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Den arabiske i morgen
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
oktober 6, 1981, skulle være en festdag i Egypten. Det markerede årsdagen for Egyptens største sejrsmoment i tre arabisk-israelske konflikter, da landets underdoghær kastede sig over Suez-kanalen i de første dage 1973 Yom Kippur-krigen og sendte israelske tropper til at trække sig tilbage. På et køligt, skyfri morgen, Cairo-stadionet var fyldt med egyptiske familier, der var kommet for at se militæret stramme sin hardware. På revisionsstanden, Præsident Anwar el-Sadat,krigens arkitekt, så med tilfredshed, da mænd og maskiner gik foran ham. Jeg var i nærheden, en nyankomne udenlandsk korrespondent. pludselig, en af hærens lastbiler stoppede direkte foran reviewstanden, da seks Mirage-jetfly brølede over hovedet i en akrobatisk forestilling, maler himlen med lange stier af rødt, gul, lilla,og grøn røg. Sadat rejste sig, forbereder sig tilsyneladende på at udveksle hilsner med endnu en kontingent af egyptiske tropper. Han gjorde sig selv til et perfekt mål for fire islamistiske snigmordere, der sprang fra lastbilen, stormede podiet, og riddled hans krop med kugler. Da morderne fortsatte i det, der syntes en evighed, at sprøjte standen med deres dødbringende ild, Jeg overvejede et øjeblik, om jeg skulle ramme jorden og risikere at blive trampet ihjel af panik tilskuere eller forblive på foden og risikere at tage en vild kugle. Instinkt fortalte mig at blive på mine fødder, og min følelse af journalistisk pligt fik mig til at finde ud af, om Sadat var i live eller død.
islam, Politisk islam og Amerika
Arabisk indsigt
Er "broderskab" med Amerika muligt?
khalil al-anani
ISLAM, DEMOKRATI & USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
Islamismen gensyn
MAHA AZZAM
Challenging Authoritarianism, Kolonialisme, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,
and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing
disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (islamisk lov). Imidlertid, since the
late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported
by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along
modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to
respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call
for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement
in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. På den ene side,
de indrømmede, at kalifatet skulle modelleres efter det islamiske
kilder til vejledning, især Koranen og profeten Muhammeds
lære (Sunnah), og at ummah's (verdens muslimske samfund)
enhed er en af islams politiske grundpiller. På den anden side, de indså
behov for at forynge imperiet eller erstatte det med et mere levedygtigt. Ja,
deres kreative ideer om fremtidige modeller inkluderet, men var ikke begrænset til, det
følge: erstatte det tyrkisk ledede osmanniske rige med et arabisk ledet
kalifat, opbygning af et føderalt eller konfødereret muslimsk kalifat, etablering
et samvelde af muslimske eller orientalske nationer, og styrkelse af solidariteten
og samarbejde mellem uafhængige muslimske lande uden at skabe
en fast struktur. Disse og lignende ideer blev senere omtalt som
Muslimsk ligamodel, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. Imidlertid, they disagreed on certain aspects
and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Islamistiske oppositionspartier og potentialet for EU-engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
ISLAMISKE BEVÆGELSER OG DEMOKRATISK PROCESS I DEN ARABISKE VERDEN: Udforskning af de grå zoner
Nathan J. Brun, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
ISLAMIST RADICALISATION
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Siden 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
Islamisk bevægelse: Politisk frihed & Demokrati
Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Det er pligten for (islamisk) Bevægelse i den kommende fase til at stå fast mod totalitært og diktatorisk styre, politisk despoti og tilranelse af folks rettigheder. Bevægelsen bør altid stå ved politisk frihed, som repræsenteret ved sand,ikke falsk, demokrati. Den bør blankt erklære sin afvisning af tyranner og styre uden om alle diktatorer, selvom en eller anden tyrann ser ud til at have gode hensigter med det for en vis gevinst og i en tid, der normalt er kort, som erfaringen har vist.Profeten (SAVE) sagde, “Når du ser min nation blive offer for frygt og ikke siger til en uret-gører, "Du tager fejl", så kan du miste håbet på dem." Så hvad med et regime, der tvinger folk til at sige til en indbildsk forbryder, "Hvor bare, hvor er du god. O vores helt, vores frelser og vores befrier!”Koranen fordømmer tyranner som Numrudh, Farao, Haman og andre, men den foragter også dem, der følger tyranner og adlyder deres ordrer. Det er derfor, Allah fordømmer folket i Noahby, "Men de følger efter (m ind) hvis rigdom og børn ikke giver dem nogen stigning, men kun tab." [Noas brev; 21]Allah siger også om Ad, folk i Hud, "Og fulgte alle magtfuldes befaling, stædig overtræder". [Surat Hud:59]Se også, hvad Koranen siger om Faraos folk, "Men de fulgte Faraos befaling, og Faraos befaling var ikke ret vejledt.[Surat Hud: 97] "Således gjorde han sit folk til nar, og de adlød ham: i sandhed var de et oprørsk folk (mod Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Et nærmere kig på den muslimske nations og den islamiske bevægelses historie i moderne tid burde tydeligt vise, at Islamicidea, den islamiske bevægelse og den islamiske opvågning har aldrig blomstret eller båret frugt, medmindre det er i en atmosfære af demokrati og frihed, og er kun visnet og blevet ufrugtbar i de tider med undertrykkelse og tyranni, der trådte over viljen hos de folk, der holdt fast ved islam. Sådanne undertrykkende regimer påtvang deres sekularisme, socialisme eller kommunisme på deres folk med magt og tvang, ved hjælp af skjult tortur og offentlige henrettelser, og bruge de djævelske redskaber, der rev kød,udgyde blod, knuste knogler og ødelagde sjælen. Vi så denne praksis i mange muslimske lande, inklusive Tyrkiet, Egypten, Syrien, Irak, (den tidligere) Syd Yemen, Somalia og nordafrikanske stater i forskellige perioder, afhængig af diktatorens alder eller regeringstid i hvert land. På den anden side, vi så den islamiske bevægelse og den islamiske opvågning bære frugt og blomstre i frihedens og demokratiets tider, og i kølvandet på sammenbruddet af imperiale regimer, der styrede folk med frygt og undertrykkelse. Derfor, Jeg kunne ikke forestille mig, at den islamiske bevægelse kunne støtte andet end politisk frihed og demokrati. Tyranerne tillod enhver stemme at blive hævet, undtagen islams stemme, og lad enhver tendens udtrykke sig i form af et politisk parti eller organ af en slags, undtagen den islamiske strømning, som er den eneste tendens, der rent faktisk taler for denne nation og udtrykker den afretning, værdier, essens og selve eksistensen.
Radical Islam in the Maghreb
Carlos Echeverría Jesús
The development of a radical Islamist movement has been a major featureof Algerian political life since the mid-1970s, especially after the death of PresidentHouari Boumediène, the Republic’s first president, in December 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, Libanon, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. I 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.
det 500 mest indflydelsesrige muslimer
John Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
Den publikation, du har i dine hænder, er den første af, hvad vi håber vil være en årlig serie, der giver et vindue ind i den muslimske verden, der bevæger sig og ryster.. Vi har bestræbt os på at fremhæve mennesker, der er indflydelsesrige som muslimer, det er, mennesker, hvis indflydelse er afledt af deres praktisering af islam eller fra det faktum, at de er muslimer. Vi tror, at dette giver værdifuld indsigt i de forskellige måder, som muslimer påvirker verden på, og viser også mangfoldigheden af, hvordan folk lever som muslimer i dag. Indflydelse er et vanskeligt koncept. Dets betydning stammer fra det latinske ord influensmeaning til flow-in, peger på en gammel astrologisk idé, der usynlige styrker (ligesom månen) påvirke menneskeheden. Tallene på denne liste har også evnen til at påvirke menneskeheden. På en række forskellige måder har hver person på denne liste indflydelse på livet for et stort antal mennesker på jorden. Det 50 mest indflydelsesrige personer er profileret. Deres indflydelse kommer fra en række forskellige kilder; men de er forenet af det faktum, at de hver især påvirker enorme dele af menneskeheden. Vi har derefter brudt op 500 ledere ind 15 kategorier – videnskabeligt, Politisk,Administrativ, Afstamning, Prædikanter, Kvinder, Ungdom, Filantropi, Udvikling,Videnskab og teknologi, Kunst og Kultur, Medier, Radikale, Internationale islamiske netværk, og Issues of the Day – for at hjælpe dig med at forstå de forskellige måder, islam og muslimer påvirker verden på i dag. To sammensatte lister viser, hvordan indflydelse virker på forskellige måder: Internationale islamiske netværk viser mennesker, der står i spidsen for vigtige transnationale netværk af muslimer, og Issues of the Day fremhæver personer, hvis betydning skyldes aktuelle problemer, der påvirker menneskeheden.
TRAVELS AMONG EUROPE’S MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS
JOOST LAGENDIJK
“A ring of friends surrounding the Union […], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, imidlertid. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Siden 11 september 2001, i særdeleshed, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.
Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase
Yusuf Al-Qardhawi
What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?
Ved “Islamisk bevægelse”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. Ved at gøre sådan, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heart – the latter being theweakest of beliefs – so that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.
Building bridges not walls
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Imidlertid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.