Tutte le voci della "Marocco" Categoria
Il Domani arabo
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
ottobre 6, 1981, doveva essere un giorno di festa in Egitto. Ha segnato l'anniversario del più grande momento di vittoria dell'Egitto in tre conflitti arabo-israeliani, quando l'esercito sfavorito del paese attraversò il Canale di Suez nei giorni di apertura del 1973 Yom Kippur War e ha inviato le truppe israeliane in ritirata. Su un fresco, mattina senza nuvole, lo stadio del Cairo era gremito di famiglie egiziane venute a vedere i militari che si pavoneggiavano sul suo hardware, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,l'architetto della guerra, osservava con soddisfazione gli uomini e le macchine che sfilavano davanti a lui. Ero nelle vicinanze, un corrispondente estero appena arrivato, uno dei camion dell'esercito si fermò proprio davanti al banco di prova proprio mentre sei jet Mirage ruggivano in alto in un'esibizione acrobatica, dipingendo il cielo con lunghe scie di rosso, giallo, viola,e fumo verde. Sadat si alzò, apparentemente si preparava a scambiare saluti con un altro contingente di truppe egiziane. Si è reso un bersaglio perfetto per quattro assassini islamisti che sono saltati dal camion, ha preso d'assalto il podio, e crivellò il suo corpo di proiettili, mentre gli assassini continuavano per quella che sembrava un'eternità a spruzzare il supporto con il loro fuoco mortale, Ho considerato per un istante se toccare il suolo e rischiare di essere calpestato a morte da spettatori in preda al panico o restare a piedi e rischiare di prendere un proiettile vagante. L'istinto mi ha detto di restare in piedi, e il mio senso del dovere giornalistico mi spinse a scoprire se Sadat fosse vivo o morto.
Islam, L'Islam politico e l'America
Arabo Insight
Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
khalil al-anani
ISLAM, DEMOCRAZIA & GLI USA:
Fondazione Cordoba
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
Islamism revisited
MAHA Azzam
Challenging Authoritarianism, Colonialismo, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamic law). Tuttavia, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,
they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic
sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s
teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)
unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. D'altro canto, they realized the
need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Infatti,
their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, il
following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led
caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing
a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity
and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating
a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the
Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Tuttavia, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, quale
emphasized education and undermined politics.
I partiti islamisti di opposizione e il potenziale di coinvolgimento dell'UE
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA Kadlec
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. Marrone, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
Movimento islamico: Libertà politica & Democrazia
Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi
È dovere del (Islamico) Movimento nella prossima fase per resistere al governo totalitario e dittatoriale, dispotismo politico e usurpazione dei diritti delle persone. Il Movimento dovrebbe sempre sostenere la libertà politica, come rappresentato da vero,non falso, democrazia. Dovrebbe dichiarare categoricamente il suo rifiuto dei tiranni e stare alla larga da tutti i dittatori, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, e sono appassiti e diventati sterili solo nei tempi di oppressione e tirannia che hanno calpestato la volontà dei popoli che si aggrappavano all'Islam. Tale regime oppressivo ha imposto il loro secolarismo, socialismo o comunismo sui loro popoli con la forza e la coercizione, usando torture segrete ed esecuzioni pubbliche, e impiegando quegli strumenti diabolici che lacerano la carne,spargere sangue, ossa frantumate e distrutto l'anima. Abbiamo visto queste pratiche in molti paesi musulmani, compresa la Turchia, Egitto, Siria, Iraq, (l'ex) Yemen del sud, Somalia e Stati dell'Africa settentrionale per periodi di tempo variabili, a seconda dell'età o del regno del dittatore in ogni paese. D'altra parte, abbiamo visto il Movimento islamico e il Risveglio islamico dare frutti e fiorire in tempi di libertà e democrazia, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.
Radical Islam in the Maghreb
Carlos Echeverría Jesús
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libano, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. In 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.
il 500 musulmani più influenti
Giovanni Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
La pubblicazione che avete in mano è il primo di quello che ci auguriamo possa essere di serie anannual che fornisce una finestra sul motori e gli agitatori del Muslimworld. Abbiamo cercato di evidenziare le persone che sono influenti come musulmani, thatis, persone la cui influenza deriva dalla loro pratica dell'Islam o dal factthat sono musulmano. Riteniamo che questo fornisca informazioni preziose sui diversi modi in cui i musulmani influenzano il mondo, e mostra anche la diversità di come le persone vivono come musulmani oggi. L'influenza è un concetto complicato. Il suo significato deriva dalla parola latina influens che significa flusso, indicando una vecchia idea astrologica che le forze invisibili (come la luna) influenzare l'umanità. Le cifre di questo elenco hanno la capacità di influenzare anche l'umanità. In una varietà di modi diversi, ogni persona in questo elenco ha influenza sulla vita di un gran numero di persone sulla terra. Il 50 figure più influenti sono profilate. La loro influenza proviene da una varietà di fonti; tuttavia sono unificati dal fatto che ciascuno di essi colpisce vaste aree dell'umanità. Abbiamo poi suddiviso il 500 leader in 15 categorie: accademico, Politico,Amministrativo, Lignaggio, Predicatori, Donne, Gioventù, Filantropia, Sviluppo,Scienze e tecnologia, Arte e cultura, Mezzi di comunicazione, Radicali, Reti islamiche internazionali, e Questioni del giorno, per aiutarti a comprendere i diversi tipi di modi in cui l'Islam e i musulmani influenzano il mondo di oggi. Due elenchi compositi mostrano come l'influenza funziona in modi diversi: InternationalIslamic Networks mostra le persone che sono a capo di importanti reti transnazionali di musulmani, e Issues of the Day mette in evidenza gli individui la cui importanza è dovuta ai problemi attuali che interessano l'umanità.
TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS
Joost Lagendijk
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, però. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 Settembre 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase
Yusuf Al-Qardhawi
What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?
Di “Movimento islamico”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.
Costruire ponti non muri
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 Settembre 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (Pjd) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Tuttavia, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.