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Orang Arab Esok

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, dimaksudkan untuk menjadi hari perayaan di Mesir. Ia menandakan ulang tahun detik kemenangan terbesar Mesir dalam tiga konflik Arab-Israel, apabila tentera underdog negara itu melintasi Terusan Suez pada hari-hari pembukaan 1973 Perang Yom Kippur dan menyebabkan tentera Israel terkial-kial berundur. Dalam keadaan sejuk, pagi tanpa awan, stadium Kaherah penuh sesak dengan keluarga Mesir yang datang untuk melihat tentera memperkasakan perkakasannya. Di tempat peninjauan, Presiden Anwar el-Sadat,arkitek perang, memerhati dengan penuh kepuasan ketika lelaki dan mesin berarak di hadapannya. Saya berada berdekatan, seorang wartawan asing yang baru tiba.Tiba-tiba, salah satu trak tentera berhenti betul-betul di hadapan tempat peninjauan ketika enam jet Mirage menderu di atas kepala dalam persembahan akrobatik, melukis langit dengan denai merah yang panjang, kuning, ungu,dan asap hijau. Sadat berdiri, nampaknya sedang bersedia untuk bertukar tabik hormat dengan satu lagi kontinjen tentera Mesir. Dia menjadikan dirinya sasaran sempurna untuk empat pembunuh Islam yang melompat dari trak, menyerbu podium, dan memenuhi tubuhnya dengan peluru. Ketika pembunuh terus melakukan apa yang kelihatannya selama-lamanya untuk menyemburkan tembakan mematikan mereka, Saya mempertimbangkan untuk seketika sama ada untuk memukul tanah dan berisiko mati dipijak oleh penonton yang panik atau terus berjalan dan berisiko terkena peluru sesat. Naluri memberitahu saya untuk terus berdiri, dan rasa tugas kewartawanan saya mendorong saya untuk mengetahui sama ada Sadat masih hidup atau sudah mati.

Islam, Islam politik dan Amerika

Wawasan Arab

Adakah "Persaudaraan" dengan Amerika Mungkin?

khalil al-anani

“Tiada peluang untuk berkomunikasi dengan mana-mana A.S. pentadbiran selagi Amerika Syarikat mengekalkan pandangan lamanya tentang Islam sebagai bahaya sebenar, pandangan yang meletakkan Amerika Syarikat senasib dengan musuh Zionis. Kami tidak mempunyai tanggapan sedia ada mengenai rakyat Amerika atau A.S. masyarakat dan organisasi sivik dan badan pemikirnya. Kami tidak mempunyai masalah untuk berkomunikasi dengan rakyat Amerika tetapi tiada usaha yang mencukupi sedang dibuat untuk mendekatkan kami,” kata Dr. Issam al-Iryan, ketua jabatan politik Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam temu bual telefon.
Kata-kata Al-Iryan merumuskan pandangan Ikhwanul Muslimin terhadap rakyat Amerika dan A.S. kerajaan. Ahli Ikhwanul Muslimin yang lain akan bersetuju, begitu juga dengan almarhum Hassan al-Banna, yang mengasaskan kumpulan di 1928. Al- Banna melihat Barat kebanyakannya sebagai simbol keruntuhan moral. Salafi yang lain - sebuah mazhab Islam yang bergantung kepada nenek moyang sebagai model teladan - telah mengambil pandangan yang sama tentang Amerika Syarikat, tetapi tidak mempunyai fleksibiliti ideologi yang dianuti oleh Ikhwanul Muslimin. Sementara Ikhwanul Muslimin percaya dalam melibatkan Amerika dalam dialog sivil, kumpulan pelampau lain tidak melihat sebarang titik dalam dialog dan mengekalkan kuasa itu adalah satu-satunya cara untuk berurusan dengan Amerika Syarikat.

ISLAM, DEMOKRASI & USA:

Yayasan Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq

Pengenalan ,


Walaupun ia menjadi perdebatan tahunan dan kompleks, Arches Quarterly dikaji semula dari landasan teologi dan praktikal, perdebatan penting mengenai hubungan dan keserasian antara Islam dan Demokrasi, seperti yang digemakan dalam agenda harapan dan perubahan Barack Obama. Walaupun banyak yang meraikan kenaikan Obama ke Oval Office sebagai katarsis nasional untuk AS, yang lain tetap kurang optimis terhadap perubahan ideologi dan pendekatan di arena antarabangsa. Walaupun banyak ketegangan dan ketidakpercayaan antara dunia Islam dan AS boleh dikaitkan dengan pendekatan mempromosikan demokrasi, biasanya menggemari pemerintahan diktator dan boneka yang memberi nilai-nilai demokratik dan hak asasi manusia, gempa susulan dari 9/11 telah benar-benar memperkuat keraguan melalui kedudukan Amerika mengenai Islam politik. Ini telah mewujudkan tembok negatif seperti yang dijumpai oleh worldpublicopinion.org, mengikut yang 67% orang Mesir percaya bahawa secara global Amerika memainkan peranan "terutamanya negatif".
Oleh itu, tindak balas Amerika begitu tepat. Dengan memilih Obama, banyak di seluruh dunia menaruh harapan mereka untuk membangun yang kurang berperang, tetapi dasar luar yang lebih adil terhadap dunia Islam. Ujian untuk Obama, seperti yang kita bincangkan, adalah bagaimana Amerika dan sekutunya mempromosikan demokrasi. Adakah ia akan memudahkan atau memaksakan?
Lebih-lebih lagi, bolehkah ia menjadi broker yang jujur ​​di zon konflik yang berpanjangan? Menyenaraikan kepakaran dan wawasan prolifi
c cendekiawan, ahli akademik, wartawan dan ahli politik berpengalaman, Arches Quarterly menyoroti hubungan antara Islam dan Demokrasi dan peranan Amerika - serta perubahan yang dibawa oleh Obama, dalam mencari jalan bersama. Anas Altikriti, Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif Th e Cordoba Foundation memberikan gambaran awal untuk perbincangan ini, di mana ia merefleksikan harapan dan cabaran yang ada di jalan Obama. Mengikuti Altikriti, bekas penasihat Presiden Nixon, Dr Robert Crane memberikan analisis menyeluruh mengenai prinsip Islam mengenai hak kebebasan. Anwar Ibrahim, bekas Timbalan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, memperkayakan perbincangan dengan realiti praktikal melaksanakan demokrasi dalam masyarakat dominan Muslim, iaitu, di Indonesia dan Malaysia.
Kami juga mempunyai Dr Shireen Hunter, Universiti Georgetown, USA, yang meneroka negara-negara Islam yang ketinggalan dalam pendemokrasian dan pemodenan. Ini dilengkapkan oleh penulis keganasan, Penjelasan Dr Nafeez Ahmed mengenai krisis pasca-kemodenan dan
kematian demokrasi. Dr Daud Abdullah (Pengarah Pemantau Media Timur Tengah), Alan Hart (bekas wartawan ITN dan BBC Panorama; pengarang Zionisme: Musuh Yahudi Sebenar) dan Asem Sondos (Penyunting Sawt Al Omma Mesir setiap minggu) tumpukan perhatian kepada Obama dan peranannya dalam mempromosikan demokrasi di dunia Islam, serta hubungan AS dengan Israel dan Ikhwanul Muslimin.
Menteri Luar Negeri menyiarkan, Maldives, Ahmed شہید membuat spekulasi mengenai masa depan Islam dan Demokrasi; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– seorang anggota Sinn Féin yang menjalani hukuman penjara selama empat tahun kerana aktiviti Republik Ireland dan kempen untuk Guildford 4 dan Birmingham 6, mencerminkan perjalanannya ke Gaza baru-baru ini di mana dia menyaksikan kesan kekejaman dan ketidakadilan yang berlaku terhadap rakyat Palestin; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pengarah Pusat Kajian Radikalisasi dan Kekerasan Politik Kontemporari membincangkan cabaran meneliti keganasan politik secara kritis; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, penulis dan penulis drama, membincangkan prospek keamanan di Darfur; dan akhirnya wartawan dan aktivis hak asasi manusia Ashur Shamis memandang kritis terhadap pendemokrasian dan politikisasi umat Islam hari ini.
Kami berharap semua ini dapat membuat pembacaan yang komprehensif dan sumber untuk refleksi terhadap isu-isu yang mempengaruhi kita semua di awal harapan.
Terima kasih

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 tahun, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julai 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Challenging Authoritarianism, Penjajahan, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Khususnya, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, tetapi
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (undang-undang Islam). Walau bagaimanapun, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Sesungguhnya,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, yang

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Walau bagaimanapun, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, yang mana

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Parti Pembangkang Islam dan Potensi Penglibatan EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Memandangkan semakin pentingnya gerakan Islam di dunia Islam dan

cara radikalisasi telah mempengaruhi peristiwa global sejak permulaan abad ini, ia

adalah penting bagi EU untuk menilai dasar-dasarnya terhadap aktor dalam apa yang boleh longgar

dinamakan 'dunia Islam'. Ia amat penting untuk bertanya sama ada dan bagaimana untuk melibatkan diri

dengan pelbagai kumpulan Islam.

Ini masih menjadi kontroversi walaupun di dalam EU. Ada yang merasakan bahawa nilai Islam itu

terletak di belakang parti Islamis semata-mata tidak serasi dengan cita-cita demokrasi barat dan

hak manusia, manakala yang lain melihat penglibatan sebagai satu keperluan yang realistik disebabkan oleh peningkatan

kepentingan domestik parti Islam dan penglibatan mereka yang semakin meningkat dalam antarabangsa

hal ehwal. Perspektif lain ialah pendemokrasian di dunia Islam akan meningkat

keselamatan Eropah. Kesahihan hujah-hujah ini dan lain-lain mengenai sama ada dan bagaimana

EU sepatutnya terlibat hanya boleh diuji dengan mengkaji pergerakan Islam yang berbeza dan

keadaan politik mereka, negara demi negara.

Pendemokrasian ialah tema utama tindakan dasar luar biasa EU, seperti yang diletakkan

keluar dalam Artikel 11 Perjanjian mengenai Kesatuan Eropah. Banyak negeri dipertimbangkan dalam hal ini

laporan tidak demokratik, atau tidak demokratik sepenuhnya. Di kebanyakan negara ini, Islamis

parti dan gerakan merupakan penentangan yang ketara terhadap rejim yang ada, dan

dalam sesetengahnya mereka membentuk blok pembangkang terbesar. Demokrasi Eropah telah lama terpaksa

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Namun, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. A.S.. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Sebagai tambahan, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Coklat, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Gerakan Islam, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Akibatnya, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, namun begitu, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Gerakan Islam: Kebebasan Berpolitik & Demokrasi

Dr Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Ia adalah kewajipan (Islamik) Pergerakan dalam fasa yang akan datang untuk berdiri teguh menentang pemerintahan totalitarian dan diktator, despotisme politik dan perampasan hak rakyat. Pergerakan harus sentiasa berpegang kepada kebebasan politik, seperti yang diwakili oleh benar,bukan palsu, demokrasi. Ia harus mengisytiharkan secara terang-terangan ia menolak kezaliman dan menjauhi semua diktator, walaupun ada yang zalim nampaknya berniat baik ke arahnya untuk keuntungan tertentu dan untuk masa yang biasanya singkat, sebagaimana yang telah ditunjukkan oleh pengalaman.Nabi (SAWS) berkata, “Apabila kamu melihat umatku menjadi mangsa ketakutan dan tidak berkata kepada orang yang zalim, "Awak salah", maka anda mungkin kehilangan harapan kepada mereka.” Jadi bagaimana dengan rejim yang memaksa orang untuk berkata kepada orang yang melakukan kesalahan yang sombong, “Macam mana, betapa hebatnya awak. Wahai pahlawan kami, penyelamat dan pembebas kita!”Al-Quran mencela orang yang zalim seperti Numrudh, Firaun, Haman dan lain-lain, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah). [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, Gerakan Islam dan Kebangkitan Islam tidak pernah berkembang atau membuahkan hasil melainkan dalam suasana demokrasi dan kebebasan., dan telah layu dan menjadi mandul hanya pada masa-masa penindasan dan kezaliman yang menginjak-injak kehendak orang-orang yang berpegang kepada Islam.. Rejim yang menindas seperti itu menimbulkan sekularisme mereka, sosialisme atau komunisme ke atas rakyat mereka dengan kekerasan dan paksaan, menggunakan penyeksaan terselindung dan hukuman mati, dan menggunakan alat-alat syaitan yang mengoyakkan daging,menumpahkan darah, hancur tulang dan hancur jiwa.Kami melihat amalan ini di banyak negara Islam, termasuk Turki, Mesir, Syria, Iraq, (yang dahulu) Yaman Selatan, Somalia dan Negara Afrika utara untuk tempoh masa yang berbeza-beza, bergantung kepada umur atau pemerintahan diktator di setiap negara.Sebaliknya, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Lubnan, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. Dalam 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,askar, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

yang 500 most influential muslims

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Wanita, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Media, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

LAGENDIJK BERSAMA

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, namun begitu. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 September 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Gerakan Islam”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. Bagi pihak mereka, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Walau bagaimanapun, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.