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Arab demen an

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktòb 6, 1981, te vle di yo dwe yon jou selebrasyon nan peyi Lejip. Li te make anivèsè pi gwo moman viktwa peyi Lejip la nan twa konfli Arab-Izrayèl, lè lame moun ki pa gen anyen nan peyi a t'ap travèse Kanal Suez la nan premye jou yo 1973 Yom Kippur Lagè ak voye twoup Izrayelyen yo anroule nan retrè. Sou yon fre, maten san nyaj, estad Cairo a te chaje ak fanmi moun peyi Lejip yo ki te vin wè militè a strut pyès ki nan konpitè li yo.Sou kanpe revizyon an., Prezidan Anwar el-Sadat,achitèk lagè a, te gade ak satisfaksyon kòm moun ak machin parad devan l '. Mwen te tou pre, yon korespondan etranje ki fèk rive.Switdenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islam, Islam politik ak Amerik

Arab Insight

Èske "Fraternite" ak Amerik posib?

khalil al-anani

"pa gen okenn chans pou kominike ak nenpòt ki peyi Etazini. administrasyon an toutotan Etazini kenbe opinyon li depi lontan nan Islam kòm yon danje reyèl, yon pwennvi ki mete Etazini nan menm bato ak ènmi Siyonis la. Nou pa gen okenn lide pre-ansent konsènan pèp Ameriken an oswa US la. sosyete ak òganizasyon sivik li yo ak think tanks li yo. Nou pa gen pwoblèm pou kominike ak pèp Ameriken an men pa gen okenn efò adekwat yo ap fè pou pote nou pi pre,” te di Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chèf depatman politik Frè Mizilman an nan yon entèvyou telefòn.
Pawòl Al-Iryan yo rezime opinyon Frè Mizilman yo sou pèp Ameriken an ak peyi Etazini.. gouvènman an. Lòt manm nan Frè Mizilman yo ta dakò, menm jan ak defen Hassan al-Banna, ki te fonde gwoup la nan 1928. Al- Banna te konsidere Lwès la sitou kòm yon senbòl pouri moral. Lòt Salafis - yon lekòl Islamik nan panse ki depann sou zansèt kòm modèl egzanplè - te pran menm pwennvi nan Etazini., men manke fleksibilite ideyolojik Frè Mizilman yo te adopte. Pandan ke Frè Mizilman yo kwè nan angaje Ameriken yo nan dyalòg sivil, lòt gwoup ekstremis pa wè okenn pwen nan dyalòg epi kenbe fòs sa a se sèl fason pou fè fas ak Etazini.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Desizyon an pou transfere yo nan tribinal militè yo pa respekte vèdik tribinal sivil yo te kondane pa òganizasyon entènasyonal dwa moun., can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, sètadi, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Jiyè 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonyalis, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Therefore, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Lwa Islamik). Sepandan, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Nan lòt men an, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Vreman vre,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Sepandan, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

dwa moun, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamis

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, epi

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

ESTRATEJI POU ANGAJE ISLAM POLITIK

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Islam politik se sèl fòs politik ki pi aktif nan Mwayen Oryan jodi a. Avni li se intimman lye ak sa ki nan rejyon an. Si Etazini ak Inyon Ewopeyen an pran angajman pou sipòte refòm politik nan rejyon an, yo pral bezwen elabore beton, estrateji koyeran pou angaje gwoup islamis yo. Poutan, Etazini. jeneralman pa t vle louvri yon dyalòg ak mouvman sa yo. Menm jan an tou, Angajman Inyon Ewopeyen ak Islamis yo te eksepsyon, pa règ la. Kote kontak ki ba-nivo egziste, yo sitou sèvi nan objektif pou rasanble enfòmasyon, pa objektif estratejik yo. Etazini an. ak Inyon Ewopeyen gen yon kantite pwogram ki adrese devlopman ekonomik ak politik nan rejyon an - pami yo Inisyativ Patenarya Mwayen Oryan an. (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation la (MCC), Inyon pou Mediterane a, ak politik Ewopeyen an katye (ENP) – Men, yo pa gen anyen pou di sou fason defi opozisyon politik islamis la anfòm nan objektif rejyonal ki pi laj yo. Etazini. ak asistans ak pwogram demokrasi Inyon Ewopeyen yo dirije prèske antyèman swa gouvènman otoritè tèt yo oswa gwoup eksklizyon sosyete sivil ak sipò minimòm nan pwòp sosyete yo..
Lè a se mi pou yon reevalyasyon politik aktyèl yo. Depi atak teworis yo nan mwa septanm nan 11, 2001, sipòte demokrasi Mwayen Oryan an te pran yon pi gwo enpòtans pou mizisyen politik Lwès yo, ki wè yon lyen ant mank demokrasi ak vyolans politik. Pi gwo atansyon yo te konsakre nan konpreyansyon varyasyon yo nan Islam politik. Nouvo administrasyon Ameriken an pi ouvè pou elaji kominikasyon ak mond Mizilman an. Pandan se tan, a vas majorite nan òganizasyon islamis endikap - ki gen ladan Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip, Fwon Aksyon Islamik lòt bò larivyè Jouden an (IAF), Pati Jistis ak Devlopman Mawòk la (PJD), Mouvman Konstitisyonèl Islamik Kowet, ak Yemeni Islah Party - te de pli zan pli fè sipò pou refòm politik ak demokrasi yon eleman santral nan platfòm politik yo.. An plis, anpil moun te siyale gwo enterè nan ouvèti dyalòg ak U.S. ak gouvènman Inyon Ewopeyen yo.
Avni relasyon ant nasyon oksidantal yo ak Mwayen Oryan an ka detèmine pa degre ansyen an angaje pati islamis san vyolans yo nan yon dyalòg laj sou enterè ak objektif pataje.. Te gen yon pwopagasyon resan etid sou angajman ak islamis yo, men kèk klèman adrese sa li ta ka enplike nan pratik. Kòm Zoe Nautre, vizite parèy nan Konsèy Alman an sou Relasyon Etranje, mete li, "Inyon Ewopeyen an ap panse sou angajman men li pa vrèman konnen ki jan."1 Nan espwa nan klarifye diskisyon an, nou fè distenksyon ant twa nivo "angajman,” yo chak ak diferan mwayen ak fen: kontak ba nivo, dyalòg estratejik, ak patenarya.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Natan J.. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, an patikilye, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Kòm yon rezilta, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, sepandan, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Lòt bò larivyè Jouden, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politik, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

RADICALIZASYON ISLAMIS

PREFAS
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Pwoblèm ki gen rapò ak Islam politik kontinye prezante defi nan politik etranje Ewopeyen an nan Mwayen Oryan an ak Afrik Dinò (MENA). Kòm politik Inyon Ewopeyen an te chache vini ak defi sa yo pandan dènye dekad la oswa konsa Islam politik li menm te evolye.. Ekspè yo montre konpleksite k ap grandi ak varyete tandans nan Islam politik la. Gen kèk òganizasyon islamis yo ranfòse angajman yo nan nòm demokratik ak angaje totalman nan lapè, politik nasyonal prensipal yo. Gen lòt ki rete marye ak mwayen vyolan. Epi gen lòt ankò ki te derive nan yon fòm Islamis ki pi trankil, degaje nan aktivite politik. Islam politik nan rejyon MENA pa prezante okenn tandans inifòm pou mizisyen politik Ewopeyen yo. Deba analitik te grandi sou konsèp 'radikalizasyon'. Sa a nan vire te anjandre rechèch sou faktè sa yo ki mennen 'de-radikalizasyon', ak kontrèman, 're-radikalizasyon'. Anpil nan konpleksite a soti nan opinyon lajman ke tout twa fenomèn sa yo ap fèt an menm tan.. Menm kondisyon yo tèt yo yo konteste. Li te souvan fè remake ke dikotomi modere-radikal la echwe totalman pou kaptire nuans yo nan tandans nan Islam politik.. Gen kèk analis tou plenyen ke pale sou 'radikalism' se ideolojikman chaje. Nan nivo tèminoloji, nou konprann radikalizasyon dwe asosye ak ekstrèm, men opinyon yo diferan sou santralite nan kontni relijye-fondamentalis kont li yo politik, epi si wi ou non volonte pou fè vyolans enplike oswa ou pa.

Diferans sa yo reflete nan opinyon yo te genyen nan Islamis yo tèt yo, osi byen ke nan pèsepsyon yo nan etranje yo.

Islam politik ak politik etranjè Ewopeyen an

ISLAM POLITIK AK POLITIK PWOZINAT Ewopeyen an

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Depi 2001 ak evènman entènasyonal yo ki te swiv nati a nan relasyon ki genyen ant Lwès la ak Islam politik te vin tounen yon pwoblèm defini pou politik etranjè.. Nan dènye ane yo, yon kantite lajan konsiderab nan rechèch ak analiz yo te eskize sou pwoblèm nan nan Islam politik. Sa a te ede korije kèk nan sipozisyon senplist ak alarmis yo te deja te fèt nan Lwès la sou nati valè ak entansyon Islamis yo.. Paralèl ak sa a, Inyon Ewopeyen an (Inyon Ewopeyen) te devlope yon kantite inisyativ politik prensipalman politik Ewopeyen an katye(ENP) ki nan prensip angaje nan dyalòg ak pi fon angajman tout(ki pa vyolan) aktè politik ak òganizasyon sosyete sivil nan peyi Arab yo. Men, anpil analis ak mizisyen politik kounye a plenyen de yon sèten trofe nan tou de deba konseptyèl ak devlopman politik. Li te etabli ke Islam politik se yon peyizaj k ap chanje, pwofondman afekte pa yon seri sikonstans, men deba souvan sanble yo te kole sou kesyon an senplist nan 'Èske Islamis yo demokratik?' Anpil analis endepandan te defann angajman ak islamis yo, men rapwòchman aktyèl ant gouvènman Lwès yo ak òganizasyon islamis yo rete limite .

Mouvman Islamik: Political Freedom & Demokrasi

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamik) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokrasi. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah). [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Peyi Lejip, Siri, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, valè, essence and very existence.

Islam radikal nan Maghreb la

Carlos Echeverria Jezi

Devlopman yon mouvman islamis radikal se yon karakteristik prensipal nan lavi politik Aljeryen depi mitan ane 1970 yo., sitou apre lanmò Prezidan Houari Boumediène, premye prezidan Repiblik la, an Desanm 1978.1 Boumediène te adopte yon politik arabizasyon ki te gen ladann elimine pa piti lang franse a. Pwofesè fransè yo te ranplase pa moun ki pale arab ki soti nan peyi Lejip., Liban, ak Siri, anpil nan yo manm Fratènite Mizilman yo. Pwoblèm yo te kòmanse nan 1985, lè Mouvman Islamik Aljeryen an (MIA),te fonde pou pwoteste kont rejim sosyalis yon sèl pati a, te kòmanse atake estasyon lapolis yo. Ogmante tansyon nan mitan bese pri lwil oliv te abouti nan revòlt Semoule nan mwa Oktòb. 1988. Plis pase 500 moun yo te touye nan lari yo nan Alje nan revòlt sa a, epi gouvènman an te finalman fòse antreprann refòm. Nan 1989 li legalize pati politik yo, enkli Front Salvation Islamik la (FIS), e pandan dezan kap vini yo, Islamis yo te kapab enpoze volonte yo nan anpil pati nan peyi a, vize senbòl Lwès "koripsyon" tankou asyèt televizyon satelit ki te pote nan chanèl Ewopeyen an, alkòl, ak fanm ki pat mete hiyab la (vwal Islamik la). Viktwa FIS nan mwa jen an 1990 eleksyon minisipal yo ak nan premye tou eleksyon palmantè yo ki te fèt nan mwa desanm 1991 te jenere laperèz pou yon diktati islamis ki t ap vini e li te mennen nan yon entèripsyon prevantif nan pwosesis elektoral la nan mwa janvye. 1992. Ane kap vini an te wè yon ogmantasyon nan vyolans ki te kòmanse nan 1991 ak diskou FIS la pou sipòte Saddam Hussein nan Lagè Gòlf la, prezans k ap grandi nan "Afgan" Aljeryen yo—konbatan volontè Aljeryen ki te retounen sot nan lagè kont Sovyetik yo nan Afganistan—ak masak gad fwontyè yo nan mwa novanm 1991 nan Guemmar., sou fwontyè ant Aljeri ak Tinizi.2Jiska mitan ane 1993, viktim MIA, Lame delivrans Islamik-AIS (zèl lame FIS la), ak Gwoup Ame Islamik (FANMI) vyolans yo te sitou polisye,sòlda, ak teworis. Nan ane sa a, vyolans la te elaji pou reklame tou de sivil etranje ak Aljeryen. Nan mwa septanm nan 1993, yo te jwenn kadav sèt etranje nan divès kote nan peyi a.3 Plizyè douzèn jij, doktè,entelektyèl, ak jounalis yo te tou touye ane sa a. Nan mwa Oktòb 1993 Islamis yo te pwomèt yo touye nenpòt etranje ki rete nan Aljeri apre Desanm 1; plis pase 4,000 etranje kite nan mwa novanm 1993.

the 500 most influential muslims

Jan Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Fanm, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Medya, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

VWAYAJ PAMI VWAZEN MIZILMAN EWÒP

JOOST LAGENDIJK

JAN MARINUS WIERSMA

"Yon bag zanmi ki antoure Inyon an […], soti nan Maròk rive nan Larisi”.Sa a se ki jan, an reta 2002, Lè sa a, prezidan Komisyon Ewopeyen an, Romano Prodi, dekri kle defi a fè fas a Ewòp apre elajisman an te planifye nan 2004. Pwosesis asansyon an te bati momantòm, ak ansyen peyi kominis yo nan Ewòp Santral yo te estabilize epi yo te transfòme tèt yo nan demokrasi. Manm Inyon Ewopeyen an pa t dirèkteman sou ajanda a pou peyi ki depase orizon elajisman an, sepandan. Ki jan Ewòp ta ka anpeche nouvo liy divize fòme nan fwontyè li yo? Ki jan Inyon Ewopeyen an ta ka garanti estabilite, sekirite ak lapè nan perimèt li? Kesyon sa yo te petèt pi enpòtan pou vwazen sid Inyon Ewopeyen an. Depi 11 Septanm 2001, an patikilye, relasyon nou yo ak mond Islamik la te anprint ak yon sans ijans. Devlopman politik nan peyi vwazen Islamik nou yo ki sou fwontyè Mediterane a ta ka gen yon gwo enpak sou sekirite Ewopeyen an. Malgre ke zòn nan tou pre, distans politik la se gwo. Nan mitan langaj menasan sou yon 'konfli sivilizasyon', Inyon Ewopeyen an byen vit te trase konklizyon an ke konsilyasyon ak koperasyon, olye ke konfwontasyon, konstitye pi bon estrateji pou fè fas ak vwazen sid li yo.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Mouvman Islamik”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Bati pon pa mi

Alex Glennie

Depi atak laterè yo nan 11 Septanm 2001 te gen yon eksplozyon enterè nan Islamis politik nan Mwayen Oryan ak Afrik Dinò (MENA) rejyon an. Jiska san patipri dènyèman,analis yo te konprann byen konsantre sou aktè sa yo ki opere nan fen vyolan nan spectre Islamis la, enkli Al-Qaeda, Taliban yo, kèk nan pati yo sektè nan Irak ak gwoup politik ki gen zèl ame tankou Hamas nan teritwa palestinyen yo okipe yo. (OPT)ak Hezbollah nan peyi Liban.Sepandan, sa te kache lefèt ke atravè rejyon MENA an politik kontanporen ap kondwi ak fòm pa yon koleksyon pi divèsifye nan 'endikap' mouvman islamis.. Nou defini kòm gwoup sa yo ki angaje oswa k ap chèche angaje yo nan pwosesis politik legal peyi yo epi ki te evite itilize vyolans piblikman pou ede reyalize objektif yo nan nivo nasyonal la., menm kote yo diskriminasyon kont oswa reprime. Definisyon sa a ta enkli gwoup tankou Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip., Pati Jistis ak Devlopman (PJD) nan Maròk ak Fwon Aksyon Islamik la (IAF) nan lòt bò larivyè Jouden. Mouvman oswa pati islamis san vyolans sa yo souvan reprezante eleman ki pi byen òganize e ki pi popilè nan opozisyon an kont rejim ki egziste yo nan chak peyi., epi kòm sa, gen yon enterè ogmante sou pati nan fè politik lwès yo nan wòl yo ta ka jwe nan pwomosyon demokrasi nan rejyon an.. Men, diskisyon sou pwoblèm sa a sanble yo te bloke sou kesyon an si li ta apwopriye pou angaje ak gwoup sa yo sou yon baz pi sistematik ak fòmèl., olye ke sou pratik ki genyen nan aktyèlman fè sa., pliryalis politik ak yon seri de lòt pwoblèm. Li reflete tou konsiderasyon pragmatik sou enterè estratejik pouvwa lwès yo nan rejyon MENA yo ke yo pèrsu yo dwe menase pa popilarite a k ap monte ak enfliyans nan Islamis.. Pou pati yo, Pati ak mouvman islamis yo te montre yon repiyans klè pou yo tabli lyen pi sere ak pisans lwès sa yo ki gen politik nan rejyon an yo opoze fòtman., pa pi piti paske yo te pè ki jan rejim represif yo opere nan yo ta ka reyaji. Konsantre pwojè sa a sou mouvman islamis politik ki pa vyolan pa ta dwe mal entèprete kòm sipò implicite pou ajanda politik yo.. Angajman nan yon estrateji plis angajman ekspre ak pati islamis endikap yo ta enplike gwo risk ak konpwomi pou mizisyen politik Amerik di Nò ak Ewopeyen yo.. Sepandan, nou pran pozisyon ke tandans tou de bò yo wè angajman kòm yon sòm zewo jwèt "tout oswa anyen" pa itil., ak bezwen chanje si yon dyalòg pi konstriktif alantou refòm nan Mwayen Oryan an ak Afrik Dinò se parèt.