窗口. 我們努力突出顯示有影響力的穆斯林人, 那是, 影響來自他們的伊斯蘭教實踐或來自他們是穆斯林這一事實的人. 我們認為這為穆斯林影響世界的不同方式提供了寶貴的見解, 並且還展示了當今穆斯林生活的多樣性。影響是一個棘手的概念. 它的意思來源於拉丁詞influensmeaning to flow-in, 指向看不見的力量的古老占星術思想 (喜歡月亮) 影響人類. 這份名單上的人物也有影響人類的能力. 這份名單上的每個人都以各種不同的方式影響著地球上許多人的生活. 該 50 最具影響力的人物簡介. 他們的影響力來自多種來源; 然而，它們是統一的，因為它們每個都影響著大量的人類。然後我們打破了 500 領導者成 15 類別—學者, 政治,行政的, 血統, 傳教士, 婦女, 青年, 慈善事業, 發展歷程,科學和技術, 文化藝術, 媒體, 激進分子, 國際伊斯蘭網絡, 和今日問題——幫助您了解伊斯蘭教和穆斯林影響當今世界的不同方式。兩個綜合列表顯示了影響如何以不同方式發揮作用: 國際伊斯蘭網絡展示了穆斯林重要跨國網絡的領導者, 和“今日問題”突出了由於當前影響人類的問題而具有重要意義的個人.
在歐洲的穆斯林鄰國中旅行
喬斯特·拉根第戎克
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, 普羅迪, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, 然而. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. 自從 11 九月 2001, 尤其是, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
未來階段伊斯蘭運動的優先事項
優素福·卡拉達維
What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?
經過 “伊斯蘭運動”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.
建造橋樑而不是牆壁
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空軍) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. 對於他們來說, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.
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