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Arabska Jutri

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Challenging Authoritarianism, kolonializem, and Disunity: The Islamic Political Reform Movements of al-Afghani and Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

The decline of the Muslim world preceded European colonization of most

Muslim lands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century. Še posebej, the Ottoman Empire’s
power and world status had been deteriorating since the seventeenth century.
Ampak, more important for Muslim scholars, it had ceased to meet

some basic requirements of its position as the caliphate, the supreme and
sovereign political entity to which all Muslims should be loyal.
Zato, some of the empire’s Muslim scholars and intellectuals called
for political reform even before the European encroachment upon
Muslim lands. The reforms that they envisaged were not only Islamic, ampak
also Ottomanic – from within the Ottoman framework.

These reformers perceived the decline of the Muslim world in general,

and of the Ottoman Empire in particular, to be the result of an increasing

disregard for implementing the Shari`ah (Islamsko pravo). Vendar pa, since the

late eighteenth century, an increasing number of reformers, sometimes supported

by the Ottoman sultans, began to call for reforming the empire along

modern European lines. The empire’s failure to defend its lands and to

respond successfully to the West’s challenges only further fueled this call

for “modernizing” reform, which reached its peak in the Tanzimat movement

in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Other Muslim reformers called for a middle course. On the one hand,

they admitted that the caliphate should be modeled according to the Islamic

sources of guidance, especially the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad’s

teachings (Sunnah), and that the ummah’s (the world Muslim community)

unity is one of Islam’s political pillars. Po drugi strani, they realized the

need to rejuvenate the empire or replace it with a more viable one. Prav zares,

their creative ideas on future models included, but were not limited to, the

following: replacing the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire with an Arab-led

caliphate, building a federal or confederate Muslim caliphate, establishing

a commonwealth of Muslim or oriental nations, and strengthening solidarity

and cooperation among independent Muslim countries without creating

a fixed structure. These and similar ideas were later referred to as the

Muslim league model, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. Vendar pa, they disagreed on certain aspects

and methods, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Od svoje ustanovitve l 1928, the Brotherhood (brat) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, vendar, bratovščina ima
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
režim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Namesto tega, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

posvetnost, hermenevtika, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation

Saba Mahmood

Since the events of September 11, 2001, against the

backdrop of two decades of the ascendance of global religious politics, urgent
calls for the reinstatement of secularism have reached a crescendo that cannot
be ignored. The most obvious target of these strident calls is Islam, posebej
those practices and discourses within Islam that are suspected of fostering fundamentalism
and militancy. It has become de rigueur for leftists and liberals alike
to link the fate of democracy in the Muslim world with the institutionalization

of secularism — both as a political doctrine and as a political ethic. This coupling
is now broadly echoed within the discourse emanating from the U.S. State
Department, particularly in its programmatic efforts to reshape and transform
“Islam from within.” In this essay, I will examine both the particular conception
of secularism that underlies the current consensus that Islam needs to be
reformed — that its secularization is a necessary step in bringing “democracy” to
the Muslim world — and the strategic means by which this programmatic vision is
being instituted today. Insomuch as secularism is a historically shifting category
with a variegated genealogy, my aim is not to secure an authoritative definition of
secularism or to trace its historical transformation within the United States or the
muslimanski svet. My goal here is more limited: I want to sketch out the particular
understanding of secularism underlying contemporary American discourses on
Islam, an understanding that is deeply shaped by U.S. security and foreign policy
concerns in the Muslim world.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, tehnologija, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, kulture, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate

pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada

uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"

ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na

o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije

posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je

da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,

se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država

specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali

razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi

države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju

zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,

demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč

poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi

uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje

med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

Islamistične opozicijske stranke in potencial za sodelovanje v EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Glede na vse večji pomen islamističnih gibanj v muslimanskem svetu in

način, kako je radikalizacija vplivala na svetovne dogodke od preloma stoletja, to

Pomembno je, da EU oceni svoje politike do akterjev znotraj tistega, kar je lahko ohlapno

imenovan "islamski svet". Še posebej pomembno je vprašati, ali in kako se vključiti

z različnimi islamističnimi skupinami.

To ostaja sporno tudi v EU. Nekateri menijo, da islamske vrednote to

ležijo za islamističnimi strankami preprosto niso združljive z zahodnimi ideali demokracije in

človekove pravice, medtem ko drugi zaradi naraščajočega vidika angažiranost vidijo kot realno potrebo

domačega pomena islamističnih strank in njihovega vse večjega vključevanja v mednarodne

zadeve. Druga perspektiva je, da bi se demokratizacija v muslimanskem svetu povečala

Evropska varnost. Veljavnost teh in drugih argumentov glede tega, ali in kako

EU bi se morala vključiti v preizkus le s preučevanjem različnih islamističnih gibanj in

njihove politične okoliščine, po državi.

Demokratizacija je osrednja tema skupnih zunanjepolitičnih ukrepov EU, kot je bilo položeno

v členu 11 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji. Pri tem so upoštevale številne države

Poročilo ni demokratično, ali ne povsem demokratičen. V večini teh držav, Islamistični

stranke in gibanja predstavljajo veliko nasprotovanje prevladujočim režimom, in

v nekaterih tvorijo največji opozicijski blok. Evropske demokracije so že dolgo morale

ukvarjajo se z vladnimi režimi, ki so avtoritarni, vendar je nov pritisk nov

za demokratično reformo v državah, v katerih imajo najverjetnejši upravičenci, Iz

Stališče EU, različni in včasih problematični pristopi k demokraciji in njeni

povezane vrednosti, kot so manjšinske in ženske pravice ter pravna država. Te obtožbe so

pogosto nasprotovan islamističnim gibanjem, zato je pomembno, da evropski oblikovalci politike to storijo

imeti natančno sliko o politikah in filozofijah potencialnih partnerjev.

Izkušnje iz različnih držav kažejo, da je islamistično več svobode

zabave so dovoljene, bolj zmerni so v svojih dejanjih in idejah. V veliko

primeri, ko se islamistične stranke in skupine že zdavnaj odmikajo od svojega prvotnega cilja

o ustanovitvi Islamske države, ki jo ureja islamsko pravo, in sprejeli osnovne

demokratična načela volilne konkurence za oblast, obstoj drugih političnih

tekmovalci, in politični pluralizem.

Politični islam na Bližnjem vzhodu

so Knudsen

To poročilo predstavlja uvod v izbrane vidike pojava

imenovani "politični islam". Poročilo daje poseben poudarek na Bližnjem vzhodu, v

zlasti levantinske države, in opisuje dva vidika islamističnega gibanja, ki lahko

velja za polarna nasprotja: demokracija in politično nasilje. V tretjem delu poročila

pregleda nekatere glavne teorije, ki se uporabljajo za razlago islamskega vstajenja na Bližnjem vzhodu

(Slika 1). V pismu, poročilo kaže, da islam ni treba združiti z demokracijo in

da je pogosto zanemarjati dejstvo, da so bile številne države Bližnjega vzhoda

vključeni v brutalno zatiranje islamističnih gibanj, jih povzroča, nekateri trdijo, da se lotijo

orožje proti državi, in redkeje, tuje države. Uporaba političnega nasilja je

razširjena na Bližnjem vzhodu, vendar ni niti nelogičen niti neracionalen. V mnogih primerih celo

Islamistične skupine, znane po uporabi nasilja, so se spremenile v mirne politične

stranke, ki uspešno kandidirajo na občinskih in državnih volitvah. Kljub temu, islamisti

oživitev na Bližnjem vzhodu ostaja deloma nepojasnjena kljub številnim teorijam, ki si jih prizadevajo

za njegovo rast in priljubljenost. Na splošno, večina teorij meni, da je islamizem a

reakcija na relativno pomanjkanje, zlasti socialna neenakost in politično zatiranje. Alternativa

teorije iščejo odgovor na islamistični preporod znotraj meja same religije in

močan, evokativni potencial verske simbolike.

Zaključek trdi v prid prehodu iz pristopa "mračnost in usoda"

predstavlja islamizem kot nelegitimen politični izraz in potencialno grožnjo Zahodu ("Star

Islamizem ”), in bolj zatemnjenega razumevanja sedanje demokratizacije islamistov

gibanje, ki se zdaj odvija po vsem Bližnjem vzhodu ("Novi islamizem"). Tole

pomembnost razumevanja ideoloških korenin "novega islamizma" je v ospredju

skupaj s potrebo po temeljitem poznavanju islamističnih gibanj in njihovih izkušenj iz prve roke

pristaši. Kot družbena gibanja, Trdimo, da je treba dati večji poudarek

razumevanje načinov, kako so lahko uresničevali težnje ne le

revnejših slojev družbe, pa tudi srednjega razreda.

Islamistične stranke : zakaj ne morejo biti demokratični

Mi Bassam

Opaža vse večjo privlačnost in moč islamizma, veliko

Zahodni učenjaki in uradniki dojemajo kako pot

vključujoč pristop k temu. V skladu s to željo, ima

postanite modno prezirljivo zavrniti idejo o vztrajanju

jasne in stroge razlike med „akademskimi“. Ko gre za islam

in demokracija, ta nesrečna moda je bila prežeta z nesrečniki

posledice.

Inteligentna razprava o islamizmu, demokracija, in islam zahteva

jasne in natančne definicije. Brez njih, analiza bo propadla v

zmede in oblikovanje politike bodo trpeli. Moje lastno stališče, nastala po

trideset let preučevanja in razmišljanja o zadevi, je, da je islam in

demokracija je res združljiva, pod pogojem, da nekatere potrebne verske

se izvajajo reforme. Nagnjenost k izvajanju takih reform je tisto, kar je

Menim, da primanjkuje političnega islama. Kot Arabec sem se znebil zanimanja-

Muslimanski teoretik in praktik prodemokracije - naj bi spodbujal ustanovo

sekularne demokracije znotraj meja islamske civilizacije.

Da bi lažje odpravili zmedo, ki jo vse preveč pogosto obdaja

Ta naslov, Izpostavil bom nekaj osnovnih točk, ki jih moram upoštevati. Prva je

da, doslej, Zahodne prakse glede političnega islama so bile napačne

ker jim primanjkuje utemeljene ocene.

Če se ne vmeša slepa sreča, nobena politika ne more biti boljša od ocene

na katerem temelji. Pravilna ocena je začetek leta 2007

vsa praktična modrost.

STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politični islam je danes najbolj aktivna politična sila na Bližnjem vzhodu. Njegova prihodnost je tesno povezana z prihodnostjo regije. Če bi se ZDA in Evropska unija zavezali podpirati politične reforme v regiji, morali bodo izmisliti beton, skladne strategije za vključevanje islamističnih skupin. Pa vendar, ZDA. na splošno ni želel odpreti dialoga s temi gibanji. podobno, Izjema je bila sodelovanje EU z islamisti, ne pravilo. Tam, kjer obstajajo stiki na nizki ravni, služijo predvsem za zbiranje informacij, ne strateških ciljev. ZDA. EU ima številne programe, ki se ukvarjajo z gospodarskim in političnim razvojem v regiji - med njimi pobuda za partnerstvo na Bližnjem vzhodu (MEPI), korporacijo Millennium Challenge (MCC), Unija za Sredozemlje, in evropsko sosedsko politiko (ENP) - vendar pa le malo govorijo o tem, kako se izziv islamistične politične opozicije ujema s širšimi regionalnimi cilji. zunaj ZDA. Pomoč in programiranje demokracije v EU so skoraj v celoti usmerjeni bodisi k avtoritarnim vladam bodisi bodisi sekularnim skupinam civilne družbe z minimalno podporo v njihovih družbah..
Prišel je čas za ponovno oceno trenutnih politik. Od septembra septembra 11, 2001, podpiranje demokracije na Bližnjem vzhodu je dobilo večji pomen za zahodne oblikovalce politike, ki vidijo povezavo med pomanjkanjem demokracije in političnim nasiljem. Večja pozornost je bila namenjena razumevanju različic političnega islama. Nova ameriška administracija je bolj odprta za širjenje komunikacije z muslimanskim svetom. Medtem, velika večina osrednjih islamističnih organizacij - tudi Muslimanska bratovščina v Egiptu, Jordanska fronta islamske akcije (IAF), Maroška stranka pravičnosti in razvoja (PJD), islamsko ustavno gibanje Kuvajta, in jemenska stranka Islama - so podpora politični reformi in demokraciji vedno bolj osrednja sestavina njihovih političnih platform. Poleg tega, mnogi so izrazili veliko zanimanje za odpiranje dialoga s ZDA. in vlade EU.
Prihodnost odnosov med zahodnimi državami in Bližnjim vzhodom je lahko v veliki meri odvisna od stopnje, v kateri prvi vključujejo nenasilne islamistične stranke v širok dialog o skupnih interesih in ciljih. V zadnjem času se je razširilo število raziskav o povezanosti z islamisti, toda le malo jih jasno obravnava, kaj bi lahko pomenilo v praksi. Kot Zoé Nautré, gostujoči kolega na nemškem svetu za zunanje odnose, postavlja, „EU razmišlja o angažmaju, vendar ne ve, kako.“ 1 V upanju, da razpravlja razpravo, ločimo med tremi stopnjami „angažiranosti,"Vsak z različnimi sredstvi in ​​konci: stiki na nizki ravni, strateški dialog, in partnerstvo.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. rjav, amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, vendar, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Od 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssef H. Abul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, zgodovino,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: ima. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. Poleg tega, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


Egipt: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, vendar, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
Prvič, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. leta

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Maroko, Jordan, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, the
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Drugič, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.