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Arābu rītdiena

DEIVIDS B. OTAVEJA

Oktobris 6, 1981, bija paredzēta kā svinību diena Ēģiptē. Tā atzīmēja gadadienu kopš Ēģiptes grandiozākā uzvaras brīža trīs arābu un Izraēlas konfliktos, kad valsts zemākā armija šķērsoja Suecas kanālu tā atklāšanas dienās 1973 Jomkipuras karā un nosūtīja Izraēlas karaspēku atkāpjoties. Uz vēsuma, bez mākoņiem rīts, Kairas stadions bija pārpildīts ar ēģiptiešu ģimenēm, kas bija ieradušās, lai apskatītu militāros spēkus. Uz apskates stenda, prezidents Anvars el-Sadats,kara arhitekts, ar gandarījumu vēroja, kā viņa priekšā defilēja vīri un mašīnas. Es biju tuvumā, tikko ieradies ārzemju korespondents.Pēkšņi, viena no armijas kravas automašīnām apstājās tieši pretī apskates stendam, kamēr sešas Mirage lidmašīnas rūca virs galvas akrobātiskā priekšnesumā, krāsojot debesis ar garām sarkanām takām, dzeltens, violets,un zaļie dūmi. Sadats piecēlās, acīmredzot gatavojas apmainīties salūtam ar vēl vienu Ēģiptes karaspēka kontingentu. Viņš padarīja sevi par ideālu mērķi četriem islāmistu slepkavām, kas izlēca no kravas automašīnas, iebruka tribīnē, un apbēra viņa ķermeni ar lodēm.Kamēr slepkavas turpināja kādu mūžību apsmidzināt stendu ar savu nāvējošo uguni., Uz mirkli apsvēru, vai trāpīt zemē un riskēt, ka panikā esošie skatītāji mani samīdīs līdz nāvei, vai arī palikt kājās un riskēt saņemt nomaldījušos lodi. Instinkts lika man palikt uz kājām, un mana žurnālista pienākuma apziņa mudināja mani doties noskaidrot, vai Sadats ir dzīvs vai miris.

| sept 26, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāms, Politiskais islāms un Amerika

Arābu ieskats

Vai ir iespējama “brālība” ar Ameriku?

halils al-anani

"nav iespēju sazināties ar kādu ASV. administrācija tik ilgi, kamēr ASV saglabā savu ilggadējo uzskatu par islāmu kā reālu briesmu, uzskats, kas nostāda ASV vienā laivā ar cionistu ienaidnieku. Mums nav nekādu iepriekšēju priekšstatu par amerikāņu tautu vai ASV. sabiedrība un tās pilsoniskās organizācijas un ideju grupas. Mums nav problēmu sazināties ar amerikāņu tautu, taču netiek veikti atbilstoši centieni, lai mūs tuvinātu,"teica Dr. Isams al Irjans, Musulmaņu brālības politiskā departamenta vadītājs telefona intervijā.
Al Irjana vārdi apkopo Musulmaņu brālības uzskatus par amerikāņu tautu un ASV. valdība. Citi Musulmaņu brālības locekļi tam piekristu, tāpat kā nelaiķis Hasans al Banna, gadā, kurš nodibināja grupu 1928. Al- Banna uzskatīja Rietumus galvenokārt par morālā pagrimuma simbolu. Citi salafi – islāma domas skola, kas paļaujas uz senčiem kā paraugiem – ir pauduši tādu pašu viedokli par ASV., taču trūkst ideoloģiskās elastības, ko atbalsta Musulmaņu brālība. Kamēr Musulmaņu brālība tic amerikāņu iesaistīšanai pilsoniskā dialogā, citas ekstrēmistu grupas neredz jēgu dialogam un apgalvo, ka spēks ir vienīgais veids, kā tikt galā ar ASV.

| sept 15, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:

Kordovas fonds

Abdullah Faliq |

Ievads ,


Neskatoties uz to, ka tā ir gan daudzgadīga, gan sarežģīta diskusija, Arkas ceturkšņa izdevums atkārtoti pārbauda no teoloģijas un praktiskā viedokļa, svarīgās debates par islāma un demokrātijas attiecībām un savietojamību, kā tas atskanēja Baraka Obamas cerību un pārmaiņu programmā. Lai gan daudzi atzīmē Obamas ieņemšanu Ovālajā kabinetā kā nacionālo katarsi ASV, citi joprojām ir mazāk optimistiski par ideoloģijas un pieejas maiņu starptautiskajā arēnā. Lai gan lielu daļu spriedzes un neuzticības starp musulmaņu pasauli un ASV var saistīt ar demokrātijas veicināšanas pieeju., parasti dod priekšroku diktatūrām un marionešu režīmiem, kas runā par demokrātiskām vērtībām un cilvēktiesībām, gada pēcgrūdiens 9/11 ir patiesi nostiprinājis bažas, izmantojot Amerikas nostāju pret politisko islāmu. Tas ir izveidojis negatīvisma sienu, kā to atklāja worldpublicopinion.org, saskaņā ar kuru 67% ēģiptiešu uzskata, ka Amerika globāli spēlē “galvenokārt negatīvu” lomu.
Tādējādi Amerikas reakcija ir bijusi piemērota. Ievēlot Obamu, daudzi visā pasaulē saista savas cerības attīstīt mazāk kareivīgu, bet godīgāka ārpolitika pret musulmaņu pasauli. Pārbaudījums Obamam, kā mēs apspriežam, ir tas, kā Amerika un viņas sabiedrotie veicina demokrātiju. Vai tas atvieglos vai uzspiež?
Turklāt, vai tas var būt godīgs brokeris ilgstošās konfliktu zonās? Prolifi pieredzes un ieskatu piesaistīšana
c zinātnieki, akadēmiķi, pieredzējuši žurnālisti un politiķi, Arches Quarterly atklāj islāma un demokrātijas attiecības un Amerikas lomu, kā arī Obamas radītās izmaiņas., meklējot kopīgu valodu. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation izpilddirektors nodrošina šīs diskusijas ievadu, kur viņš pārdomā cerības un izaicinājumus, kas ir Obamas ceļā. Sekojot Altikriti, bijušais prezidenta Niksona padomnieks, Dr Robert Crane piedāvā rūpīgu analīzi par islāma principu par tiesībām uz brīvību. Anvars Ibrahims, bijušais Malaizijas premjerministra vietnieks, bagātina diskusiju ar demokrātijas īstenošanas praktisko realitāti musulmaņu dominējošās sabiedrībās, proti, Indonēzijā un Malaizijā.
Mums ir arī Dr Shireen Hunter, Džordžtaunas universitātē, ASV, kurš pēta musulmaņu valstis, kas atpaliek demokratizācijas un modernizācijas jomā. To papildina rakstnieks par terorismu, Dr Nafeez Ahmed skaidrojums par postmodernitātes krīzi un
demokrātijas bojāeja. Doktors Dauds Abdulla (Tuvo Austrumu mediju monitora direktors), Alans Hārts (bijušais ITN un BBC Panorama korespondents; cionisma autors: Īstais ebreju ienaidnieks) un Asem Sondos (Ēģiptes iknedēļas Sawt Al Omma redaktors) koncentrēties uz Obamu un viņa lomu demokrātijas veicināšanā musulmaņu pasaulē, kā arī ASV attiecības ar Izraēlu un Musulmaņu brālību.
Ārlietu ministrs airē, Maldīvija, Ahmeds Šahīds spekulē par islāma un demokrātijas nākotni; Cllr. Gerijs Makločlains
– Sinn Féin biedrs, kurš izturēja četrus gadus cietumā par Īrijas republikāņu aktivitātēm un Gildfordas aizstāvis 4 un Birmingema 6, atspoguļo viņa neseno braucienu uz Gazu, kur viņš bija liecinieks pret palestīniešiem vērstās brutalitātes un netaisnības ietekmei; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalizācijas un mūsdienu politiskās vardarbības pētījumu centra direktore apspriež izaicinājumus kritiski pētot politisko teroru; Dr Halids al Mubaraks, rakstnieks un dramaturgs, apspriež miera izredzes Darfūrā; un visbeidzot žurnālists un cilvēktiesību aktīvists Ašurs Šamiss kritiski skatās uz musulmaņu demokratizāciju un politizāciju mūsdienās.
Mēs ceram, ka tas viss radīs visaptverošu lasījumu un pārdomu avotu par jautājumiem, kas skar mūs visus jaunā cerību rītausmā.
Paldies

| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 gadiem, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Jūlijs 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Challenging Authoritarianism, Koloniālisms, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmeds Ali Salems

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, bet
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Tomēr, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. On the other hand, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Indeed,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Tomēr, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




| sept 02, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls

Tobijs Ārčers

Heidija Huuhtanena

Ņemot vērā islāmistu kustību pieaugošo nozīmi musulmaņu pasaulē un

veids, kā radikalizācija ir ietekmējusi globālos notikumus kopš gadsimta sākuma, to

ir svarīgi, lai ES izvērtētu savu politiku attiecībā uz dalībniekiem, kas var būt brīvi

saukta par "islāma pasauli". Īpaši svarīgi ir jautāt, vai un kā iesaistīties

ar dažādām islāmistu grupām.

Tas joprojām ir pretrunīgs pat ES ietvaros. Daži uzskata, ka islāmi to vērtē

guļ aiz islāmistu partijām ir vienkārši nesavienojami ar rietumu demokrātijas ideāliem un

cilvēktiesības, savukārt citi uzskata, ka iesaistīšanās ir reāla nepieciešamība pieaugošā pieauguma dēļ

islāmistu partiju vietējā nozīme un to pieaugošā iesaiste starptautiskajā

lietas. Vēl viena perspektīva ir tāda, ka musulmaņu pasaulē palielināsies demokratizācija

Eiropas drošība. Šo un citu argumentu derīgums par to, vai un kā

ES vajadzētu iesaistīties var pārbaudīt tikai, pētot dažādas islāmistu kustības un

viņu politiskie apstākļi, valsts pēc valsts.

Demokratizācija ir ES kopējās ārpolitikas pasākumu galvenā tēma, kā likts

pantā 11 Līgumam par Eiropas Savienību. Daudzi no štatiem, kas ņemti vērā šajā

ziņojumi nav demokrātiski, vai nav pilnībā demokrātiska. Lielākajā daļā šo valstu, islāmists

partijas un kustības veido būtisku opozīciju valdošajiem režīmiem, un

dažos veidos lielāko opozīcijas bloku. Eiropas demokrātijām jau sen ir bijis

tikt galā ar autoritāriem režīmiem, bet tā ir jauna parādība, kas jāspiež

demokrātiskām reformām valstīs, kurās varētu būt vislielākie ieguvēji, no

ES viedoklis, dažādas un dažkārt problemātiskas pieejas demokrātijai un tai

saistītās vērtības, mazākumtautību un sieviešu tiesības un tiesiskums. Šīs maksas ir

bieži vērsta pret islāmistu kustībām, tāpēc Eiropas politikas veidotājiem tas ir svarīgi

ir precīzs priekšstats par potenciālo partneru politiku un filozofiju.

Dažādu valstu pieredze liecina, ka jo vairāk brīvības ir islāmists

ballītes ir atļautas, jo mērenāki viņi ir savā rīcībā un idejās. Daudzos

gadījumos islāmistu partijas un grupas jau sen ir novirzījušās no sava sākotnējā mērķa

par islāma valsts nodibināšanu saskaņā ar islāma likumiem, un ir sākuši pieņemt pamata

demokrātiskie principi vēlēšanu konkurencei par varu, citu politisko esamību

konkurentiem, un politiskais plurālisms.

| augusts 21, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. ASV. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

| augusts 19, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Neitans Dž. Brūns, Amrs Hamzavijs,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, tomēr, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Džordana, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

| augusts 18, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāma kustība: Political Freedom & Demokrātija

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islāma) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, democracy. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Ēģipte, Sīrija, Irāka, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

| marts 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Radical Islam in the Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libāna, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. In 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

| marts 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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the 500 most influential muslims

Džons Esposito

Ibrahims Kaļins

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Sievietes, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Mediji, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

| Februāris 20, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

JOOST LAGENDIJK

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, tomēr. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 Septembris 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

| Februāris 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Jusufs Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Islāma kustība”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

| Februāris 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Septembris 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Tomēr, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

| Februāris 16, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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