RSS中的所有條目 "黎巴嫩" 類別

阿拉伯的明天

大衛乙. 渥太威

十月 6, 1981, 本來是埃及慶祝的一天. 它標誌著埃及在三場阿以沖突中取得勝利的最偉大時刻的周年紀念, 當該國處於劣勢的軍隊在蘇伊士運河上突進時 1973 贖罪日戰爭並派遣以色列軍隊撤退. 在一個很酷的, 萬里無雲的早晨, 開羅體育場擠滿了前來觀看軍隊展示其硬件的埃及家庭。在檢閱台上, 安瓦爾·薩達特總統,戰爭的建築師, 滿意地看著人和機器在他面前遊行. 我在附近, 一位新來的外國記者。突然, 一輛軍用卡車直接停在檢閱台前,六架幻影噴氣式飛機在頭頂進行雜技表演, 用長長的紅色畫出天空, 黃色, 紫色的,和綠煙. 薩達特站了起來, 顯然準備與另一支埃及軍隊交換敬意. 他使自己成為四名從卡車上跳下來的伊斯蘭刺客的完美目標, 衝上講台, 並用子彈打滿了他的身體。當兇手繼續用他們致命的火焰噴射看台似乎是永恆的, 我考慮了一下,是摔倒在地,冒著被驚慌失措的觀眾踩死的風險,還是留在原地,冒著被流彈擊中的風險. 本能告訴我要站穩腳跟, 我的新聞責任感驅使我去查明薩達特是死是活.

挑戰威權主義, 殖民主義, 和不團結: 阿富汗和里達的伊斯蘭政治改革運動

艾哈邁德·阿里·薩利姆

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. 特別是, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
But, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
所以, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, 但
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (伊斯蘭法). 然而, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. 另一方面, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. 確實,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, 該

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. 然而, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, 哪一個

emphasized education and undermined politics.




埃及穆斯林兄弟會的組織連續性

苔絲李艾森哈特

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

穆斯林兄弟, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (哥) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, 兄弟會
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
政權: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. 反而, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

世俗主義, 詮釋學, 和帝國: 伊斯蘭改革的政治

薩巴馬哈茂德

自九月事件以來 11, 2001, 反對這

全球宗教政治崛起二十年的背景, 緊迫的
要求恢復世俗主義的呼聲達到了無法
被忽視. 這些尖銳呼聲最明顯的目標是伊斯蘭教, 尤其
伊斯蘭教中那些被懷疑助長原教旨主義的做法和言論
和好戰. 它已成為左派和自由主義者的必備品
將穆斯林世界民主的命運與製度化聯繫起來

世俗主義——既作為一種政治學說,又作為一種政治倫理. 這種耦合
現在在美國的話語中得到了廣泛的回應. 狀態
部門, 特別是在其重塑和轉型的計劃性努力中
“來自內部的伊斯蘭教。”在這篇論文中, 我將研究這兩個特定的概念
世俗主義是當前共識的基礎,即伊斯蘭教需要
改革——它的世俗化是實現“民主”的必要步驟
穆斯林世界——以及實現這一綱領性願景的戰略手段
今天成立. 因為世俗主義是一個歷史上不斷變化的類別
有著五花八門的家譜, 我的目的不是要獲得一個權威的定義
世俗主義或追溯其在美國或美國內部的歷史轉變
穆斯林世界. 我在這裡的目標更有限: 我想勾勒出具體的
對當代美國話語背後的世俗主義的理解
伊斯蘭教, 一種深受美國影響的理解. 安全與外交政策
穆斯林世界的擔憂.

真主黨的政治宣言 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

伊斯蘭政治文化, 民主, 和人權

丹尼爾E·. 價錢

有人認為伊斯蘭教助長了威權主義, 矛盾的

西方社會的價值觀, 並顯著影響重要的政治結果

在穆斯林國家. 所以, 學者, 評論員, 和政府

官員們經常指出“伊斯蘭原教旨主義”是下一個

對自由民主國家的意識形態威脅. 這種觀點, 然而, 主要是基於

關於文本分析, 伊斯蘭政治理論, 和特別研究

個別國家, 不考慮其他因素. 這是我的爭論

伊斯蘭教的文本和傳統, 像其他宗教一樣,

可用於支持各種政治制度和政策. 國家

具體的和描述性的研究並不能幫助我們找到有幫助的模式

我們解釋伊斯蘭教與政治之間的不同關係

穆斯林世界的國家. 因此, 一種新的研究方法

伊斯蘭教與政治之間的聯繫被要求.
我建議, 通過嚴格評估伊斯蘭教之間的關係,

民主, 和跨國一級的人權, 太多了

強調伊斯蘭教作為一種政治力量的力量. 我先來

使用比較案例研究, 關注與相互作用相關的因素

伊斯蘭團體和政權之間, 經濟影響, 種族分裂,

和社會發展, 解釋影響的差異

八個國家的伊斯蘭教政治.

伊斯蘭政治文化, 民主, 和人權

丹尼爾E·. 價錢

有人認為伊斯蘭教助長了威權主義, 矛盾的

西方社會的價值觀, 並顯著影響重要的政治結果
在穆斯林國家. 所以, 學者, 評論員, 和政府
官員們經常指出“伊斯蘭原教旨主義”是下一個
對自由民主國家的意識形態威脅. 這種觀點, 然而, 主要是基於
關於文本分析, 伊斯蘭政治理論, 和特別研究
個別國家, 不考慮其他因素. 這是我的爭論
伊斯蘭教的文本和傳統, 像其他宗教一樣,
可用於支持各種政治制度和政策. 國家
具體的和描述性的研究並不能幫助我們找到有幫助的模式
我們解釋伊斯蘭教與政治之間的不同關係
穆斯林世界的國家. 因此, 一種新的研究方法
伊斯蘭教與政治之間的聯繫被要求.
我建議, 通過嚴格評估伊斯蘭教之間的關係,
民主, 和跨國一級的人權, 太多了
強調伊斯蘭教作為一種政治力量的力量. 我先來
使用比較案例研究, 關注與相互作用相關的因素
伊斯蘭團體和政權之間, 經濟影響, 種族分裂,

和社會發展, 解釋影響的差異

八個國家的伊斯蘭教政治.

伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力

托比·阿徹

海蒂Huuhtanen

鑑於伊斯蘭運動在穆斯林世界和

自世紀之交以來,激進化對全球事件的影響方式, 它

對於歐盟來說,在可以鬆散的範圍內評估其對參與者的政策很重要

被稱為“伊斯蘭世界”. 詢問是否以及如何參與尤為重要

與各種伊斯蘭團體.

即使在歐盟內部,這仍然存在爭議. 有些人認為伊斯蘭價值觀

落後於伊斯蘭政黨與西方的民主理想和

人權, 而其他人則將參與視為現實的必要性,因為日益增長的

伊斯蘭政黨在國內的重要性及其日益參與國際事務

事務. 另一種觀點是,穆斯林世界的民主化將會增加

歐洲安全. 這些和其他關於是否以及如何

歐盟是否應該參與只能通過研究不同的伊斯蘭運動和

他們的政治環境, 逐個國家.

民主化是歐盟共同外交政策行動的中心主題, 鋪設

在文章中 11 歐盟條約. 在此考慮的許多州

舉報不民主, 或不完全民主. 在這些國家中的大多數, 伊斯蘭主義者

政黨和運動構成了對現行政權的重大反對, 和

在一些地區,他們形成了最大的反對派集團. 歐洲民主國家長期以來不得不

處理專制的統治政權, 但這是一個新現象

在最有可能受益者可能擁有的國家進行民主改革, 來自

歐盟的觀點, 不同的,有時是有問題的民主方法及其

相關值, 例如少數民族和婦女權利和法治. 這些費用是

經常反對伊斯蘭運動, 因此,對於歐洲政策制定者來說,重要的是

準確了解潛在合作夥伴的政策和理念.

來自不同國家的經驗往往表明,更自由的伊斯蘭主義者

允許聚會, 他們的行動和想法越溫和. 在許多

伊斯蘭政黨和團體早已偏離了最初的目標

建立一個受伊斯蘭法律管轄的伊斯蘭國家, 並開始接受基本的

選舉權力的民主原則, 其他政治的存在

競爭對手, 和政治多元化.

中東的政治伊斯蘭教

是克努森

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, 報告表明,伊斯蘭教不必與民主和

有一種趨勢是忽視許多中東國家已經

參與了對伊斯蘭運動的殘酷鎮壓, 導致他們, 有人爭辯, 佔用

反對國家的武器, 更罕見的是, 外國. 使用政治暴力是

廣泛分佈於中東, 但既不不合邏輯也不非理性. 在很多情況下甚至

以使用暴力而聞名的伊斯蘭團體已轉變為和平的政治組織

政黨成功參加市政和全國選舉. 儘管如此, 伊斯蘭主義者

儘管有許多理論試圖

說明它的增長和受歡迎的吸引力. 一般來說, 大多數理論認為伊斯蘭主義是

對相對剝奪的反應, 尤其是社會不平等和政治壓迫. 選擇

理論在宗教本身和宗教的範圍內尋求伊斯蘭復興的答案

強大的, 宗教象徵的喚起潛力.

結論主張超越“悲觀與厄運”的方法,即

將伊斯蘭主義描繪成一種非法的政治表達和對西方的潛在威脅 (“老的

伊斯蘭主義”), 以及對當前伊斯蘭主義民主化的更細緻入微的理解

現在正在整個中東發生的運動 (“新伊斯蘭主義”). 這個

理解“新伊斯蘭主義”的意識形態根源的重要性被凸顯出來

以及需要全面了解伊斯蘭運動及其相關的第一手資料

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

伊斯蘭政黨 : 為什麼他們不能民主

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

那, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

參與政治伊斯蘭的策略

沙迪哈米德

AMANDA卡德萊茨

政治伊斯蘭教是當今中東地區最活躍的政治力量. 它的未來與該地區的未來密切相關. 如果美國和歐盟致力於支持該地區的政治改革, 他們需要設計具體的, 參與伊斯蘭團體的連貫戰略. 然而, 美國. 普遍不願意與這些運動展開對話. 相似地, 歐盟與伊斯蘭主義者的接觸是個例外, 不是規則. 存在低級聯繫人的地方, 它們主要用於信息收集目的, 不是戰略目標. 美國. 和歐盟有許多解決該地區經濟和政治發展的計劃——其中包括中東夥伴關係倡議 (美皮), 千年挑戰公司 (中冶), 地中海聯盟, 和歐洲睦鄰政策 (ENP) - 然而,他們對伊斯蘭政治反對派的挑戰如何適應更廣泛的區域目標幾乎沒有什麼可說的. 我們. 和歐盟的民主援助和規劃幾乎完全針對威權政府本身或世俗的民間社會團體,在他們自己的社會中得到的支持很少.
重新評估現行政策的時機已經成熟. 自九月恐怖襲擊以來 11, 2001, 支持中東民主對西方政策制定者來說具有更大的重要性, 誰看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之間的聯繫. 人們更加關注理解政治伊斯蘭內部的變化. 美國新政府更願意擴大與穆斯林世界的交流. 同時, 絕大多數主流伊斯蘭組織——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟會, 約旦的伊斯蘭行動陣線 (印度空軍), 摩洛哥正義與發展黨 (PJD), 科威特伊斯蘭立憲運動, 和也門伊斯蘭黨——越來越多地將支持政治改革和民主作為其政治綱領的核心組成部分. 此外, 許多人表示有興趣與美國展開對話. 和歐盟政府.
西方國家與中東關係的未來可能在很大程度上取決於前者與非暴力伊斯蘭政黨就共同利益和目標進行廣泛對話的程度. 最近有大量關於與伊斯蘭主義者接觸的研究, 但很少有人清楚地說明它在實踐中可能需要什麼. 佐伊·諾特, 德國外交關係委員會訪問學者, 把它, “歐盟正在考慮參與,但並不真正知道如何參與。”1 希望澄清討論, 我們區分了三個級別的“參與度”,”每個都有不同的手段和目的: 低級接觸, 戰略對話, 和夥伴關係.

伊斯蘭運動和阿拉伯世界的民主進程: 探索灰色地帶

彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色, 阿穆爾·哈薩,

瑪麗娜奧特維

在過去的十年中, 伊斯蘭運動已成為中東地區的主要政治參與者. 與政府一起, 伊斯蘭運動, 溫和的和激進的, 將決定該地區的政治在可預見的未來如何展開. 他們不僅展示了製作具有廣泛大眾吸引力的信息的能力,而且, 最重要的是, 創建具有真正社會基礎的組織並製定連貫的政治戰略. 其他方,
總的來說, 所有帳戶都失敗了.
西方公眾和, 尤其是, 美國, 在發生戲劇性事件後才意識到伊斯蘭運動的重要性, 例如伊朗革命和埃及總統安瓦爾·薩達特被暗殺. 自 9 月的恐怖襲擊以來,注意力更加持久 11, 2001. 結果是, 伊斯蘭運動被廣泛認為是危險和敵對的. 雖然這種描述對於伊斯蘭極端組織的組織來說是準確的, 這很危險,因為他們願意在追求目標時不分青紅皂白地使用暴力, 這不是對許多放棄或避免暴力的群體的準確描述. 因為恐怖組織構成了直接
威脅, 然而, 所有國家的政策制定者都對暴力組織給予了不成比例的關注.
它是主流的伊斯蘭組織, 不是激進的, 這將對中東未來的政治演變產生最大的影響. 激進分子重建統一整個阿拉伯世界的哈里發的宏偉目標, 甚至將受伊斯蘭教原教旨主義解釋啟發的法律和社會習俗強加於個別阿拉伯國家,這與今天的現實相去甚遠,無法實現. 這並不意味著恐怖組織沒有危險——即使在追求不可能的目標時,它們也可能造成巨大的生命損失——但它們不太可能改變中東的面貌. 主流伊斯蘭組織通常是另一回事. 他們已經對許多國家的社會習俗產生了強大的影響, 制止和扭轉世俗主義趨勢,改變許多阿拉伯人的著裝和行為方式. 以及他們直接的政治目標, 通過參與本國的正常政治而成為強大的力量, 不是不可能的. 它已經在摩洛哥等國家實現, 約旦, 甚至埃及, 仍然禁止所有伊斯蘭政治組織,但現在議會中有八十八名穆斯林兄弟. 政治, 不是暴力, 是什麼賦予了主流伊斯蘭主義者影響力.

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲外交政策

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲鄰國政策

邁克爾·愛默生

理查德·楊斯

自從 2001 以及隨之而來的西方與政治伊斯蘭之間關係性質的國際事件已成為外交政策的決定性問題. 近年來,對政治伊斯蘭問題進行了大量的研究和分析。. 這有助於糾正西方以前對伊斯蘭價值觀和意圖的性質的一些簡單化和危言聳聽的假設. 與此平行, 歐盟 (歐盟) 制定了許多政策舉措,主要是歐洲鄰里政策(ENP) 原則上致力於對話和更深入的參與(非暴力) 阿拉伯國家內的政治行為者和民間社會組織. 然而,許多分析家和政策制定者現在抱怨在概念辯論和政策制定中的某個獎杯. 已經確定,政治伊斯蘭教是一個不斷變化的景觀, 深受各種情況的影響, 但辯論似乎常常停留在“伊斯蘭主義者是否民主”這樣簡單的問題上?’ 許多獨立分析家仍然主張與伊斯蘭主義者接觸, 但西方政府與伊斯蘭組織之間的實際和解仍然有限 .

伊斯蘭戰爭規則

優素福^ h. 阿布勒 - Enein
謝裡法·祖爾

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

從造反運動到政黨

阿拉斯泰爾·克魯克

西方許多人認為,從武裝抵抗運動到政黨的轉變應該是線性的, 應該先放棄暴力, 應該由民間社會推動並由溫和的政治家斡旋 伊斯蘭抵抗運動的情況幾乎沒有現實意義 (哈馬斯). 這並不是說哈馬斯沒有經歷過政治轉型: 它有. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. 此外, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

阿拉伯改革公報

group of researchers


埃及: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, 然而, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
第一, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. 在

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
摩洛哥, 約旦, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, 該
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
第二, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.