Kõik kanded "Maroko" Kategooria

Araabia homme

DAVID B. OTAWAY

oktoober 6, 1981, oli mõeldud Egiptuses pidupäevaks. See tähistas aastapäeva Egiptuse suurimast võiduhetkest kolmes Araabia-Iisraeli konfliktis, kui riigi allajäänud armee tungis selle avapäevadel üle Suessi kanali 1973 Jom Kippuri sõda ja saatis Iisraeli väed taganema. Jahedal, pilvitu hommik, Kairo staadion oli pungil Egiptuse peredest, kes olid tulnud vaatama sõjaväelasi, jalas oma riistvara., president Anwar el-Sadat,sõja arhitekt, vaatas rahulolevalt, kuidas mehed ja masinad tema ees paradeerusid. Olin lähedal, äsja saabunud väliskorrespondent.Äkki, üks armee veoautodest peatus otse ülevaatuse stendi ees just siis, kui kuus Mirage'i lennukit möirgasid pea kohal akrobaatilises etenduses, taeva maalimine pikkade punaste jälgedega, kollane, lilla,ja rohelist suitsu. Sadat tõusis püsti, ilmselt valmistub tervitusi vahetama veel ühe Egiptuse vägede kontingendiga. Ta tegi endast täiusliku sihtmärgi neljale veoautolt hüpanud islami palgamõrvarile, tungis poodiumile, ja täitis ta keha kuulidega.Kui mõrvarid jätkasid terve igaviku, et pritsida püstiku oma surmava tulega., Mõtlesin hetke, kas lüüa vastu maad ja riskida, et paanikas pealtvaatajad tallavad end surnuks või jään jalgele ja riskin hulkuva kuuliga. Sisetunne käskis mul jalul püsida, ja minu ajakirjanduslik kohusetunne sundis mind minema uurima, kas Sadat on elus või surnud.

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| september 26, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Islam, Poliitiline islam ja Ameerika

Araabia Insight

Kas "vennaskond" Ameerikaga on võimalik?

khalil al-anani

"Pole mingit võimalust suhelda ühegi USA-ga. senikaua, kuni USA säilitab oma pikaajalise nägemuse islamist kui reaalsest ohust, vaade, mis paneb USA sionistliku vaenlasega ühte paati. Meil ei ole Ameerika rahva ega USA kohta eelarvamusi. ühiskond ja selle kodanikuorganisatsioonid ja mõttekojad. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Moslemivennaskonna poliitilise osakonna juhataja telefoniintervjuus.

Al-Iryani sõnad võtavad kokku Moslemivennaskonna vaated Ameerika rahvale ja USA-le. valitsus. Teised Moslemi Vennaskonna liikmed oleksid sellega nõus, nagu ka kadunud Hassan al-Banna, aastal grupi asutanud 1928. Al- Banna pidas läänt enamasti moraalse allakäigu sümboliks. Teised salafid – islami koolkond, mis toetub esivanematele kui eeskujulikele mudelitele – on võtnud USA suhtes sama seisukoha., kuid puudub ideoloogiline paindlikkus, mida toetab Moslemivennaskond. Samal ajal kui Moslemivennaskond usub ameeriklaste kaasamisse kodanikuühiskonna dialoogi, teised äärmusrühmitused ei näe dialoogil mõtet ja väidavad, et jõud on ainus viis USAga toimetulemiseks.

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| september 15, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,

In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.

America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?

enamgi veel, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi

c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namely, in Indonesia and Malaysia.

We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, USA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the

demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn

– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.

We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.

Thank you

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| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 aastat, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers

in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.

The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,

whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.

Following the bombings in London on 7 Juuli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

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| september 06, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Väljakutseid autoritaarsuse, Kolonialism, ja lahusolekut: Islami poliitilised reformid liikumine al-Afganistani ja Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first

quarter of the twentieth century. In particular, the Ottoman Empire’s

power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.

But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and

sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.

Seetõttu, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called

for political reform even before the European encroachment upon

Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, but

also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islami seaduste). Kuid, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Teiselt poolt, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Tõepoolest,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Kuid, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.

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| september 02, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Islamistlikud opositsiooniparteid ja ELi kaasamise potentsiaal

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Pidades silmas islamistlike liikumiste tähtsuse suurenemist moslemimaailmas ja

viis, kuidas radikaliseerumine on mõjutanud ülemaailmseid sündmusi alates sajandivahetusest, seda

on oluline, et EL hindaks oma poliitikat osalejate suhtes, mis võivad olla lõdvalt

nimetatakse "islamimaailmaks". Eriti oluline on küsida, kas ja kuidas kaasata

erinevate islamistlike rühmitustega.

See on endiselt vastuoluline isegi ELis. Mõned arvavad, et islamid hindavad seda

islamistlike parteide taga peitumine on lihtsalt vastuolus lääne demokraatia ideaalidega ja

inimõiguste, samas kui teised peavad kaasamist reaalseks vajaduseks kasvamise tõttu

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, ja

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

islami seaduste alusel juhitava islamiriigi loomisest, ja on hakanud aktsepteerima elementaarseid

valimisvõitlemise demokraatlikud põhimõtted, muu poliitika olemasolu

võistlejad, ja poliitiline pluralism.

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| August 21, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

STRATEEGIATE tegelemise poliitilise islami

SHADI HAMID

Amanda Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. USA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.

The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Autor David Zeidan, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.

The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

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| August 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Islamiliikumistega ning demokraatliku araabia maailmas: Avastades Gray tsoonid

Nathan J. Pruun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Viimase kümne aasta jooksul, Islamiliikumistega on end tõestanud kui peamiste poliitiliste jõudude Lähis-Idas. Koos valitsused, islamiliikumistega, Mõõduka samuti radikaali, määrab, kuidas regiooni poliitikas paljastama lähitulevikus. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,

by and large, have failed on all accounts.

Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate

threat, siiski, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.

It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordaania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Poliitika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

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| August 18, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

islami RADIKALISEERUMINE

PREFACE

RICHARD YOUNGS

MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

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| August 17, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Politiseerunud islamiga ja Euroopa Välispoliitika

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (USA) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

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| August 17, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Islamic Movement: Poliitiline vabadus & Demokraatia

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

On tollimaks (Islami) Liikumine järgmise etapi tostand firma vastu totalitaarsete ja diktatuuri, poliitilise võimutsemine ja anastamine inimeste õiguste. Liikumine peaks alati seista poliitilise vabaduse, mida esindab tõsi,ei ole vale, demokraatia. Tuleb otsustavalt kuulutada see keeldumine tyrantsand juhtida selge kõigi diktaatorite, isegi kui mõned türann tundub havegood kavatsusi suunas juba mõnda saada ja aega, mis on tavaliselt lühike, nagu on näidanud experience.The Prohvet (Saed) ütles, "Kui sa näed oma rahva ohvriks hirm ja ei ütle, et vale-tegija, "Te eksite", thenyou võib kaotada lootust neid. "Niisiis, kuidas umbes korra, mis sunnib inimesi öelda ennasttäis kurjategija, "Kuidas just, kui suur sa oled. O meie kangelane, meie päästja ja meie vabastaja!"Koraan denonsseeri tyranneja nagu Numrudh, Vaarao, Haamanin ja teised, kuid see ka dispraises kes järgivad tyranneja andobey oma tellimused. See on põhjus, miks Jumal dispraises inimesed Noahby öelda, "Aga nad järgivad (m) mille rikkus ja childrengive neid ei suurene, vaid ainult kahju. " [Surat nuh; 21]Jumal ka ütleb Kuulutus, inimesed Hud, "Ja järgneb thecommand iga võimas, jonnakas üleastujaks ". [Surat Hud:59]Vt ka, mida Koraan räägib isikute vaarao, "Butthey järgneb käsu vaarao, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] "Nii ta tegi lollid oma rahva, ja nad kuuletusid talle: tõeliselt need inimesed mässavad (Jumala eest).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Lähemal ajalugu moslemi Rahvus ja IslamicMovement tänapäeval peaks näitama selgelt, et Islamicidea, Islamic Movement ja islami Awakening ole kunagi õitsenud või kandnud vilja kui õhkkonnas ofdemocracy ja vabadus, ja on närtsinud ja muutunud viljatu ainult aegadel rõhumise ja türannia et trod üle willof rahvaste mis kiskusid islam. Selline ängistav regimesimposed oma ilmalikkuse, sotsialism või kommunism nende rahvaste jõu ja sunni, kasutades varjatud piinamise ja publicexecutions, ja kus töötab nende kuratlik tööriistu, rebis liha,valatud veri, purustatud luude ja hävitatakse soul.We nägin neid tavasid paljudes islamiriikides, sealhulgas Türgiga, Egiptus, Süüria, Iraak, (endine) Lõuna-Jeemen, Somaliaand Põhja-Aafrika riikide lühemaks ajaks, sõltuvalt vanusest või valitsemisaeg diktaator igas country.On Teisest küljest, nägime Islamic Movement ja islami Awakening vilja kandma ja õitseda aegadel vabaduse ja demokraatia, ja pärast kokkuvarisemist Imperial režiimide et välistada rahvaste hirmu ja oppression.Therefore, Ma ei usu, et islami liikumine võiks toetada millegi muu kui poliitilise vabaduse ja democracy.The tyranneja lubatud iga hääl tuleb tõsta, va häälega ofIslam, ja lase iga trend väljenduda kujul politicalparty või organi mingisuguse, välja arvatud islami praeguse mis on theonly trend, et tegelikult räägib see rahvas ning väljendab ta tasandusprussidega, väärtused, olemus ja olemasolu.

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| Meri 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Radikaalne islami Magribi

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

Arengu radikaalne islami liikumine on olnud suur featureof Alžeeria poliitilises elus, sest 1970ndate keskel, eriti pärast surma PresidentHouari Boumédienne, Vabariigi esimene president, aasta detsembris 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Liibanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. sisse 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

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| Meri 06, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

the 500 most influential muslims

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Avaldamine on teie käed on esimene, mida loodetavasti anannual seeria, mis pakub akna movers ja Shakers kohta Muslimworld. Oleme püüdnud esile inimesi, kes on mõjukas nagu moslemid, thatis, inimesed, kelle mõju on saadud nende teguviis Islam või factthat nad on moslemid. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Naised, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Meedia, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

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| Veebruar 20, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Reisid HULGAS Euroopa moslemite Naabrid

Joost Lagendijk

Jan Marinus Wiersma

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, siiski. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 September 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.

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| Veebruar 17, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Prioriteedid Islamic Movement järgnevatel etapp

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “Islamic Movement”, Ma mõtlen, et organiseeritud, kollektiivne töö, võetud thepeople, taastada islami juhtkonna ühiskond, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

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| Veebruar 17, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0

Sildu ehitades ei seinte

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Kuid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

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| Veebruar 16, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0