Allar Færslur í "Marokkó" Flokkur
The Arab Tomorrow
DAVID B. ÚTTAKA
október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.
Íslam, Stjórnmála Íslam og Ameríku
Arab Insight
Er „Bræðralag“ með Ameríku mögulegt?
khalil al-anani
ÍSLAM, LÝÐRÆÐI & BANDARÍKIN:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
Íslamismi endurskoðaður
Maha AZZAM
Að ögra forræðishyggju, Nýlendustefnunnar, og sundurlyndi: Íslamskar stjórnmálaumbótahreyfingar al-Afghani og Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
Þessir umbótasinnar skynjuðu hnignun múslimaheimsins almennt,
og sérstaklega Ottómanaveldisins, að vera afleiðing af aukningu
lítilsvirðing við innleiðingu Shari'ah (Íslamsk lög). Hins vegar, síðan
seint á átjándu öld, sífellt fleiri umbótasinnum, stundum stutt
af tyrkneskum sultönum, fór að kalla eftir endurbótum á heimsveldinu
nútíma evrópskar línur. Misbrestur heimsveldisins í að verja lönd sín og til
að bregðast farsællega við áskorunum Vesturlanda ýtti aðeins undir þetta kall enn frekar
fyrir „nútímavæðingu“ umbóta, sem náði hámarki í Tanzimat hreyfingunni
á seinni hluta nítjándu aldar.
Aðrir umbótasinnar múslima hvöttu til meðalvegs. Hinsvegar,
þeir viðurkenndu að kalífadæmið ætti að vera fyrirmynd íslamska
leiðsögn, sérstaklega Kóraninum og Múhameð spámanni
kenningar (Sunnah), og að ummah's (heimssamfélagi múslima)
eining er ein af pólitískum stoðum íslams. Á hinn bóginn, þeir áttuðu sig á
þarf að yngja upp heimsveldið eða skipta því út fyrir lífvænlegra. Einmitt,
skapandi hugmyndir þeirra um framtíðarlíkön innifalin, en voru ekki takmörkuð við, the
á eftir: að skipta Tyrkneska tyrkneska Tyrkjaveldinu út fyrir araba undir forystu
kalífadæmi, að byggja upp alríkis- eða sambands-kalífadæmi múslima, stofna
samveldi múslima eða austurlenskra þjóða, og efla samstöðu
og samvinnu milli sjálfstæðra múslimaríkja án þess að skapa
fast skipulag. Þessar og svipaðar hugmyndir voru síðar nefndar
Múslimska deildarmódel, sem var regnhlífarritgerð fyrir hinar ýmsu tillögur
tengt framtíðarkalífadæminu.
Tveir talsmenn slíkra umbóta voru Jamal al-Din al-Afghani og
Muhammad `Abduh, báðir gegndu lykilhlutverkum í nútímanum
Íslamsk stjórnmálaumbótahreyfing.1 Viðbrögð þeirra við tvíþættu áskoruninni
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Hins vegar, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
STEFNI TIL AÐ TAKA PÓLITÍSKA ÍSLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. Brúnn, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Síðan 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
Islamic Movement: Political Freedom & Lýðræði
Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Það er skylda að (Íslamskt) Hreyfing á næstu áfanga tostand fyrirtæki gegn totalitarian og dictatorial regla, pólitísk despotism og usurpation um réttindi fólks. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, lýðræði. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egyptaland, Sýrland, Írak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.
Róttæka íslam í Maghreb
Carlos Echeverría Jesús
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Líbanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. Í 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.
the 500 áhrifamestu múslima
John Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
Í riti sem þú hefur í höndum þínum er sú fyrsta sem við vonum að verða anannual röð sem veitir glugga í movers og shakers af Muslimworld. Við höfum strived að benda á fólk sem eru áhrifamiklar og múslima, thatis, fólk sem hafa áhrif er dregið úr starfi sínu á íslam eða frá factthat þeir eru múslimar. Við teljum að þetta gefi dýrmæta innsýn í mismunandi leiðir sem múslimar hafa áhrif á heiminn, og sýnir einnig fjölbreytileikann í því hvernig fólk lifir sem múslimar í dag. Áhrif er flókið hugtak. Merking þess kemur frá latneska orðinu áhrif sem þýðir að flæða inn, sem bendir á gamla stjörnuspeki sem óséður afl (eins og tunglið) hafa áhrif á mannkynið. Tölurnar á þessum lista hafa einnig getu til að hafa áhrif á mannkynið. Á margvíslegan hátt hefur hver einstaklingur á þessum lista áhrif á líf fjölda fólks á jörðinni. The 50 áhrifamestu persónurnar eru kynntar. Áhrif þeirra koma úr ýmsum áttum; þó sameinast þau af þeirri staðreynd að þau hafa hver um sig áhrif á gríðarstór hluta mannkyns. Við höfum þá brotið upp 500 leiðtogar inn í 15 flokkar — Fræðileg, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Konur, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Media, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.
Travels meðal múslima NEIGHBOURS EUROPE'S
Joost Lagendijk
„Vinahringur í kringum sambandið […], frá Marokkó til Rússlands“. Svona, seint 2002, þáverandi forseti framkvæmdastjórnar Evrópusambandsins, Romano Prodi, lýst lykiláskoruninni sem Evrópa stendur frammi fyrir í kjölfar fyrirhugaðrar stækkunar á 2004. Aðildarferlið hafði byggt upp skriðþunga, og fyrrum kommúnistalönd Mið-Evrópu höfðu náð stöðugleika og voru að breytast í lýðræðisríki. Aðild að ESB var ekki beint á dagskrá fyrir lönd handan stækkunartímans, þó. Hvernig gæti Evrópa komið í veg fyrir að nýjar deilingar myndist við landamæri þess? Hvernig gæti Evrópusambandið tryggt stöðugleika, öryggi og friður á jaðri þess? Þessar spurningar voru ef til vill mest viðeigandi fyrir nágranna ESB í suðurhlutanum. Síðan 11 September 2001, sérstaklega, Samskipti okkar við íslamska heiminn hafa verið gegnsýrð af brýnni tilfinningu. Pólitísk þróun í íslömskum nágrannalöndum okkar sem liggja að Miðjarðarhafi gæti haft gríðarleg áhrif á öryggi Evrópu.. Þó að svæðið sé nálægt, pólitíska fjarlægðin er mikil. Innan um ógnandi orðalag um „árekstra siðmenningar“, ESB dró fljótt þá ályktun að sátt og samvinna, frekar en árekstra, var besta stefnan í samskiptum við nágranna sína í suðri.
Forgangsverkefni í íslamska hreyfingin í næstu áfanga
Yusuf Al-Qardhawi
What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?
By “Islamic Movement”, Ég meina að skipulögð, sameiginlegt starf, höndum thepeople, til skila íslam til forystu í samfélaginu, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.
Bygging brúar ekki veggir
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Hins vegar, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.