RSSToate intrările în "Liban" Categorie

Mâine arabă

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

octombrie 6, 1981, trebuia să fie o zi de sărbătoare în Egipt. A marcat aniversarea celui mai mare moment de victorie al Egiptului în trei conflicte arabo-israeliene, când armata subordonată a țării a străbătut Canalul Suez în zilele de deschidere 1973 Războiul din Yom Kippur și a trimis trupe israeliene care se retrăgeau în retragere. Pe un răcoros, dimineață fără nori, stadionul din Cairo era plin de familii egiptene care veniseră să vadă militarii strângându-și echipamentul, Președintele Anwar el-Sadat,arhitectul războiului, privea cu satisfacție cum bărbații și mașinile defilau în fața lui. Eram în apropiere, un corespondent străin nou sosit.Deodată, unul dintre camioanele armatei s-a oprit direct în fața standului de examinare, exact când șase avioane Mirage răcneau deasupra capului într-o performanță acrobatică, pictând cerul cu trasee lungi de roșu, galben, Violet,și fum verde. Sadat se ridică, se pare că se pregătea să facă schimb de saluturi cu un alt contingent de trupe egiptene. El s-a făcut o țintă perfectă pentru patru asasini islamiști care au sărit din camion, a asaltat podiumul, În timp ce ucigașii au continuat, ceea ce părea o eternitate, să stropească standul cu focul lor mortal, M-am gândit pentru o clipă dacă să lovesc pământul și să risc să fiu călcat în picioare de spectatori panicați sau să rămân în picioare și să risc să iau un glonț rătăcit. Instinctul mi-a spus să rămân în picioare, iar sentimentul meu de datorie jurnalistică m-a determinat să merg să aflu dacă Sadat era în viață sau mort.

Contestarea autoritarismului, Colonialism, și Dezunirea: Mișcările islamice de reformă politică de la al-Afghani și Rida

Ahmed Ali Salem

Declinul lumii musulmane a precedat colonizarea europeană a majorității

Țări musulmane în ultimul sfert al secolului al XIX-lea și primul
sfert al secolului al XX-lea. În special, a Imperiului Otoman
puterea și statutul mondial se deterioraseră încă din secolul al XVII-lea.
Dar, mai important pentru savanţii musulmani, încetase să se întâlnească

unele cerințe de bază ale poziției sale ca califat, suprema si
entitate politică suverană căreia toți musulmanii ar trebui să-i fie loiali.
Prin urmare, au sunat unii dintre savanții și intelectualii musulmani ai imperiului
pentru reformă politică chiar înainte de invadarea europeană
ţinuturi musulmane. Reformele pe care le-au avut în vedere nu erau doar islamice, dar
tot otoman – din cadrul otoman.

Acești reformatori au perceput declinul lumii musulmane în general,

şi a Imperiului Otoman în special, sa fie rezultatul unei cresteri

nesocotirea pentru implementarea Shari`ah (Legea islamica). in orice caz, din moment ce

sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea, un număr tot mai mare de reformatori, uneori sprijinit

de sultanii otomani, a început să ceară reforma imperiului

linii europene moderne. Eșecul imperiului de a-și apăra pământurile și de a

Răspunsul cu succes la provocările Occidentului a alimentat și mai mult acest apel

pentru „modernizarea” reformei, care a atins apogeul în mişcarea Tanzimat

în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea.

Alți reformatori musulmani au cerut un curs de mijloc. Pe de o parte,

au admis că califatul ar trebui modelat după islamic

surse de îndrumare, în special Coranul și cel al Profetului Muhammad

invataturile (Sunnah), și că Ummah-ul (comunitatea musulmană mondială)

unitatea este unul dintre pilonii politici ai islamului. Pe de altă parte, si-au dat seama ca

trebuie să întineriți imperiul sau să-l înlocuiți cu unul mai viabil. Într-adevăr,

ideile lor creative asupra modelelor viitoare incluse, dar nu s-au limitat la, cel

ca urmare a: înlocuind Imperiul Otoman condus de turci cu unul condus de arabi

califat, construirea unui califat musulman federal sau confederat, stabilirea

o comunitate de națiuni musulmane sau orientale, şi întărirea solidarităţii

și cooperarea între țările musulmane independente fără a crea

o structură fixă. Aceste idei și idei similare au fost mai târziu denumite

Model de liga musulmană, which was an umbrella thesis for the various proposals

related to the future caliphate.

Two advocates of such reform were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and

Muhammad `Abduh, both of whom played key roles in the modern

Islamic political reform movement.1 Their response to the dual challenge

facing the Muslim world in the late nineteenth century – European colonization

and Muslim decline – was balanced. Their ultimate goal was to

revive the ummah by observing the Islamic revelation and benefiting

from Europe’s achievements. in orice caz, they disagreed on certain aspects

si metode, as well as the immediate goals and strategies, of reform.

While al-Afghani called and struggled mainly for political reform,

`Abduh, once one of his close disciples, developed his own ideas, which

emphasized education and undermined politics.




Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (frate) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, in orice caz, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

secularismul, hermeneutica, și Imperiul: Politica Reformei Islamice

Saba Mahmood

De la evenimentele din septembrie 11, 2001, impotriva

fundalul a două decenii de ascensiune a politicii religioase globale, urgent
apelurile la restabilirea secularismului au ajuns la un crescendo care nu poate
să fie ignorat. Cea mai evidentă țintă a acestor apeluri stridente este islamul, în special
acele practici și discursuri din interiorul Islamului care sunt suspectate că încurajează fundamentalismul
și militanță. A devenit de rigor pentru stânga și liberali deopotrivă
de a lega soarta democrației în lumea musulmană de instituționalizare

al laicismului - atât ca doctrină politică, cât și ca etică politică. Această cuplare
este acum pe larg ecou în cadrul discursului emanat din SUA. Stat
Departament, în special în eforturile sale programatice de remodelare și transformare
„Islamul din interior”. In acest eseu, Voi examina atât concepția particulară
al secularismului care stă la baza consensului actual pe care Islamul trebuie să îl aibă
reformat - că secularizarea acestuia este un pas necesar în aducerea „democrației” la
lumea musulmană - și mijloacele strategice prin care se află această viziune programatică
fiind instituit astăzi. La fel de mult precum secularismul este o categorie care se schimbă istoric
cu o genealogie pestriță, scopul meu nu este să asigur o definiție autoritară a
laicism sau pentru a urmări transformarea sa istorică în Statele Unite sau
Lumea musulmană. Scopul meu aici este mai limitat: Vreau să schițez detaliile
înțelegerea secularismului care stă la baza discursurilor americane contemporane asupra
islam, o înțelegere care este profund modelată de SUA. securitate și politică externă
îngrijorări în lumea musulmană.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Cultura politică islamică, Democraţie, și drepturile omului

Daniel E. Preț

S-a susținut că islamul facilitează autoritarismul, contrazice

valorile societăților occidentale, și afectează semnificativ rezultatele politice importante

în națiunile musulmane. prin urmare, cărturari, comentatori, și guvern

oficialii indică frecvent „„ fundamentalismul islamic ”ca fiind următorul

amenințare ideologică pentru democrațiile liberale. Această vedere, in orice caz, se bazează în primul rând

privind analiza textelor, Teoria politică islamică, și studii ad hoc

de țări individuale, care nu iau în considerare alți factori. Este argumentul meu

că textele și tradițiile islamului, ca cele ale altor religii,

poate fi folosit pentru a sprijini o varietate de sisteme și politici politice. Țară

studiile specifice și descriptive nu ne ajută să găsim modele care să ne ajute

ne explicăm diferitele relații dintre islam și politică din întreaga lume

țări ale lumii musulmane. Prin urmare, o nouă abordare a studiului

este necesară legătura dintre islam și politică.
sugerez, printr-o evaluare riguroasă a relației dintre islam,

democraţie, și drepturile omului la nivel transnațional, prea mult

se pune accent pe puterea Islamului ca forță politică. eu primul

utilizați studii de caz comparative, care se concentrează pe factorii legați de interacțiune

între grupuri și regimuri islamice, influențele economice, clivaje etnice,

și dezvoltarea societății, pentru a explica varianța în influența

Islamul asupra politicii din opt națiuni.

Cultura politică islamică, Democraţie, și drepturile omului

Daniel E. Preț

S-a susținut că islamul facilitează autoritarismul, contrazice

valorile societăților occidentale, și afectează semnificativ rezultatele politice importante
în națiunile musulmane. prin urmare, cărturari, comentatori, și guvern
oficialii indică frecvent „„ fundamentalismul islamic ”ca fiind următorul
amenințare ideologică pentru democrațiile liberale. Această vedere, in orice caz, se bazează în primul rând
privind analiza textelor, Teoria politică islamică, și studii ad hoc
de țări individuale, care nu iau în considerare alți factori. Este argumentul meu
că textele și tradițiile islamului, ca cele ale altor religii,
poate fi folosit pentru a sprijini o varietate de sisteme și politici politice. Țară
studiile specifice și descriptive nu ne ajută să găsim modele care să ne ajute
ne explicăm diferitele relații dintre islam și politică din întreaga lume
țări ale lumii musulmane. Prin urmare, o nouă abordare a studiului
este necesară legătura dintre islam și politică.
sugerez, printr-o evaluare riguroasă a relației dintre islam,
democraţie, și drepturile omului la nivel transnațional, prea mult
se pune accent pe puterea Islamului ca forță politică. eu primul
utilizați studii de caz comparative, care se concentrează pe factorii legați de interacțiune
între grupuri și regimuri islamice, influențele economice, clivaje etnice,

și dezvoltarea societății, pentru a explica varianța în influența

Islamul asupra politicii din opt națiuni.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

drepturile omului, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, și

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

sunt Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, în

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democraţie, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

STRATEGII PENTRU ANGAJAREA ISLAMULUI POLITIC

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Islamul politic este cea mai activă forță politică din Orientul Mijlociu astăzi. Viitorul său este intim legat de cel al regiunii. Dacă Statele Unite și Uniunea Europeană se angajează să sprijine reforma politică în regiune, vor trebui să elaboreze concret, strategii coerente pentru angajarea grupurilor islamiste. Inca, SUA. în general nu a fost dispus să deschidă un dialog cu aceste mișcări. asemănător, Angajamentul UE cu islamiștii a fost excepția, nu regula. Acolo unde există contacte de nivel scăzut, ele servesc în principal scopurilor de colectare a informațiilor, nu obiective strategice. SUA. și UE au o serie de programe care abordează dezvoltarea economică și politică din regiune - printre care inițiativa de parteneriat în Orientul Mijlociu (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Uniunea pentru Mediterana, și politica europeană de vecinătate (ENP) - totuși, ei au puțin de spus despre modul în care provocarea opoziției politice islamiste se încadrează în obiective regionale mai largi. NE. și asistența și programarea democrației UE sunt direcționate aproape în totalitate fie către guverne autoritare în sine, fie către grupuri seculare ale societății civile cu sprijin minim în propriile societăți.
Este timpul pentru o reevaluare a politicilor actuale. De la atacurile teroriste din septembrie 11, 2001, sprijinirea democrației din Orientul Mijlociu și-a asumat o importanță mai mare pentru factorii de decizie occidentali, care văd o legătură între lipsa democrației și violența politică. O atenție sporită a fost dedicată înțelegerii variațiilor din islamul politic. Noua administrație americană este mai deschisă extinderii comunicării cu lumea musulmană. Între timp, marea majoritate a principalelor organizații islamiste - inclusiv Frăția Musulmană din Egipt, Frontul de acțiune islamică al Iordaniei (IAF), Partidul Justiției și Dezvoltării din Maroc (PJD), mișcarea constituțională islamică din Kuweit, și Partidul Yemeni Islah - au făcut din ce în ce mai mult sprijinul pentru reforma politică și democrație o componentă centrală a platformelor lor politice. în plus, mulți au semnalat un interes puternic în deschiderea dialogului cu SUA. și guvernele UE.
Viitorul relațiilor dintre națiunile occidentale și Orientul Mijlociu poate fi determinat în mare măsură de gradul în care primii angajează partidele islamiste nonviolente într-un dialog larg despre interese și obiective comune.. S-a înregistrat o proliferare recentă a studiilor privind angajamentul cu islamiștii, însă puțini abordează în mod clar ce ar putea presupune în practică. Ca Zoe Nautré, coleg vizitat la Consiliul German pentru Relații Externe, o pune, „UE se gândește la angajament, dar nu știe cu adevărat cum.” 1 În speranța clarificării discuției, distingem trei niveluri de „logodnă”,”Fiecare cu mijloace și scopuri variate: contacte de nivel scăzut, dialog strategic, și parteneriat.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Maro, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, in orice caz, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Iordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politică, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

De cand 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

From Rebel Movement to Political Party

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. în plus, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


Egipt: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, in orice caz, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
Primul, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. In

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Maroc, Iordania, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, cel
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Second, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.