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Mâine arabă
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
octombrie 6, 1981, trebuia să fie o zi de sărbătoare în Egipt. A marcat aniversarea celui mai mare moment de victorie al Egiptului în trei conflicte arabo-israeliene, când armata subordonată a țării a străbătut Canalul Suez în zilele de deschidere 1973 Războiul din Yom Kippur și a trimis trupe israeliene care se retrăgeau în retragere. Pe un răcoros, dimineață fără nori, stadionul din Cairo era plin de familii egiptene care veniseră să vadă militarii strângându-și echipamentul, Președintele Anwar el-Sadat,arhitectul războiului, privea cu satisfacție cum bărbații și mașinile defilau în fața lui. Eram în apropiere, un corespondent străin nou sosit.Deodată, unul dintre camioanele armatei s-a oprit direct în fața standului de examinare, exact când șase avioane Mirage răcneau deasupra capului într-o performanță acrobatică, pictând cerul cu trasee lungi de roșu, galben, Violet,și fum verde. Sadat se ridică, se pare că se pregătea să facă schimb de saluturi cu un alt contingent de trupe egiptene. El s-a făcut o țintă perfectă pentru patru asasini islamiști care au sărit din camion, a asaltat podiumul, În timp ce ucigașii au continuat, ceea ce părea o eternitate, să stropească standul cu focul lor mortal, M-am gândit pentru o clipă dacă să lovesc pământul și să risc să fiu călcat în picioare de spectatori panicați sau să rămân în picioare și să risc să iau un glonț rătăcit. Instinctul mi-a spus să rămân în picioare, iar sentimentul meu de datorie jurnalistică m-a determinat să merg să aflu dacă Sadat era în viață sau mort.
Contestarea autoritarismului, Colonialism, și Dezunirea: Mișcările islamice de reformă politică de la al-Afghani și Rida
Ahmed Ali Salem
Acești reformatori au perceput declinul lumii musulmane în general,
şi a Imperiului Otoman în special, sa fie rezultatul unei cresteri
nesocotirea pentru implementarea Shari`ah (Legea islamica). in orice caz, din moment ce
sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea, un număr tot mai mare de reformatori, uneori sprijinit
de sultanii otomani, a început să ceară reforma imperiului
linii europene moderne. Eșecul imperiului de a-și apăra pământurile și de a
Răspunsul cu succes la provocările Occidentului a alimentat și mai mult acest apel
pentru „modernizarea” reformei, care a atins apogeul în mişcarea Tanzimat
în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea.
Alți reformatori musulmani au cerut un curs de mijloc. Pe de o parte,
au admis că califatul ar trebui modelat după islamic
surse de îndrumare, în special Coranul și cel al Profetului Muhammad
invataturile (Sunnah), și că Ummah-ul (comunitatea musulmană mondială)
unitatea este unul dintre pilonii politici ai islamului. Pe de altă parte, si-au dat seama ca
trebuie să întineriți imperiul sau să-l înlocuiți cu unul mai viabil. Într-adevăr,
ideile lor creative asupra modelelor viitoare incluse, dar nu s-au limitat la, cel
ca urmare a: înlocuind Imperiul Otoman condus de turci cu unul condus de arabi
califat, construirea unui califat musulman federal sau confederat, stabilirea
o comunitate de națiuni musulmane sau orientale, şi întărirea solidarităţii
și cooperarea între țările musulmane independente fără a crea
o structură fixă. Aceste idei și idei similare au fost mai târziu denumite
Model de liga musulmană, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals
related to the future caliphate.
Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and
Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern
Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge
facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization
and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to
revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting
from Europe’s achievements. in orice caz, they disagreed on certain aspects
si metode, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.
While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,
`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which
emphasized education and undermined politics.
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Lee Eisenhart
secularismul, hermeneutica, și Imperiul: Politica Reformei Islamice
Saba Mahmood
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Cultura politică islamică, Democraţie, și drepturile omului
Daniel E. Preț
Cultura politică islamică, Democraţie, și drepturile omului
Daniel E. Preț
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Political Islam in the Middle East
sunt Knudsen
Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
STRATEGII PENTRU ANGAJAREA ISLAMULUI POLITIC
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA KADLEC
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. Maro, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
De cand 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
From Rebel Movement to Political Party
Alastair Crooke
The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. în plus, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.
Arab Reform Bulletin
group of researchers
Egipt: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?
Amr hamzawy